


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
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT FY
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FORCE READINESS REPORT

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
REPORT
FOR FY 1985



VOLUME III:
FORCE READINESS REPORT

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Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
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Department of the Navy

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Defense Agencies

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT, FY 1985 - VOLUME III:
FORCE READINESS REPORT

Program Review and Integration Directorate
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18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES This report is submitted to Congress in compliance with Section 138(c)(3) of Title 10, United States Code. It provides detailed justification for DoD manpower requested in the FY 1985 Presidents Budget. This report is also Volume III of the Force Readiness Report.			
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Manpower Requirements, Manpower readiness, Active/Reserve Force Mix, mobilization manpower, Manpower Costs, Alcohol and Drug Abuse			
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This report explains the Department of Defense Manpower Requirements for active military, Selected Reserve, and civilian strengths incorporated in the President's Budget for FY 1985. The report addresses the actions the department has taken to provide the Guard and Reserve with new missions and with greater integration with the active forces, quantifies each of the major dimensions of manpower readiness, and evaluates the department's ability to mobilize manpower in a crisis.			

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FY 1985 DEFENSE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Secretary of Defense hereby submits to the Congress the Defense Manpower Requirements Report (DMRR) for FY 1985 in compliance with Section 138(c)(3) of Title 10, United States Code.

This report should be read and used along with the Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1985 Budget. This report is Volume III of the FY 1985 Force Readiness Report.

I. Organization of the Report

This report explains the Department of Defense manpower program incorporated in the President's Budget for FY 1985. To assist the Congress, the report includes detailed information concerning manpower plans for FY 1985 and a summary of manpower plans included in the five year defense plan. In response to a specific request of the Conference Committee on Armed Services, improved integration of Reserve Components and increased Reserve Component missions are addressed in Section III of this chapter and in each Service chapter. For the first time, personnel readiness is discussed in detail in this report and the report is made a volume of the annual Force Readiness Report.

The report is organized into two major parts and three annexes that are submitted separately. The annexes are sent to Congress at the same time as this report.

Defense Manpower Program (Chapters I through VII). Chapter I provides an introduction to the report. Chapter II is a summary of the FY 1985 manpower program. Chapters III through VII contain details on manpower programs for each of the military Services and the Defense Agencies.

Special Analyses and Data (Chapters VIII through XI). This part contains special analyses or data on subjects related to the Defense manpower program. Chapter VIII describes personnel readiness for each Service. Chapter IX discusses substance abuse in the Armed Forces. Chapter X explains the cost of manpower. Chapter XI portrays data on forces and manpower by location. Appendix A contains an audit trail of the structure changes within the Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPCs) that have occurred since the FY 1984 DMRR. Appendix B provides a glossary of Defense manpower terminology. Appendix C describes in detail the Defense Planning and Programming Categories.

Base Structure Annex. The Base Structure Annex relates our FY 1985 base structure to the force structure for that period and provides estimates of base operating support costs.

Unit Annex. As requested by the Senate Armed Services Committee, a Unit Annex is provided that describes the planned allocation of manpower to specific types of units within the force.

Officer Flow Annex. Section 138 (c)(3)(D) Title 10, USC (Public Law 96-513, the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA)), requires the submission of specified detailed data on the Services' officer corps. These data are contained in the Officer Flow Annex.

II. The Total Force

There are three types of Defense manpower: active military, Reserve Components military, and civilian employees. Each of these categories of manpower contribute to the total US military capability; they constitute the "Total Force".

A. Active Military. The active military are those men and women who serve in combat units (units that engage enemy forces), combat support units (units that provide support in the combat theater), and other support units. These men and women are on call twenty-four hours a day and receive full-time military pay. There are about two million active duty military people.

B. Reserve Component Military. Reserve Component manpower is divided into three categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve.

The Ready Reserve is the major source of manpower augmentation for the active force. It has two principal elements: the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve. The Selected Reserve includes three groups: (1) units organized, equipped, and trained to perform wartime missions; (2) Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) who are highly-trained, skilled people designated to provide wartime augmentation to active units on or shortly after M-day; and (3) the training pipeline, which is composed of people who are members of the Selected Reserve but who have not completed sufficient training to be awarded a military skill designation. Training pipeline people may not deploy upon mobilization until minimum training is completed. Selected Reservists assigned to units and IMAs train throughout the year and participate annually in active duty training. As many as 100,000 Selected Reservists may be mobilized for up to 90 days to augment active forces by Presidential authority.

The Individual Ready Reserve generally consists of people who have served recently in the active forces or Selected Reserve and have some period of obligated service remaining on their contract. In addition, the IRR includes a group of inactive National Guard members who are not assigned to units. The majority of the members in the Individual Ready Reserve do not participate in organized training. All members of the IRR are subject to call to active duty during a national emergency declared by the President or the Congress.

The Standby Reserve generally consists of members who have completed their statutory military obligation and have chosen to remain in the Standby Reserve. The Retired Reserve consists of former members of the active and reserve forces who have retired. Members of the Standby and Retired Reserve do not generally participate in reserve training or readiness programs. They may be ordered to active duty by the Secretary of the military department concerned in the interest of national defense.

However, standby reservists may not be activated until it has been determined that there are not enough qualified members in the Ready Reserve.

The Reserve Component manpower requested by the Department of Defense is limited to that of the Selected Reserve, including full-time support personnel, since that number is authorized by Congress. The Selected Reserve numbers about one million people.

C. Civilian Employees. Defense Department civilians provide support services to the active and reserve military in all of those functions that do not require military incumbents. Many perform essential functions that must continue to be accomplished during mobilization. Our civilian workforce repairs airplanes, ships, and tanks, provides logistical support, or operates and maintains military installations. They provide research and development support, medical support, and communications support. These activities contribute directly to the readiness of the armed forces.

III. Manpower Mix.

Several Congressional Committees have expressed interest in the mix of active and Reserve Component forces. It has been suggested that more missions could be assigned to the Reserve Components, thereby reducing the need for active military people. This section addresses our policy toward the Defense manpower mix. Each Service chapter explains why specific increases in military manpower, by mission (Defense Planning and Programming Category), were assigned to either the active or the Reserve Components. A complete report on how the Department determines the active-reserve mix was prepared for the Senate Appropriations Committee and provided to each Committee concerned.

Our policy is to maintain as small an active peacetime force as national security policy, our military strategy and our overseas commitments permit. Our overall military strategy dictates the missions that must be performed by military people, reserve or active, because they are trained to perform their duties in confrontation with the enemy.

The least costly way to fill overseas peace and war support requirements is to use host nation support (HNS). The agreements we have with the BENELUX countries to provide port operations and surface transportation for deploying US units are examples of this support. Another type of host nation support is the agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to activate 93,000 reservists to support US forces in time of war. This innovative program allows us to provide essential wartime support for Army and Air Force combat units at a substantial reduction over the cost of equipping and maintaining US units to perform those missions. It is imperative that we be able to provide essential logistics support to our combat forces in Europe in wartime; we can ensure this support via the US/FRG HNS agreement at a small fraction (one-tenth to one-fortieth) of the cost of any other solution. Increased reliance on HNS does make strategic warning and allied response even more important. We will continue to implement this program that would be crucial to the safety and effectiveness of US combat forces in wartime.

We have substantially increased our reliance on Reserve Component units for more and more complex missions and plan to increase that reliance where our analyses show it warranted. The Army relies heavily on Reserve Component units to roundout nine of its 16 active divisions and to provide combat support. Naval Reserve units form an integral part of the Total Force in every mission area of the Navy. The Selected Marine Corps Reserve provides a division-wing team with balanced combat, combat support and combat service support forces of the same type as active force counterpart units. Air Force Reserve Component units bear considerable responsibility for many combat and support missions including tactical fighter, airlift, continental air defense, and aerial refueling missions.

The primary criterion that must be satisfied by either an active or a reserve unit is the responsiveness required to perform the mission. In some situations, only an active unit can meet this criterion. Strategic units and overseas deployed units must be immediately ready for combat operations, so they must be manned with active military manpower. Most Navy ships and squadrons must be manned by active military because they routinely deploy and remain overseas. In peacetime, we also authorize active military manpower to maintain a training and professional base and a rotation base to provide meaningful assignments in the United States for people who have been serving at sea or overseas.

Reserve Component units have demonstrated their capability to maintain high readiness levels. In general, however, the higher the readiness level required of a Reserve Component unit, the higher will be the cost of maintaining the unit because of the amount of training time and full-time support needed.

For support services, DoD uses civilians except where the positions must be military for the reasons discussed above. Decisions whether to use government employees or contractors for support services are based on which can provide the services most efficiently. In certain cases, national security considerations--such as ensuring that a particularly critical job will be performed during wartime--dictate the use of DoD employees.

IV. Mobilization Manpower

The Department of Defense has developed a comprehensive, analytic framework for the determination of wartime military and civilian requirements and supply, the Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS). The current calculations are based on a scenario with a short warning period followed in sequence by partial and full mobilization, deployment sequencing and prosecution of a global conflict.

DoD still has significant wartime manpower shortfalls, particularly in combat enlisted personnel.

Combat Enlisted Shortfalls

(000's at M+90)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Army	-121	-160
Navy	*	*
Air Force	-3	-2
Marine Corps	-34	-23
DoD	-158	-185

*Navy does not separately define its combat occupations since all ships at sea carry a great variety of occupations and expect to be in combat.

Because the timing of each Service in committing its forces is different, they each have peak shortfalls at different times in the scenario, as shown below:

Wartime Military Manpower Shortfalls

(000's)

	<u>FY85</u>		<u>FY89</u>	
	<u>Time Period of Peak Shortfall</u>	<u>Shortfall</u>	<u>Time Period of Peak Shortfall</u>	<u>Shortfall</u>
Army	M+90	-52	M+90	-165
Navy	M+30	-25	M+30	-42
Air Force	M+40	-123	M+40	-112
Marine Corps	M+150	-18	No total shortfalls	
All DoD	M+30	-98	M+30	-146

As shown above, the supply of military manpower, particularly in the Army and Air Force, still shows major weaknesses. Air Force experiences its peak shortfall early, at M+40; then the shortfall drops dramatically. The Army manpower shortage is felt most about three months into the scenario at M+90 days, when by FY 1989 we estimate that, if the scenario develops as we have described it, the Army will face a particularly grave shortage of 160,000 in combat enlisted skills. If we attempt to solve the Army's shortfall with more IRR members, we will actually need an additional 230,000 trained combat enlisted people in the IRR. This is because not all IRR members will be available when called. Physical disabilities, hardship excusals, delayed availability and obsolete addresses are a few of the reasons that we estimate about 70% of IRR enlisted members will be available immediately. This Army shortage lessens as large numbers of volunteers and draftees complete training and join units overseas in the fourth and fifth month after mobilization. However, a relatively small shortfall continues throughout the six months of this scenario.

Last year, Congress authorized extension of the military service obligation from six to up to eight years and authorized IRR enlistment and reenlistment bonuses to increase the size of the IRR. The Services

plan to reprogram funds in FY 1984 to begin implementation and the FY 1985 budget includes funds for the bonus program. This will help to alleviate shortfalls in the near-term. We ultimately expect to eliminate gross mobilization shortfalls in FY 1990 through use of the MSO extension.

We are also looking at our additional civilian workforce needs during mobilization and war. The purpose of this analysis is to identify the additional civilian manpower new-hire requirements that will occur upon mobilization. This will help us ensure that we have adequate plans and procedures to find and hire the numbers of people in the occupations and locations that we will need to ease our transition into mobilization. The following table summarizes our current estimates of civilian new hires required:

Civilian Wartime Manpower New Hire Requirements
(U.S. Direct Hire - Full-Time Permanent)
(Manpower in 000)

	<u>Demand</u>	<u>Current Supply*</u>	<u>New Hires Required</u>
Army	413	232	181
Navy	344	212	132
Air Force	265	183	82
Marine Corps	23	14	9
DLA	<u>55</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>11</u>
DoD Total	1,100	685	415

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

*Supply estimates are based on FY 1982 end strength. They are decremented to reflect our estimate of the number civilians recalled to military duties. We assume full utilization of all employees in new wartime positions; i.e., complete skill interchangeability is assumed.

V. Manpower Counting

Expansion of this report to discuss manpower and personnel readiness requires that we be more careful in the use of the terms describing manpower counting categories. For that reason, a glossary of defense manpower terms is provided in Appendix B. The basic distinction between "spaces", that is billets or positions, and "faces", people to fill the positions, must be kept clear. Our forces are made up of a variety of different types of units. Each unit has associated with it a collection of positions that must be filled by qualified people in order for the unit

to perform its wartime mission. The sum of the wartime position requirements of all the units in the programmed force is termed the wartime manpower structure requirement.

During peacetime, it is not necessary or desirable to fill all the positions in all the units. Some units may not be staffed at all, because there is no peacetime requirement for that unit. Some units may be staffed with a combination of active and reserve people; as the unit is tasked to perform more in peacetime, the proportion of full-time people, whether active, reserve or civilian, may be expected to increase. The aggregation of positions describing the staffing needed for the programmed peacetime force is termed the programmed manpower structure.

The department work force does not change overnight to match changes in the programmed force and thus the programmed manpower structure. As the program is being prepared, the programmed manpower structure must be adjusted to best balance the requirements of force changes, available inventory, accession and separation predictions, fiscal constraints, manpower ceilings--the list seems endless. The collection of positions that results from these decisions is termed the programmed manning. Programmed manning is the primary subject of this report. It is programmed manning that is reflected in the FY 1984, FY 1985 and FY 1986 manpower program tables throughout the report.

Finally, the reader should note that the "actual" data shown in the tables for FY 1983 represent "faces", the people who worked for the Department as of the end of FY 1983. These data allow the reader to assess how well our current work force matches the programmed manning, the "spaces" data shown for FY 1984 and FY 1985.

VI. Defense Planning and Programming Categories

Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPCs) are used throughout this report to describe and explain the defense manpower program. All three types of Defense manpower are allocated to specific DPPCs, no individual or position being counted more than once.

DPPCs are based on the same program elements as the ten Major Defense Programs, but the elements are aggregated differently. The Major Defense Programs aggregate, for each program, all the resources that can be reasonably associated with the "output" of that program. For example, the Strategic Program includes not only the bomber squadrons but also the base support personnel that sustain these units. The DPPCs, on the other hand, aggregate activities performing similar functions. For example, base support is given separate visibility. Each approach has utility for the management of resources; however, the DPPC system is particularly well suited for explaining how manpower resources are used. The DPPCs are listed below. Complete definitions are provided in Appendix C.

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES

Strategic

Offensive Strategic Forces
Defensive Strategic Forces
Strategic Control and Surveillance
Forces

Tactical/Mobility

Land Forces
Tactical Air Forces
Naval Forces
Mobility Forces

Auxiliary Activities

Intelligence
Centrally Managed Communications
Research and Development
Geophysical Activities

Support Activities

Base Operating Support
Medical Support
Personnel Support
Individual Training
Force Support Training
Central Logistics
Centralized Support Activities
Management Headquarters
Federal Agency Support

Individuals

Transients
Patients, Prisoners, and
Holdees
Trainees and Students
Cadets

CHAPTER II

MANPOWER PROGRAM SUMMARY

This chapter presents the Department of Defense manpower request and provides an overview of manpower strength trends.

I. National Security Objectives, Policy, and Defense Manpower

The basic national security objective is to preserve the United States as a free nation with its fundamental institutions and values intact. This involves assuring the physical security of the United States and maintaining an international climate in which US interests are protected. Achieving this objective is dependent upon the ability to influence international affairs from a position of recognized strength, to deter potential enemies, to fight when necessary, and to terminate conflicts on terms compatible with US national security interests. To those ends, strong and capable armed forces are essential. A detailed and comprehensive statement of the objectives of American foreign policy and the way in which defense policies and strategy support their attainment can be found in the Secretary of Defense Annual Report to Congress for FY 1985.

Defense manpower is made up of active and reserve military and civilian personnel. The size of the manpower program is based on the forces required to execute our military strategy. However, the size of the force structure is also affected by fiscal constraints and our capability to mobilize and deploy forces in the event of war.

The force structure for FY 1985 is based on DoD's Total Force Policy, which recognizes that all units in the force structure contribute to our success in wartime. In structuring our forces, units are placed in the Selected Reserve whenever feasible to maintain as small an active peacetime force as national security policy and our military strategy permit. Selected Reserve units and pretrained military manpower are available upon mobilization to bring the total force to its required combat capability. Some reserve units must also be responsive to call up for limited periods without a declaration of war or national emergency. Active units, on the other hand, are those forces needed for a contingency not involving mobilization, for immediate deployment in a major war before Selected Reserve units can be deployed, and for forward deployment in peacetime as a deterrent against major conflict.

Civilians, the third component of the Total Force, provide 25 percent of Defense manpower. In addition to providing civilian leadership, Defense civilians repair ships, tanks, trucks, and airplanes; maintain military installations; operate communication systems; do research and development; perform intelligence analyses; operate the supply systems; and perform many other functions that do not require military personnel. The Department constantly strives to make the most efficient use of its civilian work force. Work is contracted out when it is economical to do so. Programs for increasing productivity have a high priority in the Department. However, recent emphasis on increases in

readiness and sustainability requires more civilians in maintenance and supply functions. Borrowed military manpower must be replaced by civilians in order for military personnel to man combat units. Increased procurement activity will require more civilians. In fact, the increased tempo in the Department will require more civilians in nearly every phase of DoD's activities.

The following table is a summary of the major force elements planned for the end of FY 1984 and FY 1985 compared to those that existed at the end of FY 1983.

Summary of Major Force Elements

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Strategic</u>			
ICBMs	1,042	1,031	1,023
Bombers (PAA) <u>1/</u>	297	297	298
Tankers (KC-135) (PAA) <u>1/</u>			
Active	487	487	487
Guard/Reserve	128	128	128
Interceptor Squadrons			
Active	5	5	5
Guard/Reserve	10	11	11
Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs)	34	35	37
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>			
Land Forces			
Army Divisions			
Active	16	16	17
Guard	8	9 <u>2/</u>	9
Army Separate Brigade/Regiments			
Active <u>3/</u>	9	9	9
Guard/Reserve <u>4/</u>	29	26	26
Marine Corps Divisions			
Active	3	3	3
Reserve	1	1	1
Tactical Air Forces <u>5/</u>			
Air Force Squadrons			
Active	110	109	111
Guard/Reserve <u>6/</u>	59	58	57
Navy Squadrons			
Active	83	88	90
Reserve	16	16	16
Marine Corps Squadrons			
Active	30	30	30
Reserve	10	10	10
Naval Forces			
Carriers (active only)	13	13	13
Attack Submarines (active only)	98	99	100
Surface Combatants			

Active	186	193	199
Reserve	9	10	12
Amphibious Assault Ships			
Active	61	59	59
Reserve	2	2	2
Patrol Ships (active only)	6	6	6
ASW and FAD Aircraft Squadrons			
Active	54	55	57
Reserve	17	17	17
Mobility Forces			
Airlift Squadrons			
Active	34	34	34
Guard/Reserve <u>7/</u>	53	53	53
Sealift Ships			
Nucleus Fleet <u>8/</u>	89	95	105
Chartered Fleet	22	20	20

- 1/ Primary aircraft authorized (PAA).
- 2/ The additional division (35th Infantry Division) will consist only of a Division Headquarters in FY 1984.
- 3/ Includes one Air Cavalry Combat Brigade.
- 4/ Includes five Reserve Component brigades that roundout active divisions, one infantry brigade for school support upon mobilization and five theater defense brigades. Three brigades which form the 35th Infantry Division (ARNG) are excluded.
- 5/ Includes tactical fighter, tactical reconnaissance, special operations, airborne command posts, tanker/cargo (KC-10), and electronic combat squadrons.
- 6/ Includes 2 KC-10 Reserve Associate Squadrons as of FY 1984.
- 7/ Includes 17 strategic airlift Reserve Associate Squadrons, but excludes rescue, weather, and C9s.
- 8/ Includes naval fleet auxiliary force, mobility enhancement, nucleus fleet and scientific support vessels operated by the Military Sealift Command.

II. Manpower Request

The Department requests that Congress authorize manpower strength for FY 1985 and FY 1986 as shown in the following tables.

A. Active Duty Strength

Active Duty Personnel (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>
Army	780.8	780.8
Navy	575.3	595.6
Marine Corps	199.5	201.7
Air Force	610.2	629.0
Total	2,165.8	2,207.1

Note: Detail may not add due to rounding.

Civilian Authorization Request 1/

Direct and Indirect Hires, Military Functions

End Fiscal Year Strength

	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>
Total DoD	1,084,836	1,091,576

1/ Includes approximately 62,000 National Guard and Reserve technicians who are also members of the Selected Reserve.

As directed by Congress, these figures do not include anticipated reductions made possible by conversion of activities to contract under the provisions of OMB Circular A-76. Consistent with Section 501(c) of Public Law 94-361, the requested civilian authorization includes full-time, part-time, intermittent, permanent, and temporary employees; it excludes the following three categories of DoD civilian employees:

1. Special Student and Disadvantaged Youth Programs. Excluded under this category are: Stay-in-School Campaign, Temporary Summer Aid Program, Federal Junior Fellowship Program, and worker trainee opportunity programs. Employment in these categories, based on past experience, will be about 8,500 in FY 1985 and FY 1986.

2. National Security Agency employees are excluded in accordance with Public Law 86-36.

3. Civil Functions. Excluded are employees performing civil functions administered by DoD, including Corps of Engineer Civil Works, cemeterial activities, and the Wildlife Conservation Program. Civil functions employment at the end of FY 1985 and FY 1986 is planned to be about 33,000.

The composition of the total DoD civilian request for FY 1985 is shown in the following table by component, direct and indirect hire.

Composition of Civilian Authorization Request For 1985
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Direct Hire</u>	<u>Indirect Hire</u>	<u>Total</u>
Army 1/	342.6	59.2	401.8
Navy	328.8	10.8	339.6
Marine Corps 2/	(18.8)	(3.0)	(21.8)
Air Force 1/	240.1	13.6	253.6
Defense Agencies	88.0	1.8	89.8
Total DoD	999.5	85.4	1,084.8

1/ Includes military technicians.

2/ Marine Corps civilians are included in Department of Navy strengths.

Note: Detail may not add due to rounding.

III. Manpower Overview

Military and civilian manpower strength trends are shown in the following tables.

Defense Employment
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>Actual</u> <u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 1985 Budget</u> <u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Military							
Active	2,687	3,547	2,050	2,109	2,123	2,136	2,166
Selected Reserve	953	922	851	964	1,005	1,051	1,104
Civilian <u>1/</u>	1,176	1,393	990	1,028	1,064	1,078	1,085

1/ Direct and indirect hires.

A. Military Manpower. The FY 1985 authorization request for active duty military personnel is 2,165,800. This request is 29,900 greater than the planned FY 1984 end strength. Most of this growth is associated with introduction of new capabilities that must be in the active component in order to develop doctrine, train people and deploy in peacetime. Each Service chapter discusses why reserve missions could not be expanded to offset this growth.

Selected Reserve end strength is programmed to increase by 52,216 in FY 1985 over FY 1984 levels. These increases reflect the increased reliance on the Guard and Reserve and are possible because of improved retention and vigorous recruiting by the Reserve Components.

Pretrained manpower, which consists of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), the Inactive National Guard, the Standby Reserve, and retired personnel, will increase from 617,000 at the end of FY 1983 to 935,000 at the end of FY 1985. This is an increase of 155,000 over planned FY 1984 levels.

Highlights of the military manpower programs by Service follow.

Army

The Army's FY 1985 manpower structure changes improve readiness, continue modernization, increase sustainability and enhance rapid deployability. Two significant structure initiatives involve converting current divisions to lighter organizations. First, the heavy divisions will convert to a refined Division 86 redesign, reducing strength from approximately 18,000 to 16,500. Second, the Army will begin to activate a new light infantry division and convert one existing infantry division to a new, smaller light infantry design of approximately 10,000 soldiers.

Army Reserve Components will assume increased responsibility, although the force structure will remain at about the same level. Reserve Component heavy divisions will convert to the refined Division 86 design. The ARNG will increase manning of the 35th Mechanized Infantry Division activated in FY 1984.

Navy

The Navy is growing toward the goal of 600 ships. The Navy total force manpower growth to man and support these ships and squadrons is structured to balance war fighting capabilities and readiness impacts. The Navy uses its resources to provide for rapid crisis response, to meet heavy training requirements, and to ensure fleet readiness to face an increasingly capable Soviet threat.

In FY 1985, the Navy's regular active duty military strength increases by 10,500. This growth is primarily to provide manning and support for an increased number of forward deployed ships and aircraft squadrons. The Navy's current forward deployments compel assignment of these forces to active rather than Reserve Components. Reserve active duty (TAR) strength increases by 1,600, primarily to support the manning of additional ships assigned to the Naval Reserve Force (NRF). The remainder of the Selected Reserve also grows by 4,700 via initiatives designed to close the gap between mobilization requirements and existing force levels.

Marine Corps

The Marine Corps increases active duty end strength by 2,900 in FY 1985 to enhance readiness, mobility and fire power. This effort is highlighted by the addition of two TOW platoons, a target acquisition battery, a 155mm self-propelled artillery battery, and the transition of an artillery regiment from the 105mm howitzer to the 155mm howitzer. The first light armored vehicle battalion will be activated. Aviation increases include the ongoing activation of Forward Air Defense Platoons, a light antiaircraft missile battalion, a CH-53E squadron, and a CH-46 squadron. Combat service support additions include activation of a bulk fuel transport platoon and a water supply platoon. The Selected Marine Corps Reserve will grow by 2,564 spaces to improve manning of existing units.

Air Force

The Air Force active end strength request represents an increase of 15,700 or 2.6 percent over FY 1984 levels and 26,200 less than the level programmed for FY 1985 in the FY 1984 Budget. The FY 1985 manpower builds support increases and modernization of tactical force structure such as ground launched cruise missile and the tactical fighter force; increases in other wartime readiness initiatives; improved command, control, and communications, and intelligence activities; and training associated with the increased force. The Air Force continues to program for full equipment, modernization, and manning of its 26 tactical fighter wing equivalents. Not all mission changes will require additional active manpower, however, because initiatives have been taken that will save active manpower spaces or transfer the requirement to the Air Reserve Forces.

Increased manpower requested for the Air Reserve Forces of 8,700 or 5 percent are in support of new missions (C-19, strategic airlift, C-5 aircraft), expanded missions (air base ground defense, medical wartime support, aerial ports, civil engineering RED HORSE Squadrons) and more modern equipment (F-16, C-130H).

B. Civilian Manpower. Beginning with the FY 1981 Budget Supplement, civilian manpower increased for the first time since the peak of the Vietnam War (FY 1968). This increase in civilian strength is programmed to continue in FY 1984 and FY 1985.

Civilian end strength increases 6,532 in FY 1985 over the FY 1984 level. Augmentation of the civilian workforce is required to support direct readiness-related functions. Specifically, additional manpower is programmed to support growing Army industrially-funded workloads; to support Air Force increased flying hours, to improve spare parts management, to support increased Reserve missions, and to expand logistics surge capability; to support Defense Agency contract administration and audit, to complete increased logistics workload, to meet special education requirements in dependent schools, and to support intelligence operations.

Congress' customary practice is to authorize the Department of Defense to employ no more than a specific number of civilians each year. The long-standing use of specific limits on civilian employment reflects a belief that managers of government operations, free from the necessity to show a profit, tend to hire more people than are needed. The counter argument is that ceilings lead to poor management practices and are unnecessary because of DoD's strong incentive to use the annual Defense fiscal budget efficiently.

Ceilings on civilian personnel impede efficient operations by (1) discouraging substitution of civilian for military persons; (2) causing imbalances between program demands and personnel levels; (3) encouraging the use of borrowed military manpower; and (4) increasing reliance on overtime and temporary workers. Analyses by DoD, the General Accounting Office and Congress have found many opportunities to convert military jobs to civilian positions. DoD has made progress in this area, but more can be done. However, further civilianization will be resisted by the Services if ceilings are in effect in the future. The Services believe that if military positions are civilianized, possible future civilian employment reduction will degrade readiness.

We recognize the concern of the Congress about converting commercial activities to contract to avoid manpower ceilings. We have stopped the practice of reducing civilian end strength in anticipation of conversion to contract. This should help ensure that decisions to convert to contract are not influenced by civilian ceiling constraints. However, we are continuing our studies of activities that are not required in-house for national defense and we anticipate that roughly the same number of conversions will occur as in the past few years--3,000 to 5,000 spaces per year.

Civilian employment controls may decrease the ability of defense management to balance program demands and personnel levels. Congressionally approved increases in operations necessitate an increase in manpower authorizations for successful execution. When a mismatch occurs between civilian workers and authorized increases in program levels, inefficient or incomplete execution results. DoD's FY 1985 civilian manpower request balances employment with program demands.

Ceilings sometimes lead to the borrowing of military manpower to perform civilian jobs. Programmatic changes may require an increase in functions traditionally performed by civilians such as base operations support. If such functional increases are not accompanied by a higher allocation of civilians, enlisted personnel may be used to fill the gap. This use of uniformed manpower decreases morale and adversely affects readiness.

General provisions in the FY 1983 and FY 1984 DoD Appropriations Acts have prohibited the Department from imposing civilian manpower ceiling controls on its industrially funded activities. This was intended as a test of the Department's ability to operate without ceiling controls. The Department is preparing a report to the Congress on the salutary effects of operating these activities without ceiling controls.

The Department supports a broad range of programs designed to achieve our mission more efficiently.

The Defense Productivity Program (DPP) was established to improve DoD's effectiveness through more efficient use of human and capital resources. DPP efforts can be divided into three areas: productivity enhancing capital investments, efficiency reviews, and work force motivation. Although categorized for the ease of policy direction and program management, these three are implemented as an integrated approach.

The Productivity Enhancing Capital Investment (PECI) program is a multi-faceted effort involving both the Components and OSD. Initiatives focus on major investments in facilities and equipment that release resources for higher priority work. As part of Peci, \$136 million is earmarked by OSD in FY 1985 for major investments that are expected to produce a life-time return of approximately \$22 for each \$1 invested. In addition to projects financed by OSD, the Services are funding major productivity enhancing investments.

OSD requires DoD Components to conduct efficiency reviews for all support functions that are not subject to the contracting considerations of OMB Circular A-76. All reviews are to be completed by FY 1987. Efficiency reviews are now being linked to the processes by which DoD Components determine how many workers are required for various functions. Results take the form of improved staffing standards and improved operating methods. Efficiency reviews are conservatively estimated to yield a four percent improvement in productivity.

Efforts to improve work force motivation within DoD have taken two forms that should assist in both improving the quality of working life and increasing productivity. The formation of committees of workers, termed quality circles, allows employees to communicate ideas and suggestions directly to management. DoD now has 1,300 quality circles with every indication that this number will increase in FY 1985. These have resulted in both tangible and intangible improvements in worker productivity and morale for the time invested in the groups. Another method of motivating employees is through sharing the gains from higher productivity. DoD has conducted experiments in incentive pay involving sharing of the benefits from exceeding past output levels. These experiments will provide a basis for broader application in FY 1985.

Beginning in FY 1982, the Congress for the first time authorized operations and maintenance (O&M) funds. Since almost all of the Department's civilians are paid either directly or indirectly from the O&M account, the Department believes that the imposition of both a fiscal ceiling and a civilian end strength ceiling is redundant and unnecessary.

The military and civilian manpower estimates in this report also reflect the results of the Congressionally directed five percent management headquarters reduction. The Department maintains that the potential adverse effects of this reduction far outweigh any savings or economies intended.

IV. Manpower Program Summary

The following tables summarize the FY 1985 Defense manpower programs and compare them to the FY 1983 and FY 1984 programs. The presentation is by DPPC category.

TABLE 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1983</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 1984</u> <u>FY 1985 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1985</u> <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>94.5</u>	<u>94.1</u>	<u>93.9</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	73.5	73.3	72.3
Defensive Strategic Forces	7.4	6.6	6.6
Strategic Control and Surveillance	13.7	14.2	15.0
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>987.1</u>	<u>1,017.3</u>	<u>1,029.3</u>
Land Forces	553.6	569.8	571.1
Tactical Air Forces	191.2	198.9	204.2
Naval Forces	202.8	208.2	214.1
Mobility Forces	39.6	40.4	39.8
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>103.5</u>	<u>107.6</u>	<u>109.7</u>
Intelligence	32.8	34.2	34.8
Centrally Managed Communications	37.3	38.6	39.9
Research and Development	23.1	24.4	24.4
Geophysical Activities	10.3	10.4	10.5
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>636.2</u>	<u>636.6</u>	<u>642.4</u>
Base Operating Support	298.3	296.4	301.3
Medical Support	43.1	44.8	46.3
Personnel Support	32.2	31.8	31.8
Individual Training	104.6	105.0	105.0
Force Support Training	48.2	49.8	50.2
Central Logistics	20.6	21.3	21.8
Centralized Support Activities	46.1	46.2	44.8
Management Headquarters	40.3	38.5	38.5
Federal Agency Support	2.7	2.8	2.8
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>1,821.3</u>	<u>1,855.6</u>	<u>1,875.3</u>
<u>Undermanning</u>	-	-28.0	-20.9
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>302.0</u>	<u>308.4</u>	<u>311.5</u>
Transients	68.2	72.6	74.2
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	14.2	13.1	10.5
Students, Trainees	206.0	209.3	213.4
Cadets	13.6	13.4	13.4
<u>Total</u>	<u>2,123.3</u>	<u>2,135.9</u>	<u>2,165.8</u>

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

TABLE 2

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1983 Actual	FY 1984 FY 1985 Budget	FY 1985 Budget
<u>Strategic</u>	23.4	23.4	24.7
Offensive Strategic Forces	13.1	13.0	13.1
Defensive Strategic Forces	9.6	9.7	10.9
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.8	0.7	0.8
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	759.1	783.2	814.4
Land Forces	582.3	598.6	622.2
Tactical Air Forces	63.9	66.1	67.6
Naval Forces	59.8	64.7	66.4
Mobility Forces	53.2	54.1	58.4
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	21.6	22.8	23.5
Intelligence	6.0	6.6	7.1
Centrally Managed Communications	12.6	13.4	13.4
Research and Development	1.6	1.4	1.5
Geophysical Activities	1.4	1.4	1.5
<u>Support Activities</u>	166.7	177.8	196.3
Base Operating Support	48.1	47.8	51.7
Medical Support	14.4	22.5	27.3
Personnel Support	5.9	6.2	6.8
Individual Training	68.0	70.4	74.9
Force Support Training	3.3	2.9	3.5
Central Logistics	6.5	6.5	7.8
Centralized Support Activities	4.7	14.5	18.7
Management Headquarters	6.3	4.4	5.0
Federal Agency Support	0.6	1.3	1.4
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	970.9	1,007.6	1,058.8
<u>Individuals</u>	33.4	44.2	44.5
Transients	0.4	0.5	0.6
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	*	-	-
Students, Trainees	33.0	43.6	43.9
<u>Total</u>	1,004.5	1,051.5	1,103.7

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Less than 50.

TABLE 3

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CIVILIAN MANPOWER
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1983 Actual	FY 1984 FY 1985 Budget	FY 1985
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>10.9</u>	<u>11.0</u>	<u>11.4</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	6.1	6.0	6.1
Defensive Strategic Forces	3.0	3.1	3.3
Strategic Control and Surveillance	1.8	2.0	2.0
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>59.8</u>	<u>62.3</u>	<u>63.1</u>
Land Forces	22.1	24.2	25.0
Tactical Air Forces	16.7	16.6	16.2
Naval Forces	0.9	1.0	1.0
Mobility Forces	20.1	20.5	20.8
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>96.1</u>	<u>97.0</u>	<u>95.5</u>
Intelligence	7.6	8.5	8.7
Centrally Managed Communications	11.0	11.9	11.8
Research and Development	66.9	66.0	64.2
Geophysical Activities	10.6	10.5	10.9
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>897.3</u>	<u>907.1</u>	<u>913.8</u>
Base Operating Support	352.8	351.2	349.5
Medical Support	22.0	22.4	22.7
Personnel Support	23.2	25.3	25.3
Individual Training	21.6	22.9	24.2
Force Support Training	5.5	5.6	5.6
Central Logistics	378.2	385.2	390.4
Centralized Support Activities	57.8	60.5	62.0
Management Headquarters	36.3	34.0	34.1
Federal Agency Support	*	*	*
<u>Total</u>	<u>1,064.5</u>	<u>1,078.3</u>	<u>1,084.8</u>

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50.

CHAPTER III

ARMY MANPOWER PROGRAM

I. Introduction

A. Summary and Authorization Request

This chapter describes the Army's manpower program in terms of its active military, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and civilian manpower components for FY 1985. It also explains causes for major changes in the manpower program for each component and discusses the Commercial Activities (CA), Army Performance Oriented Reviews and Standards (APORS), Borrowed Military Manpower (BMM), Civilian Substitution, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs and industrial fund civilian personnel strength management separately.

The Army manpower program for active military, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and civilian personnel in support of the FY 1985 budget is as follows:

Army Manpower Program (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>
Active Military	780.8	780.8
Selected Reserve		
Army National Guard	447.3	471.0
Army Reserve <u>1/</u>	298.4	308.1
Civilian	401.8	403.2

1/ Includes 13.4 Individual Mobilization Augmentees in FY 1985 and 14.2 in FY 1986.

B. Major FY 1985 Force Structure Changes

FY 1985 will be a year of dynamic change designed to support the Army's emphasis on improved readiness, modernization, sustainability, and strategic deployability. Increased responsibility will be assumed by the Reserve Components (RC) as RC strength continues to increase. Heavy divisions will continue to modernize as they convert to a refined, smaller Division 86 design. One existing and one newly activated infantry division will begin organizing to the Army's new light infantry division structure of about 10,000 soldiers, compared to 14,000 to 17,000 in other Army divisions. The new light division will be more strategically mobile (deployable in less than 500 C-141 aircraft sorties).

1. Active Component. Significant FY 1985 force structure changes in the active component are presented below for the Continental United States (CONUS), Europe and the Pacific. Changes are shown as unit activations, conversions, and inactivations.

a. In CONUS, a new light infantry division will be activated in FY 1985 and will reach its full strength by the end of FY 1987. The 7th Infantry Division will reorganize into the new light infantry division design. Both actions will enhance the Army's flexibility to deploy rapidly with a force tailored to meet a wide variety of global contingencies. Other activations include a ranger battalion, three air defense battalions (PATRIOT) (one deploys to Europe in FY 1985), one field artillery battalion (Multiple Launch Rocket System), five air defense batteries, (Division Air Defense Guns) (one deploys to Europe in FY 1985), and one chemical company. Unit inactivations include one engineer battalion, one artillery battalion, and one air defense battalion (HAWK). Five maneuver battalions in the 9th Infantry Division will convert to the High Technology Light Division (HTLD) design. Five mechanized infantry battalions, three armor battalions, three armored cavalry squadrons, two field artillery battalions, three medical battalions, and six signal battalions will convert to the Division 86 design.

In Europe, eight forward support battalions, two air cavalry squadrons, one aviation support squadron, one aviation support battalion, two ammunition companies, one chemical decontamination company, and one petroleum supply company will activate. Two air defense units (one NIKE-HERCULES battalion and one HAWK Battalion), two air cavalry troops (with allied support) and one ground cavalry troop will deactivate. Additionally, two armored cavalry squadrons, four field artillery battalions, one air defense artillery battalion, one heavy engineer battalion, one medical battalion, one Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) battalion, and one signal battalion will convert to the Division 86 design.

In the Pacific, one Corps area signal company and one chemical (NBC) company will activate.

Throughout the active component, new tables of organization and equipment (TOE) will be implemented, and manning levels will improve as units reorganize to modernized organizational structure.

2. Reserve Component

a. Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) Mix

(1) Total Force Integration

The Total Army Force must provide for credible deterrence across a wide spectrum of risks. To be affordable, this force must be carefully balanced to provide the best AC/RC mix consistent with the needs of rapid mobilization for a global response and for sustainment of initial forces.

Within budgetary constraints, affordability is achieved by increasing reliance on the ARNG and USAR as essential elements of the national defense (approximately 50 percent of total Army force structure and 68 percent of the non-divisional combat service support forces are in the RC). This increased reliance will be possible due primarily to a 34,600 increase in the RC FY 1985 end strength at a time when the AC end strength remains essentially constant. The use of RC soldiers will provide a less costly means of enhancing the Army's ability to meet increasing world-wide contingencies.

An increase in RC force structure alone, however, will not solve problems anticipated during the early stages of conflict. The role of the RC has become increasingly important because the early demand for combat and support forces has outstripped the ability of the AC to provide them. A fully integrated AC/RC force is now necessary. This integration is achieved through a variety of programs:

- Modernization/Unit conversions. In FY 1985, RC units begin converting to new Division 86 design. These conversions will allow the RC units to adopt the latest Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOEs), compatible with AC unit designs. This modernization effort helps to integrate fully the RC into the force to support better the Army's combat and support missions. Units converting include:

26 Hospitals	6 Ordnance/Ammunition Companies
7 Engineer Companies	2 Combat Service Support Companies
13 Artillery Battalions	3 Signal Companies
23 Infantry Battalions	4 Adjutant General Companies
30 Armor Battalions	85 Military Police Companies
25 Chemical Companies	1 Truck Company

- Equipment Modernization. Over 60 new systems, including communications, tanks, helicopters, artillery radar, automatic data processing, trucks, etc. are being added to the RC. This new equipment will provide the RC state-of-the-art systems compatible with AC units. Approximately \$1.4 billion is projected for new RC equipment procurement and redistribution in FY 1985.

- Training. The importance of the RC to effective conduct of training is demonstrated by the fact that all of the Army's training divisions and brigades for stateside post-mobilization training are in the RC. These same RC units continue to achieve substantial training success through AC/RC combined training efforts both in local training and in field exercises such as BOLD EAGLE, GALLANT EAGLE, REFORGER, etc. In FY 1985 the RC will send five battalions for field exercises at the National Training Center. Training aids and devices are also being provided to RC units in increasing quantities (e.g., the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System).

- Command Relationships. The Army's highly successful CAPSTONE program provides greatly improved continuity by aligning RC units to the wartime missions which they will performing. It provides peacetime planning and training associations with the gaining AC or RC command. An additional action which will enhance peacetime management of the Reserve

Components is the reorganization during FY 1984 and FY 1985 to eliminate nine Forces Command Army Readiness and Mobilization Region Headquarters. They will be replaced by two Continental U.S. Army (CONUSA) headquarters and provide increased responsibility for the RC chain of command. The Army has also established the Army Reserve Personnel Center, which reports to the Chief, Army Reserve and provides him with increased responsibility and capability for Army Reserve personnel management.

- Assignment of new missions. Fourteen nondivisional combat unit missions are being transferred from the AC to the RC in FY 1985. Nearly all the missions are to provide combat or combat service support. As the RC assumes these new responsibilities, military manpower spaces will be available to the AC for modernization and improved readiness. FY 1985 AC-to-RC mission transfers are:

1 Field Artillery Battalion (8")	1 Personnel Service Company
2 Light Medium Truck Companies	2 Field Service Companies
2 Float Bridge Companies	1 Medical Clearing Company
2 Combat Heavy Engineer Companies	3 Combat Engineer Companies

- Roundout Program. The Army's Roundout Program is a program in which RC maneuver battalions and brigades are integrated into AC divisions or separate brigades to alleviate structure shortfalls in AC organizations. Five RC brigades and nine maneuver battalions round out AC units in FY 1985. Nine of 17 AC Divisions will have maneuver roundout units. The Roundout Program will help improve RC capability by allocating resources to the roundout RC units consistent with those allocated to their sister AC units and by establishing closer planning and training relationships.

(2) Determination of the AC/RC Mix.

AC forces are normally better suited for forward-deployment and rapid deployment missions, while RC forces are usually more appropriate for follow-on and sustaining missions. The mix of AC/RC forces must achieve a balance between capabilities and risks to achieve:

- Credible deterrence
- Sustainment of forward-deployed forces
- Rapid deployment without mobilization
- Realistic RC readiness and deployment requirements

The final mix is the result of careful long-range force planning, a continuous process linked to the the DoD Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). In essence, program force development involves the reconciliation and allocation of force level and force mix

risks within the projected levels of available resources (restrictions on dollars, end strength, equipment, facilities, etc.) An 18-month detailed process involving Defense Guidance, computer simulations, and Major Command and Army staff analyses is used by the Army to develop force structure alternatives which include structure offsets due to host nation support, unit activations, inactivations, conversions or mission transfers. This analysis includes estimates of the RC units' ability to attain the needed mission capabilities. General considerations in this decision are:

- Can an existing reserve unit displace (through roundout or affiliation) an active unit and provide the capabilities needed upon deployment?

- If no existing reserve units currently meet roundout or affiliation needed capabilities, can an existing unit be converted to provide these capabilities?

- If a unit is considered for conversion or if a reserve unit activation is deemed necessary,

- can sufficient skilled personnel be recruited (or backfilled from the converting unit) to man the unit (avoiding potential conflict/competition with adjacent units)?

- is there sufficient grade structure to ensure adequate promotion and retention of personnel with the unit (once converted or activated)?

- can the skills required for effective unit employment be established and maintained with the available schedule of drills (considering skill complexity and likely skill deterioration)?

- how long will it take for the unit to attain the readiness level required to fulfill the mission?

- are required facilities reasonably available within the timeframe required (new construction or lease)?

- What other force structure actions have affected the unit that may lead to unacceptable delays in attaining mission capabilities (minimize unit turbulence)?

- In the case of National Guard units, is it likely that the governor will accept the mission?

b. Army National Guard (ARNG)

The ARNG will focus in FY 1985 on improving force readiness and on force modernization. Improved readiness will be accomplished by providing more authorized manpower to raise unit Authorized Levels of Organization (ALOs) while making the transition to current TOE designs. ARNG heavy divisions and brigades will begin the transition to Division

86 design, while echelons-above-corps units and some support elements (ADA, FA) will begin transition to Army 90 designs. The 35th Infantry Division, activated in FY 1984 to form the ARNG's ninth division, will continue to build a division support base for its maneuver units, which will be assigned in FY 1986 from existing units. To provide specialized support, the ARNG will activate a mountain warfare battalion in FY 1985. An increase of 3588 RC spaces will be used by the ARNG for full time manning to support key ARNG daily training and to assist in supply and readiness planning. As noted earlier, missions will be transferred to the ARNG to free AC spaces so the AC can accomplish missions that it is best suited to perform.

The ARNG will activate in FY 1985 two truck companies, three engineer companies, one division material management center, and nine combat service support battalions. In addition, the ARNG will modernize three chemical units, six engineer companies, seven artillery battalions, 21 infantry battalions, four medical hospital units, six ammunition companies, two combat service support battalions, three signal companies, four personnel companies, 14 finance units, 28 armor battalions, and 64 military police companies by converting to updated Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) and Division 86 design.

c. US Army Reserve (USAR)

The primary focus of the USAR for FY 1985 will also be to improve force readiness and to modernize the force. Force readiness will be improved by converting many USAR units to the latest TOE designs. Force modernization will be accomplished by transitioning support units to Division 86/Army 90 designs compatible with the AC or ARNG unit supported. As with the ARNG, the USAR will assume responsibility for some AC missions, which will free spaces for unresourced AC missions. To eliminate layering and duplication of missions and to provide increased responsibility for the RC chain of command, the Army will eliminate four Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions (ARMR) and add one Continental Army (CONUSA) headquarters in FY 1984, and eliminate the remaining five ARMRs and add another CONUSA headquarters in FY 1985. Army Reserve Commands will assume additional responsibility for management, coordination of training, and mobilization planning of their assigned units.

In FY 1985 the USAR will activate four engineer companies, one chemical decontamination company, one medical clearing company, one personnel service company, and one signal company.

C. Major Outyear Manpower Changes

Army force structure/manpower initiatives for the FY 1986-1989 program period are directed toward improving readiness, assuring modernization (conversion to Division 86 and light division designs), improving the equipment posture of the Army, and building sustainability for committed forces. In addition, the Army plans to continue to expand special operations forces and improve the training base over the program years.

The tables below display the manpower programs for the Active and Selected Reserve forces by DPPC for FY 1984 through FY 1989.

Army Active Manpower Program by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Strategic	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5
Tactical/Mobility	475.8	475.2	471.5	472.1	473.8	472.5
Auxiliary Activities	29.5	30.2	30.2	30.3	30.6	30.7
Support Activities	175.6	171.6	173.4	172.5	169.9	169.9
Individuals <u>1/</u>	<u>98.7</u>	<u>103.2</u>	<u>105.0</u>	<u>105.3</u>	<u>105.8</u>	<u>107.0</u>
Totals	<u>780.0</u>	<u>780.8</u>	<u>780.8</u>	<u>780.8</u>	<u>780.8</u>	<u>780.8</u>

1/ includes force structure deviation (over and under manning).

U.S. Army Reserve Manpower Program by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Strategic	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tactical/Mobility	184.0	195.9	204.6	209.8	216.0	218.7
Auxiliary Activities	.3	.7	.7	.7	.7	.7
Support Activities	70.3	75.9	79.0	80.4	81.5	82.0
Individuals	12.8	12.5	9.6	9.2	9.6	9.7
Indiv Mob Aug	10.7	13.4	14.2	15.0	15.0	15.0
Totals	<u>278.1</u>	<u>298.4</u>	<u>308.1</u>	<u>315.1</u>	<u>322.8</u>	<u>326.1</u>

Army National Guard Manpower Program by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Strategic	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tactical/Mobility	381.7	392.2	411.0	411.2	419.1	423.3
Auxiliary Activities	-	-	-	-	-	-
Support Activities	31.7	34.6	37.5	40.2	42.8	43.2
Individuals	19.6	20.5	22.5	27.4	29.7	31.1
Totals	<u>433.0</u>	<u>447.3</u>	<u>471.0</u>	<u>478.8</u>	<u>491.6</u>	<u>497.6</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

II. Manpower Requirements Determination

A. Manpower Management System

Army manpower requirements are derived from analysis of wartime combat and support structures and essential peacetime support needs. The first step is to review the potential support assets available from host countries. The recent agreement by the Federal Republic of Germany to provide reserve forces, civilian personnel, and infrastructure for support of US combat forces is a result of this process. The remaining work must

be done by US personnel. The manning levels, the mix of units among Active and Reserve Component forces, and the mix of military and civilian personnel are established within the constraints of resource availability.

The Army uses a biennial computer-assisted study called Total Army Analysis (TAA) to specify force structure for the Army program. Once the force structure has been identified, Headquarters, Department of the Army, in conjunction with the major Army commands (MACOMs), determines the best possible allocation of resources to satisfy those missions. Given available resources and through interaction between the Army staff and the MACOMs, recommendations are provided to the Army leadership for the assignment of missions to the Active Component (AC) or the Reserve Components (RC). Units are generally assigned to the AC when (1) the peacetime mission entails day-to-day support of other active units; (2) the wartime mission necessitates rapid deployment to a theater; or (3) the unit may be required prior to a mobilization decision. Additionally, the day-to-day training which must be conducted to maintain mission readiness during peacetime may dictate that the requirement be filled by an active unit rather than a reserve unit.

All manpower requirements within the Army fall within three categories: Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) units, Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) units, and the Individuals account.

1. Manpower Requirements Within TOE Units. Manpower requirements for Army units with wartime missions are developed through analytical techniques which consider the type of mission to be performed. They are shown in Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE), which provide varying military manpower and equipment requirement levels for standard unit wartime mission accomplishment. TOE unit manpower requirements are determined as follows:

- The mission and desired capabilities of the unit are determined, and the organizational entities which provide the capabilities for mission accomplishment (e.g., firing sections, rifle squads, maintenance teams, mess teams) are identified.

- The number of combat type positions in a TOE is dictated by tactical and organizational doctrine, the firepower desired, and/or the number of weapons included. Each weapon has a specific number of operators. Rifle squads or firing sections are aggregated into units to produce the optimal combat capability with a manageable span of control.

- The number of personnel for TOE service and support activities (such as mess, maintenance, supply) is determined by the application of Manpower Requirements Criteria (MARC), which are based on engineering data, field training exercises, workload data, professional experience, and other sources of technical information.

A TOE prescribes the structure, manpower, and equipment for five organizational options (from full manning to cadre levels) for a particular type of unit. These options provide a model for fielding

the unit at full or reduced capability. A unit organized at full TOE capability is defined as having the minimum essential personnel and equipment for sustained operations. TOEs specify requirements only, however. The Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) is the authorization document for an actual unit. It shows the actual organizational option selected from the TOE, as amended by changes, to fit the unit to a specific geographical or operational environment and reflects manpower and equipment constraints. The approved MTOE document is the authorization for the unit to requisition personnel and equipment, normally at a reduced level from full TOE requirements.

The Army's strength request, then, is for personnel to fill a constrained number of MTOE authorized spaces and does not represent a request for the TOE full complement of personnel required to perform wartime missions.

2. Manpower Requirements Within TDA Units.

Organizations developed to accomplish peacetime, specific, local support missions for which no appropriate TOE is available are displayed in Tables of Distribution and Allowance (TDA). TDA units are usually non-deployable units organized to fulfill mission, functional, and work load obligations at a fixed support establishment in CONUS or overseas.

The organizational structures of TDA units are developed to attain minimum essential staffing, the most effective use of personnel, and the most efficient operational capability. TDA units, unlike MTOE units, include civilian manpower, and include military manpower only when absolutely essential for the mission or to maintain a rotation base in the continental United States and Hawaii for enlisted personnel stationed overseas.

Manpower requirements in TDA units are developed and validated by the application of manpower staffing standards and the employment of manpower survey teams. Manpower standards are developed and applied functionally, while manpower surveys are organizational in nature. Both processes seek to eliminate inefficiencies in organizations and to define the minimum essential manpower needed to accomplish the mission.

TDA authorizations may be equal to or less than the validated TDA requirements depending upon availability of resources. When authorizations are less than full TDA requirements, the reduced capability is defined in the unit's capability statement. Personnel and equipment fill is based on authorizations, as it is in MTOE units, not on requirements.

The structure of TDA activities changes substantially upon mobilization; therefore, a new authorization document, a mobilization (MOB) TDA, is prepared. Mobilization TDAs reflect increased or decreased work loads due to changed missions upon mobilization. Savings in manpower are due to reduced or eliminated functions, longer work weeks, and the use of such additional assets as Individual Mobilization Augmentees and borrowed military manpower diverted from uncommitted or late deploying units. Unless otherwise stated in the mobilization order, MOB TDAs replace their peacetime counterparts upon mobilization.

3. Operating Strength and Individuals Accounts

Operating strength is the number of soldiers assigned to the MTOE and TDA units of the active Army at any specified time. Operating strength is measured or forecast for each month in the Active Army Manpower Program. More important than the month-end or year-end snapshot, however, is the average, or manyears, of operating strength during a fiscal year. The units of the active Army may be undermanned at year-end, but fully manned on the average throughout the year.

Individuals are soldiers not assigned to units at a particular time. They include trainees, transients, holdees, students, and cadets (TTHS). The number of people required in the Individuals Accounts is projected based upon history and expected policy changes that are input to a computer-generated model called the Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students Forecasting Model. Although these people are not under the direct control of unit commanders, they are not unwanted "overhead." Soldiers in the individuals accounts are there because they are leaving, entering or receiving Initial Entry Training; moving between assignments; attending school; being placed in a hospital or prison; or separating from the military. Individuals, therefore are necessary to sustain the operations of the Army.

The TTHS Forecasting System operates in conjunction with the Enlisted Loss Inventory Model-Computation of Manpower Program Using Linear Programming (ELIM-COMPLIP) system, the Army program to project Army manpower requirements through budget execution and program years. These systems interact with each other to forecast the number of Individuals (trainees, transients, holdees, and students) for the Active Army Manpower Program.

End strength is the sum of operating strength and the individuals accounts. The end strength authorized by the Congress each year fixes the year-end snapshot that the Army manages toward throughout the year.

4. Active Army Military Manpower Program

The Active Army Military Manpower Program (AAMMP) examines combinations of such factors as force structure fill, recruiting goals, training base utilization, and personnel costs in order to arrive at an optimal manpower program considering a large number of constraints. The AAMMP is produced by ELIM-COMPLIP using a historical data base to project enlisted force dynamics for the current, budget, and five program years. Each year the Army makes refinements to ELIM-COMPLIP which improve enlisted loss projections and enlisted force management. Although a highly successful tool, ELIM-COMPLIP is limited in that it actually models only the enlisted force and cannot discriminate by grade or Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). Officer computations are done externally and are manually entered into the ELIM-COMPLIP system so that they are available for the AAMMP that the system produces. The Army's FORECAST project (discussed later in this chapter) will increase the capabilities of ELIM-COMPLIP and the AAMMP.

B. Manpower Management Improvements.

1. General.

The Army has undertaken a major effort to improve the policies, programs, and systems that support manpower management. Particular emphasis has been devoted to the manpower requirements determination program and manpower reporting/accounting systems. The success of the Air Force and Navy with manpower standards has been a key factor in the design and implementation of the Army's functionally oriented, workload-based manpower staffing standards program. In August 1983 the GAO reported that "... we found the Army's actions and plans with regard to manpower requirements determination for TDA units to be highly responsive to recommendations we have made in past reviews..."

2. Requirements Determination Initiatives.

a. Manpower Staffing Standards System (MS-3). The Army has established a workload-based manpower requirements determination system, MS-3, using manpower standards development and management/industrial engineering techniques as its basic methodology. This system is applicable to the Army's TDA units, just as MARC (discussed later) applies to the Army's TOE units. The Functional Army Manpower Evaluation (FAME) project, which was completed in FY 1982 and resulted in manpower standards for the civilian personnel administration functions, was used to test and refine policies and procedures for the Army's new Manpower Staffing Standards System. Civilian Personnel Office (CPO) consolidations and application of these standards to CPO's beginning in FY 1984 are expected to result in an annual savings of \$6 million.

Additional manpower standard development efforts begun in FY 1983 or FY 1984 and scheduled for completion in FY 1984 and early FY 1985 include:

- Training developments
- Army service school instruction departments
- Safety (general, aviation, and special)
- Drug and alcohol abuse
- Dining facilities
- Fire prevention and protection
- Postal facilities
- Finance and Accounting Offices
- Installation facilities engineering (including Maintenance and Repair of Real Property)

- Army Reception Stations
- Installation Directorate of Industrial Operations and logistics support
- Health Care Services (Nutritional Care and Preventive Medicine/Occupational Health)

Concurrent with standards development, the Army has planned for the long range capability of developing and maintaining its manpower staffing standards. In FY 1983, the Army established the US Army Manpower Requirement and Documentation Agency (USAMARDA), a field operating agency (FOA) directly under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) to manage the MS-3 effort in addition to its other functions. Additionally, each Army major command (MACOM) has established a similar FOA with the mission of developing command-unique manpower standards and supporting the larger mission of Army common standards development. Existing standards used by other Services and industry will be combined with a major contracting effort to obtain the quickest possible development of standards for all measurable functions between FY 1984 - 1988.

b. Functional Dictionary. A major supporting initiative of MS-3 is the development of the Army Functional Dictionary. Its purpose is twofold: (1) to provide definition to all Army functions for manpower staffing standards studies; and, (2) to provide a substantive link between Army functional manpower requirements determination and the Planning, Programming, Budget and Execution System (PPBES).

The project is being accomplished with in-house and contractual resources in three phases. Phase I began in FY 1982 and documented the Army base operations (BASOPS) functions. Phase II began in late FY 1983 and is concentrating primarily on Army training, communications, logistics, and health functions. Phase III began in FY 1984 with the objective of completing the balance of Army TDA functions.

The total project is being accomplished in coordination with the Army Management Structure (AMS) code restructure effort at the US Army Finance and Accounting Center (USAFAC). The new architecture and functional definitions will be provided to USAFAC who will determine their applicability to the AMS redesign components. When completed, the functional dictionary will provide the basis to aggregate manpower by function.

c. Updated Availability Factors. The Army's average 10 percent non-productive time factor (sick/annual leave, organizational/administrative duties) used in manpower surveys since the early 1950's has been updated to an average of 15 percent. New availability factors provide a uniform Army manpower planning policy for acceptable reasons and time limits for absences from the work center. Updated factors apply to peacetime or wartime situations, CONUS and OCONUS environments, and military or civilian employees. They are essential elements of the Army's manpower requirements determination program, particularly during manpower surveys, development of manpower staffing standards and staffing

guides, and TDA preparation. Use of updated availability factors is not expected to increase current TDA manpower requirements, because MACOMs had already been using command-unique factors which were normally more liberal than the outdated 10 percent average allowance.

d. Improvements in the Manpower Requirements Criteria (MARC) Program. MARC (formerly MACRIT) is the Army's revised process for determining wartime combat support and combat service support positions in TOE documents through a credible, systematic, and scientific method. The Army approved MARC in 1983 for implementation, and has begun a five year transition to the new process from FY 1984-1988. It will apply to approximately 50 percent of the Army's TOE positions. MARC features the following enhancements: use of computer simulation, development of scenario-oriented data elements and creation of a responsive maintenance data system. MARC functional studies are scheduled for aviation maintenance and warehousing in FY 1984 and automotive maintenance in FY 1985.

3. Manpower Management Initiatives.

a. Documentation Modernization (DOCMOD) Program. With goals of standardization, stabilization and modernization, the DOCMOD Study Group was formed in August 1983 under direction of the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army to analyze problems associated with the Army's entire documentation process for manpower and equipment and to develop solutions. Initial efforts at stabilizing the documentation process were successful and FY 1984 MTOE documentation was completed in November 1983. Standardization is being improved through new policy guidance which will achieve organizational standardization among TOE units. Modernization actions include the development of a corporate data base to replace current stovepipe systems in use. Study group actions focus on fixing systemic breakdowns in the entire Army documentation management process in order to reduce the need for off-line management and improve accuracy of data management systems.

b. Establishment of an Army Manpower Requirements and Documentation Field Operating Agency. In FY 1983 the Army established the US Army Manpower Requirements and Documentation Agency (USAMARDA), a field operating agency of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER). USAMARDA will have a two part mission: (1) to implement a workload-driven manpower requirements determination system for TDA units (MS-3, discussed previously in this chapter); and (2) to review all personnel requirements and authorizations contained in Army authorization documents and insure documentation is correctly accomplished. The new activity will integrate all DCSPER operational responsibilities for manpower requirements and documentation review into a single organization for the first time and significantly enhance standardization of requirements determination and documentation.

c. Force Alignment Plan II (FAP II). The Army's documented authorizations for basic field grade officer positions exceeded the limits specified in the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) for fiscal years 1983-1988 by an average of 4,600 positions. FAP II provides for reducing this imbalance. FAP II began documenting

FY 1984 changes, converted 900 basic branch field grade officer positions to civilians, and specified 1500 field grade positions for fill at a lower grade. FY 1985 grade ceilings were issued for documentation during Jul-Sep 1983, with the expectation that approximately 2000 additional field-grade positions would be designated for fill at lower grade. The goal for compliance with DOPMA authorization limits has been changed to end FY 1988, in anticipation of a requested increase of 1000 majors in the DOPMA ceiling.

d. Increase in DOPMA Field Grade Tables. In addition to downgrading the number of field grade positions as part of FAP II, the Army will request an increase of 1,000 majors in its strength authorization as established in Title 10, United States Code 523. This request has been forwarded to OMB for inclusion in the FY 1985 President's Legislative Program. Approval will allow the Army to man its tactical units at authorized levels and alleviate a problem of excessive time in service for promotion to major.

e. Reshaping the Logistics Force. The Army has initiated a series of management actions which will reduce logistical manpower requirements by FY 90. Reductions will be achieved by increased dependence on external support (e.g., HNS and prepositioned wartime contracts), improved analysis of requirements, and improved productivity of logistical units. In some cases, increased investment in equipment will be needed to offset manpower space requirements. However, some of the current shortfall in logistical forces can be eliminated upon implementation of the Army's proposed changes, (e.g. a new field feeding concept and increased productivity of transportation units and materiel handling units). Success of these efforts, which are now in planning stages, will be contingent upon full funding.

f. FORECAST. Active Army military manpower is currently programmed at an aggregate of officer and enlisted level using ELIM-COMPLIP. A five-year project is underway to develop a more comprehensive system called FORECAST - a multi-level, modular, integrated ADP system that will make possible the projection of active Army military strength (officer and enlisted) both in aggregate terms and by grade, skill, and unit. The Enlisted MOS Level Subsystem was placed in operation in Jan 1984 to provide detailed skill and grade information. Development efforts are continuing for the Mobilization (Enlisted) Subsystem, the Unit Level Subsystem, and the Officer Subsystem. Contracts have been awarded for the development of the functional requirements and system specification of the Budget Module and Civilian Forecasting Module. The civilian module of FORECAST will project quantitative and qualitative manpower requirements and portray the impacts of alternative civilian personnel policy and programming decisions during peacetime, mobilization, or demobilization. The system will be compatible and integrated with the Officer and Enlisted FORECAST Modules. Benefits from Civilian FORECAST include improved work force planning methodology, integrated (civilian and military) forecasts of strength and personnel management data, accurate predictions of work force characteristics and shortfalls, computer simulation of the effects of civilian personnel policy decisions, and management information

required to formulate future civilian personnel policy and program planning. The Civilian FORECAST system is primarily for use by the Department of the Army headquarters staff and should provide information necessary for the development of, and change to, the Civilian Human Resource Plan, a comprehensive plan of action for managing the civilian component of the total Army. This plan is projected for issue after the Civilian Module of FORECAST is brought on-line in FY 1986.

All FORECAST subsystems are scheduled to be operational by FY 1987 and, when combined with the existing capabilities of FORECAST, will enable the Army to project peacetime strengths (officers, enlisted, and civilian) and plan for and project strengths under mobilization conditions.

g. The Army Family Program. Efforts to improve soldier and family working and living conditions within the Army have taken a dramatic shift in increased emphasis. On August 15, 1983 the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA), issued "The Army Family" white paper, the first published summary of the Army's philosophy on families. The purpose of this paper is to assure that everyone -- family members, spouses, the chain of command, planners and programmers -- recognizes the total relationship between the Army and the Army Family.

The CSA paper resulted in the publication of a second document, the Army Family Action Plan, which translates the CSA's philosophy into plans, policies, and programs to direct current and future family program efforts in a comprehensive way within available resources. The plan focuses on specific issues identified as requiring actions to improve family and community life. It also establishes a management system that combines policy guidance and oversight on all family programs in order to consolidate the focus and direction of the system wide range of efforts in these areas. Some initiatives will require budget action, but many will require only procedural or administrative changes. The FY 1985 budget includes initiatives that support programs aimed at achieving Army family goals.

h. The Manpower Evaluation Tracking System (METS). METS is a three-phase program to monitor manpower utilization. It now provides military and civilian strength data by organization, function, and location. It also provides Army Reserve and Army National Guard strength data by organization and program. Phase II will be completed in mid - FY 1984 and will provide civilian grade and series tracking. Phase III is scheduled for completion in late FY 1984 and will provide cost and use data for the civilian work force by function.

4. Personnel Mobilization Process. The Army is preassigning retired personnel to meet mobilization needs. Ordering retirees to active duty in primarily CONUS positions during a mobilization contributes to the efficient operation of CONUS installations and activities under emergency conditions. It also permits reassignment of significant numbers of Active Army and Selected Reserve personnel for deployment or other necessary tasks not appropriate for retired personnel. Approximately 126,000 retirees (mostly Regular Army) now have preassignment recall orders, an increase of 28,000 from FY1982.

III. Significant Program Highlights.

A. Active Military Manpower.

1. General. The active Army entered FY 1983 with an authorized strength of 782,500. Based upon expected Congressional action on the FY 1983 budget, however, the Army quickly began to manage to a FY 1983 end strength of 780,000, and new policies were established to recruit and retain quality soldiers and discharge poor performers. The overall quality of the Army has been significantly improved, and the Army actually achieved an FY 1983 end strength of 779,643. The active military end strength requested in the FY 1985 budget is 780,000 for FY 1984 and 780,800 for FY 1985.

2. Enlisted. FY 1983 was a highly successful recruiting year. Enlisted end strength of 669,364 was achieved. As in FY 1982, the number of new recruits who were high school graduates or who scored average or above (Categories I - IIIA) showed a marked increase. The Army reduced shortages in some of the highly specialized skills and expects the trend to continue. The Army will continue to emphasize high quality recruits because of their lower attrition rates and better trainability. Recruiting and retention of quality volunteers continue to be necessary to force readiness and modernization.

a. Accessions. In FY 1983, the Army met its aggregate objectives and significantly improved the quality of its accessions. The active Army achieved 87.6 percent high school graduates, an increase of 12.2 percent compared to FY 1982. New enlistments included only 12.0 percent mental category IVs, a decrease of 31.0 percent compared to FY 1982.

The Army will continue to emphasize the need for high quality enlistments in steadily increasing numbers. Careful management of resources and recruiting incentives will help maintain the positive trend the Army has developed over the past several years. However, the economy of the country is expected to continue to improve, with a corresponding decrease in unemployment, making recruiting particularly difficult in a steadily dwindling market. Strong Congressional support is absolutely essential if we are to be successful. Fair, equitable pay and competitive compensation must be provided and maintained, with adequate funding for effective recruiting incentives such as the Army College Fund and Enlistment bonus programs. These measures will help in continuing the flow of bright, well educated and highly motivated soldiers into the high-tech Army of the 80's.

Enlisted Strength Plan
(In Thousands)

	FY 83		FY 84	FY 85
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
<u>Accessions</u>				
Prior Service	12.1	12.6	10.6	4.5
Non-Prior Service				
Male	116.0	116.2	118.9	116.0
(Male I-IIIa)	60.0	68.9	74.1	71.7
(HSDG)	95.7	99.7	102.5	103.0
(HSDG I-IIIa)	53.5	55.3	57.7	58.7
Female	16.4	16.5	18.0	19.1
(Female I-IIIa)	11.0	12.6	12.7	13.5
(HSDG)	16.4	16.5	18.0	19.1
(HSDG I-IIIa)	11.0	12.6	12.7	13.5
<u>Reenlistments</u>				
Initial Term	31.4	30.5	28.4	28.8
Mid Term	30.3	28.6	25.0	24.4
Career	23.1	22.8	23.4	22.6
Total	84.8	81.9	76.8	75.9

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding

b. Quality. In FY 1984 and beyond the Army will continue its objective of increasing the number of high quality people in order to build a competency based force. The goal is a minimum of 65 percent Mental Category I-IIIa male accessions each year; better than 85 percent male high school diploma graduates (HSDG) and 100 percent female high school diploma graduates; and the limitation of Mental Category IV accessions to less than 10 percent each year. These goals are well within the Congressional floor of 65 percent high school graduates and the ceiling of 20 percent test score category IV.

Failure to achieve the Army program would have an adverse impact on force readiness and modernization. Lower quality non-high school graduates would cause an increase in first term accessions due to increased attrition and result in more rapid turnover, which would decrease stability and cohesiveness in the force. Additionally, if these lower quality individuals were enlisted, the Army would face a degradation of its non-commissioned officer corps in the 1980's and have difficulty in modernizing the force with high technology equipment.

c. Retention. In FY 1983, the Army continued to be faced with a unique reenlistment challenge: managing success. As increasing numbers of soldiers compete for a limited number of reenlistment

opportunities, the focus of the FY1985 reenlistment program, as in FY 1983 and FY 1984, will be upon reenlistment of only quality soldiers. Major policy changes that were instituted to insure this occurs include:

(1) Requiring all soldiers to meet current physical fitness standards and to qualify with their basic weapon to be reenlistment eligible.

(2) Requiring a waiver for reenlistment on all soldiers who have been administered either judicial or non-judicial punishment in the form of a court-martial or Article 15.

(3) Requiring all initial term non-promotable E4 and below soldiers to appear before a reenlistment screening board.

d. NCO Shortages. One of the keys to an effective fighting force is having a qualified NCO of the right grade and MOS in every position. As the Army implements its planned force modernization and supports additional requirements for full-time manning, the need for NCOs in the top five grades will increase. Despite the increased need, as the following table shows, the Army's chronic shortage in the top five enlisted grades is expected to be eliminated in FY 1984 and sustained in FY 1985. However, some spot shortages or overages will continue to exist with shortages concentrated in the electronic warfare, intelligence and chemical specialties. Success in retaining the right numbers and skills in the NCO corps, as with new accessions, will be contingent upon the national economy and upon an equitable and competitive level of pay and compensation.

Top Five Enlisted Strength
(In Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Authorized strength (Top Five)	276.4	278.9	279.3
End strength (Total Enlisted)	669.4	667.2	667.5

e. Overseas Extension Incentive Program (OEIP). Public Law 96-579, 23 Dec 80 offers incentives to soldiers in designated skills who elect to extend their overseas tours for a minimum of 12 months. Initially, the incentive program targeted 34 space imbalanced MOS (SIMOS). The program now includes approximately 129 MOS which are experiencing short turn-around times in CONUS assignments. The incentives currently are either \$50 per month for the period of the extension, 30 days of non-chargeable leave, or 15 days of non-chargeable leave and travel to and from CONUS at government expense. Trends reveal that about 2800 soldiers a year are extending under the current program. The program benefits both the Army and the soldier. By slowing the rotation rate there is less family turbulence and more time in CONUS for soldiers and their families, while Army readiness improves through the resultant stability and cohesion in units.

f. Military Entrance Physical Strength Capacity Test (MEPSCAT). The Army has developed a gender-free Military Entrance Physical Strength Capacity Test (MEPSCAT) which evaluates physical strength requirements for each Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). MEPSCAT is now accepted as a valid predictor of physical strength capacity, with the associated Incremental Lift Device as the single best predictor of physical strength of an individual. The new test was implemented for the Active Component and USAR in January 1984. Plans for implementation in the Army National Guard have begun. Evaluation of the system will continue for each soldier for a three-year period from testing during training through the first three years of enlistment to ensure that MEPSCAT is accomplishing what it was designed to do.

3. Officer. As in the enlisted force, FY 1983 was a successful year for the officer corps. Although the Army fell short of its officer accession goal, it achieved an end strength of 105,674 as a result of increased retention beyond projected levels. Retention of lieutenants through colonels increased by approximately ten percent in FY 1983, and is expected to remain at these levels throughout FY 1985. Field grade retention remains approximately the same as in FY 1982, following the transition to an all regular field grade officer force. In FY 1985 the Army plans to access 9,599 officers to meet an end strength objective of 108,894. The result of these successes is that the Army is in a good position to achieve the officer strength needed for force modernization and to meet the projected threat of the late 1980's.

Procurement goals for active commissioned and warrant officers are shown below:

Active Officer Procurement Goals

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Programmed	11,030	10,616	9,599
Actual	10,640		

The college campus continues to be the primary source of officer accessions. Army ROTC now draws students from over 1,400 colleges, and the number of host institutions has increased from 279 to 315 over the past five years.

The Army ROTC scholarship is an incentive that attracts high quality students into the ROTC program. In 1980 Congress increased the Army's scholarship authorization from 6,500 to 12,000. The Army phased in these 5,500 additional scholarships over a three year period; during FY 1984 all 12,000 scholarships will be in effect.

The FY 1984 opening enrollment increased to 75,547, a two percent increase over FY 1983. Although this was only a slight increase in overall enrollment, the advanced ROTC enrollment (the last two years of the ROTC program) increased by 16 percent over FY 1983. The Army

expects to produce 9,355 officers in FY 1984 and 10,695 officers in FY 1985 from ROTC. Beginning in FY 1985, approximately one-half of this production will be for the Reserve Components.

In addition to increasing its output, ROTC has also been tasked to produce officers with academic disciplines needed by the Army. Based on these needs, ROTC has been tasked to produce in FY 1985 the following academic discipline mix: Business-30 percent; Engineer-20 percent; Science-20 percent; Social Science-20 percent; Other -10 percent. Historically, ROTC has produced the following mix: Business -29 percent; Engineer-8 percent; Science-10 percent; Social Science-42 percent; and Other-11 percent. Each academic institution is given a mission to produce based on prior year production and the market available at the school. The ROTC Scholarship Program will be a major resource in obtaining the technical skills (science and engineer) needed by the Army.

4. Women in the Army. The Army differs from the other Services in that there are no statutory constraints on the utilization of women. As a result, the Army operated for several years under a Combat Exclusion Policy established by the Secretary of the Army in 1977. This was replaced in 1983 by the Direct Combat Probability Coding Policy.

The DCPC Policy provides women the opportunity to serve in 90 percent of all officer, warrant officer, and enlisted specialties. Women may be assigned to all units which do not routinely perform their mission forward of the brigade rear boundary. The DCPC Policy acknowledges that women will have substantial risk of injury, death, or capture in a battlefield environment which may include the use of nuclear, chemical, and unconventional forces, but has as its goal the removal of women soldiers from units which can be expected to routinely engage in direct combat with the enemy. Within the context of the DCPC Policy, enlisted women may serve in all but 49 of 351 military occupational specialties.

The Army National Guard policy regarding the utilization and assignment of women is in consonance with Department of the Army policy. In 1971, the first two prior service women (other than nurses) enlisted in the ARNG. The policy at that time permitted the recruiting of prior service female officer and enlisted personnel only. In 1972, the ARNG extended its women's recruiting program to include enlistment of non-prior service women. By the end of FY 1972, there were 86 women in the ARNG; by the end of FY 1983, there were 21,430 women assigned.

The Army Reserve policy regarding the utilization of women is also in consonance with Department of Army policy. Due to the structure of the Army Reserve, the content of officer and enlisted women is higher than any other component of the Army and is the highest of the Reserve Forces. The USAR Selected Reserve projects an increase of 21,000 women by end FY 1988.

The combined female officer/warrant officer actual and projected strengths appear in the following table:

Women In The Army

Commissioned And Warrant Officer

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>
Active Army	9,450	10,400	11,000	12,900
USAR				
Individual Ready Reserve	4,042	5,936	5,978	6,206
Selected Reserve	6,131	7,613	8,423	9,702
ARNG Selected Reserve	2,230	2,390	2,575	3,250
Total	21,853	26,339	27,976	32,058

The actual and programmed female enlisted end strengths for the Army appear in the following table.

Women In The Army

Enlisted Women

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>
Active Army	66,110	67,100	68,300	70,700
USAR				
Individual Ready Reserve	31,451	34,034	36,810	49,917
Selected Reserve	36,307	38,142	43,045	53,726
ARNG Selected Reserve	19,200	22,100	23,000	23,000
Total	153,068	161,376	171,155	197,343

Since 1972, the Army has been in the vanguard of efforts to increase career opportunity for women. The number of enlisted women in the Army has increased sixfold from 1968 to 1983.

5. New Manning System. The Army's New Manning System (NMS) was created to increase combat effectiveness by stabilizing soldiers and enhancing cohesion in units. This goal is being achieved through implementation of two major initiatives: a unit replacement system (supplemented by the existing individual replacement system), to achieve stability and cohesion; and a regimental system to enhance cohesion and esprit.

Under the unit replacement system, regimentally recruited groups go through initial entry training and report as a group to a U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) installation to join a company level cadre of leaders for a stabilized three-year unit life cycle. These units complete collective training and remain in FORSCOM for 18 months if deploying to a long-tour area such as Europe; or for 24 months if preparing for deployment to a short-tour area such as Korea; or for 36 months, if designated not to deploy overseas. After the FORSCOM phase,

units scheduled to deploy overseas do so at a predesignated time. Upon completion of the overseas tour, a unit is replaced by another unit deployed from the continental United States. This system results in keeping groups of first term soldiers together with their leaders for three years at a time.

The U.S. Army Regimental System is based on groupings of linked, similar battalions both in the continental United States and overseas. These battalions are linked under one regimental flag or "color." The regiment is a community of battalions within which a soldier is assigned and with which he identifies. The regimental system is non-tactical and does not replace current tactical organizations. The regimental system fosters cohesion, esprit, and identification by affiliating soldiers with a single regiment throughout their careers, with repetitive troop assignments to units of the same regiment. A regimental designation program has been implemented. To date 11 regiments have been designated.

As of the end of January 1984, 63 NMS units are in the Army with 75 units programmed by the end of FY 1984; 97 by the end of FY 1985; and approximately 97 by the end of FY 1986. Ten company-size units have deployed to Europe, four to Korea and one to Alaska.

The evaluation of the NMS is being conducted with infantry, armor and cannon field artillery units. Company-size application of the concept to other combat arms units is under development along with the concept for combat support, and combat service support units. Future considerations also include the concept of battalion rotation.

B. Reserve Military Manpower.

1. Selected Reserve

a. General

(1) US Army Reserve (USAR)

In FY 1979, the strength of the USAR stopped shrinking and began to grow. This growth continued through FY 1983 with the Selected Reserve showing an increase in end strength of 9,529 over FY 1982. This strength is expected to continue to grow even though the USAR will remain below its required wartime strength level of 306,600 in FY 1985. The gains are in large part directly related to Congressional support of the Selected Reserve Incentives Program (SRIP), the use of full-time personnel, and other policies which assist recruiting and retention efforts.

The FY 1983 USAR Selected Reserve end strength of 266,188 includes paid drill strength (PDS), Active Reserve strength, and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA). The PDS of 251,031 was achieved as a result of tremendous recruiting and retention successes in FY 1983. Shown below are the FY 1982- FY 1985 strengths for the USAR Selected Reserve.

Selected Reserve Strength

<u>FY</u>	<u>Congressionally Authorized Average Strength 1/</u>	<u>Actual Average Strength 1/</u>	<u>Actual End of Year Strength 1/</u>
1982	235,300	242,965	256,659
1983	258,700	257,454	266,188
1984	273,700		
1985	288,400 (requested)		

1/ Includes AGR. Beginning in FY 1982, Individual Mobilization Augmentees are included in the totals. This is a floor.

(2) Army National Guard (ARNG)

During FY 1983, the aggregate Selected Reserve strength of the ARNG increased by 9,577 (or 2.3 percent) and exceeded the initial objective of 417,019 by 159. The ARNG strength upward trend experienced during the last five years is expected to continue. The ratio of non-prior service to prior service accessions is programmed to 55:45 for FY 1984, and 57:43 for FY 1985 and FY 1986.

ARNG

<u>FY</u>	<u>Congressionally Authorized Average Paid Strength</u>	<u>Actual Average Paid Strength</u>	<u>Actual End of Year Paid Strength</u>
1982	392,800	399,270	407,601
1983	407,400	412,476	417,178
1984	425,000		
1985	440,100 (requested)		

b. Enlisted

(1) US Army Reserve (USAR)

One of the keystones of the USAR Selected Reserve strength gains continues to be the Selected Reserve Incentive Program. Targeted on both accessions and retention, this program has provided the flexibility needed to focus both monetary bonuses and educational incentives on high priority units and selected skills. Since its introduction in FY 1979, several modifications to improve the program have been implemented. An FY 1983 improvement continued in FY 1984 involves the precise targeting of high priority units and management of the selected skills at the MOS level of detail, with a distinction being made between those for enlistment and reenlistment.

Actual USAR recruiting and retention performance and projected requirements are shown in the following table.

	<u>FY 83</u>		<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Accessions</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Prior Service	29,651	39,231	28,503	31,628
Non-Prior Service	34,699	34,913	33,502	37,182
Male	27,600	27,321	26,190	26,891
(HSDG)	17,940	20,321	17,024	17,479
Female	7,099	7,258	8,134	10,287
(HSDG)	7,099	7,258	8,134	10,287
<u>Reenlistments</u>				
First Term	8,064	6,260	6,751	6,608
Career	20,651	24,887	19,430	19,019
Total	28,715	31,147	26,181	27,552

The execution of the USAR Enlisted Accession Plan depends upon the Recruiting Command and the recruiters assigned to it. These recruiters, who are part of the Full-Time Support program, provide direct contact with the civilian or prior service person being recruited. In FY 1983 these recruiters enlisted 65,392 people for the USAR units. In FY 1984 approximately 1,613 recruiters dedicated to enlisted accessions will be in the field, and in FY 1985 that number will increase to approximately 1,855.

(2) Army National Guard (ARNG)

During FY 1983, the enlisted Selected Reserve strength of the ARNG increased by 8,286 (or 2.3 percent); from 367,214 to 375,500. While the FY 1983 ARNG enlisted strength growth was less than that achieved in FY 1982 (16,569 or 4.7 percent), the overall upward trend in enlisted strength is expected to continue through FY 1985.

The ARNG enlisted strength growth in FY 1983 was achieved through the recruiting of about equal numbers of non-prior service personnel and prior service personnel. The steady enlisted strength growth in recent years, however, has resulted from the ARNG recruiting greater numbers of non-prior service personnel. The enlistment, reenlistment and educational financial assistance programs and the split-option, non-prior service training program are critical to support increased recruiting goals and will continue through FY 1985. The split-option training program contributes to the improving strength and quality of the ARNG force by allowing the ARNG to recruit from a market not otherwise available, thus increasing the number of high school graduates and the number of recruits in higher mental categories.

The following table shows the actual and projected accessions strength plan for the ARNG.

Enlisted Strength Plan
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 83		FY 84	FY 85
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
<u>Accessions</u>				
Prior Service	22.0	43.5	50.0	47.0
Non-Prior Service				
Male	61.0	42.3	54.0	57.0
(HSDG) 1/	39.6	26.2	35.1	37.1
Female 1/	6.0	3.3	6.0	6.0
(HSDG) 1/	6.0	3.1	6.0	6.0
<u>Reenlistments</u>				
First Term	10.8	11.8	11.3	12.6
Career	60.9	61.8	61.8	64.7
Total	71.7	73.3	73.1	77.3

1/ Includes pay group L (non-paid members of ARNG)

c. Officer

(1) US Army Reserve (USAR). The number of officers in paid drill status grew by 1,479 in FY 1983. These increases still leave the USAR significantly below its required wartime strength. Unlike active component officers, USAR officer accessions come from a number of sources which are not controlled by the USAR. Accessions for the USAR units come from ROTC, OCS, direct appointments, and transfer from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), which includes officers being released from active duty. To assist in the area of improving the accession of officers, the US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) began a program in FY 1981 which requires that each officer being released from active duty be interviewed. This program, which will continue in FY 1984, assists the USAR in placing officers, reduces time lag in processing paperwork from the installations to the Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center (RCPAC), and assists efforts in developing personal contact between the officer and the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN).

(2) Army National Guard (ARNG). The growth trend in ARNG officer strength continued in FY 1983 with actual gains exceeding losses by 1,291 officers. In FY 1983 the ARNG achieved 99.7 percent of its programmed strength of 41,800 officers, for an actual end strength of 41,678.

Of the newly appointed ARNG officers, 40 percent received their commission from ROTC and 33 percent from State OCS. The remaining 27 percent are direct appointments into the ARNG or individuals who previously held commissions in other components. While ARNG OCS programs remain the primary source of career officers, the ROTC program continues to grow as the major source of lieutenants. The increased ROTC accessions are attributed in part to the success of ARNG officers assigned

to ROTC detachments under the Expand the Base Program, the increased use of Guaranteed Reserve Forces Duty contracts, and the ROTC scholarships awarded to ARNG members. ROTC is expected to continue as the major source of commissioned officers for the ARNG.

Although significant gains were achieved this year in the strength of professional fields, the recruiting and retention of these branches remains a concern, particularly for Army Medical Department (AMEDD) officers and chaplains. Emphasis on specifically tailored recruiting and retention programs will continue to be necessary. The most significant of these are:

- Support of the Full Time AMEDD Recruiting Force to assist the States in alleviating AMEDD officer shortages.
- Waivers of age, overstrength, and training requirements for AMEDD officers.
- Implementation of Reserve of the Army Medical/Dental Student Commissioning Program for ARNG.
- Establishment of TDA positions for Army Nurse Corps officers in states without large medical units through coordination with Health Service Liaison Detachments.
- Enrollment in the Chaplain Candidate Program for full-time graduate students at seminary or theological schools in an effort to alleviate chaplain shortages.

2. Pretrained Individual Manpower. In the event of a major conflict, the active component would require significant augmentation by trained individual reservists to achieve full wartime strength. In addition, large numbers of pretrained individual manpower (PIM) would also be required as casualty replacements until inductees could be trained and transported to the theater of operations. Since the first inductees will not reach the battlefield until approximately 113 days after the implementation of the draft, heavy reliance must be placed on pretrained manpower resources. Because active and reserve component units are generally manned at less than full wartime required levels and PIM inventories will not be large enough to overcome the difference and replace casualties, there will continue to be a mobilization and wartime trained military manpower shortfall. The PIM pool consists of Individual Ready Reserves (IRR), Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA), Inactive National Guard (ING), Standby Reserve, and Recalled Military Retirees.

a. Pretrained Individual Manpower Projections. The following paragraphs discuss the current and projected inventories of the various PIM pools.

(1) Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). One of the largest segments of these pretrained individuals is the IRR with a current strength of approximately 246,000 which is projected to increase to 260,000 by FY 1985. In FY 1983 the Army implemented an IRR non-bonus Direct Enlistment Program designed to provide non-prior service members

for the IRR in combat and medical skills. Due to a lack of incentives, late start and lack of training seats, only 365 individuals were enlisted under the program. A bonus program was authorized for FY 1984, but was not funded in the Appropriation Act.

Individual Ready Reserve
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
246.4	256.1	260.4

(2) Individual Mobilization Augmentation Program.

This program preassigns individual reservists with active component units in peacetime to train for their wartime duties. On October 1, 1981, the Mobilization Designation (MOBDES) program was redesignated the IMA program, and its members were transferred from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) to the Selected Reserve. As members of the Selected Reserve, IMA members are subject to the Presidential 100,000 person call-up authority.

Assignment policies under the program have been expanded to allow the assignment of IMAs to active component wartime-required positions in TOE units. Priority of assignment is given to early deploying units. IMAs will also continue to be assigned to Mobilization TDA positions on installations and in activities that also support expanded operations during a mobilization.

Expansion of assignment policies to TOE positions has greatly increased the number of mobilization manpower positions eligible for fill by IMAs. As these positions are filled, additional training funds will be allocated to the program.

The program's personnel strength is projected to increase significantly as follows:

Individual Mobilization Augmentees
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
8.1	10.7	13.4

(3) Inactive National Guard (ING). The ING consists of those ARNG members who are unable to participate in peacetime training (training assemblies and/or annual training), but who would join and deploy with their units upon partial or full mobilization. Actual and projected strengths of the ING as of the end of FY 1983 are shown below (does not include training/pay category L):

Inactive National Guard
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
9.4	9.6	9.9

(4) Standby Reserve. The strength of the Standby Reserve is being managed to place more eligible reservists in the Ready Reserve. Actual and projected strengths of the Standby Reserve as of the end of FY 1983 are shown below:

Standby Reserve
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
0.3	0.4	0.4

(5) Recalled Retirees. Regular Army and Reserve Retirees that match mobilization requirements can be recalled upon mobilization. During FY 1983 Congress approved statutory changes that permit the recall of Reserve Retirees with 20 years active service under the same conditions as Regular Army (RA) retirees. The number of pre-assigned RA and USAR retirees is shown below:

Retirees
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
126.0	133.9	136.1

b. Pretrained Individual Manpower (PIM) Management and Training. The FY 1984 DoD Authorization Act authorized the Secretary of Defense to increase the military service obligation from six to eight years. This situation will require IRR members to attend additional training to maintain MOS proficiency. In addition, there is a serious shortage of combat skills in the IRR to meet mobilization manpower requirements by M+90 that will require the retraining of outdated skills and unskilled manpower in the IRR. Skill deterioration studies that have recently been conducted further support the requirement for refresher training. All of these factors indicate the need for additional IRR training funds.

3. Full-Time Support. The ultimate goal of the various full-time support programs is to provide the Army with operationally

ready units prior to mobilization. To accomplish this, sufficient full-time manpower must be available to train, supply, maintain, administer, and manage the force. There is simply not enough time between mobilization and deployment to correct deficiencies or to train units. Full-time support for both the ARNG and the USAR consists of the additive full-time manning (FTM) program, and the military technician program.

The FTM program aids unit commanders by improving training, logistics, and mobilization planning and readiness. In the event of a call-up, these soldiers would mobilize with the unit to which they are assigned.

The Reserve Component technician program provides full-time support to all federally recognized units. While serving in a civilian status, technicians must be members of the National Guard/Army Reserve, perform all military training and duty in their units, and be available to enter military active duty when their units are called up. Technician personnel are concentrated in the maintenance, logistics, and ARNG state headquarters functional areas.

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
USAR			
AGR	7,033	9,022	15,027
Military Technicians	6,606	7,585	7,585
ARNG			
AGR	13,757	16,632	26,583
Military Technicians	22,742	24,119	24,119
Active Army			
With USAR	1,270	1,270	1,270
With ARNG	784	839 <u>1/</u>	239 <u>1/</u>
TOTAL	52,192	59,467	74,623

1/ Includes 55 aviator advisors

4. Technician Conversion Program. The program of converting personnel to full-time military status was conceived in 1978 when the Congress mandated a test to determine the ability of the Army Guard and other reserve organizations to attract and retain personnel in an Active Duty Guard/Reserve (AGR) status. Conversion of positions in the Reserve Components was accomplished by changing vacant positions or by voluntary conversion of the incumbent military technician. The Congress directed that no conversion take place in FY 1984 and that the number of USAR and ARNG military technicians would not be below 7,585 and 24,119, respectively. The FY 1985 budget reflects this decision.

C. Civilian Manpower

1. Manpower Requirements and Trends. The readiness of today's Army depends, to a large part, on its civilian component. Civilian manpower is a critical resource when the realities of the constraints of a no-draft environment are recognized. It is one resource that can be utilized selectively and in a timely manner as new mission and readiness needs dictate. Civilian manpower is an invaluable resource to help accomplish force structure changes, relieve manning shortfalls, improve training, assist the modernization process, and provide the base for mobilization and sustainability.

Seeking the best possible use of our military, civilian, and contract labor resources, Army policy has been to use civilians, or contract services when cost-effective, to release military members for essential combat, combat support, and combat service support units. In this regard, Army has vigorously pursued several initiatives to return soldiers to combat units. These initiatives, discussed later in this chapter, include the Commercial Activities, Civilian Substitution, and Borrowed Military Manpower programs. While these programs have been successful, success has been partially restricted due to changing legislative and regulatory guidance that affects program momentum.

The FY 1985 Army civilian end strength request of 401,799 reflects an increase of 1,837 compared to the authorized FY 1984 level of 399,962. This is due to an end strength adjustment in the Army Industrial Fund to accommodate budgeted FY 1985 workload, additional manpower to improve acquisition and control of spare parts, and end strength increases for the Army National Guard for the military technician program. Even though these increases will enhance execution of these programs, the Army's FY 1985 end strength requirement is still insufficient to support increased workloads associated with force modernization and restructuring initiatives, training course development and revision, and base operations support for Europe. If additional civilian spaces were to become available, the Army would increase the number of civilians in these areas with primary emphasis on the support of fielding new weapon systems.

2. Civilian High Grade (GS/GM-13 through SES) Management. Although Congress removed high grade (HG) reduction requirements for GS-13 and above positions, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has continued to monitor high-grade employment. OSD has established high-grade targets and assigned growth allowances for DOD in consultation with the Components. The Army, through assignment of HG authorizations to its major commands and agencies, is keeping within approved targets. As of 30 September 1983, Army civilian HG employment was 192 positions below the OSD approved FY 1983 target.

High-grade targets are subject to change to reflect additional requirements that have been generated by new and expanded missions in support of force modernization, fielding of new systems, improved logistics management and the initiation of high-technology, advanced development projects such as:

- Ballistic Missile Defense
- High Energy Lasers
- Robotics and Artificial Intelligence
- Night Vision Advanced Development
- Chemical/Biological Defense

The substitution of HG civilians for military field grade officers (discussed later in this chapter) has also necessitated a substantial increase in HG authorizations.

D. Commercial Activities (CA) Program. The CA program implements OMB Circular A-76. This circular provides general guidance to the Federal Government and affirms the long standing policy that the Government will rely on the private sector for the goods and services it requires when it is proper and economical to do so. Army implementation of this policy is in accordance with specific guidance issued by OSD and with the statutory requirements applicable to execution of the CA program within the DoD.

Combat, combat support, and combat service support units; activities that are inherently governmental in nature; and overseas activities are excluded from the Army CA program. All other activities that provide services available from private commercial sources are reviewed to see if the activity must be operated by government civilian or military personnel. In-house performance may be dictated by a number of requirements. The activity may be required to deploy or to support contingency plans. In-house performance may be required for military training, to maintain positions for the overseas rotation base, or to retain a core capability for intermediate and depot maintenance. Operation of the activity by a contractor could delay or disrupt an essential operation. When the review of the activity is completed, a decision is made whether to retain it as an in-house operation or to conduct a cost study to see if conversion to contract operation would produce significant savings to the Government. A cost study is initiated only when the review has determined that there is no noncost reason for in-house performance and that performance by a contractor would not degrade readiness in any way.

The CA cost study compares the estimated cost of performing the projected workload by in-house civilian personnel with the cost if performed by contract. A performance work statement is prepared that specifies the services to be provided and sets standards for quality and timeliness. A rigorous management study is conducted to develop the most efficient and competitive organization to perform the workload in the performance work statement.

The performance work statement that is used to develop the most efficient in-house organization is also used to solicit bids from commercial firms, insuring that the costs of in-house and contract performance

are comparable. In the solicitations for CA studies, small business firms are provided opportunities to compete for contracts under both small business set-aside and the CA programs.

At the completion of the cost study, the decision to remain in-house or convert to contract is made by comparing the cost of in-house operations to the cost of operation with the selected responsive and responsible contractor. The activity is converted to contract only if the estimated cost advantage to the Government of conversion will exceed ten percent of the in-house personnel cost. If this minimum cost differential is not met, or if the in-house cost is less than contract cost, the activity is retained in-house and reorganized into its most efficient structure in accordance with the conclusions of the management study.

Commercial activity cost studies offer the Army a unique and effective method of improving the management of resources. The preparation of a performance work statement requires the identification of essential services, output levels, and quality standards rather than reliance on existing procedures and traditional methods of operation. The performance work statement and the most efficient in-house organization to perform the work are developed under the pressure of competition with the private sector and with the participation of a fully informed workforce. This situation produces savings that cannot be obtained from management actions that do not have to meet the acid test of cost comparison. Also, efficiency savings to the Government accrue regardless of the outcome of the cost study. Either a more efficient in-house operation or a cost effective conversion to contract is achieved.

Two CA functions completed during FY 1983 are good examples of the Army's effort. The refuse collection function at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, was retained in-house, at a savings of \$18,700 annually. Nine civilian personnel are involved in this function. The transportation motor pool function at Cameron Station, Virginia, was contracted at an annual savings of \$524,000. This function has previously been performed by 50 civilian personnel.

Army CA cost studies completed during the past two fiscal years and associated manpower data are shown below.

Commercial Activities Cost Studies Completed

FY	Number of Studies Completed	End Strength Involved in Studies Completed			End Strength Involved in Activities Converted			Projected Annual Cost Advantage to the Govt
		Civ	Mil	Total	Civ	Mil	Total	
FY82	65	1,640	195	1,835	1,069	181	1,250	\$37.2M
FY83	44	1,654	339	1,993	1,183	254	1,437	\$51.4M

During FY 1984, the Army will continue to pursue the CA program. New studies were announced on August 4, 1983 and should be completed by the end of FY 1987. The Army has scheduled these new studies to be completed in a balanced program over the next four fiscal years. Our objective is to finish all cost studies as soon as possible in order to achieve the most efficient method of performing our commercial activities. We must, however, devote the time and resources required to develop good performance work statements and to conduct good management studies for these activities so that we may realize the maximum efficiency gains regardless of the decision for in-house or contract performance.

E. Army Performance Oriented Reviews and Standards (APORS) Program. The APORS program is a major productivity enhancement effort of the Army. It implements Department of Defense Guidance to develop performance work statements and conduct efficiency reviews, for non-deployable units, of those areas that are not cost studied under the provisions of OMB Circular A-76 (Commercial Activities (CA)). In addition, APORS provides a framework for integration of similar or like programs, and synchronization of related programs.

APORS consists of an onsite review (evaluation and analysis), conducted by qualified analysts, of processes, procedures, position management and grade structure, activity/work center design, missions, functions, and resources which identifies specific improvements required to measure productivity and enhance operations by improving performance, increasing readiness and achieving efficiency.

APORS will be implemented in non-deployable Army units worldwide over a six year period. Continental United States (CONUS) Major Army Commands (MACOMs) implemented APORS on October 1, 1983. Overseas MACOMs and Army Agencies/Activities will implement the program in their areas on October 1, 1984. The Army staff plan for APORS implementation included the development and conduct of training, providing 583 manpower spaces for field implementation in the CONUS MACOM's merger of APORS with other functional area resources, and development of model job descriptions.

The principal objective of APORS is to take positive steps to improve its efficiency and to improve operations in the non-deployable Army. A secondary objective responds to concern by the Army's top managers about the number of different programs established in the name of enhancing productivity. Therefore, the efficiency review and the methods and standards programs have been combined. APORS provides a basis for Capital Investment, Value Engineering, Management Studies, organizational review, and similar programs also to be combined. Other programs that are related such as Position Management and Classification, Manpower and Staffing Standards program, Defense Retail Interservice Support, and Commercial Activities will be synchronized/coordinated, thus improving the products of all resources and avoiding duplication of effort. It is anticipated that as a minimum, a four percent improvement in efficiency will be experienced in the areas reviewed by APORS over the six year period.

F. Borrowed Military Manpower. Since the mid-1970's, because of insufficient civilian authorizations to meet Army manpower requirements, commanders have been required to "borrow" or "divert" soldiers from their primary duties to fill the shortfall. Of the 14,300 civilian spaces provided by Congress in FY 1983, to be used to return soldiers to their primary duties, approximately 14,100 have been filled. This has resulted in over 14,300 soldiers being returned to their primary duties and a corresponding improvement in near term readiness. Presently, there are approximately 4,000 soldiers still "borrowed" or "diverted", on a daily basis, to fill positions which should be filled by civilians, if sufficient authorizations were available. These spaces are still badly needed, and continued support by Congress of this valuable program has a direct impact in improving readiness.

The Army will strive to maintain the use of borrowed military manpower/troop diversions that are replaceable with civilians at the 4,000 level during FY 1985. However, this can be accomplished only if civilian end strength is not reduced and adequate end strength is provided in relationship to increased workload.

G. Civilian Substitution Program. The Army has used both civilian substitution and civilianization programs as a means of replacing military personnel with civilians. Civilian substitution and civilianization are completely different. The Army prefers and supports civilian substitution, which retains military end strength while increasing readiness through the conversion of appropriate positions from military to civilian and the assignment of the released military manpower to other high priority force structure needs. Civilianization reduces military end strength by a corresponding civilian increase through the conversion of military TDA positions. While both programs increase civilian end strength, only substitution retains military end strength.

The Army currently has a civilian substitution program which was developed initially at the request of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In FY 1983, 1,000 positions were converted from military to civilian. In FY 1984, an additional 1,967 military positions will be converted. In FY 1985 an additional 1,707 (for a total of 4,674) positions will be converted. A total of 7,920 military positions are programmed to be converted from military to civilian through FY 1989. The released military manpower has been programmed to provide for critical increases associated with high priority modernization and readiness programs. The civilian substitution program has allowed the Army to modernize the force structure without significant increases to the active military end strength. If the Civilian Substitution Program is not supported, the Army will require additional military authorizations to continue needed programs.

H. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program. During the past few years, civilian manpower ceilings have restricted the hiring of adequate civilian personnel to implement fully the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program. In legislative action on the FY 1982 DoD Appropriations Bill, the House Committee on Appropriations recognized this problem and recom-

mended that personnel ceilings exclude personnel who work fifty percent of more of their time in support of the FMS function. Currently, the annual Authorization Act and the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 preclude treatment of FMS manpower differently from other categories of Defense programs in formulating budget authorizations. The Army supports amendatory legislation that recommends changes to Section 138(c)(2) of Title 10, United States Code, and Section 605(a) of Public Law 94-329 (International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976) exempting the approximately 3,200 civilians employed in support of the FMS program on a full-time basis from civilian end-strength ceilings.

I. Army Industrial Fund (AIF) Operations Under a Ceiling-Free Environment. The FY 1983 Defense Appropriations Act removed statutory and administratively imposed civilian personnel ceilings in industrially funded activities in FY 1983. Congress lifted the ceiling as a test to determine whether civilian end strength controls are necessary. The FY 1984 Defense Appropriations Act extended this test into FY 1984. In addition, the House Appropriation Committee language states that for purposes of planning FY 1985 workload at industrial activities, continuation of the ceiling free environment should be assumed. A review is being conducted based on FY 1983 experience and a report will be provided to Congress by 1 March 1984. The Army strongly supports permanent elimination of the ceiling.

IV. Army Programmed Manpower by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC).

The following tables display Army programmed manpower by DPPC for FY 1983 through FY 1985. Selected Reserve strengths throughout this section include reservists on full-time active duty for administration and training of the reserves.

ACTIVE ARMY MILITARY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83 (Actual)</u>	<u>FY 84 (FY 1985)</u>	<u>FY 85 Budget)</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>
Offensive Strategic	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.5	0.5	0.5
<u>Tactical/Mobility 1/</u>	<u>464.0</u>	<u>475.8</u>	<u>475.2</u>
Land Forces	463.9	475.4	474.9
Division Forces 1/	(426.9)	(432.4)	(434.6)
Theater Forces	(36.9)	(43.0)	(40.3)
Mobility Forces	0.2	0.4	0.3
<u>Auxiliary Activities 1/</u>	<u>28.2</u>	<u>29.5</u>	<u>30.2</u>
Intelligence	8.4	9.2	9.4
Centrally Managed Communications 1/	14.3	14.6	15.3
Research and Development	5.3	5.5	5.3
Geophysical Activities	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>175.6</u>	<u>175.6</u>	<u>171.6</u>
Base Operating Support	54.8	54.7	52.3
Medical Support	17.9	18.4	18.5
Personnel Support	13.1	13.0	12.8
Individual Training	44.8	44.5	44.4
Force Support Training	3.7	4.3	4.1
Central Logistics	8.6	8.7	8.9
Centralized Support Activities	22.0	21.8	20.5
Management Headquarters	10.5	10.0	9.9
Federal Agency Support	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>668.3</u>	<u>681.4</u>	<u>677.4</u>
<u>Operating Strength Deviation</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>-8.6</u>	<u>-3.3</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>111.3</u>	<u>107.3</u>	<u>106.6</u>
Transients	21.8	23.3	22.9
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	5.1	4.9	4.8
Students, Trainees	79.8	74.7	74.4
Cadets	4.6	4.4	4.4
<u>Total</u>	<u>779.6</u>	<u>780.0</u>	<u>780.8</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/ Does not agree with FYDP. See Appendix A for manpower transfer between DPPCs).

ARMY SELECTED RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER (ARNG)

(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 83 (Actual)	FY 84 (FY 1985	FY 85 Budget)
<u>Strategic</u>	-	-	-
Offensive Strategic	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>370.0</u>	<u>381.7</u>	<u>392.2</u>
Land Forces	370.0	381.7	392.2
Division Forces	(356.5)	(368.1)	(377.8)
Theater Forces	(13.6)	(13.6)	(14.4)
Mobility Forces	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	-	-	-
Intelligence	-	-	-
Centrally Managed Communications	-	-	-
Research and Development	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	-	-	-
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>31.7</u>	<u>31.7</u>	<u>34.6</u>
Base Operating Support	18.9	19.0	19.8
Medical Support	0.2	0.2	0.3
Personnel Support	2.6	2.4	2.6
Individual Training	3.8	3.8	3.8
Force Support Training	-	-	4.0
Central Logistics	-	-	-
Centralized Support Activities	6.0	6.2	7.9
Management Headquarters	*	0.1	0.1
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>401.7</u>	<u>413.4</u>	<u>426.8</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>15.5</u>	<u>19.6</u>	<u>20.5</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	15.5	19.6	20.5
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>417.2</u>	<u>433.0</u>	<u>447.3</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50 spaces

ARMY SELECTED RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER (USAR)

(End Strength in Thousands) (**)

	<u>FY 83</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 84</u> <u>(FY 1985 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	-	-	-
Offensive Strategic	-	-	-
Defense Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>180.0</u>	<u>184.0</u>	<u>195.9</u>
Land forces	178.9 (0.4)	182.9 (1.9)	194.3 (2.4)
Division Forces	(163.9)	(166.4)	(174.9)
Theater Forces	(15.1)	(16.5)	(19.4)
Mobility Forces	1.0	1.1	1.6
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>0.3 (1.3)</u>	<u>0.3 (1.6)</u>	<u>0.7 (2.0)</u>
Intelligence	0.3 (0.7)	0.3 (0.9)	0.7 (1.1)
Centrally Managed Communications	- (0.1)	- (0.1)	- (0.1)
Research and Development	- (0.2)	- (0.2)	- (0.2)
Geophysical Activities	- (0.3)	- (0.4)	- (0.5)
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>68.9 (6.4)</u>	<u>70.3 (7.2)</u>	<u>75.9 (9.0)</u>
Base Operating Support	3.9 (0.5)	4.5 (0.6)	5.5 (0.7)
Medical Support	5.7 (0.9)	6.2 (0.9)	8.1 (1.2)
Personnel Support	1.5 (0.3)	1.9 (0.3)	2.2 (0.4)
Individual Training	54.4 (1.2)	54.0 (1.4)	54.9 (1.7)
Force Support Training	- (1.1)	- (1.2)	- (1.5)
Central Logistics	- (1.2)	- (1.5)	- (1.9)
Centralized Support Activities	2.9 (0.1)	3.3 (0.1)	4.6 (0.1)
Management Headquarters	0.1 (0.8)	0.1 (0.8)	0.1 (1.0)
Federal Agency Support	0.4 (0.4)	0.4 (0.4)	0.5 (0.4)
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>249.2</u>	<u>254.6</u>	<u>272.5</u>
<u>Individual Mobilization Augmentees</u>	<u>8.1*</u>	<u>10.7</u>	<u>13.4</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>8.8</u>	<u>12.8</u>	<u>12.5</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees**	8.8	12.8	12.5
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>266.2</u>	<u>278.1</u>	<u>298.4</u>

Notes:

1. Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.
2. Numbers in parentheses show distribution of Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs).
3. Includes pay category F (non-prior service personnel currently on Initial Active Duty for Training (IADT)); and pay category U (non-prior service personnel serving on the second part of their IADT).

ARMY CIVILIAN PROGRAMMED MANPOWER

(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 83 (Actual)	FY 84 (FY 1985)	FY 85 Budget)
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>
Offensive Strategic	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>23.4</u>	<u>26.1</u>	<u>26.8</u>
Land Forces	22.1	24.2	25.0
Division Forces	(21.1)	(22.9)	(23.6)
Theater Forces	(1.0)	(1.3)	(1.4)
Mobility Forces	1.3	1.9	1.8
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>26.8</u>	<u>27.3</u>	<u>26.6</u>
Intelligence	1.5	1.8	1.8
Centrally Managed Communications	4.2	4.7	4.7
Research and Development	21.1	20.8	20.1
Geophysical Activities	-	-	-
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>340.5</u>	<u>346.5</u>	<u>348.0</u>
Base Operating Support	167.0	166.4	165.2
Medical Support	14.8	15.0	15.0
Personnel Support	8.0	9.3	9.1
Individual Training	12.3	13.4	14.6
Force Support Training	2.0	2.1	2.0
Central Logistics	85.8	89.2	90.2
Centralized Support Activities	35.2	36.5	37.5
Management Headquarters	15.5	14.6	14.6
Federal Agency Support	*	*	*
<u>Total</u>	<u>390.9</u>	<u>400.0</u>	<u>401.8</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50 spaces.

A. Strategic Forces

1. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces

Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.5	0.5	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	0.1	0.1	0.1

Manpower in this subcategory is for support of the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), including airborne command posts and an alternate National Military Command Center.

B. Tactical/Mobility Forces

1. Land Forces

a. Division Forces

Division Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	426.9	432.4	434.6
Reserve Components			
ARNG	356.5	368.1	377.8
USAR	163.9	166.4	174.9
<u>Civilian</u>	21.1	22.9	23.6

Manpower in this subcategory is assigned to or in support of the Army's combat divisions, separate combat brigades, regiments, and tactical support units.

The increase of 5,500 active military spaces in FY 1984 is a result of the inactivation of the 4-4 Mechanized Brigade (-3,793), force modernization initiatives (+2,019), transition to Division 86 design (+950), improved manning of Special Operations Forces units (+1,500), undermanning (+7,400), and transfer of missions from the active to the Reserve Components (-2,610).

The increase of 2,200 active military spaces in FY 1985 is due to numerous initiatives to restructure both light and heavy division forces and maintain total active Army end strength at about the FY 1984 level. Active military manpower changes for FY 1985 include

transition to refined Division 86 designs (-3,072), conversion of a division to the Light Infantry Division design (-2,162), activation of a light infantry division (the 17th Active Component division) (+1,268), enhancements of Corps support functions for light divisions (+311), restructure of Army aviation units (-213), activation of a third Ranger battalion (+575), activation of a logistical support unit in the Sinai (+356), improved manning of Special Operation Forces units (+1000), increases for force modernization initiatives (+3820) and miscellaneous (+320).

The increase in ARNG strength needs in FY 1984 (+11,700) results primarily from an increase in budgeted end strength in order to fill existing authorizations. In FY 1983, budgeted end strength permitted only 92.5% of these authorizations to be filled. The FY 1984 increase allows 99.5% of force structure to be filled, with a resulting improvement in ARNG unit readiness.

During FY 1985, ARNG force structure allowance will increase by 8500 authorizations above the end FY 1984 level. A concurrent increase in ARNG budgeted end strength in FY 1985 (+9,700) will raise the percentage of force structure allowance that can be supported to 100%. To modernize their structure in FY 1985, the ARNG is programmed to activate 35 units while converting 232 ARNG units of company and battalion size to changed unit structures based on an update of Total Army Analysis.

The Army Reserve increases are a part of the increases caused by the activations of six CEWI battalions in FY 1984 and one CEWI battalion and two assault helicopter companies in FY 1985.

Increases in civilian manpower in FY 1984 are to provide logistical and community support for forward stationed forces in Northern Army Group (+325) and to support conversion to military technicians to improve readiness in key USAR and ARNG units (+406). Additional civilians are also needed in FY 1984 (+895) and FY 1985 (+217) for ammunition operations in USAREUR. Other increases in both FY 1984 (+140) and FY 1985 (+142) are to provide logistical support for newly fielded weapons systems while additional civilians in FY 1985 are requested to provide operations, maintenance, and supply support to forward stationed units in Western Command and Eighth Army (+566).

The following table shows active and reserve combined arms organizations programmed for end FY 1985.

Combined Arms Organizations In Division Forces End FY 1985

	<u>Active Army</u>	<u>Reserve Components 3/</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Divisions (Brigades)</u>			
Armored	4(11)	2(6)	6(17)
Mechanized	6(16)	2(6)	8(22)
Infantry	5(11)	5(15)	10(26)
Air Assault	1(3)		1(3)
Airborne	1(3)		1(3)
	17(44)	9(27)	26(71)

Separate Combat Brigades 1/ 2/

Armored	1	3	4
Mechanized	1	7	8
Infantry	0	6	6
	2	16	18

Cavalry Brigade

Air Combat	1	0	1
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Cavalry Regiments

Armored	3	4	7
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- 1/ Includes five Reserve Component separate brigades that round-out Active Component Divisions.
- 2/ Excludes the 33rd Infantry Brigade (Illinois National Guard) which provides for school support, and three active and five reserve infantry brigades that are part of theater forces.
- 3/ Includes three brigades for the 35th MX Division (ARNG).

b. Theater Forces

Theater Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	36.9	43.0	40.3
Reserve Components			
ARNG	13.6	13.6	14.4
USAR	15.1	16.5	19.4
<u>Civilian</u>	1.0	1.3	1.4

Manpower in this subcategory is assigned to theater-wide and specialized units such as three active and four reserve component separate infantry brigades, and one scout group; certain supply, maintenance, and security activities in support of NATO; and theater-level psychological warfare and civil affairs units and related support.

The FY 1984 AC manpower increase of 6,100 is for the activation of PATRIOT air defense units (+2369), psychological warfare and civil affairs units (+1103), increased unit manning (+1323), standardization of unit organizational structure to doctrinal designs (+268), undermanning (+400) and miscellaneous changes (+592).

The FY 1985 active military manpower changes are due to inactivation of NIKE and HAWK air defense units (-3123), increased air defense unit manning levels (+244), and standardization of unit organizational structure to doctrinal designs (+139).

The FY 1985 ARNG military manpower increases enhance fill of Theater Forces and support the reorganization of heavy brigades into the new Division 86 design.

The Army Reserve increases in FY 1984 and FY 1985 are to improve staffing levels of two infantry brigades and two Special Forces Groups, thereby improving readiness.

Civilian increases in FY 1985 are due to increased logistical support for the fielding of new equipment and weapons systems in both Europe and CONUS (+111).

2. Mobility Forces.

<u>Mobility Forces Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.2	0.4	0.3
Reserve Component			
USAR	1.0	1.1	1.6
<u>Civilian</u>	1.3	1.9	1.8

Manpower included in this category supports CONUS Ocean terminal operations, DoD traffic management and engineering services, and accountability and maintenance of the Defense Railway Interchange Fleet.

The decrease in active military manpower in FY 1985 is due to a reduction (-34) in port terminal operations.

Army Reserve increases in FY 1985 are due to the addition of two combat support aviation companies to the structure.

The FY 1985 civilian decrease (-24) reflects adjustments in support of port terminal operations and traffic management activities.

C. Auxiliary Activities

1. Intelligence.

<u>Intelligence Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.4	9.2	9.4
Reserve Component			
USAR	0.3	0.3	0.7
<u>Civilian</u>	1.5	1.8	1.8

Manpower in this category supports Consolidated Cryptologic Activities, the General Defense Intelligence Program, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.

The FY 1985 active military manpower increase supports cryptologic activities (+101) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (+51).

FY 1985 Army Reserve increases are due to increased staffing of military intelligence detachments which had previous significant shortfalls of personnel.

2. Centrally Managed Communications.

Centrally Managed Communications Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u> Active	14.3	14.6	15.3
<u>Civilian</u>	4.2	4.7	4.7

Manpower in this category supports defense consolidated telecommunications and the worldwide command and control system, and excludes support of tactical units (included under Land Forces) and installations (included in Base Operations Support).

The active military manpower increases for FY 1985 are a result of reductions in communications associated with the adjustments to the Division 86 design (-238), standardization of unit organizational structure to doctrinal design (+193), increased unit manning (+100), communications increases for Korea (+143), military to civilian conversions (-42), force modernization increases (+176), and increases in strategic Army communications (+306) and a transfer from the Air Force for communications support of SHAPE Headquarters (+30).

3. Research and Development Activities.

Research and Development Activities
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u> Active	5.3	5.5	5.3
<u>Civilian</u>	21.1	20.8	20.1

Manpower in this category directs contractor efforts and in-house programs in areas of basic and applied research and exploratory, advanced, and engineering development.

The FY 1985 decrease in active military manpower is due to the decision to restrict growth in Field Operating Agencies (-163), reductions in the chemical/biological protective material program (-23) and Army Industrial Fund staffing (-13) offset slightly by an increase in Ballistic Missile Defense Systems (+14).

The decrease in civilian manpower in FY 1985 is a result of a decrease in overall Army Research and Development projects.

4. Geophysical Activities.

Geophysical Activities Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.2	0.2	0.2

Manpower in this category is assigned to the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA).

D. Support Activities

1. Base Operations Support

Base Operating Support Manpower Combat Installations (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	23.9	23.6	22.7
<u>Civilian</u>	87.4	86.1	86.7

Manpower in this subcategory supports the Army's combat mission commands: US Army Europe, US Army Japan, Eighth US Army-Korea, US Army Forces Command, and the US Army Western Command.

The FY 1985 reduction in active military manpower is a result of converting military to civilians (-584), restricting

European growth (-312), additional BASOPS to support Division 86 (+79), increase to reenlistment personnel (+216), and a reduction based upon reliance on the commercial sector or government civilian employees to perform functions more appropriate for civilian than military personnel (-322).

The overall civilian manpower decreases in FY 1984 result from reprogramming from base operations and combat service support augmentation functions, primarily in FORSCOM units (-948). FY 1984 civilian strength was also decreased to reflect changes in the fielding schedule for the PATRIOT Missile (-393). Civilian increases in FY 1985 are to support fielding new systems (+177) and Division 86 restructuring initiatives (+677) in addition to civilian substitution initiatives (+584).

Base Operating Support Manpower
Support Installations
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	30.9	31.2	29.7
Reserve Components			
ARNG	18.9	19.0	19.8
USAR	3.9	4.5	5.5
<u>Civilian</u>	79.5	80.3	78.5

Manpower in this subcategory is for Army support-oriented commands: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command, US Army Communications Command, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, US Army Military District of Washington, and US Army Health Services Command.

The FY 1985 reductions in active military manpower are for military to civilian conversion programs (-248); increased reliance on the commercial sector and government civilian employees to perform functions more appropriate for civilian than military personnel (-1254), and a reduction in commissary retail sales personnel (-26).

The FY 1985 ARNG increases are due to fill of current base operations support structure shortfalls in order to permit increased reliance on the ARNG and improve readiness.

The USAR increase in FY 1985 is to fill existing structure shortfalls in U.S. Army garrisons and personnel and administration battalions, and for RCPAC augmentation.

Civilian decreases in FY 1985 reflect reprogramming of civilian spaces from base operations activities (-1,860) and field operating agencies (-300) to support force modernization and training initiatives, with an increase (+320) due to civilian conversions.

2. Medical Support Activities.

Medical Support Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	17.9	18.4	18.5
Reserve Components			
ARNG	0.2	0.2	0.3
USAR	5.7	6.2	8.1
<u>Civilian</u>	14.8	15.0	15.0

Manpower in this category supports health care activities.

Active military increases in FY 1985 support direct patient care in Army Medical Centers (+78).

ARNG increases in FY 1985 are to fill existing structure to a minimum of its force structure allowance.

The USAR increase in FY 1985 results from the activation of several Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals (MASH) and medical and dental detachments.

3. Personnel Support Activities.

Personnel Support Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	13.1	13.0	12.8
Reserve Components			
ARNG	2.6	2.4	2.6
USAR	1.5	1.9	2.2
<u>Civilian</u>	8.0	9.3	9.1

Manpower in this category is used in the US Army Recruiting Command, the Army Junior ROTC Program, counterintelligence and investigative activities, Army personnel processing activities, and off duty education programs.

The FY 1985 decrease in active military manpower is due to the conversion of military to civilians (-17), reductions in recruiting activities (-42) and examining activities (-113).

The increase in the USAR and ARNG strengths in FY 1985 is the result of growth in the recruiting force associated with increased strength needs and with increased dependence upon the Reserve Components.

Civilian increases in FY 1984 result from augmentation of the Army's civilian intern program (+645); restoration of spaces from the Army Correctional Activity (+120) to adjust for a projected decline in prisoner population that did not materialize; logistic and supply support for training activities (+374) and additional personnel for research on recruitment and retention policies and quality of life programs (+174). The FY 1985 decrease from FY 1984 levels results primarily from reductions to Military Enlisted Processing Command staffing (-205), partially offset by increased civilian substitution (+43).

4. Individual Training Activities.

	<u>Individual Training Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)		
	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	44.8	44.5	44.4
Reserve Components			
ARNG	3.8	3.8	4.0
USAR	54.4	54.0	54.9
<u>Civilian</u>	12.3	13.4	14.6

Manpower in this category supports the conduct of individual training. Individuals actually undergoing training are carried in the student/trainee and cadets portions of the Individuals account.

The active military manpower changes for FY 1985 are a result of increases for flight training (+74), and integrated skills training (+241) offset by a decrease in training developments (-267) and at the U.S. Military Academy and the USMA Preparatory School (-126).

The ARNG changes in FY 1985 reflect increased fill of the 33d Infantry Brigade (Training) (Illinois National Guard) which will allow that unit to move toward filling its force structure allowance.

The USAR changes in FY 1985 are the result of reorganization of training divisions accompanied by an improvement in manning of the divisions.

FY 1984 civilian increases result from augmentation in general skills training to support new equipment fielding (+481), expansion of military technicians conversions in the Army National Guard (+140), additional support for specialized training of mid-level noncommissioned officers (+102), and military to civilian conversions (+397). Civilian strength growth in FY 1985 is to support general skills training (873), specialized skills training (+136), and integrated skill training associated with new systems fielding.

5. Force Support Training Activities.

Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	3.7	4.3	4.1
<u>Civilian</u>	2.0	2.1	2.0

Manpower in this category supports the Army's Jungle Warfare School in Panama, the Northern Warfare Training Command in Alaska, and the Seventh Army Training Center in Germany.

The FY 1985 decrease in active military manpower is a result of military to civilian conversions (-34), reductions in force related training for the M-1 Abrams tank (-144) and Bradley Fighting Vehicle (-135), adjustments to unit manning documents (+207), and reductions in training support (-141).

The decrease in civilian manpower in FY 1985 is a result of decreases in the development and fielding of individual training and evaluation programs (-73) and other force related training initiatives.

6. Central Logistics Activities.

Central Logistics Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.6	8.7	8.9
<u>Civilian</u>	85.8	89.2	90.2

Manpower in this category serves in supply, maintenance, and logistics support activities worldwide, with the largest strength concentration in the US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command and US Army Europe.

The active military manpower changes for FY 1985 are a result of increases for overseas port units (+216), and supply operations (+31) offset by a decrease for logistic support activities (-68).

The increase in civilian manpower in FY 1984 is the result of additional manpower for procurement activities (+357), military construction support (+392), management of logistics systems including inventory control and demilitarization (+708), and for industrially funded supply and maintenance activities (+1,938). Civilian manpower increases for FY 1985 include additional manpower for industrial funded supply and maintenance of new systems and improvements to existing systems (+628) as well as procurement support for new systems (+328).

7. Centralized Support Activities.

Centralized Support Activities Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	22.0	21.8	20.5
Reserve Components			
ARNG	6.1	6.2	7.9
USAR	2.9	3.3	4.6
<u>Civilian</u>	35.2	36.5	37.5

Manpower in this category supports joint and international activities (less management headquarters), combat development, counter-intelligence reserve activities, public affairs, personnel administration, criminal investigation, OSD activities, and foreign military sales.

FY 1985 reductions in active military manpower are due to reductions in Foreign Military Sales support (-71), full-time manning to the Reserve Components (-800), personnel administration (-78), full-time support provided to the USAR as a result of the elimination of Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions (-223), and decisions to restrict growth in Field Operating Agencies (-251), offset by increases caused by conversion of units to standard doctrinal designs (+104), in combat development activities (+20), and additional support to OSD and JCS (+25).

ARNG increases in FY 1985 are due to increases in full-time unit support previously provided by active military manpower (+600), mobilization planners at MACOMs (+51), and reenlistment personnel (+99). The remainder (+950) are for fill of existing force structure due to increased reliance on the RC.

The USAR increases are to fill structure shortfalls in public affairs and personnel and administration units.

Civilian increases in FY 1984 (+1274) and FY 1985 (+1647) are due to increased emphasis on military technician conversions, partially offset by FY 1985 decreases in manpower for Army field operating agencies (-862).

8. Management Headquarters Activities.

Management Headquarters Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	10.5	10.0	9.9
Reserve Components			
ARNG	*	0.1	0.1
USAR	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>Civilian</u>	15.5	14.6	14.6

* Fewer than 50 spaces.

Manpower in this category is assigned to defense agencies, international military organizations, unified commands, service support-combat commands, and service support-support commands.

Reductions shown reflect the Congressional/OSD-mandated five percent reduction for Army Management Headquarters in FY 1984 and FY 1985.

9. Federal Agency Activities.

Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.2	0.2	0.2
Reserve Component			
USAR	0.4	0.4	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

Manpower in this category is assigned to non-DoD agencies in support of various functions. Assignments are normally on a reimbursable basis unless they support the mission of DoD.

The Army Reserve increase in FY 1985 is a result of increased support of Selective Service activities.

E. Operating Strength Deviation

Operating Strength Deviation
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0	-8.6	-3.3

Operating strength deviation is the number of spaces in the force structure (units) that are not filled (undermanning) or are over filled (overmanning) primarily because of the seasonal or cyclic nature of gains and losses.

End strength deviations shown reflect a snapshot situation as of 30 September and are not necessarily reflective of the average deviation throughout the year.

A more representative indicator is the average yearly operating strength deviation, which for FY 1984 and FY 1985 is projected to be -3.2K and -2.1K, respectively. Because of Congressional actions on the Army's FY 1984 budget request, the Army's basic philosophy changed from outyear growth to outyear stability. During the construction of the FY 1985 President's Budget, accommodations for the end strength changes were made and a turbulent two-year period resulted. Additionally, the tougher drug policy initiated in late FY 1983 is showing its effects in FY 1984 and FY 1985.

The projected FY 1984 deviation is due to

F. Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs)

Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs)
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Reserve Component			
USAR	8.1	10.7	13.4

An IMA is an individual reservist (officer or enlisted) who is preassigned to an Active Component organization in peacetime to train for wartime duty with that organization. Increases are the result of growth in the program.

G. Individuals.

The Individuals accounts are estimates of manpower required for transients, holdees (patients, prisoners, separatees), trainees, students, and US Military Academy cadets.

1. Transients.

Transients Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	21.8	23.3	22.9

Transient strengths are based on the projected levels of non-prior service accessions; separations; retirements; and operational, rotational, and training moves.

The changes in transient end strengths are as a result of a change in seasonality of accessions and overseas rotation.

2. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees

Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.1	4.9	4.8

The decreases in FY 1984 and FY 1985 are primarily the result of more soldiers expected to leave the Army in September than in previous years, and is based on recent experience.

3. Trainees, Students, and Cadets

Trainees, Students, and Cadets
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Trainees/Students	79.8	74.7	74.4
Cadets	4.6	4.4	4.4
Reserve Component			
Trainees/Students			
ARNG	15.5	19.6	20.5
USAR	8.8	12.8	12.5

Active component trainees decrease in FY 1984 because training is currently programmed to occur early in the fiscal year, thus contributing to the operating strength in FY 1984 and FY 1985. This has the additional benefit of smoothing training load.

The USAR increases are due to expansion of the total paid strength and the resulting increase in those attending training.

The ARNG increases in FY 1985 support the increased accessions to attain an end strength of 447.3K. Non-prior service accessions increased to 65,000 in FY 1985, which required an increase to the trainee/student account.

CHAPTER IV
NAVY MANPOWER PROGRAM

I. Introduction

A. Summary and Authorization Request

This chapter describes the Navy's manpower program for FY 1985. The program derives from the force structure required to accomplish Navy missions within the scope of the national political and military strategy.

The Navy requests resources for active military, reserve military, and civilian manpower for FY 1985 and FY 1986 as follows:

Navy Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>		
Active	575.3	595.6
Total Selected Reserve	128.8	134.7
Drilling Reservists and Trainees	(112.6)	(117.6)
Active-Duty Reservists (TARs)	(15.2)	(16.0)
IMAs (CAT"D") ^{1/}	(0.8)	(0.9)
Active Guard and Reserve (10 U.S.C. 265)	(0.2)	(0.2)
<u>Civilian</u>	317.7	320.3

^{1/} Individual Mobilization Augmentees (Pay Category "D" perform two weeks active duty for training but are not paid for drills.)

The Navy is requesting an active manpower increase of 3.5 percent for FY 1986.

B. Major Force Structure Changes. Major Force Structure consists of Total Ship Battle Forces, Local Defense and Miscellaneous Support Forces, and Naval Aviation Forces.

1. Total Battle Forces. In FY 1985, the Total Ship Battle Forces will increase by 20 to 545 ships. Changes in each of the four categories comprising Total Ship Battle Forces (Strategic Forces, Battle Forces, Support Forces, and Mobilization Forces Category "A") follows:

a. Strategic Forces. Strategic Forces will contain 43 ships in FY 1985, an increase of two from FY 1984 as two new OHIO class TRIDENTS are commissioned.

b. Battle Forces. The number of other Battle Force ships will grow from 426 to 434 between FY 1984 and FY 1985. The number of carriers will remain at 13 in both years. There will be a net gain of six surface combatants to 199 during FY 1985: Eight new frigates and one guided-missile cruiser will be delivered; two FFG-7 Class guided missile frigates will transfer from Battle Forces into Mobilization Category "A," when they enter the Naval Reserve Forces; and one FF-1098 class frigate will enter inactive status. The attack submarine force will gain three new SSN-688 vessels, and two others will enter inactive status, resulting in a net SS/SSN total (Conventional/Nuclear Attack Submarines) of 100 in FY 1985. There will be six patrol combatants in both years. Amphibious warfare ships will remain at 59 during FY 1984 and FY 1985 as one LSD-28 class ship is decommissioned and one LSD-41 class ship is commissioned. Mine warfare ships in the Battle Forces category will increase from three to four during FY 1985, with the commissioning of USS AVENGER (MCM-1). Mobile logistics ships will remain at 53 during both years.

c. Support Forces. The number of support forces will increase by eight vessels, from 46 to 54, with the addition of five ocean surveillance ships (TAGOS) and three ARS-50 class salvage ships.

d. Mobilization Forces Category "A". Mobilization Forces Category "A" ships increase by a net of two ships to 14, with the aforementioned transfer of two FFG-7s in FY 1985.

2. Local Defense and Miscellaneous Support Forces. Auxiliaries and Sealift force levels increase from 35 to 43 ships with the addition of eight TAKXs and one new TAVB, and one TARC transferred to inactive status. Mobilization Forces Category "B" fall from 24 to 18, with the decommissioning of six ships.

3. Naval Aviation Forces. A total of 88 Navy active and 16 reserve tactical squadrons will be operating during FY 1984. In FY 1985, the number of active tactical squadrons will increase to 90 with the addition of two F/A-18 squadrons. A total of 55 active and 17 reserve fixed-wing and rotary-wing Antisubmarine Warfare and Fleet Air Defense squadrons will be operating in FY 1984, the active increasing to 57 in FY 1985 with the addition of two LAMPS squadrons. The number of active direct-support squadrons remains at 18 during FY 1984 and FY 1985. The number of reserve light attack helicopter and direct-support squadrons remains at two and 16, respectively.

II. Manpower Requirements Determination

A. Manpower Management Systems. On December 27, 1983, the Secretary of the Navy approved a new concept for manpower requirements determination within Navy entitled Navy Manpower Engineering Program (NAVMEP). Its principle objective is to fully support the planning, programming, and budgeting system with emphasis on relating manpower requirements and authorizations to funded programs while achieving economic and efficient manpower utilization. NAVMEP is an umbrella program which includes:

(1) Ship and Squadron Manpower Document Programs; (2) Efficiency Review (ER) Program; (3) Shore Requirements, Standards, and Manpower Planning System (SHORSTAMPS); (4) Commercial Activities (CA) Programs; and other manpower determination approaches such as macro-models developed at more aggregate levels of detail. Other manpower determination programs that complement NAVMEP include: (1) Military Manpower/Hardware Integration Program (HARDMAN); (2) Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS); and (3) Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS). NAVMEP will shorten the time needed to document manpower requirements and will ensure that all programs which contribute to the overall documentation effort are coordinated and jointly managed.

The objectives of the Manpower Requirements Determination Process are:

- o to identify the quantitative and qualitative manpower requirements to support the accomplishment of all assigned missions in the operational forces and the associated shore support establishment;
- o to allow the timely identification of manpower requirements of the training implications and operations of new weapons systems and platforms; and
- o to determine the total force, military and civilian, wartime mobilization requirements for various scenarios.

1. Navy Active/Reserve Force Mix. The Navy is growing toward the goal of 600 ships and 15 battle groups. A major component of this growth is occurring in the Naval Reserve, which is embarked on its most ambitious expansion effort in recent history. Navy has completed two of three phases of a recently initiated Active/Reserve Force Mix Study by the Center for Naval Analyses. Now in the most difficult analytic phase, the study is scheduled for completion in October 1984. It is essential that the Navy Total Force growth is properly structured and balances warfighting capabilities and readiness impacts. Limited resources must be used with optimum efficiency. Rapid crisis response, heavy training requirements, and fleet readiness all must be accommodated in the face of an increasingly capable Soviet threat.

In addition, Navy formed a flag officer oversight group to supervise all Active/Reserve Force Mix studies and investigations. It is formulating Navy strategy on Active/Reserve Force mix issues, ensuring the Naval Reserve has the capability to maintain a high state of readiness, and examining possible additional roles and missions for the Naval Reserve. Working in conjunction with this group is the newly-appointed Special Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations on Total Force Planning. This rear admiral and his staff were appointed to advocate a balanced approach to active and reserve matters. Their analysis extends to all mission areas using a cost and benefit approach to optimize Total Force Planning.

This section provides an overview of the Navy's active/reserve force mix for FY 1985 and later years. A separate, more detailed report is being provided by the Navy to concerned Congressional committees on the Navy's policies and plans to enhance the Naval Reserve.

The force mix for Navy's tactical forces is different from that of other Services because of the need to forward deploy at sea a large number of units during peacetime. A ship's mobility distinguishes it as a forward asset. Unlike units assigned to forward deployed bases, a deployed ship may be in the Mediterranean one week and then, due to national requirements, transit to the Indian Ocean or the North Atlantic. Even if a ship were to stay in the Mediterranean Sea, its schedule could change due to an emergent threat or mission requiring its presence elsewhere. Since Reserves are available for about two weeks without mobilization, they have limited application in fulfilling Navy's forward deployed peacetime requirements. It is difficult to get an individual to a ship at sea, especially if that ship's schedule has changed and it is no longer in its normal operating area. It is possible that a drilling reservist sent to join a ship in transit could spend his entire Active Duty for Training period chasing the ship. National interests would suffer were a ship required to remain in the home operating area just to facilitate Reserve employment. The mobile nature of forward deployed Naval units forces Navy to meet most overseas commitments with active forces.

Peacetime commitments dictate that about 30 percent of the Navy's current active operating force be deployed overseas in a fully operational status. Thus, ships and their crews will be away from CONUS for six to eight months at a time. An additional 40 percent of the active operating forces conducts Atlantic and Pacific fleet operations while based in U.S. ports. These U.S. based forces are operationally ready for rapid deployment or reinforcement of forward-deployed forces in the event of war, contingency, or crisis. The remaining 30 percent of the active operating force is in reduced operational status, undergoing planned maintenance and conducting training. In times of tension or crisis, forward deployment of the fleet can be increased from 30 percent to about 50 percent without mobilization or undue short term strain on the remaining units. Serving as the vanguard of the nation's forward strategy, the Navy's peacetime operations are essentially the same as wartime operations, varying only in degree of intensity and expanse.

As an example of Navy's requirement, the Navy was involved in 70 percent (34 of 47) of the overseas incidents that required some form of U.S. military response in the last ten years. In more than 43 percent (20 of 47) of those cases, Navy was the only Service capable of providing the needed response.

Deployment commitments are thus an important element in active/reserve force mix decision making. Because Selected Reserve units are comprised of personnel who are available for only limited periods of time, six month deployments are not feasible. If active ships and aircraft are transferred to the Reserve Component, the Navy has two choices in scheduling fleet operations: either to lessen present commitments abroad by reducing the number of forward deployed units or to require remaining active forces to spend more time overseas. Reduction in presence overseas decreases

flexibility to respond to contingencies. Extending time away from home-port affects material condition of equipment and retention of skilled personnel who cite family separation as the primary reason for leaving the Navy. Where possible, the Navy uses Selected Reservists to help meet commitments. For example, Reserve anti-submarine patrol aircraft fly 10,000 hours in direct support to fleet operations in deployed areas and another 5,000 hours from their homeports. Ships take at least two to three weeks to reach deployed areas and return and are thereby limited in deployed support. Thus, the Navy must meet overseas commitments mainly with active forces.

The gap between peacetime capability and wartime requirements must be filled with qualified reserve units and individuals. One major function of the Naval Reserve in peacetime is to man, equip and train for a high state of readiness upon mobilization. In training to fill this gap and ensure effective integration upon mobilization, the Naval Reserve provides active forces with direct support which is mutually beneficial to Selected Reserve mobilization and training requirements. The phrase "mutual support" has been adopted to describe those Naval Reserve training evolutions which also provide direct assistance to active duty units in the performance of their missions. Examples are CONUS air logistics support, air tanker services, drug interdiction, predeployment air combat refresher training, fleet intelligence production, fleet exercise support, ship intermediate level maintenance, cargo handling support, construction support, chaplain and medical support, and security group signal analysis.

The Naval Reserve force presently contributes to total Navy force capability as follows:

- 3% of Navy Amphibious Warfare Ships
- 6% of Navy Surface Combatants (Destroyers)
- 14% of Naval Submarine Force Support Personnel
- 14% of Navy Tactical Carrier Air Wings (CVW)
- 17% of Navy Base Operating Support Personnel
- 18% of Navy ASW Helicopter Squadrons (HS)
- 30% of Naval Medical Support Personnel
- 34% of Naval Intelligence Personnel
- 35% of Naval Maritime Air Patrol Squadrons (VP)
- 40% of Navy Composite (Service) Squadrons (VC)
- 66% of Naval Special Boat Forces
- 65% of Navy Mobile Construction Battalions
- 85% of Military Sealift Command (MSC) Military Personnel
- 86% of Navy Cargo Handling Battalions
- 86% of Naval Ocean Minesweepers
- 99% of Naval Control of Shipping Organization
- 100% of Naval Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Units
- 100% of Navy Combat SAR Capability (HC-9)
- 100% of Light Attack Helicopter Squadrons (HAL)
- 100% of Naval CONUS Based Logistic Airlift (VR)

The Navy plans a major modernization effort for the Naval Reserve. The Navy has programmed the transfer of 24 modern frigates from the active force to the Naval Reserve Force (NRF). Of particular significance in the Surface Naval Reserve Force is the introduction of modern frigates (eight FF-1052 class and 16 guided-missile FFG-7 class). Several ships will be transferred from the active fleet each year (the first four arrived in FY 1982), until a total of 24 frigates is reached in FY 1988. The new frigates are fully as capable as and are exact copies of the active ships. They represent a major upgrade of surface combat capabilities, especially in the area of antisubmarine warfare.

A similar modernization effort is programmed for the mine warfare arm of the NRF, with the introduction of mine countermeasures (MCM-1 class) and mine sweeper-hunter (MSH-1 class) ships to replace retiring ocean minesweepers (MSOs). The Navy will transfer the first MCM-1 class ship in FY 1986, with additional transfers in successive years to total eight ships by end of FY 1989.

The Naval Air Reserve comprises 51 aviation squadrons, with a programmed increase to 53 by FY 1986. Along with surface Reserve modernization, the Navy plans to equip the Naval Air Reserve with more sophisticated attack, fighter, antisubmarine warfare, and support aircraft beginning in FY 1984. Of particular significance is the beginning of the F/A-18 training program for pilot and maintenance personnel in FY 1984 for coordination with the projected delivery of those aircraft into the Naval Air Reserve in FY 1985. The current A-7B attack squadrons are programmed to become four F/A-18 and two A-7E squadrons by FY 1989. Two F-4N fighter squadrons are programmed for change to two F-4S squadrons, for a total of four F-4S squadrons by end of FY 1984. The transport and cargo squadrons will be completely converted to C-9s by end of FY 1985, representing a major upgrade to the fleet logistics support mission. Two Naval Air Reserve helicopter squadrons are moving from SH-3D to SH-2F LAMPS MK-I helicopters and one new SH-2F squadron will be formed in FY 1986: This change will make these squadrons compatible with the modern frigates being introduced in the surface Naval Reserve Force. The Navy will modernize Reserve VP aircraft with Tactical Navigation Modification by FY 1986 and plans to introduce a VP Master Augment Unit (MAU) in Brunswick (1984). MAUs combine 18 Reserve augmentation crews units into one unit and use three P-3C aircraft plus trainers and facilities to train SELRES crews. One Reserve squadron has converted from E-2B to E-2C airborne early warning aircraft (1983) and the other is scheduled to convert in FY 1988.

The decision to make a unit active or reserve must be made in the context of fleet readiness, combat capability, forward deployment requirements, and costs associated with operating units. The goal of Navy is to strike the best active/reserve force mix balance consistent with warfighting capability and cost effectiveness.

2. Operating Forces. As the Navy grows, it establishes additional active duty positions to meet ship, squadron, and support requirements ashore for the growing fleet as well as to provide sea-to-shore rotation in support of new positions at sea. Operating force programmed manpower for the fleet is determined through the Navy's Ship and Squadron Manpower Document Systems.

The Ship Manpower Document (SMD) identifies manpower requirements for individual ships predicated on ship configuration, computed work load, Required Operational Capabilities, and Projected Operational Environment (ROC and POE). It determines the level of manpower essential to the operation, maintenance, and support of a ship under stated conditions of readiness. The SMD program covered 91 percent of all ships at the beginning of FY 1984, and is projected to cover 94 percent during FY 1985.

The Squadron Manpower Document (SQMD) identifies requirements for aviation squadrons that relate work load to the operating tempo defined in the ROC and POE statements. Initial documentation has been completed for all active-duty aviation squadrons. The SQMD program schedule provides for annual updates of Fleet Readiness Squadrons and Training Squadrons, while updates for all other squadrons are scheduled for 24-30 month intervals. During FY 1983, 100 percent of squadrons were covered by SQMDs. Navy expects to sustain that percentage in FY 1984 and FY 1985.

3. Shore Support Establishment. The OSD Efficiency Review Program has been combined with SHORSTAMPS under the NAVMEP concept to determine requirements for military and civilian manpower in the shore support establishment. The goal is to define manpower requirements for 100 percent of the shore establishment by end FY 1985; 51 percent is presently covered under SHORSTAMPS.

4. Manpower Requirements and Hardware Procurement. The Military Manpower and Hardware Integration Development Program has completed the sixth year of a seven-year development effort. The principal objective of this program is to develop analytical tools and methodologies capable of determining the manpower, personnel, and training requirements of any new weapon system during the concept and design phases of the Weapon System Acquisition Process (WSAP).

The various HARDMAN methodologies have successfully completed their test application on systems currently in the WSAP and are now being integrated and automated. Upon successful completion of a pilot program in FY 1984, HARDMAN will be implemented Navy-wide in FY 1985.

5. Navy Manpower Mobilization System. The Navy Manpower Mobilization System is used to plan and program for total wartime manpower requirements. NAMMOS requirements are reviewed annually with regard to specific functional categories, changes in the scenario and

force structure, mobilization training requirements, and impact of host-nation support agreements. When the review is completed, it is possible to evaluate whether the existing manpower inventory is adequate--quantitatively and qualitatively--to meet the projected mobilization requirements.

As a system, NAMMOS was designed to make maximum use of existing systems, methodologies, and data bases. To determine operational mobilization manpower requirements, NAMMOS uses the Ship Manning Document and Squadron Manning Document programs. Based upon current force tables, annually each active fleet and Naval Reserve Force ship and aircraft squadron is listed and active duty billets authorized compared to SMD and SQMD requirements. The delta is the mobilization increment identified in NAMMOS.

The NAMMOS methodology as applied to shore commands is an extension of SHORSTAMPS. The NAMMOS and SHORSTAMPS systems employ a common functional classification of manpower covering all support mission areas. The NAMMOS system, however, operates at a significantly higher level of aggregation than does the SHORSTAMPS system, which is oriented to the work center level. Thus, the NAMMOS system is more flexible and responsive in the determination of mobilization manpower requirements for alternative scenarios.

6. Wartime Manpower Planning System. The Wartime Manpower Planning System is a Department of Defense-wide data base for computing, compiling, projecting, and displaying the demand and supply of military and civilian wartime manpower. WARMAPS estimates of Navy wartime manpower requirements and assets are based upon a set of policies and assumptions consistent with the Navy Manpower Mobilization System. The Department of Defense and the Navy use data generated by WARMAPS to prepare and review manpower mobilization plans, the Program Objectives Memorandum, budget estimates and justification, Congressional reports and testimony, and responses to Congressional and other inquiries.

B. Manpower Management Improvements. In addition to the previous discussion of the active/reserve force mix, three significant improvements are noted next.

1. Enlisted Inventory Balance. The Navy is taking action to correct its enlisted inventory imbalance. Navy's current enlisted inventory imbalance was caused by two interacting factors: 1) introduction of sophisticated weapons platforms requiring highly skilled and technically experienced personnel and 2) the inability to retain sufficient numbers of midgrade petty officers from 1974 through 1979. To correct this imbalance, Navy expects to increase the retention of personnel in technically skilled ratings. Additionally, Navy is accessing high quality recruits, thus ensuring survivability and trainability, and providing these personnel with the proper technical training required to successfully support a 600 ship Navy. These actions will be complemented by the accession of approximately 10,000 technically qualified, prior service veterans per year. The aggregate and rating-specific inventory imbalances are expected to be corrected by 1989.

2. Navy Manpower Engineering Program. The Navy Manpower Engineering Program discussed earlier (paragraph II.A.) represents a step toward the goal of manpower management in a total force context. Navy has also initiated several improvements, related to NAVMEP, to increase accuracy, and responsiveness of management information systems which support Manpower Management.

3. Individuals Account. The Navy is implementing revised accounting procedures to more accurately account for and process people in the Individuals Account. The Navy's Individuals Account is composed of personnel who are not assigned to force structure at any specified time, but who do contribute to the overall Navy mission. It includes students, patients, prisoners, separatees, transients, trainees, and cadets. Every person in the Individuals Account is in an authorized billet for the specific purpose of being trained, moving to a new assignment, getting well, or serving a sentence imposed by a court-martial. For this reason the Individuals Account supplements the force structure and is necessary to sustain the operations of the Navy.

III. Significant Program Highlights

A. Overview

1. Manpower for a Growing Navy. FY 1985 continues significant expansion of the nation's naval forces. Substantial growth is programmed in the numbers of ships, aircraft, and weapons systems, bringing increased requirements for manpower. Throughout the remainder of the decade, the Navy must expand its manpower resources in order to support and operate the growing Navy. The keys to meeting the increased manpower requirement for active military are sustained high continuation and retention rates, attaining necessary quality and quantity in recruiting, and attainment of programmed strength growth.

Career satisfaction and compensation remain the most desirable and effective ways to obtain the quantity and quality of personnel needed for the 1980s and beyond. A Navy career, to remain attractive, must depend on a competitive compensation package including special and incentive pays, bonuses, fringe benefits, and a stable retirement system. Attractiveness is further enhanced by improved training and quality-of-life improvements in living conditions and adequate family services.

Planning for active military support of a growing Navy is based on a combination of related factors:

- Sustaining retention of first term and career personnel at levels comparable to FY 1982 through periodic adjustments which keep the military compensation package competitive with civilian opportunities.
- Successful recruiting of approximately 6,500 prior-service enlisted veterans per year.

- Accession of non-prior-service enlisted personnel at annual rates of about 70,000.
- Moderate increases in the number of women in the Navy (within the constraints of Section 6015 of U.S. Code, Title 10).

The Navy's various inventory projection models repeatedly predict that it can achieve required quantity end strength under these planning factors. Economic considerations are a major factor, as demonstrated by modeling and confirmed by actual experience. Compensation issues are central to meeting expanding Navy manpower requirements; this requirement is true for civilians and members of the Selected Reserve as well as for active-duty personnel.

To meet the Navy's expanding manpower needs only in numbers is not enough; manning a growing naval force has a qualitative dimension as well. The types of skills required depend on the composition of the naval force to be manned. Projections show there will be a significant increase in requirements in technical ratings through 1990. The quality of new recruits and the career force must match these changing needs.

The distribution of military manpower during the expansion period reflects growth not only in the number of ships and squadrons but also in the support elements of the force. The following table depicts the growth profiles as currently programmed. The right-hand column shows growth planned for each Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC) category over the five-year period ending in FY 1989. The specific figures may change as a result of annual budget decisions; however, the general proportions should remain relatively stable.

Navy Active Strength Distribution By DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 84-89</u>
Strategic	20.6	20.8	21.8	22.1	22.9	23.5	+ 2.9
Tactical/Mobility	277.8	284.4	295.2	302.2	304.8	309.7	+31.9
Auxiliary Activities	23.7	24.2	24.8	25.0	24.9	25.0	+ 1.3
Support Activities	145.5	149.1	155.0	157.4	158.4	159.2	+13.7
Individuals	97.2	96.8	98.9	100.8	102.7	104.0	+ 6.8
TOTALS*	<u>564.8</u>	<u>575.3</u>	<u>595.6</u>	<u>607.6</u>	<u>613.7</u>	<u>621.4</u>	<u>+56.6</u>

* Totals may not add due to rounding.

The bulk (61 percent) of the added active-duty manpower is programmed for Strategic and Tactical/Mobility categories. Increasing the number of ships and aircraft dictates increases in support activities as well. Support requirements (base operating support, personnel support, individual training, logistics, etc.) account for approximately 24 percent of the growth. Relatively small increases (three percent) will

occur in Auxiliary Activities (intelligence, communications, research and development, and geophysical activities). The Individuals Account (students, trainees, and transients) is a necessity so that military personnel will be adequately prepared to assist the Navy in accomplishing its mission. This will occur through proper training, both in schools and at a variety of duty stations. The account has grown in proportion to the overall growth in end strength.

The active growth of 56,600 shown in the preceding table is to provide for crews and essential support to Naval units deploying on a routine basis. During the time period shown in this table, the number of ships in the Strategic Forces, Battle Forces, and Support Forces increases by 50. Current and future operational requirements dictate that these ships and associated support activities be manned with full-time active personnel. As can be seen in the next table, the Selected Reserve also grows significantly. When measured by percentage, the Reserve grows 20 percent, a faster rate than the active forces which grow 9.2 percent. Mobilization category "A" ships increase by 27 in the DPPC table timeframe, a result of Navy's commitment to expand the Selected Reserve in those areas where the mission can be effectively accomplished by Selected Reservists.

Expansion of the Naval Reserve is integral to expansion of the Total Force Navy. Increases in Selected Reserve manpower will be distributed among the DPPC categories previously discussed for active duty manpower as follows:

Navy Selected Reserve Strength Distribution by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 84-89</u>
Strategic	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	+ 0.1
Tactical/Mobility	75.4	77.1	79.7	82.8	85.8	86.0	+11.6
Auxiliary Activities	6.2	6.5	6.7	6.8	7.1	7.1	+ 0.9
Support Activities	37.0	41.5	44.6	47.4	49.2	49.4	+12.4
Individuals	3.5	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	- 0.3
TOTALS	122.5	128.8	134.7	140.7	145.8	146.2	+24.7

The Navy FY 1985 budget submission indicates that Selected Reserve strength will reach to the full NAMMOS requirement by the end of FY 1988. The growth is programmed for higher priority units to achieve full funding in the earlier years and the lower priority units to be fully funded in the later years. Reserve force ships and squadrons received highest priority with full funding in FY 1984 followed by ship and squadron augmentation units, combat and combat support units such as Special Warfare units, Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity (SIMAs), and Mobile Construction Battalions. Auxiliary Activities, which includes intelligence, communications, research and weather units, are incrementally increased to reach full funding by the end of FY 1988. Augmentation for Support Activities is incrementally funded to reach the full requirement by the end of FY 1988.

One problem facing the Navy during the expansion period is the shortage of mid-grade surface, submarine, and air warfare officers of the Unrestricted Line. Inventory lagged below authorizations throughout the 1970s. The FY 1982 and FY 1983 improvements in compensation and quality of service life have helped stem the outflow of junior and mid-grade officers; however, the Navy cannot enjoy for some years a complete recovery from the mid-grade shortages that reached critical proportions as the 1970s ended. A key element of the Navy program to manage the mid-grade officer shortfall is continuation of the temporary promotion authority which expires 30 September 1984. Temporary promotion to lieutenant commander of lieutenants serving in certain specified engineering billets is necessary to keep these most critical billets filled with qualified officers. Temporary promotion authority provides a flexible alternative to alleviate critical surface and submarine engineering officer shortages. No additional cost is incurred while effectively targeting these skill shortages. OSD plans to submit legislation in FY 1984 to provide the Navy permanent temporary promotion authority. The current inventory reflects the improved continuation in senior grades of all categories except submarine warfare, improved retention in junior grades experienced recently, and confidence that currently funded bonus plans and pay raises which match the annual growth in private sector pay will continue throughout the 1980s. Officer recruiting and retention during the FY 1985 budget cycle are covered in detail later in the chapter.

An additional problem impeding the elimination of the mid-grade officer shortfall is the restrictive nature of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act 0-4 and 0-5 ceilings. When DOPMA was enacted in 1980, the 0-4 and 0-5 grade tables contained in the legislation were based on inventory achievable under poor officer continuation and not on the requirements of an expanding Navy. At the time, Congress expressed receptiveness to legislation in three to five years to increase the statutory ceilings when continuation improved and the ceilings became restrictive. The recent improvement in officer continuation caused the inventory to reach the ceilings in 1981. Further inventory growth, which is necessary to alleviate the mid-grade officer shortfall, is being constrained by the ceilings. Consequently, a proposal to increase the 0-4 and 0-5 ceilings to the approximate level of programmed authorizations will be submitted this fiscal year.

As with the officer community, the Navy's enlisted force is faced with current manpower imbalances, particularly among trained petty officers who constitute the vital supervisory and skilled experience necessary to fleet operations. The inventory of the Navy's "Top-Six" petty officers (pay grades E-4 through E-9) lagged below authorized strength throughout the 1970s. Continued attention to compensation issues and quality-of-life improvements have eased the worst shortfalls but these initiatives must be maintained to eliminate the petty officer skill imbalances by the end of FY 1989. Elimination of petty officer imbalances in certain mission-critical ratings will require either legislative change to remove the current Selected Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) ceiling or a significant increase in sea pay.

The problem of enlisted manpower imbalances has a qualitative as well as a quantitative dimension. Certain occupational specialities--that is, Navy ratings--suffer greater shortfalls. These are the "critical ratings" vital to the operation of ships and aircraft. Inventories in several of these ratings currently lag 10 to 25 percent (and in some cases more) below authorized levels; as a result, sea-to-shore rotation for these sailors must be adjusted, keeping people at sea for unacceptably long periods.

Navy's success in growing enlisted personnel inventories by 14,000 in FY 1983, enlisted careerists (Length of Service over four years) by 16,300 and Top-Six (E-4 to E-9) inventories by 19,400 in FY 1983 is largely attributed to the compensation increases (including the SRB) passed by the 98th Congress and the national economic situation. These increases not only provided a real economic restoration to competitive compensation, but also represent a national change in attitude toward the military profession as a highly regarded career. Navy's FY 1985 program is predicated on continued realization of competitive pay scales and Congressional support of requested bonuses and recruiting resources.

Civilian manpower comprises a vital segment of the Navy's manpower resources. The majority of Navy civilian employees are directly related to readiness posture: over half work in industrial fund activities, which are primarily engaged in depot-level maintenance and repair of ships, planes, missiles, and associated equipment. Many of the civilians perform essential readiness support in supply centers, ship repair facilities, and air stations. The remainder of the Navy's civilians provide vital support in training, medical, engineering, development, and acquisition, all of which have a longer-range effect on readiness. The Navy civilian end strength for FY 1985 reflects a reduction of 588 from FY 1984. Despite the slight net decrease in total civilian end strength resulting from workload decreases at some industrial fund activities, the Navy has provided for selected increases in direct readiness-related functions and other essential support functions. This reflects the continuation of the readiness improvements begun in FY 1981 which significantly reduced the backlog of ship overhaul deferrals; improved aircraft maintenance; made a more responsive supply system; and expanded civilian manning of Military Sealift Command Support Ships.

B. Active

1. Enlisted

a. Enlisted Recruiting. The Navy achieved its "One Navy" recruiting objectives in FY 1983. While the total number of accessions required was lower in FY 1983 than in previous years, Navy capitalized on this situation, as well as economic conditions, to access the best quality applicants. As a result, trainee attrition losses have declined during

this fiscal year. Additionally, the quality achievements accomplished in FY 1983 are expected to result in reduced first term attrition in future years. Navy was also able to improve the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) posture with a FY 1983 end size of 43,351 as compared to 39,336 at the end of FY 1982.

The Navy has had notable success in the prior service market, by attaining 7,818 prior service veterans in only those ratings that are currently undermanned. Navy veterans, of whom 76.7 percent were petty officers, were made available for immediate assignment to fleet billets. This has contributed to improved readiness during FY 1983.

With respect to quality, the Navy accessed 59,836 non-prior service male high school diploma graduates (HSDG), exceeding its target of 57,000. The total number equated to 90.0 percent of the total NPS male accessions. The Mental Group I-IIIU (Upper Mental Group) goal of 63 percent was exceeded by 7.0 percent, while Navy achieved 4.0 percent below the 12 percent NPS male Mental Group IV ceiling with all MG IV recruits being high school diploma graduates. The Navy's MG IV attainment was well under the Congressionally mandated ceiling for FY 1983 of 20 percent MG IV NPS males.

The Navy's recruiting success in FY 1983 is attributable to reduced accession numbers, sound management of scarce resource allocations, and the national economic situation. The FY 1983 success should not cause undue optimism when considering future year recruiting objectives. While Navy anticipates achieving its FY 1984 goals, due in part to the excellent DEP posture, it will become more difficult to achieve FY 1985 and beyond goals. These goals will require accessing approximately 100,000 active duty accessions per year with extremely high quality requirements. An Upper Mental Group quality requirement of 64 percent, and 80 percent HSDG, will be necessary to assure Navy can sustain its present force structure and provide trained personnel to meet the scheduled growth in inventories prior to 1989.

Attainment of this quality and growth is directly dependent on the success of Navy's recruiting efforts. Congressionally directed budget cuts decreased recruiting resources in FY 1983 and FY 1984. Any further cuts, coupled with the decline in the market of recruitable non-prior service males and the predicted improving economy, may negatively affect Navy's ability to attain its accession goals. In light of this predicted recruiting environment, recruiting resources must be sustained.

Another pivotal indicator of recruiting success is the status of the DEP pool. A large DEP is an invaluable aid in recruiting: Navy's objective is to increase the DEP to 55,000, approximately one-half the future recruiting objective. A DEP of this size will mitigate against the negative effects of fluctuating compensation, economic situations, and loss behavior which might impact the recruiting environment or numerical objectives. Consequently, the Navy is programming personnel and fiscal resources to provide for continued attainment of annual recruiting objectives while concurrently increasing the size of the DEP posture.

To be certain that Navy can grow the future petty officers to meet the 600 ship force structure, Navy will attempt to maintain present quality goals for FY 1984 and beyond. These goals, as stated above, will not only meet trainable quality requirements, as determined by Mental Group, but also will improve survivability which correlates directly to HSDG status.

Enlisted Strength Plan
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u>		<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
<u>End Strength</u>	487.5	484.6	491.8	498.8
<u>Accessions</u>				
Prior Service:	7.8	7.8	8.0	10.0
Non-Prior Service:				
Male	66.5	66.5	73.2	76.0
HSDG	57.0	59.8	57.0	60.8
(%)	(85.7)	(90.0)	(77.9)	(80.0)
Female	8.5	8.5	8.1	10.6
HSDG	8.0	8.5	7.7	10.1
(%)	(95)	(99.9)	(95)	(95)

Navy's major management initiatives, which are incorporated into its inventory growth plan to man the 600 ships, center around correction of the petty officer imbalance by FY 1988, while concurrently balancing the skill inventories to meet skill demands in 1990. To accomplish this objective, Navy must retain its technically trained petty officers, provide professional development to assure attainment of necessary experience, train new accessions to support inventory growth in seriously undermanned ratings, recruit quality accessions to insure trainability and survivability during the first enlistment, and request compensation initiatives that will provide a competitive benefits program necessary to sustain and grow the required force structure.

b. Enlisted Retention. FY 1983 marked Navy's third consecutive year of improved retention with highest net reenlistment rates since the end of conscription. Retention rates exceeded goal in all terms of service reducing Navy's petty officer imbalance from 22,000 in FY 1981 to 9,286 at end FY 1983.

	<u>FY 83</u>		<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
1st Term	55.7%	49%	50%	48%
2nd Term	65.4%	63%	65%	67%
3rd Term	96.6%	96%	95%	96%
& beyond				

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
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT FY
1985 VOLUME III FORCE READINESS REPORT(U) ASSISTANT
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Balancing Navy's force structure in FY 1984 and beyond while maintaining programmed growth will require sustained momentum of today's retention climate. Accelerating economic recovery and concurrent increase in civilian employment opportunity are early indicators of the increasingly competitive market place Navy will encounter in FY 1984 and FY 1985. Competitive compensation, retirement system stability, Selective Reenlistment Bonus funding and Vietnam Era G.I. Bill extension will be major determinants shaping the retention decisions of our highest quality careerists and molding the retention climate for the rest of this decade.

c. Enlisted Attrition. First-term enlisted attrition for FY 1983 dropped to 11.3 percent from a FY 1982 level of 11.7 percent. Project Upgrade 83, a special discharge program used to eliminate marginal performers, discharged 35.3 percent fewer personnel than a similar discharge program held in FY 1982. (If the figures from Project Upgrade 83 had been excluded, end-of-year attrition would have been 10.1 percent.)

d. Enlisted Desertion and Unauthorized Absences (UA). The desertion rate continued to decline in FY 1983 for the sixth consecutive year. The FY 1983 rate of 12.9 per 1000 is the lowest the Navy has experienced since FY 1972, and it represents a 28.3 percent improvement when compared to the FY 1982 desertion rate of 18.0 per 1000. The unauthorized absence rate also continues to improve. The FY 1983 UA rate of 48.8 per 1000 represents a 23.2 percent improvement when compared to the FY 1982 UA rate of 63.6 per 1000. This is the fourth consecutive year the UA rate has declined and the FY 1983 UA rate was the lowest in the Navy since FY 1973.

2. Officers

a. Officer Accessions. Active officer procurement goals and attainment for the FY 1985 budget period are as follows:

	<u>Active Navy Officer Procurement Goals</u>		
	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Plan	7,529	6,348	9,379
Actual	7,479 ^{1/}		

^{1/} End strength constraints caused a delay of commissioning 295 FY 1983 accessions to FY 1984.

Accessions to the Navy officer corps come from both regular and reserve officer commissioning sources. Of the 7,479 officers commissioned in FY 1983, 2,458 (33%) were commissioned in the regular Navy. Roughly 74 percent of these regular officers (1,822) were accessed through the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) or the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps (NROTC) Scholarship Program.

The Navy also recruits officers via reserve officer programs. Continued emphasis on officer recruiting, improved training, and an uncertain economy were factors in achieving 101 percent (3,990) of the FY 1983 reserve officer recruiting goal.

The following data portray the Navy's recruiting success in officer accessions by program:

Recruiting Command's Major Officer Program Attainment
(Percent of Goal)

<u>Program</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Aviation Officer Candidate	103	103	101
Naval Flight Officer Candidate	105	105	101
Surface Warfare Officer	103	108	108
Nuclear Propulsion Officer Candidate	49	76	103
Supply Officer	104	100	101
General Unrestricted Line	102	100	103
Civil Engineer Corps Officer	101	102	101
Physicians	141	93	82
Nurses	100	100	100

Although recruiting has met overall reserve officer requirements, the Navy continues to experience shortfalls in medical specialties and attainment of overall nuclear power officer requirements.

The nuclear officer community continues to experience accession shortages. The overall nuclear power officer accessions as percent of goal from all sources (USNA, NROTC, and Recruiting Command) are: 74 percent for FY 1981, 81 percent for FY 1982, and 96 percent for FY 1983. Nuclear power accessions come from three sources; U.S. Naval Academy, Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps, and the Nuclear Propulsion Officer Candidate (NUPOC) program. Over the past five years these sources have only been able to produce an average of 614 accessions per year. This is less than the 830 required annually, producing a shortfall of 26 percent. Because of the current economic situation, NUPOC accessions are providing about 300 new officers per year into the nuclear power program. However, historically low continuation rates have been experienced with officers acquired from the NUPOC source. This low continuation prevents an equivalent substitution of NUPOC officers for USNA and NROTC accession shortfalls. Present economic recovery is expected to adversely affect the ability of the NUPOC source to continue providing a high number of nuclear officer accessions. The 2,000 additional NROTC scholarships (authorized in four annual increments of 500) are expected to provide the additional accessions necessary for NROTC to meet its nuclear power accession goal. Establishment of a new source of officers with high continuation rates (Nuclear Enlisted Commissioning Program) is a necessary step to securing a firm accession foundation. Navy is submitting the legislation to establish this program.

Physician recruiting remains an area of considerable concern. We recruited more physicians in FY 1983 than in FY 1982, yet did not meet our FY 1983 goal. Navy's requirements for medical specialists, particularly surgeons, have been historically difficult to meet in an extremely competitive market place.

Officer goals remain high and are realistic as long as the Navy remains competitive in attracting candidates from the highly competitive civilian market place.

b. Officer Retention. FY 1983 marked the third consecutive year of significant improvement in overall officer retention. Increases were attained in all unrestricted line officer communities. These increases can be attributed to past compensation gains, including bonuses, and the moderating influence of the economy on the civilian sector. Despite gains, mid-grade shortages still exist in the submarine, aviation, and surface communities. The current economic recovery and increase in civilian employment opportunities are early indicators of the increasing retention challenge the Navy will encounter in FY 1985 and beyond.

Most encouraging is the improvement in pilot retention. In FY 1983 pilot retention rose to 58 percent from 49 percent in FY 1982. The increase is largely attributed to increased compensation realized in FY 1981, the Aviation Officer Continuation Pay (AOCP) that took effect on July 1, 1981, and the continued paucity of airline hiring through FY 1983. During the period of the AOCP program, which ran through September 30, 1982, ninety percent of the aviators in the critical sixth through ninth years of aviation service obligated for the bonus. Seventy percent made four-year commitments. The severe midgrade aviator shortage was reduced from 2,350 in FY 1981 to 1,206 by end FY 1983. The bonus is presently targeted to the younger aviator (6 through 10 years service vice 6 through 15 years service) and requires longer term contracts (3 year minimum). Now that the benefits from AOCP are being realized, more discrete application of bonus among aviation specialties can be made without jeopardizing the positive impacts of the program throughout naval aviation. The proposed FY 1985 AOCP program is specifically directed toward the young Navy and Marine aviator team whose retention is critical to our warfighting capability.

Nuclear Submarine officer retention for FY 1983 was 46 percent. This was better than projected, but short of the 61 percent needed within that cohort. Inventories in the 0-4/5/6 grades are abnormally small due to inadequate accessions in the past and historically poor continuation. Compensation increases in FY 1981 combined with high unemployment conditions have resulted in increased retention rates. The same number of nuclear trained officers (183) resigned in FY 1983 as in FY 1982. An improvement in junior officer inventory has been achieved. This increase in nuclear trained 0-3s provides a partial solution to poor continuation to the senior grades. Steady achievement of accession goals and continued improvements in retention are required now and in the future, if 0-4/5/6 shortages are to be eliminated. As the economic recovery progresses,

retention is expected to decline to previous low levels. By maintaining the effectiveness of earlier compensation gains through periodic adjustments, the Navy can sustain the recovery of nuclear trained officer inventories.

The following data show relative success in retention among the Navy's Unrestricted Line communities.

Unrestricted Line Officer Retention Rates
(Percent)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Surface Warfare	39	42	43	45
Surface Nuclear	42	33	21	45
Pilot	30	42	49	58
Naval Flight Officer	71	65	73	74
Nuclear Submarine	36	33	39	46

Improving retention rates throughout the 1980s is central to alleviating officer shortages and enabling force structure expansion. Navy is programming an increase of 7,983 more officers by FY 1988. This increase can be attained through sustaining competitive compensation and continuing to focus on retention issues.

3. Navy Women. FY 1983 marked steady progress toward reaching the Navy's goal of 45,000 enlisted women and 7,200 women officers on active duty by FY 1987.

In FY 1979, the Navy's Enlisted Women's Utilization Study developed a methodology for determining the maximum number of women that could be used effectively without adversely affecting sea/shore rotation Navy wide and still provide a career path and upward mobility for the women. The study showed that the Navy can use about 45,000 enlisted women and projected that the goal could be reached in FY 1985. Accession cuts based on end strength constraints in the past two fiscal years, however, and the need to properly manage the enlisted women's accessions to ensure their entrance into needed skill areas have necessitated a revision of the attainment year to FY 1987.

End Strength: Enlisted Women

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
			Actual			Projected		
End Strength	5,723	29,806	34,348	37,024	40,477	41,500	43,800	45,000
% of all								
Navy enlisted	1.1	6.5	7.3	7.7	8.2	8.4	8.6	8.6

The study was validated annually through 1982. In 1983, Navy undertook an extensive review of it in an effort to refine goals of enlisted women in individual rating specialties.

As part of the 45,000 enlisted women's end-strength goal, 31 percent (13,950) are needed in "non-traditional" skill areas for women, such as engineering/hull, deck, and electronics/precision instrument ratings. In FY 1983, progress continued to increase the number and percentage of enlisted women in the needed non-traditional skill areas.

		<u>Enlisted Women</u> <u>Traditional/Non-traditional Skills</u>						
		<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
		<u>Actual</u>			<u>Projected</u>			
Traditional	14,660	17,496	19,745	21,739	21,335	21,988	21,190	
Percentage	49	51	53	54	51	50	47	
Non-traditional	6,521	7,762	8,779	9,922	11,205	13,140	15,702	
Percentage	22	22	24	24	27	30	35	
Non-designated	8,625	9,090	8,500	8,816	8,960	8,672	45,000	
Percentage	29	26	23	22	22	20	18	

Growth was also attained in FY 1983 in the number of women officers:

	<u>End Strength: Women Officers</u>							
	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
			<u>Actual</u>				<u>Projected</u>	
End Strength	3,185	4,877	5,345	5,740	6,322	6,438	6,789	7,216
Percentage of Navy Officers	4.3	7.7	8.2	8.5	9.0	9.4	9.4	9.5

As these figures show, the number of women officers increased by 582 between FY 1982 and FY 1983. As a proportion of all officers, women increased from 8.5 to 9.0 percent. Navy projects 7,216 women officers on active duty by FY 1987. This projection is based on the number of women in each officer community that can be effectively employed given existing legal constraints on their assignment.

Navy policy is to employ women to the fullest extent, assigning them to positions commensurate with their expertise and capabilities. Under the provisions of Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 6015, Navy may not assign women to ships or aircraft squadrons engaged in combat missions. Consequently, 13 of the Navy's 99 enlisted occupational specialties are closed to women because these fields are almost exclusively on board combatant ships and aircraft squadrons. In addition, four other enlisted occupational specialties are presently closed to women because of a lack of a viable career path. Because of their combat relationship, two officer

communities, Submarine Warfare and Special Warfare, are also closed to women. It should be noted, however, that both officer and enlisted women are assigned to non-combatant ships and to aviation force-support and training squadrons and deploy regularly to the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Western Pacific.

As of the end of FY 1983, 2,623 enlisted women were serving in 26 ships. Likewise, 170 women officers were serving in 30 ships. Current plans call for 5,338 enlisted women and 200 women officers to be in shipboard assignments by FY 1985. At the end of FY 1983, there were 97 women pilots (including trainees) versus 60 at the same time the previous year, and 38 women are Naval Flight Officers (including trainees). Approximately 14 percent of enlisted women serve in aviation rating specialties.

C. Reserve

1. General. In November 1983, the Navy Manpower Mobilization System established a Selected Reserve (SELRES) manpower requirement of 121,408 for fiscal year 1985. At the present strength level, Naval Reserve Force ships and squadrons will be programmed at 100 percent of requirements, auxiliary activities at 90 percent, and other support activities at 86 percent.

<u>CATEGORY A</u> <u>Unit</u>	<u>FY 84</u> 104,466	<u>FY 85</u> 109,060	<u>FY 86</u> 114,060
Individual Mobilization Augmentee	600	940	940
<u>CATEGORY F</u> <u>Trainees</u>	2,934	2,640	2,640
<u>CATEGORY D</u> <u>Individual</u> Mobilization Augmentee	650	750	850
Full-time Support (Training and Administration of Reserves)	13,846	15,410	16,227
End Strength	122,496	128,800	134,717

A total of 600 Category A Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) will be funded in FY 1984. The increase in Training and Administration of Reserve (TARs) supports the NRF ships and squadrons, Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Departments (AIMDs), SIMAs, and base support. The drilling Reserve increase between FY 1984 and FY 1985 includes 2,100 medical support personnel, with 1,800 for ships, squadrons, SIMAs and operational staffs, and the balance of the increase distributed throughout the DPPC structure.

The Sea and Air Mariner (SAM) Program was developed to meet junior enlisted personnel mobilization requirements. The Appropriation Committee directed that SAM accessions be limited to 5,000 in FY 1984 unless the Naval Reserve achieves an average on-board strength of 105,000. The SAM program will increase use of traditional "A" schools and other command-sponsored training to enable the Naval Reserve to satisfy its E-4 requirements as well as unattainable E-3 and below skill requirements for NRF ships, squadrons, SIMAs, and medical units. The SAM program will ultimately expand to 10,000 per year the number of non-prior service accessions into the Naval Reserve.

2. Enlisted Retention. To analyze retention within the Selected Reserve, it is presently necessary to review retention data for those people who have been affiliated with a unit for less than one year separately from data for those who have been affiliated with a unit for more than one year. Since many Selected Reservists are non-obligors who may cease to participate at any time, a breakdown by length of unit affiliation allows reserve units to direct special retention efforts toward newer affiliates. What is not reflected is total Naval Reserve affiliation which is also of importance for retention efforts. This refinement of retention data to define overall Naval Reserve participation is now in progress. The Navy has extended the current goals pending this review and pending the impact of the total force mix issue on Selected Reserve force composition.

Retention by Percent

<u>Affiliated</u>	<u>FY 83</u>		<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Less than one year	85	85.2	85	85
More than one year	88	90.9	88	88

3. Incentive Programs. Three bonus programs are presently employed to upgrade enlisted quality in the Selected Reserve:

- Reenlistment Selected Reserve: A bonus of \$900 or \$1,800 for either a three-year or six-year reenlistment of SELRES personnel with fewer than nine years of service.
- Selective Affiliation for Selected Reservists: A bonus directed toward active personnel in the "4X6" program who entered the Navy under an enlistment agreement requiring a total six-year obligation, the first four years of which are served on active duty. These people are eligible for a bonus if they affiliate in the Selected Reserve at a point between 4 and 5 1/2 years of initial obligated service. The individual payment equals \$25 for each month of remaining obligated service.
- SAM Enlistment Bonus or Tuition Aid: For critical rates, payments is \$2,000 or \$4,000.

4. Officers. Local recruiting commands, with access to nation-wide officer billet availability, conduct Naval Reserve Officer recruiting. Past increases in authorized Selected Reserve Officer billets have been meager when compared with those of enlisted billets. Further, those increases have been in the junior officer ranks (O-1 to O-3) in response to the active force mobilization requirements. This paucity of authorized and funded billets, when coupled with the declining available prior service officer population, makes it difficult to recruit enough Selected Reserve Officers to meet mobilization requirements. The Naval Reserve has invested significant additional efforts into new junior officer recruiting areas while expanding and publicizing those ongoing accession programs which include direct commissions into the Naval Reserve in some areas.

5. NRF Frigate Program. During FY 1985, the Navy will continue to transfer frigates from the active fleet into the Naval Reserve Force. The program calls for eight KNOX class (FF-1052) and 16 PERRY class (FFG-7) frigates in the NRF by the end of FY 1988 as follows:

NRF Frigate Program Schedule

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>
Frigates Added	2	3	2	3	4	6
Total Number	6	9	11	14	18	24

Each NRF frigate will be manned by a crew consisting of both active-duty and drilling reservist personnel. The crew mix will vary slightly according to ship type: 50/50 active-duty/reserve for the KNOX class ships and 60/40 for the PERRYs. The House Appropriations Committee (HAC) has directed that all Naval Reserve Force FF and FFG active billets be filled by members of the Training and Administration of Reserves program. TARs now account for more than 50 percent (approximately 85 of 155 billets) of the active-duty crews of the FF-1052's now in the NRF. Two additional ratings have been approved for entry into the TAR program in FY 1986. Further expansion potential is currently being examined, with the goal of compliance with the HAC guidance. The unusual nature of the NRF frigate crewing requires that some of the maintenance responsibility typically handled by the ship's crew on board an active-fleet vessel be transferred to a co-located Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity (Naval Reserve Maintenance Facility (NRMF)). Most of the recruits for the expanded surface TAR program will perform their shore-duty tours at the SIMA(NRMF)s.

The Commander Naval Surface Reserve Force will assume responsibility for overseeing preparation of employment schedules and approving NRF frigate operating schedules. He will share responsibility for developing the ships' readiness training programs for the combined active/Selected Reserve crews and will monitor material and personnel readiness of the ships, as well as their funding. Operating tempo of the NRF ships will be limited to the level necessary to ensure proper crew training, operational reliability, and safety.

This plan assigns the Naval Reserve an increased role in the Navy's wartime antisubmarine warfare mission and provides the NRF with assets to augment wartime convoy escort forces. The plan increases the authority of the Commander Naval Surface Reserve Force to ensure NRF frigates are responsive to reserve readiness mobilization training. This plan involves the Naval Reserve to a much greater degree in fleet operations through the expanded use of TAR and Selected Reserve personnel in both the NRF frigates and supporting SIMA(NRMF)s.

6. Modernization of the Naval Air Reserve. In response to the President's direction to provide more capable Reserve components, the Naval Air Reserve is embarking on an ambitious plan to improve its force structure. By pursuing a program of horizontal integration, or the concurrent incorporation of hardware in both Reserve and active components, the Navy is significantly enhancing overall readiness. By FY 1984, horizontal integration will be initiated in the case of the E-2C and A-7E communities. In addition, introduction of the F/A-18 into the Naval Reserve marks the first opportunity to operate a front line aircraft concurrent with its fleet-wide employment. In addition, the Naval Reserve is continuing a program of replacing C-118 aircraft with DC-9 aircraft. A modernized inventory of Reserve aircraft will facilitate better opportunities for training while providing a capable force in being. The net result will be increased operational readiness through a modern Naval Air Reserve Force.

D. Civilian. The FY 1985 Navy Civilian end strength request is 317,727. The request reflects changes in personnel phasing, as well as workload-related decreases at some industrial fund activities and increases at a number of non-industrial fund activities in direct readiness-related functions and other essential support areas.

Central supply staffing increases represent a continuation of Congressionally directed initiatives to improve inventory management. The increases will also provide for other supply workload increases that will result in more responsive, timely, and efficient provision of supplies to the fleet. Fleet operating bases and stations will also receive additional civilians to enhance their ability to maintain a high level of fleet operational readiness in such areas as ship maintenance and increased base security. Staffing increases for Naval Investigative Service agents and facilities acquisition and management oversight will provide increased contract management effort, as well as investigation and prevention of fraud, waste and abuse. Medical activity increases are primarily associated with implementation of the occupational safety and health program. Personnel are also to be added for a variety of aviation acquisition, engineering, and technical support programs. These increases represent a continuation and expansion of the readiness improvements begun in FY 1981 which have resulted in improved aircraft maintenance, a more responsive supply system, an expanded, civilian-manned fleet of military sealift ships, and a significant reduction in the backlog of ship overhauls.

E. Commercial Activities Program. Continuing the momentum previously gained in the Commercial Activities Program, the Navy completed 352 cost studies in FY 1983. This represents an increase of 40 percent over the 252 studies completed in FY 1982. Of the 6,746 end strength involved in these cost studies, 53 percent or 3,396 were in functions converted to contract. The net savings of civilian end strength from these conversions has been deducted from the civilian end strength reflected in the FY 1984 and FY 1985 columns of the President's FY 1985 Budget.

The Navy has increased the level of trained personnel available to develop performance work statements and conduct cost studies. The increase has moved the Navy toward the goal of achieving the most cost effective means of support. We have encountered problems that are inherent with any program of this size and nature, but none were considered significant or insurmountable.

Cost Comparison Studies
In-House or Contract Decisions

Number of Studies Completed	End Strength Involved in Studies			Number of Activities Converted to Contract	End Strength Involved in Studies			Projected Annual Cost Advantage to Government
	Civ.	Mil	Total		Mil	Civ	Total	
FY 83: 352	6,383	365	6,746	161	295	3,101	3,396	\$26,263,000

Examples of functions converted to contract during FY 1983 indicate the range of savings encompassed by the program. The base operating support function at Naval Air Station, Memphis, Tennessee, which had previously been performed by 43 military and 255 civilians was contracted out at a projected annual savings of \$3,235,000. At the other end of the spectrum, the administrative telephone services, previously performed by 5 civilian employees at Naval Air Station, Dallas, Texas, was converted to contract for a projected annual savings of \$9,000.

The Navy has also restructured in-house requirements to most efficiently accomplish work. This restructuring has reduced manpower by about 10 percent in those functions studied. The following examples illustrate the application of the restructuring.

The manpower requirements to perform the maintenance of buildings, structures, and grounds at Naval Air Station, Brunswick, Maine, were reduced from 59 civilians to 53 civilians and thus proved more economical than contractor performance.

Similarly, the bulk liquid storage function at the Naval Supply Center, Puget Sound, Washington, was retained in-house as most cost effective following a cost comparison study in which civilian requirements were reduced from 27 to 24.

IV. Navy Programmed Manpower By Defense Planning and Programming Categories

This section summarizes changes in Navy's manpower totals in terms of force and program changes resulting in year-to-year adjustment in overall Navy strength. The summary tables which follow display Navy active military, Selected Reserve, and civilian manpower by DPPC over the period FY 1983 through FY 1985. Following these tables, each subcategory is discussed separately.

One factor which complicates discussion of the FY 1983 to FY 1984 changes is the fluctuating operating strength in the force structure. When it is necessary to ensure a correct representation of manpower changes between FY 1983 and FY 1984, the effects of these factors will be explained in the context of planned force structure increases.

NAVY ACTIVE MILITARY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1983 Actual	FY 1984 FY 1985 Budget	FY 1985
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>20.0</u>	<u>20.6</u>	<u>20.8</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	18.3	18.8	18.9
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	1.8	1.9	2.0
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>269.8</u>	<u>277.8</u>	<u>284.4</u>
Land Forces	3.6	4.0	4.2
Tactical Air Forces	63.7	65.9	66.4
Naval Forces	202.2	207.6	213.5
Mobility Forces	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>22.9</u>	<u>23.7</u>	<u>24.2</u>
Intelligence	8.3	8.5	8.6
Centrally Managed Communications	7.0	7.3	7.6
Research and Development	5.7	6.0	6.1
Geophysical Activities	2.0	1.9	1.9
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>148.3</u>	<u>145.5</u>	<u>149.1</u>
Base Operating Support	62.8	58.1	60.5
Medical Support	10.6	11.6	12.3
Personnel Support	7.9	7.8	7.8
Individual Training	29.6	29.7	29.2
Force Support Training	14.5	15.4	16.0
Central Logistics	6.7	6.8	7.1
Centralized Support Activities	6.6	6.7	6.7
Management Headquarters	8.7	8.4	8.4
Federal Agency Support	1.1	1.1	1.1
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>461.1</u>	<u>467.6</u>	<u>478.6</u>
<u>Operation Strength Deviation</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-7.0</u>	<u>-7.1</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>96.5</u>	<u>104.3</u>	<u>103.8</u>
Transients	23.9	25.9	27.0
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	7.8	6.8	4.2
Students, Trainees	60.0	67.0	68.1
Cadets	4.5	4.5	4.5
<u>Total</u>	<u>557.6</u>	<u>564.8</u>	<u>575.3</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

NAVY SELECTED RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1983 ^{1/} <u>Actual</u>	FY 1984 <u>FY 1985 Budget</u>	FY 1985 <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.5</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.4	0.4	0.5
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>68.4</u>	<u>75.4</u>	<u>77.1</u>
Land Forces	1.7	2.0	2.1
Tactical Air Forces	5.8	6.5	6.4
Naval Forces	59.6	64.6	66.3
Mobility Forces	1.2	2.2	2.3
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>6.4</u>	<u>6.2</u>	<u>6.5</u>
Intelligence	4.0	4.3	4.4
Centrally Managed Communications	1.6	1.2	1.2
Research and Development	0.5	0.5	0.7
Geophysical Activities	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>31.7 (0.4) ^{2/}</u>	<u>35.7 (1.3)</u>	<u>39.8 (1.6)</u>
Base Operating Support	13.5	12.4	13.5
Medical Support	4.4 (0.3)	11.0 (0.9)	12.2 (1.3)
Personnel Support	0.8	0.8	0.8
Individual Training	0.6 (0.2)	0.2 (0.4)	0.2 (0.4)
Force Support Training	1.1	0.6	1.0
Central Logistics	5.5	5.7	7.0
Centralized Support Activities	1.6	1.3	1.3
Management Headquarters	4.0	3.4	3.6
Federal Agency Support	-	0.1	0.1
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>107.5 (0.4)</u>	<u>118.4 (1.3)</u>	<u>124.9 (1.6)</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>3.2</u>
Transients	0.4	0.5	0.6
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	1.1	2.9	2.6
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>108.7 (0.4)</u>	<u>121.2 (1.3)</u>	<u>127.2 (1.6)</u>

1/ TARS are counted in the Selected Reserve beginning in FY 1983.

2/ Numbers in parentheses show distribution of Individual Mobilization Augmentees and are not included in the DPPC totals.

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

NAVY CIVILIAN PROGRAMMED MANPOWER
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1983 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1984 <u>FY 1985 Budget</u>	FY 1985 <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>2.9</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	2.7	2.7	2.8
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>7.1</u>	<u>7.0</u>	<u>7.3</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	0.4	0.4	0.4
Naval Forces	0.9	1.0	1.0
Mobility Forces	5.8	5.6	5.9
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>35.5</u>	<u>35.0</u>	<u>33.5</u>
Intelligence	1.3	1.5	1.5
Centrally Managed Communications	1.5	1.7	1.7
Research and Development	31.7	30.8	29.3
Geophysical Activities	1.0	1.0	1.0
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>272.3</u>	<u>273.5</u>	<u>274.0</u>
Base Operating Support	77.4	77.2	76.7
Medical Support	3.9	4.0	4.1
Personnel Support	1.7	1.7	1.7
Individual Training	3.2	3.4	3.4
Force Support Training	1.6	1.6	1.7
Central Logistics	169.1	169.8	170.4
Centralized Support Activities	6.4	7.0	7.2
Management Headquarters	9.0	8.8	8.8
Federal Agency Support	*	*	*
<u>Total</u>	<u>317.7</u>	<u>318.3</u>	<u>317.7</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50.

A. Strategic

The Strategic category includes nuclear offensive, defensive, and control and surveillance forces having the objective of deterrence and defense against nuclear attack upon the United States, its military forces, bases overseas, and allies. The majority of Navy manpower in this category are associated with the Fleet Ballistic Missile System, including both SSBNs and their tenders. The TRIDENT program, strategic operational headquarters, and communication and Automated Data Processing support are also included.

Navy Strategic Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	20.0	20.6	20.8
Reserve Components	0.4	0.4	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	2.8	2.8	2.9

Due to the high proportion of ships on deployed status, ship and squadron units in the Strategic Category must receive active duty manpower to support operations. The increase in active spaces in FY 1985 results from crew requirements for two new TRIDENT submarines and one TRIDENT precommissioning crew offset by decreases in manpower for non-TRIDENT SSBNs, in overhaul.

B. Tactical/Mobility

The Tactical/Mobility manpower requirements are those associated with conventional warfare forces and their operational headquarters and supporting units.

The active duty growth in Tactical/Mobility forces supports the increase in the number of ships and squadrons, all of which require full time manpower due to deployment requirements.

1. Land Forces. Navy Land Forces include doctors, chaplains, hospital corpsmen, and dental technicians assigned to Marine Corps divisions, regiments, and air stations.

Navy Land Forces (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	3.6	4.0	4.2
Reserve Components	1.7	2.0	2.1

The increase in active spaces in FY 1985 results from increased Navy medical support for Marine Corps land forces.

2. Tactical Air Forces. The Tactical Air Forces subcategory includes manpower associated with Navy fighter, attack, reconnaissance, and special operations squadrons; multipurpose aircraft carriers; and tactical air operational headquarters units.

Navy Tactical Air Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	63.7	65.9	66.4
Reserve Components	5.8	6.5	6.4
<u>Civilian</u>	0.4	0.4	0.4

The actual increase in FY 1984 is the result of being understrength by 1,200 in FY 1983, new spaces for phased remanning of CV-59 due to the Service Life Extensive Program (SLEP), and commissioning of four additional squadrons. The increase in active spaces in FY 1985 results from the addition of two squadrons offset by a decrease in manpower for CV-62 entering SLEP.

3. Naval Forces. This subcategory includes manpower for anti-submarine warfare and fleet air defense forces, amphibious forces, and support forces. It is the largest subcategory of active military and Selected Reserve manpower in the Navy. Naval Forces include virtually all ship manpower requirements except the fleet ballistic missile manpower in the Strategic category and the carrier manpower in Tactical Air Forces.

Naval Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	202.2	207.6	213.5
Reserve Components	59.6	64.6	66.3
<u>Civilian</u>	0.9	1.0	1.0

The increase in active spaces in FY 1984 results from under-manning of approximately 1,700, increases to complete manning of the net growth of ships added in FY 1984, precommissioning crews for the net growth of 20 ships to be added in FY 1985, one additional direct fleet support helicopter squadron, special warfare and Explosive Ordnance Disposal manpower, Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department manpower, and Ship Intermediate Maintenance Activity manpower offset by a slight

decrease in Naval Facility manpower. The increase in FY 1985 results from the net growth of 20 ships, precommissioning crews for the ships to be added in FY 1986, two additional Light Airborne Multipurpose Squadrons (LAMPS), AIMD manpower, SIMA manpower, precommissioning manpower for the ninth Naval Mobile Construction Battalion and electronic warfare support manpower.

The Reserve increase between FY 1983 and FY 1984 is primarily an increase in TARs and drilling reservists for three additional NRF frigates and their support Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities.

The Reserve increase during FY 1985 consists of TARs and drilling reservists for two NRF frigates and support SIMAs. Increases in other combat/combat support units including construction forces, Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare, direct support squadrons, and other augmentation units account for the remaining increases as the drilling reserve strength builds toward the full NAMMOS requirement by FY 1988.

4. Mobility Forces. This subcategory includes Navy strength for airlift and sealift capability, plus port terminal and traffic management operations.

Navy Mobility Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.3	0.3	0.3
Reserve Components	1.2	2.2	2.3
<u>Civilian</u>	5.8	5.6	5.9

The increase in Reservists is to meet the NAMMOS requirement by FY 1988 and will improve manning of units in this category.

Civilians in this category are predominately the mariners who operate the Military Sealift Command (MSC) fleet of support ships. The changes are a direct result of the number of MSC ships scheduled for operation during each year.

C. Auxiliary Activities

The Auxiliary Activities category includes manpower associated with Department of the Navy programs under centralized DoD control. These programs include Intelligence, Centrally Managed Communications, Research and Development, and Geophysical Activities.

1. Intelligence. This category includes strength for the centralized intelligence gathering and analytic agencies and activities within the Department of Defense.

Navy Intelligence Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.3	8.5	8.6
Reserve Components	4.0	4.3	4.4
<u>Civilian</u>	1.3	1.5	1.5

The increase in Reservists is to meet NAMMOS requirements by FY 1988.

2. Centrally Managed Communications. This subcategory includes strength associated with the Defense Communications System, internal Navy communications requirements, satellite communications systems, communications security, and other related communications units.

Navy Centrally Managed Communications
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.0	7.3	7.6
Reserve Components	1.6	1.2	1.2
<u>Civilian</u>	1.5	1.7	1.7

The increase in active spaces in FY 1985 results from increased satellite communications activities and increased naval communications requirements.

3. Research and Development. The Navy's Research and Development (R&D) community comprises headquarters, laboratories, Research Development, Test and Evaluation project ships, test and evaluation activities, and support offices. A large portion of the manpower is attached to R&D laboratories. The Navy's R&D efforts are comprehensive, involving land, sea, air, and undersea operations.

Navy Research and Development Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.7	6.0	6.1
Reserve Components	0.5	0.5	0.7
<u>Civilian</u>	31.7	30.8	29.3

The increase in drilling Reservists builds toward the full NAMMOS requirement by FY 1988.

As a result of the flexibility provided by the civilian industrial-fund ceiling exemption in FY 1983 and FY 1984, the industrial laboratories' civilian manpower exceeded normal staffing levels by about 1,000 in order to hire new junior scientists and engineers. General economic conditions created an opportunity for Navy to compete successfully with industry for high quality engineering graduates. Laboratory staffing is projected to drop back to the baseline level in FY 1985 by attrition.

4. Geophysical Activities. The Navy's geophysical programs include the Naval Observatory and various oceanographic and meteorological activities throughout the world. These employ professional meteorologists, oceanographers, geophysicists, mathematicians, engineers, and technical specialists, directed by a small headquarters staff.

Navy Geophysical Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.0	1.9	1.9
Reserve Components	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Civilian</u>	1.0	1.0	1.0

D. Support Activities

The Support Activities category includes strength associated with base operating support for combat and support installations. Also included are medical and personnel support; individual and force-support training; logistics, management headquarters, and federal agency support; and other centralized support activities.

Active manpower growth for Support Activities is critical to ensure adequate full-time support ashore for the growing fleet. Reserve manpower is utilized when possible and, in fact, the Selected Reserve growth in this category is greater than the active growth, especially for Medical Support Manpower.

1. Base Operating Support (BOS). Manpower in the BOS subcategory provides operation and maintenance of installations for both combat and support forces. Base Operating Support for combat forces covers strategic, tactical, and airlift and sealift commands, including base communications and air traffic control. Support forces BOS includes auxiliary forces, research and development, logistics, training, medical, and administrative commands.

Navy Base Operating Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	62.8	58.1	60.5
Reserve Components	13.5	12.4	13.5
<u>Civilian</u>	77.4	77.2	76.7

After adjusting for overmanning of approximately 3,600 spaces the remaining active decrease in FY 1984 results from a decrease of approximately 800 spaces for combat installations and a decrease of approximately 300 spaces for support installations. The increase in active spaces for FY 1985 results from increases of approximately 1,000 spaces for combat installations and 1,400 spaces for support installations, of which approximately 1,250 are for medical support manpower.

A reduction of drilling reservists in this area was due to funding cuts for equipment to support Advance Base Functional Component units, thus the units were disestablished. Further, the increase from FY 1984 to FY 1985 is a result of continued increases in TAR manning in operations, training, and administration at Reserve activities. Increases in drilling reservists continue to build toward the NAMMOS requirement by FY 1988.

The civilian decrease in FY 1985 reflects a reduction in Public Works Centers' in-house workload due to greater reliance on the private sector to perform specific major repair projects at station facilities. This is offset in part by increases for physical security facilities maintenance and fire protection in fleet activities.

2. Medical Support. Navy manpower in this category provides medical care in DoD military medical facilities and to qualified individuals in non-DoD facilities.

Navy Medical Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	10.6	11.6	12.3
Reserve Components	4.7	11.9	13.5
<u>Civilian</u>	3.9	4.0	4.1

The increase in active spaces in FY 1985 is to correct long standing shortfalls in the capability to provide casualty care in support of Navy and Marine Corps operational forces.

The increase in Reservists from FY 1983 through FY 1985 builds to meet NAMMOS requirements by FY 1988 and will improve manning of the units in this category.

3. Personnel Support. This subcategory includes manpower associated with Navy recruiting and examining, education of overseas dependents, reception centers, disciplinary barracks, centrally funded welfare and morale programs, the Armed Forces Information Program, and civilian career-training and intern programs. The Personnel Support category also includes research and development manpower requirements for human factors and personnel development research.

Navy Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.9	7.8	7.8
Reserve Components	0.8	0.8	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	1.7	1.7	1.7

4. Individual Training. This category includes manpower for formal military and technical training, as well as for professional education of military personnel conducted under the centralized control of service training commands. Training activities in this category include recruit training, officer acquisition training (including ROTC), general skill training, flight training, professional development education, health care, individual training, and training support activities.

Manpower in the Individual Training Category is dedicated to training of active Navy students and trainees and Naval Reservists on active duty for training. The students and trainees in permanent change of station status are carried in the Individuals subcategory; those in temporary additional duty status are included in the categories of their parent commands.

Navy Individual Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	29.6	29.7	29.2
Reserve Components	0.8	0.6	0.6
<u>Civilian</u>	3.2	3.4	3.4

The increase of active manpower (FY 1983 to FY 1984) provides additional training staff for more students and recruits in training. Additional staff is also provided for new ROTC units. The decrease in manpower in FY 1985 reflects Navy's plan to contract a portion of the maintenance of flight training aircraft.

5. Force Support Training. Force Support Training manpower supports units providing training to organized crews or teams in conjunction with performance of a specific mission. Civilian support in this area consists of maintenance and clerical support for fleet air training units.

Navy Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	14.5	15.4	16.0
Reserve Components	1.1	0.6	1.0
<u>Civilian</u>	1.6	1.6	1.7

The manpower increases in active Force Support Training continue to reflect increased squadron manning and manpower growth associated with introduction of F/A-18 aircraft and SH-60B helicopters.

The Reserve increase between FY 1984 and FY 1985 reflects TARs associated with the introduction of the Reserve Air Squadron Augmentation Unit Program.

6. Central Logistics. Manpower in this subcategory is associated with supply, maintenance, operations and logistic support operations. This manpower provides critical support to the fleet and directly affects readiness.

Navy Central Logistics Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.7	6.8	7.1
Reserve Components	5.5	5.7	7.0
<u>Civilian</u>	169.1	169.8	170.4

The increase in active manpower are additional officers to administer the Military Construction Program and projects for shore facility repair and maintenance and additional people at logistic support activities.

The increase in Reservists is to build toward the full NAMMOS requirement by FY 1988 and improve manning in these units.

Civilian changes for FY 1984 and FY 1985 are discussed separately by type of operation as summarized below.

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Supply Operations	22.8	23.9	24.5
Maintenance Operations	130.1	129.0	128.6
Logistic Support	16.2	16.9	17.3
Total	169.1	169.8	170.4

a. Supply Operations. Included are Supply Depots, Inventory Control Points and procurement operations activities that provide fleet support and contract expertise for ship and aircraft systems acquisition. The civilian increases for FY 1983 through FY 1985 provide for continuation of the Navy initiative to identify and correct increasingly high inventory adjustments at the Naval Supply Centers. This initiative will result in more responsive, timely, and efficient logistics support for the fleet. The increases also support the spare parts acquisition improvement program.

b. Maintenance Operations. Included are Naval Air Rework Facilities (NARFs), Shipyards, Ordnance Activities and Maintenance Support Activities. The NARFs perform depot-level maintenance of aircraft frames, engines and components. Shipyards provide logistic support for ships and service craft in connection with construction, conversion, overhaul, repair, alteration, drydocking and outfitting. Ordnance activities receive, renovate, maintain, store and issue ammunition, explosives, weapons and ordnance material. These activities provide technical engineering and logistics support for combat systems, manage underwater acoustic ranges and provide support for weapon system acquisition. Maintenance support activities include Naval Aviation Engineering Service Unit, Shipyard Planning, Engineering Repair and Alteration Activities and Fleet Combat Directional Systems Support Activities. These activities provide logistics planning, design and engineering services for the operating forces and provide technical assistance to the shore establishment. The civilian decrease from FY 1983 to FY 1984 is largely due to actual decisions made during FY 1983 to economically convert to contract commercial/industrial functions at industrially funded activities. The decrease in civilian manpower from FY 1984 to FY 1985 is primarily attributable to a projected NARF workload decline due to a drop in Naval Reserve reworks and a reduction in anticipated Foreign Military Sales funded workload.

c. Logistics Support Operations. Logistics support comprises a variety of logistics and technical support activities. Included are the Navy Publications and Printing Service and technical and engineering support activities of the Naval Air, Sea, Facilities, and Electronics Systems Commands.

The civilian increase from FY 1984 to FY 1985 provides resources for increased oversight of contracted commercial functions; updating of engineering and design documents; logistics engineering support for the mechanical and electrical systems within ship hulls; ship systems maintenance monitoring and support for submarines; and the spare parts acquisition improvement program.

7. Centralized Support Activities. This subcategory includes non-management headquarters strength for unified commands, international military organizations, foreign military sales support, counterintelligence, Reserve readiness support, public affairs, personnel administration, finance centers, criminal investigations, support of Defense Agencies, and other miscellaneous support activities.

Navy Centralized Support Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.6	6.7	6.7
Reserve Components	1.6	1.3	1.3
<u>Civilian</u>	6.4	7.0	7.2

The civilian increase in FY 1985 is mostly additional people for selected intelligence programs and more investigative agents for prevention of waste, fraud and abuse.

8. Management Headquarters. This subcategory includes management headquarters manpower required to support Defense Agencies; international military organizations; and Unified, combat, and Service commands.

Management Headquarters Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.7	8.4	8.4
Reserve Components	4.0	3.4	3.6
<u>Civilian</u>	9.0	8.8	8.8

The decrease in active spaces in FY 1984 results from the five percent Management Headquarters reduction required by the FY 1984 DoD Authorization Act. This brings Management Headquarters below FY 1983 levels.

The Reserve increase builds toward the full NAMMOS requirement by FY 1988 and improves manning in these units.

The Management Headquarters civilian manpower requests reflects compliance with the five percent headquarters reduction.

9. Federal Agency Support. The Federal Agency Support subcategory includes Navy manpower assigned to other federal departments and agencies. Normally, such cross assignment is made on a reimbursable basis.

Navy Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.1	1.1	1.1
Reserve Components	*	0.1	0.1
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*

* Fewer than 50.

E. Operating Strength Deviation. The Navy's internal manpower management is based on an average strength projected for force structure manning. Average strength for the force differs from the actual end strength because of seasonal fluctuations in manning, usually related to Permanent Change of Station moves and accessions. These seasonal fluctuations may result in undermanning (fewer people than spaces) or overmanning (more people than spaces) in both the active and reserve force.

Operating Strength Deviation
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Active Military	-	-7.0	-7.1

F. Individual Mobilization Augmentees. An IMA is an officer or enlisted person in the Ready Reserve who will fill a specific billet in the active force upon mobilization or shortly thereafter. Each IMA will be assigned to a mobilization billet within the active force and will train in that billet during peacetime.

Approximately 44 percent of the IMAs will be in Training/Pay Category "D", which means they will not receive drill pay but will be paid for 12 days annual Active Duty for Training. The remaining 56 percent of IMAs will be in training/pay category "A" and will receive both drill and Active Duty for Training pay.

The majority of the IMA positions will be in the Medical/Dental programs. Those requirements are programmed as follows:

Individual Mobilization Augmentees

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Category A</u> ^{1/}			
Officer	27	200	-
Medical Officer	65	150	200
Medical Enlisted	-	450	740
Subtotal:	<u>92</u>	<u>800</u>	<u>940</u>
<u>Category D</u> ^{2/}			
Officer	150	350	350
Medical Officer	30	60	70
Medical Enlisted	170	240	330
Subtotal:	<u>350</u>	<u>650</u>	<u>750</u>
Total IMAs:	442	1,450	1,690

^{1/} Allocated as active duty among appropriate DPPC categories in the summary table.

^{2/} The possibility exists that medical personnel with whom the Navy will fill these requirements are also being counted by civilian medical facilities when they project the number of beds and other medical support they could provide DoD in case of a major war.

The increase in IMAs reflects NAMMOS medical corps requirements to staff fleet hospitals in conjunction with the rapid deployment force.

G. Individuals. The Individuals account is sized according to several factors. The number of students is related to overall end strength and the implicit training requirements (discussed in detail in the Military Manpower Training Report). The major portion of the transient strength requirement is projected by multiplying the average time to execute a move by the total number of moves scheduled in each year's Permanent Change of Station move program. Requirements for patients, prisoners, and personnel awaiting separation are derived from actual monthly data from the previous year and projected total end strength.

1. Transients

Navy Transient Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	23.9	25.9	27.0
Reserve Components	0.4	0.5	0.5

The FY 1984 and FY 1985 increases result from increased force levels and do not result from any growth in the factors used to estimate the account.

2. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees

Navy Patients/Prisoners/Holdees Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.8	6.8	4.2

Patients manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from hospitalization for extended periods (30 days for members assigned to operating force units, 45 days for all others).

Prisoners manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from confinement in a military disciplinary facility in excess of 30 days.

Holdees manpower spaces are provided to accommodate personnel who are dropped from their assigned units and are awaiting administrative discharge or separation from active duty.

More people than expected were imprisoned in FY 1983 because a more stringent drug screening program and stricter enforcement of standards of conduct were implemented. This trend is expected to continue and result in an underprogrammed prisoner account in FY 1984. In FY 1985, with the dropping of prisoners on appellate leave from Navy strength, this account will be adequately programmed. Involuntary and adverse administrative separations related to drug and misconduct charges increased dramatically beginning with March 1983. All subsequent years have been revised to reflect this increase in projected separations.

3. Trainees, Students, and Midshipmen

Trainees, students, and midshipmen manpower spaces represent present investment for future trained individuals. Trainees are individuals undergoing basic military and initial skill training. Students are individuals undergoing specialized, flight, and professional training. Midshipmen are individuals attending the United States Naval Academy. The number of trainee and student spaces is a function of enlistment patterns, course lengths, and training plans.

Navy Trainees/Students/Midshipmen Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Trainees/Students	60.3	67.0	68.1
Midshipmen	4.5	4.5	4.5
Total	<u>64.8</u>	<u>71.5</u>	<u>72.6</u>
Reserve Component			
Trainees/Students	1.1	2.9	2.6

The increase of both active and Reserve student/trainee manpower reflects substantial growth in recruit and initial skill (including Sea and Air Mariner Program) increase from 84,798 in FY 1983 to 102,573 in FY 1984, and 112,095 in FY 1985. The Sea and Air Mariner program is authorized traditional "A" school seats for 4,727 Reservists in FY 1984. The FY 1985 budget guarantees 3,808 SAM "A" school seats, with the possibility of additional seats being made available based on active-duty end strength.

CHAPTER V

MARINE CORPS MANPOWER PROGRAM

I. Introduction

A. Summary and Authorization Request

This chapter describes the Marine Corps active and reserve military and civilian manpower program, presents the manpower levels requested for FY 1985 and FY 1986, depicts manpower trends, discusses initiatives, and explains the changes from year to year. It also contains the changes that provide the Reserve with new missions, more modern equipment and greater integration with the active forces in keeping with the Total Force concept. The information on the Guard and Reserve complies with the Joint Conference Report on the Department of Defense Authorization Act for 1984.

The Marine Corps is unique among the four Services because the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides that the Marine Corps will consist of and shall provide:

- "Three combat divisions, air wings and such other land combat, aviation, and other services.. organized, trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms...for service with the fleet."
- "Detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy."
- "Security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases."
- "Marines to perform other such duties as the President may elect."
- "Guards for U.S. embassies...as a result of a memorandum of agreement based on the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended."

The National Security Act of 1947 also requires that the Marine Corps provide rapidly deployable forces for contingency missions in support of the national strategy. The requirement to deploy forces rapidly has resulted in a Fleet Marine Force (FMF) that provides a balance between strategic mobility and tactical capability and that is well suited to meet assigned United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) missions.

To support its missions and functions, the Marine Corps maintains an FMF posture as follows: one Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) composed of a command element, a Marine division, a Marine aircraft wing and a force service support group located on the East Coast of the United States; one MAF forward deployed in the Pacific area; and a third MAF stationed on the West Coast of the United States.

The Marine Corps Reserve forces augment and reinforce the active forces. The structure of the Marine Corps Reserve is a Division Wing Team that includes a force service support group. As a general rule individual reserve units are mirror images with their active counterparts in order to facilitate integration into the total force. The structure and equipment found in the Marine Corps Reserve are similar to those found in the active component, thus enhancing the Marine Corps Reserve's augmentation and reinforcement capabilities.

Although the National Defense Act of 1947 specifies that the Marine Corps will have a minimum of three wings and divisions with supporting units, it does not specify the size, composition, or manning of these units. These factors, as well as the nature, size, and composition of the supporting establishment, are matters of Marine Corps determination. As has been true since the Vietnam era, the manpower levels requested in FY 1985 and FY 1986 are less than required to support all contingency plans fully. The Marine Corps request for active military, reserve military, and civilian manpower for FY 1985 and FY 1986 is as follows:

Marine Corps Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Active Military	199.5	201.7
Marine Corps Reserve	46.4	47.9
Civilian Personnel	21.8	22.0

The Marine Corps selectively mans the force structure to maximize combat capability while maintaining the minimum necessary acceptable support to the combat forces. Historically, except during wartime or mobilization, the active forces are manned at less than 100 percent of requirements. In peacetime some functions, such as salvage platoons, do not require manning. This plus constraints on manpower levels and funds prevents full manning of the entire structure, in that these constraints cause bases and stations to be unable to provide necessary manpower support to tenant units. FMF units share in this support responsibility through the FMF Augmentation Personnel (FAP) program. FAP personnel fulfill a significant portion of the base operating support workload requirements and are returned to their parent units when they are committed to an operational mission.

The extent to which the active forces are selectively manned can be shown by the total number of people who would be required to fully man the force structure represented in the Unit Identity and Status Reporting System (UNITREP). The Joint Chiefs of Staff use this system to report the readiness of authorized forces. It would require some 216,300 Marines to fully man all authorized Marine Corps units and organizations in FY 1985, considerably more than the 199,500 currently requested. Unmanned units, such as the salvage platoon,

are retained in the structure, however, because they will be activated and manned when required. Unmanned units and units manned at less than 100 percent during peacetime will be augmented by reassigned active duty or mobilized Individual Reservists in time of emergency.

B. Major Force Structure Changes

The Marine Corps' program includes a carefully planned restructuring of the force structure to modernize the force and to impose the same structure on all similar units. It also provides for increased active and reserve force capabilities. Only those forces essential for the timely compliance with stated contingencies and readiness missions are retained or placed in the active component, all others are placed in the Reserves.

From FY 1984 to FY 1990 the Marine Corps will make several significant changes to its structure that will enhance tactical mobility and firepower to meet the potential threat and requirements involved with USCENTCOM missions. These improvements will add significantly to the mission capabilities of the ground combat, combat service support and aviation elements of the Marine Corps.

1. Active Structure Changes

Ground combat enhancements include the reorganization and modernization of artillery units, more and better anti-tank capabilities, the addition of light armored vehicles to each division and restructuring of the infantry battalions to give them more firepower with fewer people. In FY 1985, the Marine Corps reorganizes three direct support artillery battalions from six 105mm howitzer batteries to eight 155mm howitzer batteries, activates a 155mm self propelled battery, and adds a target acquisition battery. Also, we add two heavy anti-tank guided missile (TOW) platoons and a light armored vehicle (LAV) battalion that, when all mission type vehicles are available, will contain 145 LAVs. The manning for the LAV battalion will come from personnel savings from restructured infantry battalions and increases in authorized end strength.

Increases to the Force Service Support Groups (FSSGs) will improve combat service support. This improvement will enable FSSGs to better support the new ground combat structure such as TOW, LAV and the additional howitzers. The Marine Corps adds several platoon size units to enhance the water supply and bulk liquid transportation capability. Aviation growth is concentrated on ongoing activation and equipping of light antiaircraft missile units. These are necessary to insure Fleet Marine Forces are provided a minimally acceptable level of air defense. Additionally, in FY 1985 a CH-53E helicopter squadron is activated.

2. Reserve Structure Changes

The Marine Corps' continuous review of requirements within the Total Force has produced plans for increasing the reserve structure. In FY 1985 the Corps will reorganize the infantry battalion in order to

make it similar to its active counterpart. Additionally, in FY 1985 we will increase ground combat capability by adding two Civil Affairs Groups and an Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company. The Corps will begin to enhance the reserve artillery organization in FY 1986 as the Direct Support Artillery Battalions begin reorganizing for receipt of the M198 155mm towed howitzer, thus acquiring a substantial increase in firepower. The Reserve will also receive an additional Sensor Control and Management platoon in FY 1986 and four TOW Platoons in FY 1987. Of the four TOW Platoons, one platoon completes the Anti-tank Company within the 4th Tank Battalion, while each of the others will enhance an infantry regiment with an improved anti-tank capability. Finally, in FY 1988 the Reserve artillery regiment will acquire and activate a Target Acquisition battery giving it an essential capability.

The increases in the Reserve combat service support in FY 1985 include the addition of two Salvage Platoons and a Bridge Platoon. Modernization within Reserve aviation continues to be of the utmost importance. The Marine Corps has developed a long range Aviation Master Plan which responds to the need to upgrade aircraft models and the requirement to address shortages primarily in the Reserve KC-130 and AH-1 community. Structure changes, other than system upgrade, are primarily in FY 1987 and FY 1991 respectively. Additionally, in FY 1992 the reserve will transfer a Medium Lift Helicopter Squadron (CH-46) to the active force, while simultaneously acquiring an additional Heavy Lift Helicopter Squadron (CH-53D) which was previously in the active structure. This change in structure will benefit both active and reserve components in that the active force will receive the needed medium lift structure, while the reserve receives an increase in lift capability with the additional CH-53D aircraft.

The Marine Corps Manning Plan is given in the following tables:

MARINE CORPS ACTIVE MANPOWER PLAN
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 84-89</u>
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Strategic *							
Tactical/Mobility	118.6	120.2	122.8	125.2	126.1	126.2	+7.6
Auxiliary Activities	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	-
Support Activities	44.3	44.5	44.5	44.6	44.4	44.4	+0.1
Undermanning	-0.5	+0.2	-0.4	-0.7	-1.3	-1.3	-
Individuals	32.4	32.9	33.0	33.2	33.2	33.2	+0.8
TOTALS	196.6	199.5	201.7	204.0	204.2	204.3	+7.7

* Fewer than 50.

MARINE CORPS RESERVE MANPOWER PLAN
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 84-89</u>
Strategic *	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Tactical/Mobility	37.9	39.9	40.9	41.5	41.6	41.6	+3.7
Support Activities	.8	1.1	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.7	+0.9
Individuals	4.1	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	+0.2
Individual Mobilization	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	+0.2
Augmentees							
TOTALS	43.9	46.4	47.9	48.1	48.4	48.5	+4.6

* Fewer than 50.

The active Fleet Marine Forces, composed of three divisions, air wings and FSSGs, are either permanently forward deployed in Japan or serve as a rotation base for afloat and land based forward deployed forces. Units that are home based in the U.S. deploy infantry battalions and tactical aircraft squadrons to Japan and Marine Amphibious Units to the Mediterranean and Western Pacific. Peacetime contingency commitments, such as air alert or near term prepositioning forces, require additional elements of the FMF to be operationally ready with little or no advance notice. These units provide capabilities which cannot be realized in the Reserve Component because of the day-to-day commitment and requirement for response on short notice.

II. Manpower Requirements Determination

A. Manpower Management System

The first step in developing manpower requirements is to determine the general forces needed to accomplish Marine Corps roles and missions in the national military strategy. A "planning force" is then constructed within the Joint Strategic Planning System in terms of MAF's. The planning force is the force level necessary to execute the national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success. The planning force is considerably larger than the "UNITREP force" or the fiscally constrained "program force" and would require authorization to mobilize. The UNITREP force is derived from the force structure requirements for the accomplishment of the wartime mission without mobilization. The UNITREP force for FY 1985 requires about 16,800 active duty manpower above what is requested. The requested authorized strength or "program force" represents Marine Corps decisions, in light of fiscal and manpower constraints and readiness requirements. An important consideration is the active/reserve force mix.

1. Criteria for Determining Active/Reserve Force Mix

a. The active/reserve force mix decisions of the Marine Corps are made as the result of a deliberate process that crosses many staff lines. These decisions are made consistent with the Marine Corps' Total Force policy. The Total Force sponsor within

Headquarters Marine Corps is the Plans, Policies and Operations (PP&O) Department. PP&O translates Marine Corps missions and taskings into requirements for force structure. These missions and taskings are stated or implied in the operational plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or contained in OSD guidance. PP&O proposes structure changes, after consultation with appropriate structure and functional sponsors, based on modified requirements. These proposed changes are to the Total Force structure which is a hybrid of active and reserve component organizations. Only those forces essential for timely compliance with stated contingency and readiness missions are retained or placed in the active component; all others are placed in the reserves. The mix proposals from PP&O are forwarded to the Requirements and Programs (R&P) Division for validation against approved requirements. Subsequently, R&P coordinates the development of the proposals into Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) initiatives for their movement through the Planning Programming and Budgeting cycle. The culmination of the POM effort is an evaluation by the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps' Committee on the value and necessity of each Total Force structure initiative. A decision recommendation is made by that committee to the Commandant.

b. The Marine Corps active forces are fiscally constrained, yet they must be prepared to respond to day-to-day requirements, move out rapidly, or execute any one of numerous contingency plans. The general criteria for determining whether a new capability should be placed in the active component or reserves is listed below:

- Peacetime Commitment and Force Projection
- Responsiveness
- Manpower
- Reserve Accessions
- Rotation Base
- Cost

1. Peacetime Commitment and Force Projection

It is the Marine Corps view that, unless partial or full mobilization is declared, peacetime forward deployed requirements must be met, with few and very limited exceptions, by active forces. The Marine Corps holds this view because of the length of time and distance away from CONUS of the forward deployments and the limited time allowed for reserve forces to serve on active duty in peacetime.

At this time, Marine Corps units must meet peacetime forward deployment requirements in the Mediterranean, the Far East and the Indian Ocean areas. These forward deployments are fulfilled in large part by balanced ground, air and combat service support units deploying on a rotational basis from CONUS. Reserve units are not used to meet these forward deployed peacetime requirements since the deployments are normally for six months.

2. Responsiveness

In addition to the peacetime forward deployed requirements, the Marine Corps is tasked to respond rapidly to various contingency requirements. The response requires that Marine Corps combat and support forces must be in a posture to deploy and engage in combat before mobilization of reserves can be effectively executed. This need for rapid response is in keeping with the idea that active Fleet Marine Force units be structured into Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) which provide a balanced war fighting capability. These MAGTFs are a combined force consisting of Marine Corps ground, air and combat service support forces. They take maximum advantage of the combat potential inherent in a closely integrated air-ground team, under direction of a single commander. An example of a MAGTF is the unit that participated at Grenada and is currently in Lebanon.

3. Manpower

Due to fiscal constraints, the active FMF is manned at a 91 percent level. This equates to a shortfall of approximately 17,000 personnel to the active force. The shortfall could be made up for certain contingencies by deployment of qualified individuals from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) or Standby Reserve. Certain support billets within the supporting establishment have been preassigned to Reservists under the Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) program, and through preassignment of individuals from the IRR.

4. Reserve Accessions

As in the Navy, there are certain military skills that can only be acquired by being on active duty. Reserve units requiring these skills will therefore be dependent on accessions of prior service personnel possessing these skills. For example, Aviation Pilots and Radar Intercept Officers in the Marine Air Reserve consist of officers who have served a period of obligated active service. Therefore, in certain mission areas, the size of the Marine Reserve is dependent on the size of the active Marine Corps and on the ability of local reserve units to recruit prior service personnel with appropriate skills within geographic drill boundaries.

5. Rotation Base

The Marine Corps requires a certain level of active forces to maintain a rotation base for its forward deployed force. Including the supporting base structure, in FY 1985 the Marine Corps will maintain approximately 25,600 Marines deployed in Japan, 2,000 in the Mediterranean area, and 1,800 more afloat in the Far East and Indian Ocean area. Most of these Marines and units are deployed for six months to one year without dependents and must be replaced at the forward deployed location. In addition to the units that are already forward deployed outside of the U.S., other units are on a 24 to 48 hour

immediate alert status to respond to various contingencies. The Marine Corps must maintain sufficient assets to provide a rotation base that provides for the time needed for predeployment training, personnel leave and transportation of units or personnel to their forward-deployed locations.

b. More detailed information concerning the proper active/reserve force mix is contained in a report to the Senate Appropriations Committee.

2. Operating Forces. The infantry battalion structure and the number of such battalions, together with mission requirements, form the basis for determining the type and quantity of other combat, combat support, and combat service support units required to form the Marine division. The objective is to form a ground combat element consisting of infantry, light armored vehicle, tank, assault amphibious vehicle, artillery, reconnaissance, combat engineer, and command and control units, and to integrate this force with aviation and combat service support elements to produce Marine Air-Ground Task Forces for amphibious or other combined arms operations.

Design of the infantry battalion begins with analysis of the capabilities that are essential to accomplish the missions and functions of the Marine Corps. The analysis involves research on new weapons technology, equipment experiments, war games using manual and computer simulation techniques, field tests, and military judgment.

Manpower needs for Marine aviation units derive from the support the ground combat forces require. Computer simulated war games, historical data, and military judgment are used to estimate the number of sorties required daily to support an infantry battalion in combat. Each aircraft type has a specific sortie capability that, when divided into the sortie requirement, determines the number of each type of aircraft required. The crew ratio (crews per aircraft in wartime) and the direct maintenance and ordnance support factors dictate the manpower required to fly and maintain each aircraft. Consideration of the necessary span of control, the geographic distribution of supported forces, and the available assets establish the number of aircraft to be assigned to each squadron. The number of aircraft per squadron provides the basis for determining the additional command and control and support manpower required in each squadron. Squadrons are then organized into Marine aircraft groups and wings according to specific mission requirements.

The FSSGs of the Fleet Marine Force are composed of specialized units, such as supply, maintenance, engineer, motor transport, landing support, dental, and medical battalions, which are essential to the combat service support of the MAF. When the size of the forces and the density of equipment of the task organized MAGTF have been established, the combat service support required is determined using criteria that incorporate maintenance, service, and supply concepts.

Determination of the manpower requirement for support activities is more complex because of the great variety of activities performed, the many one-of-a-kind situations that exist, and the interdependence of the military, civilian, and contractor portions of the work force. Specific details of the Total Force manpower requirements for support activities are contained in the discussion of the appropriate Defense Planning and Programming Category in Section IV of this chapter.

Total force manpower requirements of all organizations are critically examined on a regular cycle. Structure and manning reviews are conducted at both the Headquarters Marine Corps and field levels, and are verified by Headquarters Marine Corps on-site survey teams. This procedure assures that the structure and related manpower requirements support the national strategy and that the constrained manpower levels permit the Marine Corps to meet its assigned missions at an identified level of risk. Marine Corps active force increases between FY 1984 and FY 1985 reflect improved manning of the total structure. This is a result of force modernization and an improvement in readiness to meet operational commitments, and to support assigned missions as they relate to deployable forces. Accordingly, the responsiveness required to meet assigned contingencies precludes placing the increase in structure within the Reserve Component.

The peacetime Marine Corps active component consists of operating deployable forces and other units in support of these operating forces. Selective programming actions are required to equitably distribute affordable assets between the operating forces and the support establishment. The Marine Corps Reserve Component is maintained to provide wartime support upon mobilization to the fiscally constrained, active operating forces. In implementing this Total Force concept, employment roles for the active Selected Marine Corps Reserve, upon mobilization or Presidential callup, are as follows:

- o Trained units to selectively augment the active forces in order to field three MAF's at full wartime structure.
- o Trained units to reinforce the active forces.
- o A Marine Amphibious Brigade or, if augmentation/reinforcement is not ordered, a fourth Division Wing Team (DWT).
- o A nucleus to reconstitute a Fourth DWT and FSSG.

B. Manpower Management Improvements

The Marine Corps continues to integrate military manpower management initiatives with initiatives designed to enhance overall Fleet Marine Force readiness. Two manpower management initiatives include conversion of Western Pacific unaccompanied billets and the unit deployment program.

1. Conversion of Unaccompanied Billets

The Marine Corps expansion of accompanied tours in the Western Pacific improves tour stability and promotes unit integrity. Many one year unaccompanied tours are being converted to three year accompanied tours. During FY 1983, the Marine Corps changed two hundred billets from one year unaccompanied tours to three year accompanied tours. An additional 200 billets are scheduled to be similarly converted during FY 1984 and 215 in FY 1985. Over 5,400 billets will be converted to accompanied tours by FY 1992. Overall cost in transients and permanent change of station (PCS) moves will be reduced as a result of this action.

2. Unit Deployment Program

The Marine Corps unit deployment program is designed to enhance uniform readiness and reduce organizational and individual turbulence. It permits Marines assigned to tactical aviation squadrons and infantry battalions to be homebased in CONUS or Hawaii while deploying for periods of approximately six months to meet a portion of the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean commitments. This program reduces requirements for individual replacements in the Western Pacific and the percentage of Marines on unaccompanied tours. Annual budget savings associated with this program for FY 1984 are projected to be \$10.9 million. Additional manyear savings will also be realized from the reduction of the transient pipeline in comparison with 12 month PCS moves. Additionally, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, deploys units for a period of approximately six months to the Mediterranean.

3. Other Military Manpower Management Initiatives

To support the unit deployment program, the Marine Corps is developing a computer-based planning and assignment system designed to provide cost effective, equitable allocation of first-term manpower resources among all units in the active structure and particularly in the Fleet Marine Force. Inventory projection and tour optimization models tested in FY 1982-83 will provide improved readiness through a procedure that reconciles first-term requirements with first-term assets in a manner consistent with approved manning policies.

In addition to management actions that improve tour stability and support unit deployments, models dedicated to providing by-grade projections in specific skill areas and management of the career force are improving enlisted force management. The Enlisted Assignment Model is responsible for about 36,000 enlisted orders every year. The Marine Corps has begun work on models that will support the same goals for the officer corps and would extend our capabilities in the management of the mobilization force.

III. Significant Program Highlights

A. Active Military Manpower

1. General. Congress authorized the Marine Corps a FY 1984 end strength of 196,600. In view of economic factors and the cumulative effects of continued improved recruitment and retention, the FY 1985 request is 199,500. This increase in end strength supports the new units and equipment requested for FY 1985.

2. Enlisted. The Marine Corps' FY 1983 enlisted end strength was 174,106, 99.7 percent of the programmed level of 174,553. Enlisted recruiting and retention plans are shown in the following table.

Enlisted Strength Plan

	<u>FY 83</u>		<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>(Current Year)</u>	<u>(Budget Year)</u>
<u>Accessions</u>				
Prior Service	2,117	2,123	1,197	1,200
Non-Prior Service	35,573	36,864	38,762	40,420
Male	33,573	34,863	36,962	38,620
(HSDG)	(28,846)	(31,805)	(34,375)	(35,917)
Female	2,000	2,001	1,800	1,800
(HSDG)	(2,000)	(2,001)	(1,800)	(1,800)
<u>Retention</u>				
First Term	9,180	6,496	6,609	5,578
Career	7,320	7,579	10,887	10,854

Although management actions in FY 1983 enabled the Marine Corps to come within 511 of the authorized FY 1983 end strength, the FY 1985 request is 199,500 in light of the favorable accession and retention climate.

The Marine Corps achieved 103.4 percent of the combined prior service and non-prior service enlisted recruiting goals. The Marine Corps recruited 7,046 three-year, 29,336 four-year, and 481 six-year enlistees. Future enlistments will be for three or more years, with a goal of 75 percent for four or more years.

The Marine Corps continues to emphasize quality accessions. In FY 1983 91.7 percent of non-prior service enlistees were high school diploma graduates. High school diploma graduates are the best source of quality manpower in terms of retention, trainability, and amenability to discipline. The Marine Corps' minimum standard is for 75% of all male non-prior service recruits to be high school graduates; however, we have set a recruiting goal for FY 1984 of 93 percent. The goal for female non-prior service accessions is 100 percent high school graduates.

An aggressive career planning effort coupled with current economic factors has significantly improved retention. Additionally, the expanded reenlistment bonus program spurred retention and has been effective in reducing critical skill shortages. Continued favorable retention trends are reflected in the higher FY 1984 and FY 1985 retention projections. Reenlistment bonuses are now targeted at specific occupational specialties, to address the problem of critical skill shortages more effectively.

3. Officer. Active officer procurement objectives are shown in the following table.

Active Marine Corps Officer Procurement Objectives

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Plan	1,975	1,825	1,668
Actual	2,313	-	-

Officer end strength will increase to 20,186 in FY 1984 and 20,266 in FY 1985. Improved officer retention will permit this modest growth to be achieved with fewer accessions. This increased strength will permit the Marine Corps to provide the necessary leadership for combat forces and support functions, while continuing to retain the most promising officers, maintain a normal promotion flow, and support the requirement for rapid expansion in time of emergency.

Overall officer retention and pilot retention, in particular, have improved. The improvement in pilot retention can be attributed to increased compensation, which includes the Aviation Officer Continuation Pay, and various management initiatives maximizing the amount of time junior pilots spend in flying duties.

4. Women in the Marine Corps. Women Marines are assigned to billets commensurate with their capabilities to the maximum extent practicable. Such use is based on both the roles and missions of the Marine Corps and the necessity to provide women with rewarding careers. The Marine Corps does not classify women in combatant Military Occupational Specialties and restricts the numbers of women who may be assigned to deployable combat units. Women are not assigned to infantry regiments or artillery and other combat support battalions. Current policy is that enlisted women Marines will not exceed 10 percent of the authorized strength of an FMF unit where they may be assigned. In such FMF units, women may be assigned in numbers not to exceed 10 percent of the unit's authorized strength in any MOS by grade group cell. This 10 percent restriction is currently being reevaluated with a goal toward basing future woman Marine FMF strengths on the deployment and mission requirements of specific units versus on a designated overall percentage.

Female Marine Strength
Total (Enlisted/Officer)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Active	8,896 (8273/623)	9,117 (8474/643)	9,321 (8659/662)
Reserve Component	1,265 (1184/81)	1,316 (1241/75)	1,394 (1318/76)

Enlisted Women in
Traditional/Nontraditional DOD Occupational Groups

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Infantry/Gun Crew	2*	0	0	0
Electronic Equipment Repair	207	243	304	349
**Communication/Intelligence	518	578	733	779
Other Technical	136	141	183	223
**Support & Admin	2,510	2,958	3,511	3,788
Mechanic Equipment Repair	392	421	482	552
Craftsmen	170	179	177	159
**Service Supply	719	925	1,055	1,149

Remainder are in individuals category.

* Combat Engineer Billets which were later excluded because of a lack of career progression.

** Considered traditional fields by USMC

More women are serving in all fields in which they may be effectively used. Increases in FY 1984 and FY 1985 woman Marine strength reflect a continued effort to realize the intent of DoD equal opportunity programs, which are concerned, in part, with expanding the number of women in the military consistent with unique service mission requirements. Increases also reflect improving retention and successful recruiting of women Marines.

B. Marine Corps Reserve

The mission of the Marine Corps Reserve is to maintain highly trained units and qualified individuals for active duty in time of war or national emergency. The Marine Corps Reserve is divided into two categories: Ready Reserve and Standby Reserve. The primary source of units and individual manpower upon mobilization is the Ready Reserve consisting of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) and the Individual Ready Reserve.

The SMCR units form a DWT with balanced combat, combat support, and combat service support forces of the same type as active force counterpart units. Also included within the SMCR are individuals who are not members of the Division, Wing or FSSG but are preassigned to mobilization billets which must be filled on or shortly after M-Day. The IRR consists of individuals who have some period of obligated service remaining on their contracts and individuals who have completed their military service agreements and elected to remain in the IRR. The IRR provides qualified individuals to fill shortfalls in active operating forces and reserve units and also provide for the expansion of the supporting base as necessary to meet wartime contingency requirements.

The Standby Reserve consists of members of the reserve component other than those in the Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve. The Standby Reserve provides additional manpower to augment active and reserve forces in a national emergency declared by the Congress. If mobilized, Standby Reservists would require refresher training.

SMCR personnel requirements are 48,854. These requirements provide sufficient personnel to ensure SMCR units report to Station of Initial Assignment with full wartime manning, maintain a training pipeline; and maintain ancillary mobilization manpower requirements. Without considering active force mobilization requirements, the SMCR unit wartime requirements for FY 1985 will be met by 37,283 selected Marine Corps Reserve Unit Personnel, 4,679 active duty support personnel, and 1,108 Individual Ready Reservists. The FY 1983 IRR end strength was 44,424. IRR strength is projected to increase to 50,000 by the end of FY 1985. The strength of the Standby Reserve will be 1,500 at the end of FY 1985.

The SMCR average strength authorization for FY 1985 is 44,300. This strength supports the force structure contained in the UNITREP and ancillary personnel support requirements. The end strength authorization also includes reservists on Initial Active Duty for Training and full-time active duty personnel for administration and training of reserves.

Recruiting goals and attainment for the SMCR are as follows:

Marine Corps Reserve Enlisted Recruiting Goals
(Non-Prior Service)

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Plan	7,744	9,496	9,652
Actual	8,291	-	-

For FY 1983, the Selected Marine Corps Reserve exceeded 100 percent of the planned end strength of 42,571. Continuing improvements in the gain-to-loss ratio during FY 1983 and 547 non-prior service and 275 prior service accessions above goal enabled the SMCR to end FY 1983 with a total paid strength of 42,690.

Marine Corps Reserve Enlisted Recruiting Goals
(Prior Service)

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Plan	5,443	5,848	5,848
Actual	5,661	-	-

For FY 1983, the SMCR attained 104 percent of the prior service enlistment goal. This marked the first year that the goal was attained after five consecutive years of missing quota. The downward trend is now being reversed which will ensure the SMCR is able to maintain the prior/non-prior service ratio needed to have the expertise, maturity, and grade manning required by the structure. In mid FY 1983, the SMCR established a prior service recruiting force consisting of full-time support reserve personnel. This recruiting force is reversing the previously unacceptable trend.

Accession criteria and quality goals for the SMCR are the same as for the active force. Officer input into the Selected Marine Corps Reserve comes from officers who have completed their initial obligated active service of three years or more.

C. Civilian Manpower

The Marine Corps request for civilians in fiscal year 1985 satisfies only minimal requirements.

Marine Corps policy is that civilian personnel will be used to meet the requirements of supporting activities to the maximum extent practicable consistent with the requirements for use of military personnel by reason of law, training, security, discipline, rotation and readiness.

Employment of civilian personnel permits more effective FMF manning with Marines, enhances FMF training, readiness and sustainability, provides continuity in operations and provides specialized experience that is not otherwise available within the military structure. Marine Corps civilian personnel are employed in a wide variety of professional, technical, trades and administrative functions.

In order to provide maximum efficiency and to avoid costly duplication of effort, military and civilian manpower resources are fully integrated. Reducing civilian strength without concomitantly reducing workload requires an offsetting increase in military manpower.

The Marine Corps continuously evaluates the cost effectiveness of having support services performed by commercial contract. The purpose of the evaluation is to contract out those functions that can be performed more effectively and at less cost by contract personnel.

D. Commercial Activities (CA) Program - Marine Corps

Cost Comparison Studies Completed FY 83

<u>Number of Studies Completed</u>	<u>End Strength Involved in Studies Completed Civ. Mil. Total</u>	<u>Number of Activities Converted to Contract</u>	<u>End Strength Involved in Ac- tivities Converted Civ. Mil. Total</u>	<u>Projected Annual Cost Advantage to Government</u>
3	72 5 77	0	0 0 0	\$0

The limited effort during FY 1983 is mainly a function of the personnel resources at the field activity level not being brought on board until late 1982 and early 1983. It takes an average of 12 to 18 months to complete a CA cost study. It is expected that the results of the application of these resources will be an increased volume of completed CA studies in FY 1984.

IV. Marine Corps Programmed Manpower by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC).

The following tables display by DPPC, the actual Marine Corps manpower distribution for FY 1983 and programmed manpower for FY 1984 and FY 1985.

MARINE CORPS ACTIVE MILITARY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1983 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1984 <u>FY 1985 Budget</u>	FY 1985 <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	*	*	*
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	*	*	*
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	113.5	118.6	120.2
Land Forces	86.1	90.5	92.0
Tactical Air Forces	26.8	27.5	27.6
Naval Forces	0.6	0.6	0.6
Mobility Forces	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	1.6	1.7	1.6
Intelligence	0.7	0.8	0.8
Centrally Managed Communications	*	*	*
Research and Development Activities	0.8	0.9	0.8
Geophysical Activities	*	*	*
<u>Support Activities</u>	44.9	44.3	44.5
Base Operating Support	21.4	20.6	20.6
Medical Support	-	-	-
Personnel Support	4.8	4.7	4.7
Individual Training	8.7	8.8	8.9
Force Support Training	3.1	3.5	3.5
Central Logistics	0.7	0.8	0.8
Centralized Support Activities	2.4	2.4	2.3
Management Headquarters	2.5	2.3	2.3
Federal Agency Support	1.2	1.3	1.3
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	160.0	164.6	166.4
<u>Undermanning</u>	-	-0.5	+0.2
<u>Individuals</u>	34.1	32.4	32.9
Transients	5.3	7.3	7.4
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	0.7	0.9	0.9
Students, Trainees	28.0	24.2	24.6
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	194.1	196.6	199.5

Note: Detail may not add to due to rounding.

*Fewer than 50.

MARINE CORPS SELECTED RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER ^{1/}

(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1983 Actual	FY 1984 FY 1985 Budget	FY 1985 Budget
<u>Strategic</u>	-	-	-
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	37.3 (0.3)	37.9 (0.3)	39.9 (0.3)
Land Forces	31.5 (0.2)	31.9 (0.2)	33.5 (0.2)
Tactical Air Forces	5.8	6.0	6.4
Naval Forces	- (0.1)	- (0.1)	- (0.1)
Mobility Forces	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	-	- (0.2)	- (0.2)
Intelligence	-	- (0.2)	- (0.2)
Centrally Managed Communications	-	-	-
Research and Development Activities	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	-	-	-
<u>Support Activities</u>	0.7 (0.3)	0.8 (0.6)	1.1 (0.6)
Base Operating Support	- (0.1)	- (0.2)	- (0.2)
Medical Support	-	-	-
Personnel Support	- (0.2)	- (0.2)	- (0.2)
Individual Training	-	-	-
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	-	-	-
Centralized Support Activities	0.7	0.8 (0.1)	1.1 (0.1)
Management Headquarters	-	-	-
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	38.0 (0.6)	38.7 (1.1)	41.0 (1.1)
<u>Individuals</u>	4.1	4.1	4.3
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	4.1	4.1	4.3
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	42.1 (0.6)	42.8 (1.1)	45.3 (1.1)

^{1/} Numbers in parentheses show distribution of Individual Mobilization Augmentees and are not included in the DPPC totals.

Note: Detail may not add to due to rounding.

MARINE CORPS CIVILIAN PROGRAMMED MANPOWER

(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1983 Actual	FY 1984 FY 1985 Budget	FY 1985 Budget
<u>Strategic</u>	-	-	-
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	-	-	-
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	-	-	-
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	-	-	-
Intelligence	-	-	-
Centrally Managed Communications	-	-	-
Research and Development Activities	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	-	-	-
<u>Support Activities</u>	21.4	21.3	21.8
Base Operating Support	15.8	15.7	15.7
Medical Support	-	-	-
Personnel Support	0.2	0.2	0.3
Individual Training	0.2	0.2	0.3
Force Support Training	0.1	0.1	0.1
Central Logistics	2.9	2.9	3.0
Centralized Support Activities	1.5	1.6	1.8
Management Headquarters	0.7	0.7	0.7
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	21.4	21.3	21.8

Note: Detail may not add due to rounding.

A. Tactical/Mobility Forces

Marine Corps Tactical/Mobility Forces include Land Forces, Tactical Air Forces, and Naval Forces. About 120,200 Marines (60 percent of the Corps) will be in this category in FY 1985. Tactical/Mobility units are all rapidly deployable and intended to operate in the combat theater. Only military people are included in these units.

With the exception of reserves filling Individual Mobilization Augmentation billets, undergoing initial active duty for training, or serving on full-time active duty, the entire Selected Reserve contributes to Tactical/Mobility Forces.

1. Land Forces. Land Forces include the four Marine divisions and supporting Force Service Support Groups. Additionally, this category includes helicopter, observation, and air defense units from the Marine aircraft wings. The following table displays Land Forces for FY 1983 to FY 1985.

Marine Corps Land Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	86.1	90.5	92.0
Reserve Components	31.5	31.9	33.5

Actual active force strength in FY 1983 largely reflects the temporary undermanning on 30 September 1983 associated with the seasonal fluctuation of recruiting input. The strengths in FY 1984 and FY 1985 provide for the addition of force structure, primarily for land forces aviation units, artillery, and the light armored vehicle units, and combat service support.

A light antiaircraft missile battalion (LAAM) and a CH-53E helicopter squadron are added to aviation units. The LAAM battalion will be at a forward deployed location and will provide a minimally acceptable level of air defense for active force units. The CH-53E squadron provides an additional tactical heavy lift capability required by Marine Air-Ground Combat Teams which are prepared for immediate world-wide deployment.

The artillery increases support reorganization of existing active units which are transitioning to the M-198 howitzer, adding self-propelled artillery, and forming a target acquisition battery. This planned improvement will bring all regiments to the same level of capability by the end of the program period. This evolution will include the reserve force in the future giving them the same capabilities as an active artillery regiment.

A light armored vehicle battalion will be added in FY 1985. The LAV will be fielded first with the active force to develop tactics, doctrine, organization and training techniques for the new weapon. The decision to place the LAV in the reserve force is pending outyear funding availability and force structure profiles.

A TOW missile platoon will be added to each infantry regiment in order to provide additional necessary heavy anti-tank capability to the active operational forces and to improve their readiness posture. This is a process started in 1983 with two new TOW platoons. Two more will be added in FY 1984 and two more platoons in 1985. TOW will be added to the reserves beginning in FY 1987.

The combat service support units are being increased to provide maintenance for the LAV, a water supply platoon, and bulk liquid and fuel support. These assets are required in the active force to ensure the timely access of these capabilities.

Reserve increases in FY 1983, FY 1984, and FY 1985 reflect realignment of the Reserve helicopter, observation, and air defense units from the Tactical Air Forces category in order to parallel the active forces. Additionally, Reserve Component numbers reflect strength improvements resulting from exceeding the FY 1983 non-prior service recruiting goals and continued improvements in the gain-to-loss ratio. Increases also reflect programmed growth necessary to meet wartime requirements and to support mobilization. These increases are primarily associated with manning reserve Force Service Support Group units previously in cadre status.

2. Tactical Air Forces. Tactical Air Forces manpower includes air crews and aircraft organizational and intermediate maintenance personnel who support fixed wing tactical aircraft squadrons. It also includes the manpower associated with reserve component support, Marine security detachments in aircraft carriers, and various command, control, and support functions.

The Tactical Air Forces manpower requirement is as follows:

Marine Corps Tactical Air Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	26.8	27.5	27.6
Reserve Components	5.8	6.0	6.4

The reserve manpower program will support nine fixed wing tactical aircraft squadrons with appropriate air control, maintenance, and expeditionary support.

Decreases in Reserve Tactical Air Forces reflect realignment of the reserve helicopter, observation, and air defense units to the Land Forces category in order to parallel the active forces. The slight increase in FY 1985 reflects manning for increases in aerial refueling aircraft.

3. Naval Forces. The Marine Corps request for Naval Forces includes people assigned to ships' detachments (except those assigned to aircraft carriers which are included in Tactical Air Forces), security detachments aboard submarine tenders and missile support ships, and Marine Corps staff billets for Naval operational and amphibious commands and ships.

Marine Corps Naval Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.6	0.6	0.6

B. Auxiliary Activities

The Marine Corps program for the Auxiliary Activities category totals approximately 1,600 active military people, most of whom are in either Intelligence or Research and Development. The Marine Corps has no reserve or civilian manpower in the Auxiliary Activities category.

1. Intelligence. The manpower in the Intelligence category supports the national intelligence effort under the Director of the National Security Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The manpower program also provides for a small number of people (less than 50) who provide Marine Corps representation at Naval Intelligence Centers.

Marine Corps Intelligence Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.7	0.8	0.8

The Marines in the Intelligence function in peacetime are cryptologic specialists gaining valuable training and experience through work in their occupational specialty. Marine general intelligence specialists

assigned to DIA also gain valuable training and experience while supporting the national intelligence effort. Under wartime conditions, approximately one-third of these Marines would be returned to duty with the Fleet Marine Forces, remaining in the same type of billet, but contributing directly to the support of a deployed Marine Amphibious Force.

2. Research and Development. Marine Corps participation in research and development activities is small and remains essentially constant throughout the period.

Marine Corps Research and Development Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.8	0.9	0.8

The decrease in manning in FY 1985 reflects an effort to realign assets to the combat forces.

Most of the Marines who perform this function are assigned to the Development Center of the Marine Corps Development and Education Command located at the Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia. A significant subordinate organization of the Development Center, the Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity, is a tenant activity at the Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California. Marine Corps research and development efforts include the development of the organization, doctrine, tactics, techniques, equipment, and weapons for employment by the Fleet Marine Force. Primary emphasis is placed on efforts in support of the landing force in amphibious operations. All development activity is closely coordinated with the other Services to avoid duplication. Marines assigned to research and development activities conduct studies that identify required operational capabilities, manage materiel development projects designed to satisfy requirements, and conduct and coordinate developmental and operational test and evaluation of all systems intended for procurement and deployment. Additionally, they review and revise Marine Corps doctrinal publications. Some Marines are also assigned in a liaison capacity to developmental activities of the other services.

3. Other Auxiliary Forces. In FY 1984, fewer than 50 Marines will be in the remaining Auxiliary Forces categories. The Marines in the Centrally Managed Communications category support the Military Affiliate Radio System and the Defense Communications Agency. The Marines in the Geophysical Activities category are assigned to the Defense Mapping Agency as instructors in schools attended by Marines.

C. Support Activities

1. Base Operating Support. The following table displays the total manpower request for this category and provides detail regarding the sub-categories of Combat Installations and Support Installations.

Marine Corps Base Operating Support
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
	<u>Total of Sub-Categories</u>		
<u>Military</u>			
Active	21.4	20.6	20.6
<u>Civilian</u>	15.8	15.7	15.7
	<u>Combat Installations</u>		
<u>Military</u>			
Active	16.4	15.8	15.8
<u>Civilian</u>	11.2	11.1	11.1
	<u>Support Installations</u>		
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.0	4.8	4.8
<u>Civilian</u>	4.6	4.6	4.6

Civilians in this sub-category reinforce capabilities that directly affect the readiness and sustainability of Marine Corps operating forces and provide for improved safety and quality of life.

Base Operating Support manpower constitutes an essential adjunct to Fleet Marine Force readiness by providing the administration, operation, and maintenance of the base structure in which combat forces are housed, supported, supplied, and trained. Manpower in the Base Operating Support-Combat Installations sub-category is assigned to operate the installations at which Fleet Marine Forces are based. The Support Installations sub-category includes manpower assigned to operate logistic and training bases.

The Marine Corps determines manpower requirements for Base Operating Support-Combat Installations using a fixed/variable support concept. Only the fixed portion is presently included in the Base Operating Support manpower request. The fixed portion consists of the functions and services that are required because of the existence of the base, apart from the Fleet Marine Force units that are located there. Examples of these functions are road maintenance and repair, utilities operations, and sewage disposal. The variable support portion of the manpower requirement results directly from the presence of the tenant units. To the extent feasible, the tenant unit provides augmentation to the base under agreements worked out by local commanders

and monitored and approved by Headquarters Marine Corps. Since the augmentation manpower is part of the tenant unit and will train and deploy with that unit, it is counted in the Tactical/Mobility Forces. This system, which enables a percentage of the Marines assigned to augmentation duties to maintain their military skills in a garrison status prior to deployment, significantly reduces the manpower assigned to Base Operating Support-Combat Installations. It does, of course, correspondingly reduce the number of personnel available to Fleet Marine Force units for routine training. Increases to this category are necessary to enhance the daily support provided to the deployed forces.

The Base Operating Support-Combat Installations sub-category also includes Marines assigned to security duties with Marine barracks located at major Navy bases throughout the world. Personnel are provided for security guard posts based on the number of hours that each post is required to be manned per week. Supervisory, supply, mess, and administrative personnel are provided based on the number of guards in that unit and to meet other assigned responsibilities.

The determination of manpower requirements for Base Operating Support-Support Installations is based on an analysis of the functional and work load requirements of bases in this sub-category. Since such bases do not support Fleet Marine Force tenant units, computation of the variable support element is excluded.

The Marine Corps constantly reviews the requirement for Base Operating Support manpower at all combat and support installations. All support functions are reviewed periodically to determine if economies can be achieved by changing the method of performance from in-house to contract (and vice versa), consistent with military readiness requirements. A full-scale, on-site manpower survey is conducted at each installation at least once every three years and authorized manning levels are reviewed annually. Organizations, functions performed, and services provided are evaluated to ensure that the approved manpower, grade, and skill levels are appropriate. Once the functions to be performed are determined and a work measurement system devised, staffing becomes a matter of deciding the level of support or service that will be furnished. Manpower survey efforts have improved support organizations by consolidating duplicative functions, improving staffing efficiency, and eliminating dual staffing requirements, thereby releasing manpower resources for reallocation into areas of more critical need.

2. Personnel Support. Manpower requirements in this category are:

Marine Corps Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.8	4.7	4.7
<u>Civilian</u>	0.2	0.2	0.3

Marine Corps requirements in this category include recruiting and examining services, support to disciplinary commands, and other personnel support. The program in this category is actually level. The increase in civilians is due to the realignment of civilian training spaces from the Base Operating Support Category.

3. Individual Training

Marine Corps Individual Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.7	8.8	8.9
<u>Civilian</u>	0.2	0.2	0.3

Individual Training manpower is required to conduct formal military and technical training and professional education of Marine Corps personnel through the use of other Service and Marine Corps schools. The Individual Training manpower requirements in excess of school capabilities are trained through alternative methods such as on-the-job or field skill training. During FY 1985, approximately 5 percent of those Marines undergoing initial skill training will be trained through such alternative methods. The decrease in non-formal school training from FY 1983 to FY 1984 is the result of the opening of several formal schools in FY 1983. This is a continuation of the Marine Corps' training philosophy of offering the preferred formal courses of instruction to as many entry-level Marines as is possible. A detailed justification of training requirements is contained in the FY 1985 Military Manpower Training Report. The increase in Marine Corps Individual Training Manpower in FY 1985 is a result of the fielding of new equipment, formalizing and expanding initial skill training as well as a projected increase in student throughput. Instructor and support personnel requirements are a function of student throughput. The billets for all instructor and support personnel at Marine Corps and Joint Service Schools are fully manned since training is done on a daily continuous basis. A reduction in (or failure to increase) these type billets will require

the Marine Corps to reduce the number of personnel that would receive initial skill training. Without additional instructor and support personnel, an increase in student load leads to a backlog of students awaiting initial skill training and overtaxes billeting and messing facilities. Excessive delays due to reduction in class capacity will increase personnel shortages in FMF units and subsequently reduce unit readiness because of manpower shortages.

4. Force Support Training. Force Support Training units train recently designated aviators and flight officers in combat aircraft prior to their assignment to operational squadrons and provide standardized training to other aviation personnel. In addition, designated units within the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Training Group are tasked with providing wartime interceptor support for the Continental Air Defense Command. The manpower program is based on the projected student load and the need to provide instructors, maintain aircraft, and perform the air defense mission.

This category also includes manpower to support the Marine Corps Institute which provides military skill training to individual Marines through correspondence courses. It also includes instructor personnel for unit training at the Mountain Warfare Training Center, Bridgeport, California. The following table summarizes the manpower requirement for the Force Support Training mission.

Marine Corps Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	3.1	3.5	3.5
<u>Civilian</u>	0.1	0.1	0.1

5. Central Logistics. The Central Logistics manpower displayed below is required for the conduct of centrally managed supply, maintenance, and logistics support activities. These activities procure materiel, maintain centralized inventory control, perform depot level maintenance, and provide other logistics support services. Increased civilian strength in FY 1985 is primarily associated with increased support to the Inventory Control Points.

Marine Corps Central Logistics Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.7	0.8	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	2.9	2.9	3.0

6. Centralized Support Activities

Marine Corps Centralized Support Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.4	2.4	2.3
Reserve Components	0.7	0.8	1.1
<u>Civilian</u>	1.5	1.6	1.8

The Marines in this category provide centralized support for non-management headquarters activities. They serve in such diversified areas as United Nations truce teams, audit and judiciary activity support, Marine membership on the Naval Council of Review Boards, public affairs activities, family assistance activities, and Marine Corps support to OSD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Military and civilian personnel in this category also include the Marine Corps Personnel Support Activity, which administers all active and reserve Marine Corps personnel records, the Marine Corps Automated Services Center, which maintains the automated Marine Corps Manpower Management System, and the Marine Corps Finance Center, which administers the Joint Uniform Manpower Pay System for the Marine Corps. Reserve personnel on full-time active duty in support of reserve training and administration are accounted for in this category. Increases in the reserve program reflect support of additional aviation assets and full manning of the centralized Individual Reserve Management Organization.

7. Management Headquarters. The following table displays the manpower requirement in the Management Headquarters category.

Marine Corps Management Headquarters Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.5	2.3	2.3
<u>Civilian</u>	0.7	0.7	0.7

The manpower requirement for this function is associated with three sub-categories of Management Headquarters. Marines serving at NATO, North American Air Defense Command, and U.S. Forces Korea headquarters activities are categorized under International Military Organizations. Marines assigned to Unified Commands are also so categorized. The Service Support-Combat Commands sub-category includes the Fleet Marine Force and major Navy operational command headquarters. Manpower requirements for Marine Corps and Navy departmental headquarters and service administrative headquarters are categorized under Service Support-Service Commands. The reduction in FY 1984 and FY 1985 reflects actions taken to comply with the Congressionally-directed five percent reduction in the manning of management headquarters.

All of the sub-categories of Management Headquarters include requirements external to the Marine Corps. Marines so assigned perform two important functions. First, they provide readily available expertise on amphibious warfare matters. Second, they provide a channel through which the Marine Corps keeps current on contingency planning alternatives and through which external staffs stay aware of current Fleet Marine Force capabilities and limitations.

8. Federal Agency Support. The following table displays Marine Corps manpower committed to Federal Agency Support.

Marine Corps Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY-84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.2	1.3	1.3

Federal Agency Support manpower consists almost exclusively of the Marine Corps Security Guard Battalion, which furnishes security guards for Foreign Service Posts around the world for the Department of State.

D. Operating Strength Deviation

Operating Strength Deviation
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	N/A	-0.5	+0.2

The Marine Corps' internal manpower management is based on an average strength projected for force unit manning. Average strength for a given unit differs from the actual end strength because of seasonal fluctuations in manning. The projected undermanning for September 30 is expressed as operating structure deviation, or undermanning factor. This undermanning is shown as a single minus entry in the Active Military Programmed Manpower DPPC table for FY 1984. For FY 1985, the figure is positive because improvements in accession management will reduce the seasonal fluctuation.

E. Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs)

<u>Individual Mobilization Augmentees</u> (End Strength in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Reserve	0.6	1.1	1.1

Individual Mobilization Augmentees are individual SMCR members not assigned to the SMCR Units. IMAs are preassigned to active force billets that must be filled on or shortly after mobilization. These individual Selected Reservists are assigned to Training and Pay Categories depending on the amount of training required in peacetime to insure immediate and effective performance of duty upon mobilization. IMAs will possess premobilization orders for execution upon statutory authorization and notification for execution by the assigned operational sponsor. Each IMA will attend drill periods at their respective gaining command, as determined by the training category code, and will spend 14 days on active duty each year in the mobilization designee billet.

F. Individuals

The following table displays the Individuals accounts.

<u>Marine Corps Individuals Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Transients	5.3	7.3	7.4
Patients/Prisoners/Holdees	0.7	0.9	0.9
Trainees/Students	<u>28.0</u>	<u>24.2</u>	<u>24.6</u>
Total	34.1	32.4	32.9
Reserve Component			
Trainees/Students	4.1	4.1	4.3

The strengths shown in the Individuals accounts are estimates of the number of people who will be in transient, trainee/student, or patient/prisoner/holdee status at the end of a fiscal year. These estimates are based partly on historical data and partly on current and projected manpower plans and policies. The Individuals accounts are as necessary as the force structure spaces and shortages in authorizations for these accounts will result in strength reductions in the combat or support forces.

The low FY 1983 transients is a result of management action taken to delay a number of PCS moves planned in the last quarter of FY 1983 to FY 1984. The high number of students/trainees in the FY83 end strength was caused by management actions to increase accessions during the last quarters of FY 1983. An increase in intelligence training to meet the shortage in the intelligence field and an increase in undergraduate pilot training needed to improve manning in the tactical air forces also contribute to the higher than programmed student/trainee end strength. The FY 1984 request has been lowered as a result of more evenly spreading the entry of recruits over the entire year.

The planned end strength increase from FY 1984 to FY 1985 drives the request for additional students/trainees as well as increasing the request for additional transients in FY 1985.

CHAPTER VI

AIR FORCE MANPOWER PROGRAM

I. Introduction

A. Summary and Authorization Request

The FY 1985 request for active military, reserve military, and civilian manpower for FY 1985 and FY 1986 is as follows:

Air Force Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Active Military	610.2	629.0
Selected Reserve		
ANG	107.9	109.0
AFR	74.8	79.3
Civilian	253.6*	256.1**

* Includes approximately 30,300 Air National Guard and Reserve Technicians


** Includes approximately 30,500 Air National Guard and Reserve Technicians

B. Key Air Force Manpower Issues


1. Implementation of the Total Force Policy. The Air Force manpower program for FY 1985 and FY 1986 reflects continued implementation of the Total Force Policy to accomplish assigned missions. We have been extremely successful and our program this year reflects even more emphasis on improving the capabilities and use of the Air Reserve Forces (ARF).

In developing the program, the Air Force corporate board structure carefully evaluates the type mission, level of participation and speed with which the ARF should accept increased force structure. It makes force mix decisions on a case by case basis, determining a balanced mix of active and ARF units in each mission area. This annual program development process takes into account Presidential and DoD defense guidance, and fiscal constraints as well as the operational and management factors discussed in more detail below. During these deliberations, both the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve are fully represented at every decision level. Further, every functional element on the Air Staff has ARF representation to ensure daily decision making encompasses the Total Force perspective. The following charts depict the current ARF contribution to selected mission areas.

ARF CONTRIBUTION TO THE TOTAL FORCE



COMBAT SUPPORT CONTRIBUTION



2. Theater Ceilings. Imposition of theater ceilings such as NATO European troop levels continues to complicate the task of force planners and theater mission commanders in executing overall national military strategy. The Air Force solicits Congressional support in eliminating theater ceilings, allowing our mission commanders and force planners to utilize forces in a militarily prudent manner consistent with the threat and overall fiscal and end strength constraints.

3. Civilian End Strength Ceilings. The Air Force strongly endorses elimination of civilian end strength ceilings. Civilian ceilings arbitrarily restricts the number of people in the Services without consideration of the workload. Workload requirements coupled with dollar limitations ensure utilization of the least costly form of manpower.

C. Force Structure Manpower Relationships

The Secretary of Defense provides broad planning and programming guidance to the Services based on the President's national security policy and objectives. The Air Force translates this guidance into force structure. The size and the composition of the force structure provide the basis for programmed manning. The program is determined principally through an engineered process designed to identify military essential requirements in support of wartime taskings and to incorporate all available economies and efficiencies. Between FY 1985 and FY 1989 major weapon system increases include B-1, GLCM, Peacekeeper, F-15, F-16, KC-10, C-5, and TR-1. In addition, the Air Force continues with its efforts of equipment modernization, expansion, and fully equipping its programmed 40 total (active and ARF) tactical fighter wing equivalents. Manpower is not a program in and of itself but an integral part of every program -- a prime requisite to the achievement of approved levels of national defense. As new programs are approved, we must provide the critical manpower needed to insure successful implementation and operation.

1. Active/ARF Decision Criteria

The FY 1984 DoD Authorization Act directs the Services to review missions for integration into the Reserve forces. Specifically, what changes will be accomplished to provide the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve with new missions, more modern equipment and greater integration with the active force? This section outlines the criteria used in the active/ARF mix decision process. This discussion is followed by specific force structure changes, together with a rationale for the decisions that resulted in integrating particular units and missions into either the active or Reserve force.

The Air Force considers the following criteria: a) mission requirements, b) manpower and personnel, c) modernization, d) mobilization and e) cost.

a. Mission Requirement Considerations. The primary consideration in the Active/ARF decision process is mission requirements.

If mission requirements dictate that forces be forward deployed, these forces are better suited for the active component. These active forward deployed forces must also have an adequate source of replacement forces in the CONUS that can be assigned to support the overseas commitments. In addition, about 80 percent of the ARF is composed of part-time military personnel whose livelihood depends primarily upon full-time civilian employment. Therefore the Air Force must carefully scrutinize the extent that missions require significant full-time peacetime activity. Missions requiring large peacetime workloads are most suitable for the active force, because transferring them to the ARF could require nearly the same number of full-time personnel resulting in little or no cost savings.

b. Manpower and Personnel Considerations. Manpower and personnel considerations include (1) ARF capability, (2) manpower availability, and the (3) impact on our ability to maintain a capable active force.

(1) Total Force capability is highly dependent on personnel who are competent and reliable. By recruiting prior service personnel into the Guard and Reserve, the Total Force retains needed experience and amortizes training costs over an extended period. Because of their experience and inherent job stability, ARF prior service personnel maintain their proficiency in the reduced training time available. However, when the mission of an established unit is changed or the weapon system is converted, the conversion process can be longer than that of the active force. Readiness is decreased in both active and ARF units during the period of conversion.

(2) Availability is the second consideration in manpower and personnel. Most ARF personnel live within commuting distance of their unit of assignment. A proposal to establish new units or expand existing units must consider whether the regional population base will support the growth in terms of the numbers of additional people and technical disciplines and whether adequate facilities exist. Since non-prior service personnel gain experience slowly in a part-time environment, the ARF should continue to rely heavily on trained prior service personnel. Any significant ARF growth must be planned and time phased to allow for recruiting and training of personnel and facility development.

(3) The Air Force first priority is maintaining a Total Force that is capable and ready to go to war. The active force requires experienced rated personnel for operations, planning, inspection, training, and other staff overhead requirements to support both active and ARF components. Because these jobs are full-time peacetime requirements they are best suited for the active component. The transfer of an operational flying unit reduces the ability of the active force to experience sufficient aircrew members to maintain these operational requirements. Transferring an active mission to the ARF rarely reduces the requirement for rated experienced personnel above wing level but it does reduce the capability to train and experience personnel for requirements above wing level. Currently, the Air Force is limited in its ability to produce

enough experienced pilots with the cockpits available. Consequently, the transfer of additional cockpits may impact the long-term readiness of the total force.

Many support functions are suited to part-time personnel in peacetime especially where the primary mission is a wartime surge requirement. In FY 1985 the ARF is increasing responsibilities in Air Base Ground Defense, medical support, civil engineering, and aerial port units. Increases in these areas help offset wartime manpower shortfalls. However, sufficient support personnel must remain in the active force to perform the peacetime support mission and the expanded mission that may occur short of mobilization.

c. Modernization Considerations. Over the past five years, a concerted effort has been made to equip the ARF with newer and more capable systems. This trend is in keeping with their increased tasking as early deployers under many contingency plans. The Air Force pursues a force modernization policy that provides new equipment: first, to forward deployed forces to assure the best systems are available for initial combat; second, to early deployers, both active and ARF; and third, to all other forces. While recent Air Force action has placed new production aircraft (e.g., A-7s, A-10s) directly into the ARF, a larger share of older systems have historically been retained in the ARF due to deployment priorities, lower utilization rates, potentially higher levels of aircrew and maintenance experience in the older systems, and stability in the ARF. However, until complete weapon system phase-out, active forces should retain a portion of older systems to assure active component attention to their combat viability and support.

d. Mobilization Considerations. A decision to mobilize reserve forces signals the degree of national resolve of a U.S. response to crisis situations. Under periods of rising tension this decision can directly affect future actions of adversaries/allies. The active component must be large enough to provide a flexible response capability for contingencies short of mobilization. However, a significant number of ARF volunteers can be expected to complement the active force during these contingencies. Due to the heavy reliance on ARF missions in such areas as strategic airlift, Air Force planners must remain cognizant of mobilization requirements in the active/ARF decision process.

e. Cost Considerations. The ARF minimizes costs through reduced peacetime activity, low full-time manning and by utilizing funds and support structure already required and existing in the active component. The active force provides: all research and development funds; the majority of initial and recurring training such as pilot and navigator instruction; and the stock fund, depot maintenance and investment item procurement structure. The ARF reimburses the Air Force Industrial Funds for depot maintenance costs with the exception of military personnel costs. For items procured from the Stock Fund, the ARF reimburses at the standard Air Force prices which do not include the majority of overhead costs. By maintaining these forces in the Reserve at lower activity rates, the Total Force benefits from savings in investment, O&M, base operating support, and military personnel costs. By retaining the experienced former active members, we are able to maximize the return on the initial and recurring training costs previously invested in those members.

2. Major Force Structure Changes. The following section highlights our major force structure changes and includes a brief rationale of the factors that resulted in integrating them into either the active or Reserve component.

a. Strategic Offensive Forces. These forces consist of B-52 and FB-111 bomber forces totaling 241 Primary Aircraft Authorized (PAA) and 56 PAA respectively. In FY 1985 the B-1B enters the inventory with an initial 1 PAA. Active KC-135 tanker aircraft will remain stable at 487 PAA in FY 1985. Minuteman missiles remain at 1,000 while Titan II missiles will decrease by 8 as they continue to be deactivated. ARF Strategic Offensive forces consist of 104 PAA KC-135 aircraft in the Air National Guard and 24 PAA in the Air Force Reserve. Participation by the ARF in the strategic offensive missions has been limited to tanker operations because of the highly time-intensive nature of bomber and missile operations and training in peacetime. For example, the Atomic Energy Act requires very time-intensive training for nuclear certification within the Strategic Offensive Forces.

The bomber force mission is most suitable for the active component. Aircrews on nuclear alert must be stationed 24 hours a day in the immediate vicinity of the bomber aircraft. Alert duty is a peacetime task. In addition, extensive qualification and crew proficiency training is necessary for penetration of a high-threat target area. An ARF bomber unit could attain the proficiency of an active bomber unit. However, it would require the same demanding flying training program as that of the active force. The additional, costly manhours to support this time-intensive training and SIOP alert duties would negate the cost advantages of ARF participation in this mission.

Similar factors make ICBM missile responsibilities more suitable for the active component. Missile forces are maintained at near-maximum readiness levels regardless of the international situation. They do not require appreciable augmentation in a wartime environment. The combination of limited availability of ARF personnel and the requirement that ICBM forces be maintained in a high state of readiness during peacetime (at mostly remote locations in the North Central United States), mitigate against ARF ICBM units.

The Air Force has successfully used the ARF to meet strategic offensive refueling requirements. ARF tanker units are operationally capable, and availability is manageable because of the lighter alert commitment. (Currently one tanker in eight for ARF versus a minimum of one tanker in four for the active force). However, increased efficiencies from ARF participation in the refueling mission may be possible. Both the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve have determined that an additional line of alert could be performed by each ARF unit that is increased from the current size of 8 PAA to 10 PAA. However, transfers of aircraft to the ARF must be evaluated from a total force perspective. Overall capability in SIOP alert, day-to-day user refueling training and overseas tanker task force commitments must not be degraded as transfers are considered.

b. Strategic Defensive Forces. These forces include five active and eleven Air National Guard interceptor squadrons. In FY 1985, modernization continues with the conversion of one active F-106 squadron to F-15s. In addition, strategic defensive forces include aircraft and ground radars for surveillance, control, and limited defense. In FY 1978, the Air Force began the phased transfer of military long-range radars to the FAA for the Joint Surveillance System (JSS). The Air Force continues to operate eleven military radars in the CONUS, as a part of the joint USAF/FAA JSS program. When the four Region Operations Control Centers (ROCC) in the CONUS and the Alaskan ROCC achieved final operating capability (FOC) in early FY 1984, the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE), Back-up Intercept Control (BUIC) and manual air defense systems in the CONUS and Alaska were deactivated.

The air defense fighter mission is well suited to the ARF because of its in-place wartime role. For almost 30 years, ANG units have performed air defense alert in the United States and now provide 69 percent of the CONUS air defense force. There is, however, little fiscal savings for ARF forces in this mission area due to the high ratio of full-time personnel required to perform the alert requirement. The decision to transfer more missions to the ARF must consider the limited manpower base along the northern tier where most of the active units are located, as well as the contribution that the remaining active units make to the CONUS/overseas rotation base. Additionally the following factors support maintaining some of the operational capability for any mission area in the active component. There must exist: an active duty sponsorship responsible for continuing tactics development and evaluation of mission specific aircraft modifications; a pool of active duty mission experienced personnel to perform headquarters staff duties; a pool of active duty personnel, trained in the mission from which Reserve personnel can be drawn; and finally, a supply/depot system that remains responsive to the weapon system.

c. Tactical Air Forces. The tactical fighter force is measured in terms of wing equivalents, each wing equivalent equaling 72 aircraft authorizations. The active tactical fighter force is building towards 26 wing equivalents which the Air Force plans to achieve by the end of the 1980s. The ARF tactical fighter force is being modernized and expanded simultaneously with the active force. By end FY 1985, an increase to 12 wing equivalents of 43 fighter squadrons will enhance the Air Force Total Force Policy. ARF tactical forces are modernized and their mission is expanded with additional F-16 aircraft. The active force will modernize with the addition of two F-16 fighter squadrons and will have three KC-10 squadrons by the end of FY 1985. The AFR associate tanker mission will be further expanded with the contribution of half of the aircrews for the KC-10 as new aircraft are delivered to the Air Force. The ANG has now assumed over half the total forces in tactical reconnaissance. Other changes programmed in the active tactical aircraft force structure in FY 1986 include an increase in E-3A AWACS aircraft from 28 to 29 PAA, providing a significant command and control capability, and an additional eleven EF-111 tactical electronic combat aircraft.

From a historical perspective, since 1972 active and ARF tactical fighter forces have shared in the growth from approximately 32

tactical fighter wing (TFW) equivalents to the current 36 TFWs (end FY83). The ARF has increased from 10 TFW equivalents to 12 while the active force grew from approximately 22 to 24 plus wing equivalents. Additionally, through our modernization efforts the A-10, F-15, and F-16 now comprise better than 55 percent of the active inventory while the ARF has received F-4D, A-7, A-10 and recently F-16 aircraft. Concomitantly the older less capable F-105, F-104, and F-100 aircraft have been retired from the ARF.

To meet our current tactical commitments the Air Force must have strong, flexible in-place forces to support a forward defense. Overseas commitments represent roughly one-third of our total tactical fighter forces (roughly one-half of our active tactical fighter forces), with another third providing stateside rotational and training units. The final third is made up of ARF units able to provide a responsive surge of military capability during a national crisis. This force posture has been developed so that the rotation base supports our overseas tactical force commitments.

Training requirements must be considered in developing the total tactical force structure. Close air support, interdiction, and counterair missions are complex and require high levels of training and, in many cases, specialized training ranges to retain proficiency. The part-time nature of the ARF and physical location of individual units are carefully assessed when assigning roles and missions that require skills that must be continually exercised to achieve and maintain essential levels of proficiency.

d. Airlift Forces. In FY 1985, the Air Force will transfer 8 (PAA) C-5 aircraft to the Air Force Reserve. Plans for transfer of 26 (PAA) additional C-5s are being developed providing measured, near simultaneous active/ARF expansion as the Air Force takes delivery of 50 C-5Bs by FY 1989. The Air National Guard will modernize as C/LC-130Hs replace C-130Ds (8 PAA) and one unit converts from O-2s to a C-19 (Boeing 747) strategic airlift unit. The Air National Guard will have a total of 19 C-130 units and the Air Force Reserve will have 15 units in FY 1985. The Air Force Reserve associate units continue to provide nearly 50 percent of C-141, C-9, and C-5 wartime capability.

The Military Airlift Command (MAC) has led the way in implementing Total Force policy. In addition to operating and maintaining airlift aircraft, the ARF provide substantial capabilities in aero-medical evacuation, rescue and recovery, aerial port, and weather reconnaissance.

Integration of MAC gained Reserve and Guard units is unique. This is best demonstrated in the associate units where reserve and active crews are used interchangeably and, in some cases, a single aircrew may contain a mix of active and reserve members. Since March 1968 the close relationship of the Reserve and its associated active wing has provided a very rapid response to increased activity levels.

The requirement for airlift forces to surge to a level of activity many times greater than the peacetime flying requirements makes a significant ARF contribution desirable. However, several factors affect the ability of the Air Force to transfer more airlift missions to the ARF. The mix as reflected in the FY 1985 Budget balances the requirement for immediate responsiveness with rapid emergency surge capability. Further transfers of airlift missions to the ARF and the resulting reduction in the active force would mean an increased cost to the ARF to provide initial training. The active force C-9 and C-130 units located overseas need a reasonable rotation base. One further consideration in the airlift active/ARF mix equation is the responsiveness of our total airlift mission. Fifty percent of our total wartime passenger and cargo airlift capability is provided by the civil reserve air fleet. The ARF provides 25 percent and the active force provides the other 25 percent of total wartime airlift capability. Further substantial changes must consider the overall impact on responsiveness. These and other factors will be addressed in a comprehensive study by Air Force which will examine force mix in the context of expanding airlift capabilities.

e. Support Forces. There are several support and auxiliary missions which are full-time functions required for peacetime support of the combat forces. These missions include such things as centralized logistics, research and development, and intelligence. Because of their full-time requirement, these missions require full-time personnel. Transfer to the ARF would not diminish the required level of support. But, it would increase the number of ARF full-time personnel offsetting some of the intended cost savings. Auxiliary and support activities have been and will continue to be transferred to the ARF where the peacetime requirements are satisfied but the wartime requirements are not. Of particular note is the new support mission of Air Base Ground Defense. As the Air Force builds to the required level of capability, the percentage of ARF participation will dramatically increase from today's three percent to over 33 percent by FY 1989.

II. Manpower Requirements Determination

A. Manpower Management System

The most fundamental task in effective manpower management is the systematic determination of manpower requirements. Despite the use of recognized techniques for quantifying and aggregating total manpower needs, manpower management remains a difficult task. Greatly complicating the task is having to fund and manage a force structured for peacetime against which wartime missions and taskings are assigned. As a consequence, the funded manpower levels are derived from a force structure that represents the resources available to the Air Force, rather than those desired in an unconstrained environment.

Air Force Management Engineering Program (MEP). An important aspect of manpower management is the accurate determination of the manpower requirements for forces deployed, operated, and maintained to carry out assigned Air Force missions. The Air Force determines manpower requirements through its Management Engineering Program (MEP). This program utilizes industrial engineering work measurement techniques

and computer simulation such as Logistics Composite Modeling (LCOM). The MEP develops manpower standards and guides that set the most valid work center manhour-to-work load relationships and quantifies Air Force manpower needs. In so doing the MEP contributes directly to increased combat readiness by providing for the efficient and effective use of our manpower. The annual reapplication of manpower standards against force structure work load estimates determines the numbers, category, and distribution of manpower authorizations.

As early as 1959 the Air Force identified a need to accurately determine manpower requirements. This resulted in the establishment of the Manpower Validation Program (MVP) - a forerunner to the current MEP. The MVP concentrated on manpower standards with limited base or command application. By 1961 the focus had shifted to deriving common Air Force-wide standards, and AFM 25-5 was published to provide standard methods and techniques. In 1964 we emphasized the methods improvement side of the program and formalized the Management Advisory Services (MAS). At the same time, we assigned Management Engineering Teams (METs) to Major Air Commands (MAJCOMs), but located them at installations world-wide. In 1973 an internal study recommended refinements to strengthen the program even further. Management acceptance of these recommendations is reflected in our current Functional MET (FMET) concept, i.e. the dedication of one full FMET to a single function. This concept was tested on Civil Engineering in 1974 and proved very successful. During 1975 we began to fully develop this concept and today there are ten FMETs. The need for formal and full-time direction of these FMETs dictated the establishment of the Air Force Management Engineering Agency (AFMEA) in early 1976.

The Director of Manpower and Organization at HQ USAF (AF/MPM) is the office of primary responsibility for the MEP. AFMEA, located at Randolph AFB, TX, directs and supervises manpower standards development, provides technical guidance, schedules Air Force-wide studies, accomplishes a quality control of standards documentation, and is the approval authority for all standards. The ten FMETs that report to AFMEA develop and maintain manpower standards for Air Force common functional areas (civil engineering, supply, security police, etc.) In addition to the FMETs, there are 140 command METs, located at virtually every major installation throughout the world. These METs develop/maintain command unique and single point standards and guides, as well as assist in the FMET (Air Force-wide) studies.

Cumulative results of the MEP through FY 1982 reflect about \$800 million in combined savings from standard applications and MAS, a return on investment of \$3 for each dollar spent, and 96,000 authorizations deleted or redistributed. Further, the MEP has produced manpower standards that cover approximately 67 percent of current Air Force authorizations. The remaining 33 percent are covered by manpower guides. These guides are quantitative expressions of manpower; however, they are less structured than standards and are based on staff estimates, manpower surveys, and contractor estimates rather than on formal work measurement techniques. We prefer guides where standards development is not practical, for example, when the Air Force is inexperienced with new systems or when standards would be short-lived because a system or activity is approaching phase-out.

The MEP continues to emphasize incorporating productivity improvements into the standards development process. Activity in this area ranges from refinement of present procedures to testing of new concepts of standards development. Initiatives include: designing standards to enhance their maintainability, improving the wartime manpower determination process, and designing studies to meet the specific needs of Air Force functional managers.

The MEP has progressively improved and enjoys increased credibility because of experience gained over the years and through constant refinement of methodology. Annual application of manpower standards and guides provides an accurate, objective, and consistent basis to forecast future manpower requirements based on projected work loads. When mission or force adjustments cause work load changes, this procedure assures that manpower requirements will also be revised in accordance with the changed mission or force levels and resultant work loads. This systematic procedure supports the fundamental task of programming, which is to translate Air Force approved plans and requirements into time-phased resource packages including people, money, and materials.

B. Manpower Management Improvements

The Air Force is aware of the continuing need for productivity improvements and strives to minimize resource requirements while maximizing overall capability. Major manpower management improvement initiatives under way at this time include:

1. Functional Reviews. The Air Force has begun a major initiative, through its Management Engineering Program, to accomplish functional reviews of in-house activities. A concerted effort is being made during the 1980's to increase productivity and reduce operating costs by eliminating unnecessary and inefficient work practices. Under this initiative, virtually every Air Force function will be analyzed for ways to increase operating efficiency without decreasing effectiveness. To gain efficiencies, prime emphasis is being placed on removing unnecessary work requirements and enhancing operations through streamlined procedures and state-of-the-art equipment. Work requirements levied on Air Force functions are being investigated to ensure validity and currency. Further, during the review process, wartime taskings are being studied to ensure that peacetime economies are not taken at the expense of our war fighting capability. These reviews, which began in Spring 1983, after an intense training period, are expected to be very beneficial. Manpower savings resulting from functional reviews will be used to fund new programs or valid deferred requirements.

2. Productivity Enhancing Capital Investments (PECI). PECI programs improve management efficiency in two important ways. First, these investments provide a funding alternative for productivity-improving equipment and facilities not funded in the normal budget process. Secondly, savings resulting from such investments are redistributed to accomplish validated but otherwise unfunded requirements. Since the OSD-sponsored Productivity Investment Fund (PIF) program began in FY 1981, Air Force has received over \$160 million based on initiatives which are expected to generate \$2.2 billion in life cycle savings. These same projects

also represent a savings of nearly 2,500 manpower and equivalent authorizations. In addition to the money earned through the OSD program, Air Force will be investing approximately \$20 million of its own money in FY 1985 for Fast Payback Capital Investment (FASCAP) and Component Sponsored Investment Program (CSIP) projects. Our annual financial goal is to more than double current savings by the end of the decade, thus continuing our efforts to improve the distribution of critical manpower resources.

3. Work Force Motivation. Some elements of manpower management can be described as work force motivation. The best known of these is the quality circle concept where supervisors and workers alike meet as a team to resolve problems affecting their mission and work environment. By the end of FY 1983, Air Force had well over 400 quality circle teams in existence. Another element impacting portions of the work force deals with performance incentive pay. This concept is currently being tested and, if the results are favorable, could be in widespread use by FY 1985. Finally, the Air Force Human Resources Laboratory and the Leadership Management Development Center have helped improve overall manpower management through applied research and organizational effectiveness studies respectively.

4. Contract Cost Comparisons. Still another tool in the management of manpower resources is contract cost comparisons. A description of Air Force efforts in this area is included in Section III D, Commercial Activities.

III. Significant Program Highlights

A. Active Military Manpower

1. General. Military manpower increases 15,700 between FY 1984 and FY 1985. In the tactical force, 4,500 authorizations are added for modernization and training, largely to support increases in the F-16 and GLCM force structure. In addition, the Air Force is increasing support for wartime readiness initiatives in aerial ports, medical, critical military skills and chemical-biological protection equipment maintenance (total of all programs +4,400), a new strategic bomber and Peacekeeper (+300); expanded communications, intelligence and ADP (+2,800), and increased Research and Development (+400). To obtain a quality force as well as support the increased end strength, 4,000 spaces are added to the various training areas. In addition, the Air Force is terminating its temporary undermanning of the force imposed in FY 1984 (+1,700). These increases are partially offset by decreases for phasing down Titan II (-900), peacetime work load changes (-600), the transfer of missions to the Air Reserve Forces (-400) and numerous smaller decreases (-600).

The table below displays the manpower program by DPPC for FY 1984 through FY 1989.

Manpower Program By DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

DPPC	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88	FY 89
Strategic	72.9	72.5	75.7	79.6	80.5	79.4
Tactical/Mobility	145.2	149.4	157.1	160.6	166.7	169.9
Auxiliary Activities	52.8	53.7	54.7	54.6	55.0	54.9
Support Activities	271.1	277.2	285.7	289.6	290.4	289.7
Operating Strength						
Deviation	-11.9	-10.8	-21.6	-21.3	-21.0	-21.0
Individuals	64.4	68.2	77.4	74.8	74.4	74.0
Totals	594.5	610.2	629.0	638.0	646.0	646.9

2. Enlisted. The actual number of enlisted personnel recruited in FY 1983 and the projected accession requirements for FY 1984 and FY 1985 are shown below:

Enlisted Accessions and Reenlistments

	FY83		FY84		FY85
	Actual Year		Current Year		Budget Year
	Goal	Achieved	Goal		Goal
Accessions					
Prior Service	3,220	3,220	1,000		4,800
Non-Prior Service	60,489	60,489	60,000		65,000
Male	50,582	51,606	51,150		55,700
(HSDG)*	no less than 83%	(50,582)	no less than 96%		no less than 92%
Female	8,883	8,883	8,850		9,300
(HSDG)*	no less than 83%	(8,782)	no less than 96%		no less than 92%

* The AF establishes targets, not goals, for High School Diploma Graduates (HSDG). Numbers in () are actual FY 1983 HSDGS.

The Air Force achieved its FY 1983 enlisted non-prior service (NPS) and prior service (PS) recruiting objectives. The Air Force uses and tracks quality indicators such as HSDGs, upper mental categories (MCAT I and II) and lowest mental category (MCAT IV) as measures of NPS accession quality. For FY 1983, 98.1 percent of our NPS accessions were HSDG and 49.2 percent mental category I & II. Conversely, our mental category IV rate was only 2.4 percent. But, this quality was achieved in the most favorable recruiting environment in many years. As the economy continues to improve and unemployment declines, competition from civilian industry will increase. This competition will be exacerbated by the decline in the youth population through 1992.

The FY 1985 PS goal is significantly higher than FY 1984. This requirement will continue to be primarily in chronic critical hard-to-fill skills. Using fully qualified NCO's with direct duty assignments in lieu of retraining options reduces training costs and increases experience levels, but requires increased recruiting resources. PS recruiting will continue to be an extremely difficult program.

Reenlistments

		<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
First Term	-	31,100	24,400	26,400
Career	-	43,500	44,700	52,600

In FY 1983 the Air Force had the best enlisted retention in recent history. First term (66 percent) and second term (83 percent) reenlistment rates were all-time highs. The career reenlistment rate of 96 percent for FY 1983 was the highest since FY 1977. Even with continued high retention, the programmed force expansion will result in a net reduction in enlisted experience levels. This decline will be most pronounced in critical sortie generating skills where shortages of mid-level NCOs already exist. The Air Force has identified 72 NCO chronic critical shortage (CCS) skills -- concentrated in aircraft maintenance, aircraft systems, avionics maintenance, and munitions -- and has implemented several initiatives to reduce and ultimately eliminate the shortages. Voluntary and directed retraining programs and fully qualified prior service recruiting have been greatly increased, and focused on filling critical shortages. Selected numbers of qualified volunteers are being allowed to remain on active duty past normal mandatory retirement. To improve manning and encourage retraining from overage skills, a two-tier enlisted promotion policy has been instituted that offers greater promotion opportunity for people in critical occupations. Also, the ongoing Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program has been focused to ameliorate some of the remaining personnel readiness deficiencies.

Both recruiting and retention were positively influenced in FY 1983 by attainment of pay raises and increased bonus levels. Recent improvement in the economy make it essential that we maintain military pay levels that are equitable and competitive with the private sector and effect continued improvement in the quality of life.

3. Officer

Officer Accession Plan

<u>FY 83</u>		<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Goal</u>	<u>Achieved</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
9,094	9,094	8,900	9,053

The officer procurement program supports undergraduate flying training (pilot and navigator) and the broad range of essential combat sustaining, scientific and engineering, management, and medical requirements. The Air Force achieved its FY 1983 officer accession requirement in numbers, but critical skill shortages continue. FY 1983 was the most successful year for Officer Training School engineer recruiting (924) in memory, yet our end-of-year engineer shortage was still about 500, or over 6 percent of our hard core requirements. The majority of this shortage is for specific engineering disciplines such as electrical and aeronautical. These disciplines are also those most in demand by civilian

industry and command the highest initial salary offers. This engineer shortage directly affects the ability of the research and development community to develop new weapon systems. Shortages can impact our ability to apply new technologies, result in system design deficiencies, and reduce our ability to monitor contract operations. At the end of FY 1983, the Air Force was also short 300 pilots and 25 navigators. We expect to eliminate these deficits by end FY 1984. In FY 1983, the Air Force physician recruiting objective was 50 critical specialists. We accessed 50 specialists, but not in the exact skills desired. For example, we continue to have shortfalls in neurosurgery, orthopedics, and ear, nose and throat specialists. These shortfalls impact our ability to treat casualties during a conflict. In addition, military personnel who require care by these specialists must be referred to civilian physicians; and military dependents must use CHAMPUS. The result is increased costs to the Air Force. Our FY 1985 objective will be equally selective and just as difficult to achieve.

4. Women. The total number of women in the Air Force increased to 65,337 at the end of FY 1983, approximately 11.2 percent of the active duty force. Continued increases are programmed in the total number of Air Force women through FY 1989. Current projections for FY 1984 and FY 1985 for the utilization of women based upon anticipated accession, retention and attrition rates are as follows:

Air Force Women
Projected Strengths

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Planned Total	66,400	68,900

The above projections are slightly lower than the number in last year's report because of the denial of the requested FY 1984 end strength increase. By FY 1987, the Air Force anticipates the number of women will increase to 73,700, approximately 11.6 percent of the active force.

The Air Force has identical enlistment, commissioning, and job entry standards for both men and women. Officer women are assigned to all career fields and enlisted women to all but five of 230 enlisted skills. Women are precluded from assignment to combat-related specialties or positions on the basis of Section 8549 of Title 10, United States Code, and associated Air Force policy. This restriction affects only 10 percent of the positions in the Air Force.

B. Air Reserve Forces Military Manpower

1. Air National Guard Manpower (Selected Reserve)

a. General. The Air National Guard (ANG) has programmed an increase of 3,786 between FY 1984 and FY 1985. Of this increase 2,477 are drilling Guardsmen and 1,309 are full-time Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel. The drilling Guardsmen are required to support force structure changes such as the conversion of an O-2 unit to a C-19 (Boeing 747) unit and increased PAA for three RF-4 units and one F-4 unit. It also supports increases in air base defense, aerial port, aeromedical evacuation, civil

engineering and tactical control. The AGR increases support additional PAA at the ANG training units, force changes as noted above, increased aircraft maintenance requirements, the application of various manpower standards and new missions and equipment.

The table below displays the ANG manpower program by DPPC for FY 1984 through FY 1989.

ANG Manpower Programs by DPPC
Selected Reserve
(End Strength in Thousands)

DPPC	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88	FY 89
Strategic	20.8	22.2	22.2	22.6	23.3	23.2
Tactical/Mobility	60.3	62.5	63.5	65.2	67.3	68.5
Auxiliary Activities	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6
Support Activities	7.9	8.2	8.3	9.0	9.4	9.7
Individuals	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4
Totals	104.1	107.9	109.0	111.8	115.0	116.4

b. Enlisted. The actual number of ANG enlisted personnel recruited in FY 1983 and the accession goals for FY 1984 and FY 1985 are shown below.

ANG Enlisted Accession Plan

	<u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 83 1/</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY84</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY85</u> <u>Goal</u>
Non-Prior Service	6,855	5,073	5,740	6,040
Prior service	8,035	6,860	8,100	9,360
Male				
HSDG	3,145	(84.0%)		
Female				
HSDG	1,104	(83.0%)		

1/ ANG attained 100.4 percent of its programmed end strength. Due to an increased rate of retention it was only necessary to recruit 83% of the original accession goals.

c. Officer. The actual number of ANG officers recruited in FY 1983 and the accession goals for FY 1984 and FY 1985 are shown below:

ANG Officer Accession Plan

	<u>FY 83</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 84</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 85</u> <u>Goal</u>
	1,325	954	1,413	1,486

Officer goals were not achieved during FY 1983. It is anticipated that progress will be made in FY 1984 and that desired levels will be achieved.

d. Retention rates for the ANG enlisted force for FY 1983 and goals for FY 1984 and FY 1985 are shown below:

ANG Retention Effectiveness Rates

	<u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 83</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 84</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 85</u> <u>Goal</u>
First Term	55%	62.0%	55.0%	55.0%
Career	*	89.0%	*	*
Total	70%	79.0%	70.0%	70.0%

*Goals not set in this area, goals are set for first term and total only.

First term and the overall retention effectiveness rate exceeded the goals established for FY 1983.

2. Air Force Reserve Manpower (Selected Reserve)

a. General. The Air Force Reserve (AFR) programmed end strength increases by 4,949 between FY 1984 and FY 1985. This increase is for force structure growth and modernization, including additional support for the first reserve F-16 unit, first reserve equipped C-5 unit, and additional KC-10 aircrews (+1,000). The largest single increase is for medical personnel to help reduce the wartime manpower shortfall (+900). A significant increase of aerial port personnel supports wartime surge requirements for the growing strategic airlift force (+500). Civil engineering authorizations increase to redress wartime shortfalls (+700). Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) funded authorizations are increased to provide wartime augmentation to active force organizations that have greatly increased wartime workloads (+700). Small increases in full-time personnel and in other support skills have been made to accommodate mission and personnel program changes.

The table below displays the AFR Manpower Program by DPPC for FY 1984 through FY 1989.

AFR Manpower Program by DPPC
Selected Reserve
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Strategic	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1
Tactical/Mobility	44.0	46.8	47.8	48.6	49.8	50.1
Auxiliary Activities	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.7
Support Activities	18.7	20.9	24.3	27.6	30.2	30.6
Individuals	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6
Totals	69.9	74.8	79.3	83.6	87.4	88.0

b. Enlisted. The Air Force Reserve placed emphasis on matching accessions to critical skills and programmed structure requirements. The Air Force Reserve exceeded its goals for both prior service and non-prior service personnel and continued to obtain very high quality recruits. The actual numbers of enlisted personnel recruited in FY 1983 and the accession goals for FY 1984 and FY 1985 are shown below, followed by retention data:

AFR Enlisted Strength Plan

	<u>FY 83</u>		<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
<u>Accessions</u>				
Prior Service	7,474	9,036	7,275	9,325
Non-Prior Service	3,285	3,563	3,379	3,748
Male		2,360		
Female		1,203		
Overall HSDG		3,393		

c. Officer. The Air Force Reserve does not have accession goals for officers. It receives officers separated from the active force and from the non-EAD commissioning program for qualified enlisted personnel who hold needed skills and are presently participating in reserve activities. The actual number of officers recruited in FY 1983 and the estimated requirement for FY 1984 and FY 1985 are shown below:

AFR Officer Strength Plan

	<u>FY 83</u>		<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
	<u>Est Req</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Est Req</u>	<u>Est Req</u>
<u>Accessions</u>	2,490	1,919	2,565	2,248

d. Retention. Retention/reenlistment rates for the Air Force Reserve enlisted force for FY 1983 and goals for FY 1984 and FY 1985 are shown below:

AFR Retention Rates

	<u>FY 83</u>		<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
<u>Retention</u>				
First Term	60%	83%	65%	65%
Career	80%	88%	80%	80%

e. Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs). The Air Force Reserve manpower program for FY 1984 and FY 1985 continues to reflect the importance of a growing IMA program. The IMA program supports the wartime needs of the active force organizations.

Individual Mobilization Augmentees

	<u>FY 83</u>		<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Total	10,832	11,116	11,232	11,973
Officers	7,603	7,141	7,703	8,159
Enlisted	3,229	3,975	3,529	3,814

3. Pretrained Individual Manpower (PIM). The Air Force will mobilize and meet contingencies within the existing force structure (the active force and selected reserve). The Air Force actively manages PIM (Individual Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve and retirees) because it is a viable resource from which members will be selectively recalled by grade and skill to fill positions in sustaining units vacated by deployed members and as theater replacements. The Air Force will continue to implement initiatives to enhance the usability of PIM so long as these initiatives do not adversely impact the readiness of the existing and programmed force structure.

Pretrained Individual Manpower
(Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Projected Assigned</u>	<u>Resources</u>
Individual Ready Reserve	24.8	24.1	23.7
Standby Reserve	55.2	53.1	52.9
Retirees	213.6	207.4	204.5
Total	293.6	284.6	281.1
Officers	148.4	142.7	142.2
Enlisted	145.2	141.9	138.9

4. The following chart displays full-time military support for the ANG and the AFR.

ARF Full-time Military Support

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
	<u>Actual</u>		
ANG	4,574	5,915	7,224
AFR	465	517	623

C. Civilian Manpower

Air Force civilian manpower authorizations increase by 4,219 or 1.7 percent between FY 1984 and FY 1985. This increase directly supports increased flying hours, increased emphasis to improve spare parts procurement, increased Reserve missions, and aircraft procurement. Air Force civilians comprise approximately 20 percent of the total workforce. Included in civilian end strengths are Air Reserve Force military technicians, who are ANG/AFR reservists serving in their units on a full-time basis as dual status civilians in peacetime, who become military upon mobilization.

The Air Force strongly endorses the DoD position that imposition of both a fiscal ceiling and a civilian end strength ceiling creates management difficulties. The success of the industrial fund test which exempts industrial funded activities from ceilings to determine if total elimination of ceilings would be appropriate, reinforces our position that ceilings are counter-productive, costly, and not required for management of the civilian workforce.

The recent effect of artificial ceiling constraints and Congressional denial of civilian end strength increases have severed the relationship between programs and the manpower needed to support them. The force structure is building and the Air Force requires civilian manpower resources to support it. The FY 1985 civilian manpower request represents the minimum essential level of civilians required to support a credible deterrent force.

One area where the Air Force uses civilians extensively is in wholesale logistics activities (management, distribution, maintenance, contracting) at the Air Force's five Air Logistics Centers (ALCs). Numerous past actions have resulted in major AFLC manpower reductions. Over the past two decades, all management, supply, and maintenance functions were consolidated into five depots and one specialized repair activity. Nearly 3,800 civilians were reduced in the FY 1974 - FY 1981 time frame under the Depot Plant Modernization Program, which was a major investment in modern depot maintenance and distribution facilities and equipment. A reduction of 1,153 spaces, primarily management and support, was achieved when technology repair centers were consolidated in FY 1976.

The core of the Air Force depots is an organic industrial base designed to be the ultimate repair source for critical workloads in peace and war. Our current industrial base is comparatively modern with a replacement value of over \$4 billion in plant and equipment. The Air Force has placed a high priority on maintaining its organic facilities in a high state of readiness. This requires continuous efforts to modernize, increase productivity, and insure a proper mix of depot workloads.

More than 40 percent of the depot maintenance workload is now contracted. The Air Force vigorously pursues contracting of depot workloads when it makes sense to do so in accordance with approved

decision logic criteria. The remaining in-house depot workloads are necessary to the operating forces to sustain their operation in a war-time surge environment. Excessive contracting of in-house workloads jeopardizes the Air Force's ability to meet surge requirements and results in adverse facility utilization.

It is inconsistent to embark on program objectives which expand funding, force structure, combat capability, and readiness initiatives without the necessary civilian manpower in the industrial community.

Another restraint on civilian employment is the limitation placed on DoD Cooperative Education Programs in the FY 1981 Defense Appropriations Act. Cooperative Education Programs are a very effective source of well-qualified and trained manpower, especially in skill-shortage occupations. However, the Congressional limitation on numbers that can be hired in this program restricts its effectiveness. As a result, the Air Force must spend more time and money on recruitment of college graduates while positions remain vacant. Support is needed to eliminate the statutory ceiling on cooperative education students.

Another important civilian intensive function is spare parts acquisition. The Air Force is aggressively working to insure a reasonable price is paid for every spare part used and to expand the competitive environment. Our civilian request includes increased authorizations to support a newly established competition advocate office at the Air Logistics Centers for price analysis and contract screening, provisioning and data analysis and manufacturing surveillance.

Air Force civilians are a critical part of the Total Force and they make significant contributions to military readiness. Therefore, they expect and should be entitled to pay, benefits, and working conditions which are comparable to those attainable in their profession in the private sector. Programs which impact adversely on their pay and benefits have a detrimental impact on our ability to attract and retain the talent necessary to maintain a quality force.

The Air Force has consistently supported the principle of pay comparability for civilian employees. This principle is established in law; however, other laws and practices conflict within, causing us to depart from comparability in many situations. For example, there are four major provisions of the current blue collar pay law, which negate the principle of comparability and, hence, need change:

- The step rate structure for nonsupervisory/leader rates which result in pay above the local prevailing rates.
- Exclusion of wage data from state and local government.
- The requirements to pay uniform percentage night shift differentials of 7½ percent and 10 percent for second and third shifts.

- The Monroney Amendment which requires the government to establish "local" prevailing rates using wage data imported from different areas of the country when there is a "dominant" Federal industry in a particular locality, e.g., aircraft overhaul and repair.

An issue that still requires attention is our need to have a civilian force that is mobile enough to meet mission readiness requirements. For several years, however, we have faced increased difficulty in relocating civilians to vital positions when they themselves must partially pay for the move. We are very pleased that Congress has recently provided some relief extending the temporary quarters reimbursement period to a possible 120 days; providing a tax allowance for tax applied to relocation expense reimbursement; and providing an annual adjustment upward, if warranted by the Consumer Price Index (CPI).

However, there are several needed improvements that still require legislation. The most important is that although Congress recently increased the household goods weight limitations to 18,000 pounds for Federal employees, the FY 1984 DoD Appropriation Act limits shipment of household goods to 13,500 pounds for DoD civilians. The Air Force supports relief from the 13,500 limitation and requests restoration of the 18,000 pounds allowed non-DoD civilian under title 5 U.S. Code. Another required improvement is legislation to reimburse employees for sale of a residence in a former duty station when an employee returning from an overseas duty station returns to an alternate duty station in the continental United States. Title 5 US Code does not authorize any reimbursement for real estate expenses involving an overseas duty assignment. Civilians under our centrally managed career programs are required to relocate periodically much the same as their military counterparts. Civilians (from grades General Schedule/General Manager 11-15) in the logistics, research and development, acquisition, manpower and personnel, engineering services and comptroller career program move at great personal inconvenience. These moves are for the benefit of the government. An area of concern is that at retirement there is no provision to return these people at government expense to their "home of record". Some relief is required for these motivated career employees.

Civilian pay and benefits should be considered not only in terms of cost but in terms of their impact on attracting and keeping a high-quality, career-minded civilian force needed to meet Air Force mission requirements. Extreme care should be taken to design the new pension system and to supplement the social security system coverage that begins 1 January 1984. Together, the new systems should result in retirement packages of equal value to the current private sector plans.

Image of the civilian work force is a matter of increasing concern. Recruitment and retention are critically impacted by employee perceptions of the Air Force and Federal Government as an employer. There is concern over productivity and morale. It has become more difficult to sustain an improved distribution of minorities and women

in the work force. We encourage open and frank dialogue among Federal agencies with OPM and between OPM and Congress concerning civilian pay and benefits. This will reduce misunderstandings and lead to consensus on Administration personnel program initiatives.

In summary, the key to achieving Air Force goals and objectives are the people who do the work. Comparable pay, adequate health insurance, and a stable, sound retirement system are key to the morale, performance and productivity of our civilian work force and essential in attaining our goals and objectives. We request your support in raising the image of the Federal worker and in providing pay and benefits comparable to the private sector.

D. Commercial Activities (CA)

The Air Force uses a mix of military (active, Reserve, and National Guard), federal civilian employees, and contractors to satisfy mission requirements. This practice helps provide sufficient military personnel to meet wartime commitments while taking advantage of the experience and continuity provided by civilian employees and the economies often generated by contracting.

Guidance for determining whether to accomplish commercial activity (CA) workload in-house or by contract is provided in OMB Circular A-76. Generally, A-76 reaffirms the Government's policy of reliance on the private sector for goods and services. While recognizing that certain functions are inherently governmental in nature and others must be performed in-house for national defense reasons, the Circular directs all other CA workload be reviewed to determine the most cost-effective method of operation.

The Air Force has established an aggressive program and has long been considered a leader in the implementation of A-76. First, determinations are made as to the work load that military members must perform based on military essentiality. Criteria for military-essential positions include combat and direct combat support duties, maintenance of favorable overseas rotation indices, and career progression requirements. Additionally in-house positions are retained that must be manned by Air Force military or civilian employees, because of inherent management responsibilities or to comply with applicable statutes or regulations. All remaining CA work load is considered eligible for contract. From these eligible work loads, the Air Force develops a cost-comparison program by identifying candidate activities that will be cost studied for possible contract performance.

During FY 1983 the Air Force completed 81 cost comparison studies at 48 locations covering approximately 1,100 authorizations. Contracts were awarded as a result of 31 studies while in-house operations were identified as more economical in 50 cases. These studies covered such diverse activities as transient aircraft maintenance functions and word processing centers.

Cost comparisons have been effective in identifying the most economical method for accomplishing various Air Force workloads. For example, in the first year of performance for a contract operated technical order distribution function at Hill AFB, Utah, the Air Force estimates it will realize a cost avoidance of \$26,000 over the cost of an in-house operation. Conversely, the source data entry function at Robins AFB, Georgia, remained in-house based on a cost study which indicated that the cost of an in-house operation was lower by approximately \$80,000 dollars than the lowest estimated contract cost.

Currently, The Air Force is conducting 343 cost comparison studies covering approximately six thousand authorizations. These current studies along with our continuing review of activities to determine their contract eligibility gives the Air Force an aggressive program that has been recognized throughout the federal government as a model program for the implementation of A-76.

IV. Air Force Manpower By Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC)

The following tables display Air Force Manpower by DPPC for the period FY 1983 through FY 1985. A more detailed description of each DPPC explaining significant growth areas follows the DPPC tables. It is important to note the Air Force continually reviews its requirements and seeks optimum methods of performing its functions. The Air Force goal remains improved readiness at minimum cost by ensuring the most effective balance between active and reserve components as well as the proper balance between combat and combat sustaining forces.

AIR FORCE ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER PROGRAM
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 83 <u>Actual</u>	FY 84 <u>(FY 85</u>	FY 85 <u>Budget)</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	73.9	72.9	72.5
Offensive Strategic Forces	55.2	54.5	53.4
Defensive Strategic Forces	7.4	6.6	6.6
Strategic Control and Surveillance	11.4	11.8	12.5
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	139.8	145.2	149.4
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Force	100.6	105.4	110.3
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	39.2	39.7	39.1
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	50.8	52.8	53.7
Intelligence	15.4	15.7	16.0
Centrally Managed Communications	16.0	16.7	16.9
Research and Development	11.3	12.0	12.3
Geophysical Activities	8.1	8.3	8.4
<u>Support Activities</u>	267.4	271.1	277.2
Base Operating Support	159.3	163.0	167.8
Medical Support	14.6	14.8	15.5
Personnel Support	6.4	6.4	6.5
Individual Training	21.6	22.0	22.5
Force Support Training	26.9	26.5	26.6
Central Logistics	4.6	5.0	5.1
Centralized Support Activities	15.1	15.3	15.1
Management Headquarters	18.6	17.8	17.8
Federal Agency Support	0.2	0.3	0.3
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	531.9	541.9	554.9
<u>Operating Strength Deviation</u> (As of 30 Sept)	-	-11.9	-10.8
<u>Individuals</u>	60.1	64.4	68.2
Transients	17.1	16.1	16.8
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	0.6	0.6	0.6
Students, Trainees	37.9	43.3	46.3
Cadets	4.5	4.4	4.4
<u>Total</u>	592.0	594.5	610.2

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

AIR FORCE SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER PROGRAM (ANG)
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 83 Actual	FY 84 (FY 85	FY 85 Budget)
<u>Strategic</u>	20.9	20.8	22.2
Offensive Strategic Forces	10.7	10.5	10.6
Defensive Strategic Forces	9.5	9.6	10.8
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	60.3	60.3	62.5
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	43.0	43.0	44.1
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	17.4	17.3	18.4
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	11.5	12.6	12.6
Intelligence	-	-	-
Centrally Managed Communications	11.0	12.1	12.1
Research and Development	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	0.5	0.5	0.5
<u>Support Activities</u>	7.5	7.9	8.2
Base Operating Support	2.7	2.9	2.9
Medical Support	-	-	-
Personnel Support	0.5	0.5	0.5
Individual Training	-	-	-
Force Support Training	2.2	2.3	2.5
Central Logistics	-	-	-
Centralized Support Activities	2.0	2.1	2.1
Management Headquarters	0.1	0.1	0.1
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	100.3	101.7	105.5
<u>Individuals</u>	1.9	2.4	2.4
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	1.9	2.4	2.4
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	102.2	104.1	107.9

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

AIR FORCE SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER PROGRAM (AFR)
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 83 <u>Actual</u>	FY 84 <u>(FY 85</u>	FY 85 <u>Budget)</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	2.1 (.1)	2.1 (.1)	2.1 (.1)
Offensive Strategic Forces	2.0 (.0)	2.0 (.0)	2.0 (.0)
Defensive Strategic Forces	0.1 (.1)	0.1 (.1)	0.1 (.1)
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	42.8 (.2)	44.0 (.3)	46.8 (.3)
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Force	9.2 (.1)	10.5 (.3)	10.7 (.3)
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	33.5 (*)	33.5 (*)	36.1 (*)
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	3.5 (2.9)	3.5 (2.9)	3.5 (2.9)
Intelligence	1.6 (1.6)	1.8 (1.8)	1.8 (1.8)
Centrally Managed Communications	0.1 (*)	0.1 (*)	0.1 (*)
Research and Development	1.1 (1.1)	0.9 (.9)	0.9 (.9)
Geophysical Activities	0.7 (.1)	0.7 (.2)	0.7 (.2)
<u>Support Activities</u>	17.4 (8.0)	18.7 (8.0)	20.9 (8.7)
Base Operating Support**	9.0 (2.8)	8.9 (2.5)	9.8 (2.6)
Medical Support	3.8 (1.4)	4.1 (.9)	5.4 (1.5)
Personnel Support	0.3 (.0)	0.3 (.0)	0.3 (.0)
Individual Training	0.9 (.9)	1.3 (1.2)	1.3 (1.2)
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	1.0 (1.0)	0.8 (.8)	0.8 (.8)
Centralized Support Activities	1.0 (.5)	1.5 (1.0)	1.5 (1.0)
Management Headquarters	0.9 (.8)	1.0 (.8)	1.0 (.8)
Federal Agency Support	0.5 (.5)	0.8 (.8)	0.8 (.8)
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	65.7 (11.1)	68.3 (11.2)	73.2 (12.0)
<u>Individuals</u>	1.5 (.0)	1.6 (.0)	1.6 (.0)
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	1.5 (.0)	1.6 (.0)	1.6 (.0)
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	67.2 (11.1)	69.9 (11.2)	74.8 (12.0)

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

*Less than 50.

**BOS in the AFR includes Civil Engineering, Individual Mobilization Augmentees, and Combat Logistics Support Authorizations.

Numbers in () indicate IMAs and are included in the totals.

AIR FORCE CIVILIAN MANPOWER PROGRAM
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 83 Actual	FY 84 (FY 85	FY 85 Budget)
<u>Strategic</u>	7.5	7.5	7.7
Offensive Strategic Forces	3.5	3.3	3.3
Defensive Strategic Forces	3.0	3.1	3.3
Strategic Control and Surveillance	1.0	1.1	1.1
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	29.3	29.2	29.0
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	16.4	16.3	16.0
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	12.9	13.0	13.0
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	21.4	22.0	22.3
Intelligence	1.8	1.9	2.0
Centrally Managed Communications	4.4	4.5	4.5
Research and Development	14.0	14.4	14.6
Geophysical Activities	1.2	1.2	1.2
<u>Support Activities</u>	193.0	190.7	194.6
Base Operating Support	87.2	86.5	86.5
Medical Support	3.1	3.2	3.4
Personnel Support	1.8	1.9	1.9
Individual Training	5.2	5.1	5.1
Force Support Training	1.9	1.9	1.9
Central Logistics	75.1	73.8	77.4
Centralized Support Activities	9.7	10.2	10.3
Management Headquarters	9.0	8.1	8.1
Federal Agency Support	*	*	*
<u>Total**</u>	251.2	249.4	253.6

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50 spaces.

** Includes Air National Guard and Reserve technicians (FY 83: 30.0, FY 84: 30.0, FY 85: 30.3).

A. Strategic.

1. Offensive Strategic Forces.

Air Force Offensive Strategic Forces (PAA)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
<u>Bombers</u>			
B-52	241	241	241
FB-111	56	56	56
B-1B	0	0	1
<u>Tankers</u>			
KC-135	487	487	487
<u>Missiles</u>			
Titan II	42	31	23
Minuteman	1,000	1,000	1,000
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
<u>Tankers</u>			
ANG KC-135	104	104	104
AFR KC-135	24	24	24

Offensive Strategic Forces consist of combat aircraft and intercontinental ballistic missiles under the control of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). SAC's primary mission is to deter nuclear war by maintaining the ability to deliver nuclear weapons to any part of the world. SAC is also capable of delivering conventional weapons with its bomber aircraft. To perform these missions in FY 1985, we have 16 B-52 squadrons, four FB-111 squadrons, 32 active force and 16 smaller Reserve force KC-135 tanker squadrons, three Titan missile squadrons, and 20 Minuteman squadrons with the Primary Aircraft/Aerospace Vehicle Authorizations (PAA) shown in the above table.

Air Force Offensive Strategic Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	55.2	54.5	53.4
Selected Reserve			
ANG	10.7	10.5	10.6
AFR	2.0	2.0	2.0
<u>Civilian</u>	3.5	3.3	3.3

The FY 1985 active military manpower decrease is due to decreases in B-52 bomber and tanker programs (-750) and Titan II Missile program (-810). These decreases are partially offset by increases in B-1B bomber program (+474) and Peacekeeper missile program (+118). The ANG increase in FY 1985 is due to security for Priority "B" alert aircraft (+38). Participation by the ARF in the strategic offensive missions has been limited to tanker operations because of the highly time intensive nature of bomber and missile operations and training in peacetime.

2. Defensive Strategic Forces.

Air Force Defensive Strategic Forces (PAA)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
F-106	72	54	36
F-15	18	36	54
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
ANG F-4	90	126	126
ANG F-106	81	66	66

FY 1985 Air Force Strategic Defensive Forces include aircraft and ground radars of Tactical Air Command and Air National Guard, and ground radars of Alaskan Air Command for atmospheric tactical warning/attack assessment (TW/AA), airspace control and limited defense. To perform this mission in FY 1985, the Air Force will employ a force of three active F-15 squadrons, two active Air Force and four Air National Guard F-106 squadrons, and seven Air National Guard F-4 squadrons. The ground environment systems include five Regional Operations Control Centers and 61 surveillance radar sites (including USAF/FAA joint use). Distant Early Warning (DEW) stations in Alaska, Canada, and Greenland are manned primarily by contractor personnel.

Air Force Defensive Strategic Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.4	6.6	6.6
Selected Reserve			
ANG	9.5	9.6	10.8
AFR	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>Civilian</u>	3.0	3.1	3.3

ANG increases between FY 1984 and FY 1985 are a direct result of the decision to transfer more of the continental air defense mission to the Reserve forces. The increased manpower ties to the conversion of a tactical reconnaissance unit to a fighter interceptor unit (+966), the transfer of three detached alerts to the ANG mission (+34), and increased spaces to accommodate a F-106 (15 PAA) unit to a F-106 (18 PAA) unit (+111). In addition, ANG manpower has been added for priority "B" NORAD security (+39).

The civilian increase (+244) in FY 1985 is civilian (military) technicians to support the conversion of the tactical reconnaissance unit to a fighter interceptor unit but is offset by an identical decrease in civilian (military) technicians in tactical Air Forces.

3. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces.

In FY 1985, Control and Surveillance Forces include one squadron of SR-71s for reconnaissance, 27 PAA EC-135 post attack command and control system aircraft, which are used by the Strategic Air Command for airborne command posts, communications relay, and launch control centers, and three E-4B National Emergency Airborne Command Post aircraft. The ground environment activities include the NORAD Command Post in Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs, which is the nerve center for aerospace defense of the North American continent; three ballistic missile early warning sites; five Submarine Launch Ballistic Missile (SLBM) detection and warning sites; eight SPACETRACK facilities consisting of radars and ground-based, electro-optical deep space surveillance system sites; the ground data system for the satellite early warning program; three Air National Guard aircraft control and warning sites; and portions of the National Military Command System. Control and Surveillance Forces also include communications and command and control support equipment. Finally, some of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System automatic data processing resources are also included in this category.

Air Force Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	11.4	11.8	12.5
Selected Reserve			
ANG	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>Civilian</u>	1.0	1.1	1.1

The FY 1985 active military increase results from increases for the Consolidated Space Operations Center (+250), Automated Data Processing Architecture for the North American Defense Cheyenne Mountain Complex (+93), Strategic War Planning System (+30) Defense Support Program (+70), critical military skills (+44), Airborne Command and Control Systems (+100), and Worldwide Military Command and Control System (+31). Strategic control and surveillance missions are best suited for the active force due to their highly time-intensive nature and the fact that they do not require appreciable augmentation a wartime environment.

B. Tactical/Mobility.

1. Tactical Air Forces.

Air Force Tactical Air Forces

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
Tactical Fighter Wing Equivalents	24.3	24.3	24.8
Tactical Fighter Squadrons	78	78	79
Reconnaissance Squadrons (RF-4C and TR-1)	8	8	8
Special Operations Force Squadrons	5	5	5
Airborne Warning and Control Squadrons	6	6	6
Airborne TACCS Squadrons	9	7	7
Tanker/Cargo Squadron (KC-10)	2	2	3
Electronic Combat Squadrons <u>1/</u>	2	3	3
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
ARF TAC Fighter Wing Equivalents	11.7	11.9	12.0
ANG Fighter/Attack Squadrons	33	33	33
ANG Reconnaissance Squadrons (RF-4C)	7	6	6
AFR Fighter/Attack Squadrons	10	10	10
AFR Special Operations Squadrons	2	2	2
ANG Airborne TACS Squadrons	4	4	3
ANG Electronic Combat Squadron <u>2/</u>	1	1	1
Tanker/Cargo Squadron (KC-10) (AFR-Assoc) <u>3/</u>	2	2	2

1/ Includes EF-111A and EC-130 H (Compass Call) squadrons.

2/ Includes 8 PAA EC 130E squadron.

3/ Associate squadrons provide one-half of the wartime required aircrews for utilization with active USAF squadrons.

Tactical Air Forces consist of the tactical fighter, attack, reconnaissance, special operations, and command and control aircraft (for close air support, interdiction, counterair, reconnaissance), tanker/cargo aircraft, the Ground Launched Cruise Missile, and special purpose missions. Manpower supporting these forces includes air crews, organizational and intermediate aircraft maintenance personnel, missile operations crews, and weapon systems security, GLCM and munitions maintenance personnel. Also included in this category are the forces and manpower for the Air Force's Tactical Air Control Systems, the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, civil engineering Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Squadrons (RED HORSE) and tactical intelligence squadrons.

Air Force Tactical Air Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	100.6	105.4	110.3
Selected Reserve			
ANG	43.0	43.0	44.1
AFR	9.2	10.5	10.7
<u>Civilian</u>	16.4	16.3	16.0

The active military increase in FY 1984 results from force structure increases (+350), Ground Launched Cruise Missile force structure growth (+500), the purchase and prepositioning of new War Reserve Materiel equipment (+450) and support of combat forces in Southwest Asia and Europe (+450), the growth of special access programs (+500), increased intelligence gathering activities (+400), tactical air control system communication activities (+550), and an increase of 2,050 due to actual end year 1983 strength reporting.

The active military increase in FY 1985 results from force structure increases (+2,250), Ground Launched Cruise Missile beddown (+1,100), special access program growth (+400), increased air base ground defense requirements (+250), increased communication consoles in 12 E-3As (+70), new Ground Mobile Force - SATCOM terminals in Europe (+150), manpower to operate and maintain the prototype TR-1 ground station in Europe (+90), and other Command and Control improvements (+500). These increases are best suited for the active force because they are either forward deployed or provide the CONUS rotation base to support overseas commitments.

The ANG increase in FY 1985 is due to the establishment of five Air Base Ground Defense Flights and two civil engineering (RED HORSE) units (+673). Other mission changes include three tactical reconnaissance units increasing from 18 PAA to 24 PAA (+922). These increases are offset by the conversion of one RF-4 tactical reconnaissance unit to a fighter interceptor unit (-914) and a tactical air support 0-2 unit to a C-19 (Boeing 747) strategic airlift unit (-648). Other increases include F-4 maintenance spaces (+130) and manpower requirements to support Systems Trainer and Exercise Module (STEM), PACER savings, Rapid Deployment Force plans officers, Inertial Navigation Systems (INS), F-16 and A-7 simulator support, environmental health technicians and ground explosive safety personnel (+203). Manpower standards requirements to support supply, transportation, and fuels account for additional spaces (+250) and spaces are required to support increased manning to allow the ANG to achieve 100 percent of its wartime requirement (+435).

AFR increases in FY 1984 reflect the continued modernization and expansion of its tactical fighter force, including the conversion of the F-105 Squadron to F-16s, increases in F-4D, and increases in KC-10 aircrews to support increased active force PAA. In FY 1985, additional KC-10s are assigned and F-16 PAA is increased. In addition increases are made in A-10 maintenance authorizations.

The civilian decrease in FY 1985 is a reduction of civilian (military) technicians as a result of the conversion of a tactical reconnaissance unit to a fighter interceptor unit (-244).

2. Mobility Forces.

Air Force Mobility Forces (Sqds)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
Tactical Airlift Squadrons	14	14	14
Strategic Airlift Squadrons	17	17	17
Aeromed Airlift Squadrons	3	3	3
Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Squadrons	8	8	8
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
Tactical Airlift Squadrons	34	34	34
Strategic Airlift Squadrons (AFR-Assoc) 1/	17	17	17
Aeromed Airlift Squadrons (AFR-Assoc) 1/	1	1	1
Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Squadrons	6	6	5
Strategic Airlift (AFR-unit equipped)	0	0	1
Strategic Airlift (ANG-unit equipped)	0	0	1

1/ Associate airlift squadrons provide aircrews and maintenance personnel (except CONUS based C-9s which are aircrew only) for utilization with active USAF squadrons. These include one C-9 aeromedical evacuation squadron, four C-5A squadrons, and 13 C-141 squadrons.

Air Force Mobility Forces consist of the tactical airlift, strategic airlift, aeromedical airlift, and aerospace rescue and recovery aircraft of the Military Airlift Command, the Air Force Reserve, and the Air National Guard. Manpower supporting these forces include crews, organizational and intermediate aircraft maintenance, and aircraft security personnel. This category also includes manpower for aerial port operations and Air Force special mission forces.

Air Force Mobility Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	39.2	39.7	39.1
Selected Reserve			
ANG	17.4	17.3	18.4
AFR	33.5	33.5	36.1
<u>Civilian</u>	12.9	13.0	13.0

Active military manpower decreases in FY 1985 result from the transfer of C-5 aircraft (8 PAA) to the Air Force Reserve (-381) and the conversion of CT-39 aircraft maintenance to contract (-554). These are partially offset by increases in aerial port (+ 186) and command and control workloads (+ 107).

ANG manpower increases in FY 1985 are due to the conversion of the tactical air support (0-2) unit to a C-19 (Boeing 747) strategic airlift unit (+702) and establishment of a mobile Aerial Port for this unit (+127). Further, 109 spaces are required for the build up of existing aerial ports flights. Growth of 156 spaces are also programmed in support of an increase for aeromedical crews.

AFR increases in FY 1985 reflect more and expanded missions being transferred to the ARF. A significant manpower increase is associated with the assignment of strategic airlift assets (C-5s) to the USAFR. The remaining increase is due to expansion of aerial port operations, medical services support and aeromedical crews to meet Air Force shortfalls.

The active/ARF mix as reflected above balances the requirement for immediate responsiveness with rapid emergency surge capability.

C. Auxiliary Activities. Auxiliary Activities are subdivided into Intelligence, Centrally Managed Communications, Research and Development Activities, and Geophysical Activities.

1. Intelligence.

This category includes manpower for selected National Foreign Intelligence Programs and other Air Force intelligence related activities. The Air Force Intelligence Service and the Air Force Electronic Security Command are the two Air Force organizations whose primary mission is intelligence; however, nearly all major Air Force organizations also support these activities.

Air Force Intelligence Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	15.4	15.7	16.0
Selected Reserve			
AFR	1.6	1.8	1.8
<u>Civilian</u>	1.8	1.9	2.0

The active military increase in FY 1985 results from increases in selected National Foreign Intelligence Programs (+205) Service Support to the National Security Agency (+79) and Defense Intelligence Agency (+25). The civilian increase in FY 1985 results from increases in selected National Foreign Intelligence (+31).

Effective use of the ARF has enhanced our intelligence potential to respond to crisis situations. This is especially true in those disciplines where Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) have more expertise than the active component. In such cases, they man Indications and Warning Centers or train less experienced active force personnel.

The proper force mix, however, as reflected above, is imperative to meet expanded mission requirements effectively. Most intelligence activities require access to information so sensitive that control and dissemination of data to those individuals only randomly associated with its exploitation is considered inadequate for security protection. Additionally during this period of rapid technology growth, most intelligence functions require technical expertise and continuity of knowledge far in excess of what may reasonably be expected of personnel available less than full-time. Detecting the nuance within a multitude of indicators demands unique skills. Thus, intelligence personnel must be well trained, current in their speciality and cleared for access to highly classified information and the most sensitive sources available for exploitation. Continuing technological advances make the retention of these special skill levels an ongoing full-time task.

2. Centrally Managed Communications

This category includes manpower supporting long-haul defense communication systems, Air Force communications systems, satellite communications systems, and the Air Force Communications Command engineering and installation activities.

Air Force Centrally Managed Communications Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	16.0	16.7	16.9
Selected Reserve			
ANG	11.0	12.1	12.1
AFR	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>Civilian</u>	4.4	4.5	4.5

The active military increase in FY 1985 results from increases in Air Force communications programs (+268), in long-haul communications (+30), and in Defense Communications Agency support (+31) offset by decreases in communications security (-72) and worldwide engineering and installation communications (-27).

The ANG increase from FY 1983 to FY 1984 is caused by a lower than programmed manning level which occurred during FY 1983. This shortage of 835 manpower spaces is reflected in the FY 1984 program coupled with 268 spaces for new TSC-100, TPN-19, TSC 38b equipment, establishment of a new Joint Communication Service Element (JCSE) augmentation unit and ANG efforts to enhance the manning of the communications units.

3. Research and Development

This category includes manpower, primarily in the Air Force Systems Command, which carries out basic and applied research and design, development, test, and evaluation of Air Force systems and subsystems. Manpower in this category also supports various Department of Defense research and development activities and agencies.

Air Force Research and Development Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	11.3	12.0	12.3
Selected Reserve			
AFR	1.1	0.9	0.9
<u>Civilian</u>	14.0	14.4	14.6

The active military increase in FY 1985 results from increases in acquisition and related programs (+249).

ARF participation in this area consists of Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) who provide valued support to the Research, Development and Acquisition efforts. The full-time active manpower, however, is required to ensure continuity in all phases of weapon systems conception and development to ensure we are getting the best technological product at the best price and within the time constraints imposed by mission requirements.

The civilian increase in FY 1985 results from increases for spares acquisition and test and evaluation programs (+272).

4. Geophysical Activities

The manpower in this category supports active and Reserve weather service activities, meteorological and navigational satellite/space programs, and Defense mapping, charting, and geodesy activities.

Air Force Geophysical Activities Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.1	8.3	8.4
Selected Reserve			
ANG	0.5	0.5	
AFR	0.7	0.7	
<u>Civilian</u>	1.2	1.2	


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
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT FY
1985 VOLUME III FORCE READINESS REPORT(U) ASSISTANT
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The active military build in FY 1985 results from increases in space shuttle operations support at Vandenberg Air Force Base (+63), Global Positioning Satellite Operations (+33), and Defense Mapping Agency (+22). The full-time, peacetime nature of these activities make them most suitable for the active component.

D. Support Activities. Support Activities are subdivided into Base Operating Support, Medical Support, Personnel Support, Individual Training, Force Support Training, Central Logistics, Centralized Support Activities, Management Headquarters, and Federal Agency Support.

Accounting for Base Operating Support (BOS) manpower varies among the Services. All the Services include in the BOS category those people who provide fixed-site services such as housing and real property maintenance. The Air Force also includes all manpower providing food, transportation and supply type services in the BOS category and carries only operations and maintenance manpower in its Strategic and Tactical/Mobility categories. These accounting differences between Services preclude making simple "combat to support" comparisons among the Services.

1. Base Operating Support. BOS has two subcategories: Combat Installations and Support Installations.

a. Base Operating Support - Combat Installations.

This category contains manpower resources essential for the direct support and overall readiness of our combat forces in such vital functions as control tower operations, aircraft dispatch, airfield and combat facilities maintenance and battle damage repair, fire protection and crash rescue, security, base communications, food service, transportation, data automation, and supply.

Air Force Base Operating Support Manpower - Combat Installations
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	115.1	117.5	119.6
Selected Reserve			
ANG	2.2	2.4	2.4
AFR	8.5	8.6	9.4
<u>Civilian</u>	49.0	49.1	49.4

The active military increase in FY 1984 can be attributed to the beddown of Ground Launched Cruise Missile (+624), mobility forces program adjustments (+100), and (+1600) due to actual 1983 year end strength reporting.

The active military increase in Air Force spaces in FY 1985 results from increases in communication requirements (+310), Consolidated Space Operation Center (+100), Ground Launched Cruise Missile beddown (+683), aircraft fuels requirements from increased tactical

flying hours of (+150), increased security police training (+103); strategic force structure support requirements (+58), tactical force structure beddown at Misawa (+180), and tactical force structure support requirements (+259).

This active manpower represents daily, peacetime workload in support of active force missions and is most suitable for the active component.

AFR manpower increases in FY 1985 reflect the need to reduce manpower shortfalls against requirements to operate ten bases and an increase in civil engineering areas. The accelerated manpower procurement in Base Operating Support (Offensive) in FY 1983 is above the authorized strength level. These authorizations will be funded positions in FY 1986.

The civilian increases in FY 1985 support Ground Launched Cruise Missile beddown (+166), tactical force structure beddown at Misawa (+52), and Marine Corps Family Housing support on Okinawa (+95).

b. Base Operating Support - Support Installations

This category contains manpower resources for the operation and maintenance of auxiliary, logistics, and training installations and other base operating support activities such as base hospitals, clinics, dispensaries, laundries, and commissaries.

Air Force Base Operating Support Manpower - Support Installations. (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	44.2	45.5	48.2
Selected Reserve			
ANG	0.5	0.5	0.5
AFR	0.5	0.3	0.4
<u>Civilian</u>	38.1	37.4	37.1

The active military increase in FY 1984 results from contract program adjustments (+60), medical wartime readiness (+530), increased non-accessions related training (+497), and the impact of actual end year 1983 assigned strength (+175).

The active military increase in FY 1985 results from increases in accession driven base operating support requirements (+259), food service new start (+219), medical requirements associated with force structure expansion (+485), wartime medical readiness (+1,021), base operating support for expanded logistics management and new weapon system acquisition (+600), and troop issue readiness expansion (+330),

offset by decreases in the conversion of non-wartime essential military to civilian (-154). The active military manpower displayed supports full-time, peacetime work load.

Early manpower procurement in FY 1983 above the AFR authorized strength in Base Operating Support (Defensive) will not be funded until FY 1985.

The civilian decrease in FY 1985 results from increases in non-accession driven base operating support requirements (+124), military to civilian conversion of non-wartime essential skills (+154), and the opening of new commissary stores coupled with increased retail workload (+160). These increases are offset by an internal arbitrary reduction of civilian end strength (-730).

2. Medical Support.

Included in this category is manpower required to provide medical and dental care to eligible individuals in Air Force medical centers and dental facilities. It also includes medical research and development and Air Force Reserve medical service units.

Air Force Medical Support Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	14.6	14.8	15.5
Selected Reserve			
AFR	3.8	4.1	5.4
<u>Civilian</u>	3.1	3.2	3.4

The active military increase in FY 1985 results from increases in medical war readiness program (+500) and other medical initiatives (+200) such as family support practices and occupational/environmental health laboratories.

The AFR increase in both FY 1984 and FY 1985 is due to additional medical support for the Central Command and World Wide Force Projection (WWFP).

ARF increases in the medical support area help offset a significant wartime manpower shortfall. However, the Air Force has an extensive peacetime daily work load that must continue to be supported by the active component.

The civilian increase in FY 1985 results from medical support for increased force structure (+100) and support for occupational/environmental health laboratories (+26).

3. Personnel Support.

The Air Force operates over 1,000 recruiting offices and contributes manpower to 69 Military Entrance Processing Stations. Air Force manpower requirements in support of investigative activities, personnel processing, and the Air Force Aerial Demonstration Team are also included in this category.

Air Force Personnel Support Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.4	6.4	6.5
Selected Reserve			
ANG	0.5	0.5	0.5
AFR	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Civilian</u>	1.8	1.9	1.9

The active military increase in FY 1985 results from increases in Air Force interservice support to the Army at the Army Confinement Facility at Fort Lewis, Washington (+50).

The active military manpower displayed supports full-time peacetime workload with no requirement for a wartime surge capability.

4. Individual Training.

Manpower required to conduct training is included in this category. Individuals actually undergoing training are carried in the Trainees, Students, and Cadets accounts of the Individuals category.

Air Force Individual Training Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	21.6	22.0	22.5
Selected Reserve			
AFR	0.9	1.3	1.3
<u>Civilian</u>	5.2	5.1	5.1

The active military increase in FY 1985 results from instructor/staff support for increased non-prior service enlisted accessions from 60,000 to 65,000 (+364), and training activities in support of force structure expansion (+333). This increase is partially offset by a reduction in undergraduate flying training production (-239). Individual training is a full-time peacetime function. As such, it is best suited to the active component.

Detailed justification of training requirements is presented in the FY 1985 Military Manpower Training Report.

5. Force Support Training.

Manpower in this category includes Air Force strategic, tactical, and mobility mission support training. Also included are tactical fighter aggressor squadrons and manpower supporting chemical/biological defensive training.

Air Force Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	26.9	26.5	26.6
Selected Reserve			
ANG	2.2	2.3	2.5
<u>Civilian</u>	1.9	1.9	1.9

The ANG increase in FY 1985 is due to increased F-4 PAA at ANG operated training schools at Kingsley Field, OR, and McConnell AFB, KS (+175).

6. Central Logistics.

Air Force manpower for this category is required for centrally managed supply, procurement, maintenance, and logistics support activities, primarily in the Air Force Logistics Command.

Air Force Central Logistics Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.6	5.0	5.1
Selected Reserve			
AFR	1.0	0.8	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	75.1	73.8	77.4

The Air Force is aggressively working to ensure a reasonable price is paid for every spare part used and to expand the competitive environment. One resource required for this task is sufficient civilian manpower. The civilian increase in Air Force spaces in FY 1985 results from increases in Depot Operations (+493), inventory control operations (+2,607), and procurement operations (+1,095). These new personnel will support a newly established competition advocate office at the Air Logistic Centers, price analysis and contract screening, contract management,

provisioning and data analysis and manufacturing surveillance. These increases are partially offset by decreases in Depot Maintenance Industrial Fund manpower (-643).

The civilian decrease in FY 1984 results from decreases for FY 1983 on-board strength (-5,600); offset by an increase in depot maintenance industrial fund to support wartime surge capability (+4,300).

7. Centralized Support Activities.

The manpower in this category is for centralized support to multiple missions and functions that do not fit other DPPCs and includes Air Force support to OSD, JCS, unified commands, and international military organizations. Manpower supporting foreign military sales, counterintelligence activities, readiness support, personnel administration, finance centers, public affairs, and various Air Reserve Force activities is also included.

Air Force Centralized Support Activities Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	15.1	15.3	15.1
Selected Reserve			
ANG	2.0	2.1	2.1
AFR	1.0	1.5	1.5
<u>Civilian</u>	9.7	10.2	10.3

The active military decrease in FY 1985 is the result of an internal 5 percent reduction in various Separate Operating Agencies/ Direct Reporting Units.

The civilian increase in FY 1985 results from increases in Accounting and Finance Center (+75), and the Air Force Audit Agency (+15).

8. Management Headquarters.

The manpower in this category supports Air Force Management Headquarters including the Departmental Headquarters Air Force Secretariat, and the Air Staff (including the National Guard Bureau and Air Force Reserve), Departmental Support Activities, major command headquarters and their numbered Air Force headquarters, Air Force Reserve headquarters, and Air Force Systems Command Product Divisions. Air Force manpower supporting international military headquarters and unified command headquarters is also included in this category.

Air Force Manpower in DoD Management Headquarters
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	18.6	17.8	17.8
Selected Reserve			
ANG	0.1	0.1	0.1
AFR	0.9	1.0	1.0
<u>Civilian</u>	9.0	8.1	8.1

The Air Force success in reducing its overall headquarters structure during the last ten years illustrates the concern and strong commitment we have toward improving management efficiencies while increasing combat effectiveness. For example, as recently as 1982, the Air Force implemented a management and operational headquarters reduction which resulted in the reallocation of 413 management headquarters authorizations to support combat readiness initiatives. Over the extended period from 1968 to 1982, the Air Force achieved internal management headquarters savings of more than 28,000 authorizations. The effect of those actions has been a cumulative reduction of 53 percent in management headquarters manning as compared to a total Air Force end strength reduction during the same period of 34 percent.

The manpower decrease in FY 1984 reflects the Congressionally, directed reduction in management headquarters.

The Air Force requests support of our management headquarters program as requested in the FY 1985 Budget. Reductions in this critical manpower resource could seriously erode our capability to provide effective planning and control of our combat forces and maintenance of a viable review and oversight capability.

9. Federal Agency Support.

This category includes manpower supporting other federal agencies on either a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis.

Air Force Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.2	0.3	0.3
Selected Reserve			
AFR	0.5	0.8	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*

*Fewer than 50.

E. Operating Strength Deviations. The internal manpower management system of the Air Force records authorized strength for force units as opposed to the projected actual strength shown in this report. Authorized strength for a given unit, and hence for a given DPPC, differs from the actual in-place strength because of fluctuations in manning. Active Air Force military strength fluctuates continuously as personnel enter and leave the service. Historically, the number of students and transients tend to be higher in the summer than on average due to seasonal variations in recruiting and PCS moves; hence there are fewer numbers of people in operating units at the end of the fiscal year. The Air Force accounts for this by projecting year end vacancies in field units in a separate, undistributed, manpower program which partially offsets the training pipeline account. Thus, the higher the expected number of students at year end, the larger the operating (unit) strength deviation. The force structure was also impacted in FY 1984 by Congressional limitations on end strength which necessitated a programmed unit manning shortfall of 5,400 enlisted authorizations.

Operating Strength Deviation
(End Strength In Thousands)

	<u>FY 1983</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	N/A	-11.9	-10.8

The military growth in FY 1985 is the result of Air Force efforts to reduce units, missions, and programs and, thus, eliminate programmed shortfalls in average assigned manning (+1566), this is offset by increased student and transient pipelines which decreases expected unit end strength (-518).

F. Individuals. The Individuals accounts contain manpower required for transients; patients, prisoners, and holdees; trainees and students; and Air Force Academy cadets. The manpower in the individuals account is based primarily on manyears required for training military people and moving them to and between duty assignments. Manyears are also included to cover unit personnel losses due to prolonged sickness, criminal confinement, and holding while processing out for disciplinary separation.

1. Transients

Air Force manpower in this category accounts for personnel in travel, leave, or proceed status while under PCS orders.

Air Force Transient Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	17.1	16.1	16.8

The active military increase for FY 1985 results from the increased PCS moves associated with overall Air Force end strength increases which result in an added requirement of 720 spaces.

2. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees

Air Force manpower in this category includes patients, prisoners, and personnel assigned to the Correctional and Rehabilitation Squadron for retraining.

Air Force Patient, Prisoner, and Holdee Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.6	0.6	0.6

3. Trainees and Students

This category accounts for people undergoing basic military and initial skill training and all other formal training in courses at least 20 weeks long.

Air Force Trainee and Student Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	37.9	43.3	46.3
Selected Reserve			
ANG	1.9	2.4	2.4
AFR	1.5	1.6	1.6

The active military increase in FY 1984 is the result of the FY 1983 adjustment for actual student end strength (+5,733) and reductions in skill progression training (-250) and Undergraduate Pilot Training (-77).

The active military increase in FY 1985 is the result of increased trainees/students (+827) projected from accession rates that increased by +2,214. The ANG increase between FY 1983 and FY 1984 reflects a lower number of individuals in Basic Military Training at the end of FY 1983 than anticipated.

4. Cadets

This category includes only Air Force Academy cadets and remains constant throughout the program.

Air Force Cadet Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u> Active	4.5	4.4	4.4

CHAPTER VII

DEFENSE AGENCIES MANPOWER PROGRAM

I. Introduction

In 1958, the Congress authorized the Secretary of Defense to integrate under a single agency "any supply or service activity common to more than one military department, whenever (he) determines it will be advantageous to the Government in terms of effectiveness, economy, or efficiency". Since that time, the Secretary has utilized that authority 18 times. Today's Defense Agencies vary widely in their functions and missions: they provide communications, mapping, intelligence, education, logistics and other support to the military Services and other parts of the federal government. Underlying each Agency are the economies and efficiencies they have brought to the Defense community. By eliminating duplication of effort within the Service, the Defense Agency structure permits the Services to devote a greater proportion of their resources to their primary military missions.

This chapter contains the manpower programs of the following organizations:

- Office of the Secretary of Defense
 - Staff
 - Field Activities
- Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Inspector General, Department of Defense
- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
- Defense Audiovisual Agency
- Defense Communications Agency
- Defense Contract Audit Agency
- Defense Intelligence Agency
- Defense Investigative Service
- Defense Legal Service Agency
- Defense Logistics Agency
- Defense Mapping Agency
- Defense Nuclear Agency
- Defense Security Assistance Agency
- Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences
- US Court of Military Appeals

II. Manpower Programs

The combined manpower programs of the Defense Agencies are shown in the following table. All military strength displayed in the table and throughout this chapter are active duty and are included in Service active strength in the preceding chapters. In all tables in this chapter, details may not add to totals due to rounding.

Defense Agencies Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Military	8.1	8.6	8.8
Civilian	<u>83.0</u>	<u>88.5</u>	<u>88.9</u>
Total	91.1	97.1	97.7

The FY 1983 data shown throughout this chapter are actual strength, while manpower space authorizations are shown for FY 1984 and FY 1985. Actual civilian strength is typically below authorizations because vacated positions cannot be refilled immediately. This accounts for all apparent FY 1983 to FY 1984 civilian increases in this chapter unless otherwise indicated.

The mission and associated manpower program of each agency are discussed in the following paragraphs. At the end of this chapter, the combined Defense Agency manpower program is displayed by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC).

A. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

1. Staff. OSD staff provides the Secretary of Defense with the analytical capability and specialized expertise necessary for him to fulfill his management responsibilities over the vast and complex operations of the Defense Department.

OSD Staff Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Military	0.5	0.5	0.5
Civilian	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.3</u>
Total	1.8	1.8	1.8

2. Field Activities of OSD. Field activities perform designated services for DoD activities. These programs are more limited in scope than those of a Defense Agency. These organizations are described below.

a. Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) provides administrative support to the OSD staff and to the other OSD field activities.

WHS MANPOWER PROGRAM
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Military	.1	.1	.1
Civilian	<u>.4</u>	<u>.4</u>	<u>.4</u>
Total	.5	.5	.5

b. The American Forces Information Service (AFIS) is responsible for the DoD Armed Forces Information Program, including the dissemination of internal information and the management of materials and resources used in support of this program.

AFIS Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>FY 83</u> (actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Military	58	61	61
Civilian	<u>129</u>	<u>132</u>	<u>131</u>
Total	187	193	192

c. The Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) manages payment for medical care in nonmilitary facilities for retired members and for dependents or survivors of active or retired members.

CHAMPUS Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>FY 83</u> (actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Military	7	7	7
Civilian	<u>220</u>	<u>222</u>	<u>222</u>
Total	227	229	229

d. The Tri-Service Medical Management Information System (TRIMIS) Program Office centrally manages the development and application of standardized automated systems to improve the effectiveness and economy of health care in the military Services.

TRIMIS Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>FY 83</u> (actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Military	26	30	30
Civilian	<u>30</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>37</u>
Total	56	69	67

e. The Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) aids communities which have been affected by major program changes such as base closures, contract cutbacks, reductions-in-force, or substantial growth.

OEA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>FY 83</u> (actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Military	3	3	3
Civilian	29	28	28
Total	32	31	31

f. The Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DoDDS) administers and operates primary and secondary schools for the dependents of Defense personnel assigned overseas.

DoDDS Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Civilian	11.5	12.2	12.2

The increase in FY 1984 is due to increased enrollment worldwide.

B. Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS)

OJCS provides military expertise and technical and administrative support to the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to aid them in discharging their statutory responsibilities as the principal military advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

OJCS Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Military	1.1	1.1	1.2
Civilian	0.3	0.3	0.3
Total	1.4	1.5	1.5

C. Inspector General, Department of Defense (IG, DoD)

The Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense was established in FY 1983. The IG, DoD, is the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense for matters relating to the prevention and detection of fraud, waste and abuse in the programs and operations of the Department. The office initiates, conducts and supervises such audits and investigations in the DoD that the IG deems appropriate and provides policy direction for audits and investigations relating to fraud,

waste and abuse and program effectiveness. The resources of the Defense Audit Service, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Review and Oversight, Defense Logistics Agency's Inspector General, and certain elements of the Director of Audit Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) were all transferred to the new agency.

IG, DoD, Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Military	*	*	*
Civilian	<u>.7</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.1</u>
Total	<u>.7</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.1</u>

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

D. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

DARPA manages high-risk basic research and applied technology programs. Its objective is to select and pursue revolutionary technology developments that minimize the possibility of technological surprise by adversaries and offer potential for major increases in U.S. defense capability. In the performance of its work, DARPA uses the services of the military departments, other government agencies, private industry, educational and research institutions, and individuals.

DARPA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Military	0.2	0.3	0.3
Civilian	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>
Total	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>

E. Defense Audiovisual Agency (DAVA)

The DAVA mission is to provide audiovisual production, acquisition, distribution and depository services and certain other audiovisual services which can be performed more efficiently on a centralized basis.

DAVA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Military	*	*	*
Civilian	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>
Total	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>

F. Defense Communications Agency (DCA)

DCA is responsible for engineering and management of the Defense Communications System and system architect functions for current and future Military Satellite Communications Systems. DCA provides engineering and technical support to the Worldwide Military Command and Control System, the National Military Command System, and the Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network. They also procure leased communications circuits, services, facilities, and equipment for DoD and other government agencies.

DCA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Military	1.6	1.7	1.7
Civilian	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.8</u>
Total	3.3	3.4	3.5

The civilian and military increases in FY 1984 and FY 1985 reflect program growth due primarily to newly-assigned projects.

G. Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)

The Defense Contract Audit Agency is responsible for assisting Department of Defense procurement authorities world-wide in achieving sound contract pricing by evaluating proposals submitted by contractors for proposed contracts, verifying the propriety and acceptability of costs charged to flexibly priced government contracts, and deterring contractors' inefficient practices. The agency also provides contract audit services to about 30 other Federal agencies at contractor locations where DoD has a continuing audit interest, or where it is considered efficient from a government-wide point of view.

Contract audit work load is generated by procurement and contract administration activities. The approved funding level for the DoD procurement and research and development programs directly affects the workload of DCAA. Other factors affecting contract audit workload are DoD procurement policies, the implementation of existing Cost Accounting Standards (Public Law 91-379), reviews required under Public Law 87-653 (The Truth in Negotiations Act), new or expanding programs of non-Defense agencies, and audits performed for the military departments in connection with the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program.

DCAA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Civilian	3.7	4.1	4.1

The increase of 400 civilian end strength in FY 1984 is the result of Congressional action to increase DCAA's capability to monitor Defense contracts.

H. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

The primary mission of DIA is to produce finished, all-source foreign general, military, scientific and technical intelligence. DIA provides DoD intelligence estimates and DoD contributions to National Estimates. They determine information gaps and validate intelligence collection requirements, provide plans, programs, policies, and procedures for DoD intelligence collection activities and manage and operate the Defense Attache Service. DIA manages the production of general military intelligence by the military Services, Unified and Specified Commands, and produces or manages the production of all DoD scientific and technical intelligence. DIA serves as the J-2 of the Joint Staff and manages and coordinates all DoD intelligence information systems programs and the interface of such systems with the intelligence community and DoD systems.

The DIA supports the intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified and Specified Commands, military departments, the National Security Council, various other departments of the Executive Branch, and Congressional committees.

DIA Manpower Program (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Military	1.9	2.1	2.2
Civilian	2.9	3.1	3.4
Total	4.8	5.2	5.6

The increase in both military and civilian manpower in FY 1984 reflects the continuing need for intelligence analysis capabilities supported by effective intelligence processing and dissemination manpower, collection managers, education and training people and intelligence planners. The increase in FY 1985 includes resources for information processing and analysis manpower, support services manning, attaches for the Third World, intelligence planners, education and training manpower and technical personnel.

I. Defense Investigative Service (DIS)

DIS conducts personnel security investigations, law enforcement investigations for DoD Components and other investigations directed by the Secretary of Defense. It also administers defense industrial security programs on behalf of the DoD and other Federal departments and agencies.

DIS Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Military	*	-	-
Civilian	<u>3.3</u>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>3.4</u>
Total	3.3	3.4	3.4

*Fewer than 50 spaces

The absence of military end strength after FY 1983 reflects implementation of a civilianization program directed by the Congress. The civilian decrease in FY 1984 reflects productivity improvements.

J. Defense Legal Services Agency (DLSA)

The Defense Legal Services Agency consolidates the functions of the OSD legal staff with the legal staffs of the Defense Agencies. The legal staffs of the Defense Agencies and OSD field activities remain with their current organizations while operating under the supervision of the DoD General Counsel/Director DLSA.

DLSA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>FY 83</u> (actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Military	2	-	-
Civilian	<u>54</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>55</u>
Total	56	55	55

K. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

DLA provides common supplies and a broad range of logistic services to the military departments, other defense components, federal agencies, and authorized foreign governments. Supply management responsibilities include clothing, subsistence and medical goods, industrial and construction material, general supplies, and petroleum products. Logistic services rendered by DLA include contract administration, surplus personal property disposal, documentation services to the R&D community, and operation of the Federal Cataloging System.

DLA is the largest of the Defense Agencies, accomplishing its varied missions both in the United States and overseas through 25 major field activities.

DLA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Military	1.0	1.0	1.0
Civilian	<u>46.8</u>	<u>50.4</u>	<u>50.5</u>
Total	47.8	51.4	51.5

L. Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)

DMA provides mapping, charting, and geodetic (MC&G) support to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments, and other DoD components through the production and worldwide distribution of maps, charts, precise positioning data, and digital data for strategic and tactical military operations and weapons systems. It serves as Program Manager and coordinator of all DoD MC&G resources and activities and carries out statutory responsibilities for providing nautical charts and marine navigation data.

DMA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Military	0.4	0.5	0.5
Civilian	<u>8.7</u>	<u>8.8</u>	<u>8.8</u>
Total	9.2	9.2	9.3

The manpower increases in FY 1984 and FY 1985 are to satisfy increased requirements in several major programs, including support to the U.S. Central Command, and to increase our production of products by softcopy or computerized production techniques.

M. Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)

DNA is the consolidated manager of the DoD nuclear weapons stockpile. It also manages DoD nuclear weapons testing and nuclear weapons effects research programs.

DNA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Military	0.4	0.4	0.4
Civilian	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.7</u>
Total	1.1	1.1	1.1

N. Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA)

DSAA is responsible for management of the DoD Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Programs.

DSAA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Military	*	*	*
Civilian	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>
Total	0.1	0.1	0.1

* Fewer than 50 spaces.

O. Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS)

USUHS provides education in health sciences to individuals who demonstrate dedication to a career in the health professions of the uniformed services. The University is authorized to grant appropriate advanced academic degrees.

USUHS Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 83</u> (actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Military	0.7	0.8	0.8
Civilian	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.8</u>
Total	1.4	1.6	1.6

The increase in military end strength from FY 1983 to FY 1985 is due to growth in the student body by 42 students and by 22 additional faculty and staff members. The civilian end strength increased by 88 positions between FY 1983 and FY 1985 to complete the planned staffing of the University and by 42 reimbursable positions to handle growth of outside-funded research projects.

P. US Court of Military Appeals (USCMA)

The US Court of Military Appeals serves as the supreme court of the United States system of military justice. It has jurisdiction over every court-martial case involving death, flag or general officers, dismissals, discharges, and confinement for a year or more.

USCMA Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>FY 83</u> (actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Civilian	42	49	49

III. Programmed Manpower By DPPC.

The following tables show the combined military and civilian manning programs of the Defense Agencies DPPC.

DEFENSE AGENCIES MILITARY MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1983 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1984 <u>FY 1985 Budget</u>	FY 1985 <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.4	0.4	0.4
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	-	-	-
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>3.8</u>	<u>4.1</u>	<u>4.1</u>
Intelligence	1.9	2.1	2.1
Centrally Managed Communications	1.2	1.2	1.2
Research and Development	0.2	0.3	0.3
Geophysical Activities	0.4	0.4	0.4
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>3.9</u>	<u>4.1</u>	<u>4.2</u>
Base Operating Support	-	-	-
Medical Support	0.1	0.1	0.1
Personnel Support	-	-	-
Individual Training	0.7	0.8	0.8
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	1.4	1.4	1.4
Centralized Support Activities	0.1	0.2	0.2
Management Headquarters	1.6	1.6	1.7
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>8.1</u>	<u>8.6</u>	<u>8.8</u>

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

Military strengths in agencies are also included in Service tables.

DEFENSE AGENCIES CIVILIAN MANPOWER
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1983</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 1984</u> <u>FY 1985 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1985</u> <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.5	0.6	0.6
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Land Forces			
Tactical Air Forces			
Naval Forces			
Mobility Forces			
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>12.3</u>	<u>12.7</u>	<u>13.1</u>
Intelligence	2.9	3.3	3.4
Centrally Managed Communications	0.9	1.0	1.0
Research and Development	0.1	0.1	0.1
Geophysical Activities	8.4	8.3	8.6
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>70.2</u>	<u>75.1</u>	<u>75.2</u>
Base Operating Support	5.4	5.4	5.5
Medical Support	0.2	0.2	0.2
Personnel Support	11.5	12.2	12.2
Individual Training	0.7	0.8	0.8
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	45.4	49.4	49.4
Centralized Support Activities	5.0	5.2	5.2
Management Headquarters	2.0	1.9	1.9
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>83.0</u>	<u>88.5</u>	<u>88.9</u>

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

CHAPTER VIII

MANPOWER READINESS

I. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the term "readiness" refers to the pre-M-day staffing of the force with respect to the total number of billets that describe 100 percent manning for all units and organizations. The term "mobilization" refers to the post-M-day capability to meet the full manning needed for all units and organizations. Under mobilization conditions, the number of billets requiring staffing increases because additional units are activated.

The level of peacetime readiness provided by a given budget remains one of the most difficult aspects of military capability to quantify and predict. What we do know is that the readiness of the force is influenced by peacetime staffing levels (the "hollowness" of the structure), the stability of the inventory, grade and skill imbalances, and the overall experience level of the force.

The Service sections that follow will strive to quantify each of these major dimensions of manpower readiness, and to evaluate our ability to mobilize manpower.

A. Programmed Manpower Structure and Programmed Manning: The programmed structure represents the total number of billets that comprise the full manning needed for all units and organizations in the force. The term programmed manning refers to the number of these billets that are programmed for staffing in the light of end-strength, fiscal, policy, or other constraints.

B. Programmed Manning versus Operating Strength: The programmed manning target is achievable only if enough total strength is planned to yield a sufficient operating strength population after accounting for "individuals" in the active component and the training pipeline in the reserve component. While a sufficient operating strength population, in gross, may not allow for the staffing of billets with personnel of the exact grade and occupation called for (i.e., without substitution), it does answer a critical question: is the planned peacetime staffing level (programmed manning) achievable?

This question will be answered in the sections below by translating the end-year programmed manning goal into an average for the fiscal year, and comparing this value to the average operating strength. This will provide a more useful estimate of the achievability of the planned peacetime staffing level.

Throughout this report the term operating strength, as it applies to the reserve component, refers to the total trained strength in units, which excludes those personnel in the training pipeline.

C. Inventory Stability: This is a frequently overlooked dimension of manpower readiness, but the stability of the population has a significant impact on the level of effort required to maintain a trained force at desired strength. Stability also contributes to a high level of unit cohesion. Inventory stability is captured in this chapter in two dimensions:

1. Aggregate Population Stability: Reflects the number of personnel who remain in service over the period of a year. One hundred percent stability means simply that all personnel in service at the beginning of a year are still in service at year's end. Measured this way, aggregate population stability captures the net effect of reduced attrition and higher retention.

2. Unit Personnel Stability: This measurement takes aggregate population stability one step further. It reflects the number of personnel who remain in service over the course of a year and who remain in the same unit. It captures the combined effect of attrition, retention, and reassignments, as measured -- in general -- at the battalion, squadron and ship level. A unit stability rate of 100 percent means all personnel in service at the beginning of the year were not only still in service at year's end, they were all also in the same unit.

D. Inventory Imbalances: Many units continue to report readiness deficiencies due to shortages of qualified personnel in needed grades and skills. Of equal concern, but less publicized, are the excess populations in many occupations ("excess" in terms of satisfying peacetime programmed manning, not necessarily the wartime requirement). Inventory imbalances will be outlined in terms of both overages and shortages in the following manner:

1. "Out-of-Kilter" Occupations: Those occupations with inventories greater than 105 percent or less than 95 percent are defined as "out-of-kilter." Measured this way, overages are just as undesirable as shortages. In all cases, the number of out-of-kilter occupations is contrasted to the total number of occupations (if 25 occupations are out-of-kilter, it is useful to know if this represents 25 of 50 occupations or 25 of 325).

2. Inventory Overages and Shortages: All inventory excesses and shortages are measured against the desired end-year population for each occupation. Thus, the overage and shortage figures presented in this chapter include the excesses and deficits in those occupations that are "balanced" (i.e., within the 95-105 percent band) as well as those occupations defined as "out-of-kilter." Where available, projections are provided to indicate the anticipated effect of executing the accession, training, promotion and retention plans on which the FY 1985 budget is based.

The inventory imbalance displays are designed to portray a very simple message: correct management actions over time should reduce the number of out-of-kilter occupations and the number of overage personnel and shortage vacancies. The net deviation from "balance" -- defined as the percent of total overages and shortages

divided by total "desired" -- should be reduced over time if personnel readiness levels are to improve. The 95-105 percent band is intended to specifically address the fact that some overages and shortages are unavoidable, due to errors in inventory projection, and the general "friction" in the system, a major element of which is the ongoing modernization effort (where future structure needs are more difficult to predict).

E. Experience and Grade Mix: These measures of manpower capability capture the importance of experience and leadership in the manpower readiness equation. Since personnel readiness is generally assessed by matching on-board personnel against requirements, a more senior inventory must be produced to yield a better match against the increasing number of senior grade personnel called for in the programmed manpower structure. In this chapter recent trends will be outlined with respect to the changing grade and experience of the population.

F. Readiness Assessment: A narrative assessment of the net effect of programmed structure, programmed manning, operating strength, stability, imbalances, grade and experience trends, and projections of the manpower readiness of the force is provided in each Service section.

G. Mobilization Manpower: This section describe each Service's capability to generate in a timely manner sufficient military and civilian manpower to meet mobilization requirements.

II. OVERVIEW

From the Service sections that follow a number of Department-wide trends emerge:

A. Programmed Manpower Structure: As shown in Table VIII-1, the total programmed manpower structure increases from FY 1983 to FY 1985 by 123,500 billets, or 3.9 percent. Although the absolute growth of 44,700 spaces in the reserve component is less than the 78,800 growth in the active component, reserve structure growth exceeds that of the active component in relative terms -- 4.1 percent vice 3.8 percent.

B. Programmed Manning: Changes in programmed manning are also shown in Table VIII-1. The programmed manpower structure minus programmed manning yields the number of billets not planned for staffing. The data indicate:

1. The active structure in the aggregate is growing at a faster rate than the staffing plans to fill it. The 25,400 increase in billets not planned for staffing results exclusively from the reduced levels of programmed manning in the Navy.

2. The opposite holds true for the reserve program in the aggregate. The total number of billets in the structure not programmed for manning is planned to decline 10,000.

Table VIII-1

DoD
Programmed Manpower Structure
and Programmed Manning
FY83 - FY85
(In 000's)

	<u>Programmed Manpower Structure</u>	<u>Programmed Manning</u>	<u>Billets Not Planned For Staffing</u>
<u>Active Component</u>			
FY 1983	2,051.6	1,838.8	212.8
FY 1985	2,130.4	1,892.2	238.2
FY 83-85 Change (As Percent)	+78.8 (3.8%)	+53.4 (2.9%)	+25.4 (12%)
<u>Reserve Component</u>			
<u>National Guard</u>			
FY 1983	550.0	533.4	16.6
FY 1985	580.0	553.2	26.8
FY83-85 Change (As Percent)	+25.0 (4.5%)	+19.8 (3.7%)	+10.2 (61%)
<u>Reserve</u>			
FY 1983	533.1	470.1	63.0
FY 1985	552.8	505.0	47.8
FY 83-85 Change (As Percent)	+19.7 (3.7%)	+34.9 (7.4%)	-15.2 (24%)
<u>Total RC</u>			
FY 1983	1,088.1	1,003.5	84.6
FY 1985	1,132.8	1,058.2	74.6
FY83-85 Change (As Percent)	+44.7 (4.1%)	+54.7 (5.4%)	-10.0 (12%)
<u>Total DoD</u>			
FY 1983	3,139.7	2,842.3	297.4
FY 1985	3,263.2	2,950.4	312.8
FY83-85 Change (As Percent)	+123.5 (3.9%)	+108.1 (3.8%)	+15.4 (5.2%)

3. The combined effect of these two factors is an FY 1983 to FY 1985 increase in the number of programmed manpower structure spaces not planned for staffing from 297,400 to 312,800.

C. Operating Strength: In the active component, The Army and Navy project an operating strength shortfall in FY 1985. This means that the aggregate unit strength levels contained in the programmed manning targets discussed above are not quite achievable. Although 238,200 active component billets are not programmed for staffing in FY 1985, the actual number of billet vacancies is likely to be greater. The total active component programmed manpower structure will probably be staffed at about 88 percent in the aggregate. The impact of an operating strength shortfall is very much influenced by staffing policies and inventory distribution priorities. Since not all units and organizations in the force report their readiness status, it is difficult to quantify the effect of this shortfall on the personnel readiness status of the reporting units.

In the reserve component, projections indicate adequate trained strength in units to support the overall programmed manning goals, with the exception of the Army Guard and Reserve programs. As a consequence, the number of billet vacancies in the total DoD reserve programmed manpower structure will be closer to 84,000 spaces than the 74,600 vacancies shown in Table VIII-1.

In practical terms, this means that the total number of programmed manpower structure spaces in both the active and reserve components in FY 1985 that will not be staffed with trained operating strength personnel will be closer to 331,000 billets than the 312,800 billets not planned for staffing -- about ten percent of the total programmed manpower structure.

D. Inventory Stability:

1. Aggregate Population Stability: Overall population turnover has been reduced significantly, as evidenced by the DoD aggregate population stability rates shown below:

<u>DoD Aggregate Population Stability</u> (Percent)					
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>Percent Improvement FY80-83</u>
<u>Active</u>					
Off	90.8	92.2	92.7	93.1	+3.2
Enl	80.7	82.3	83.9	83.8	+4.7
<u>Reserve</u>					
Enl	78.9	80.9	81.6	80.4	+2.2

2. Unit Personnel Stability: The reduction in overall turnover has contributed to improved stability at the unit level, as shown below. Personnel turbulence has been reduced, and fewer PCS moves are needed to replace losses in the active component. The Department estimates that

about 70,000 fewer active component PCS moves of all types (except unit moves) were executed in FY 1983 than in FY 1980, with an estimated cost avoidance of about \$40 million in FY 1977 constant dollars.

DoD Unit Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>Percent Improvement FY80-83</u>
<u>Active</u>					
Off	47.1	49.3	49.6	49.0	+3.4
Enl	42.6	44.1	44.0	45.1	+5.1
<u>Reserve</u>					
Enl	67.5	71.1	73.0*	73.3*	+4.4

* Excludes Navy selected reserve.

E. Inventory Imbalances

In varying degree, all of the Services report peacetime imbalances by grade and occupation. Imbalances in the active Army are increasing; in the Army Guard and Reserve, in general, they are decreasing.

The following sections identify active component shortages at end FY 1983 totalling about 71,600, and about 151,900 shortages in the reserve components.

The Navy has made impressive progress reducing its active petty officer shortfall, as well as enlisted imbalances overall. However, enlisted imbalances in the naval reserve have worsened. The Navy will also continue to experience shortages of surface warfare officers, pilots, submariners, and other officer specialists, but the magnitude of the problem has abated significantly.

The Marine Corps has a most impressive trend regarding skill imbalances. The data is consistent, it reflects a sound inventory management plan, and the progress made to reduce enlisted shortages can only be described as dramatic.

Inventory imbalances in the Air Force are decreasing, but with the available data it is difficult to assess trends.

F. Experience & Grade Mix:

The Department has a more experienced force because of continued improvements in retention. The average grade is likely to continue increasing because continued success in reducing NCO shortages will increase the average grade, and due to a richer mixture of senior-grade requirements in the structure. Importantly, grade increases matched by a corollary increase in the level of experience are indicative of a conscious

effort to avoid promotion merely to fill vacancies, and to promote only those personnel of sufficient experience -- in terms of years of completed service -- for the jobs to be done. The data below summarize a number of general trends:

DoD Grade And Experience Mix
(Percent)

<u>Active Component</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Officers *	14	14	14	14	14	14
(Off/Enl ratio)*	1:7.2	1:7.1	1:7.0	1:6.9	1:7.0	1:6.9
"Top 6" (E4-E9)	59	62	63	64	66	66
Enl with over 4 YOS	41	43	44	45	46	46
<u>Reserve Component</u>						
Officers *	14	14	13	15	Not Available	
(Off/Enl ratio)	1:6.9	1:7.3	1:7.6	1:6.7	Not Available	
"Top 6" (E4-E9)	72	70	71	72	Not Available	
Enl with over 4 YOS	62	62	62	63	Not Available	

*Does not include warrant officers, cadets or midshipmen

G. Assesment of Overall Readiness:

The Department's current manpower readiness is the best it has been in years. The FY 1985 budget and requested end-strengths will support continued progress, albeit at a slower pace. This will be particularly true in the Navy and Air Force. The Navy has not requested an active FY 1985 end-strength sufficient to eliminate a chronic operating strength shortfall. The Air Force also is not requesting an FY 1985 active end-strength adequate to support the programmed manning goal allocated to the field commands.

Improvement in Army reserve component readiness is contingent on Army success in reducing rather dramatically a significant shortage of trained strength in units.

H. Mobilization Manpower:

Although the situation is improving, the ability of the Department to mobilize sufficient military and civilian manpower with the required skills in a timely manner is still a significant problem. In FY 1985 both the Army and the Air Force have several shortages in the total military manpower available to meet their mobilization requirements. In addition to shortages in total manpower, the Army also has in FY 1985 a chronic

shortage of combat arms enlisted personnel ninety days after mobilization, a situation that is projected to worsen through FY 1989. The Department is also concerned about its ability to hire the additional civilians who would be required quickly in the event of mobilization.

III. Army Manpower Readiness

A. Active Uniformed Manpower

1. Programmed Force, Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning: As shown in Table VIII-2, the Army activates a seventeenth division in FY 1985. The data indicate that 83,900 structure spaces in total are not planned for staffing in FY 1985, down from 86,700 in FY 1983. This means that 11 percent of the Army's total active structure is not programmed for staffing in FY 1985. Note that the division and theater forces are programmed for 93 percent manning, an increase over FY 1983-1984. The programmed manning percentages, particularly in the auxiliary and support categories are only approximations.

2. Operating Strength: As shown by comparing line 2 to line 3 below, the Army has not programmed sufficient operating strength to staff the average programmed manning target in FY 1984 - 1985. However, the average operating strength shortfall of less than 0.5 percent translates into fewer than 3,000 vacancies in the billets approved for staffing.

Active Army Operating Strength (In 000's)

	<u>FY 83</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
1. End-Year Programmed Manning	675.8	681.4	677.5
2. Average Programmed Manning*	675.8	676.0	678.0
3. Average Operating Strength*	677.0	673.8	675.8
4. Operating Strength Deviation*	+1.2	-3.2	-2.2
5. Percent Deviation	(+1.18%)	(+0.47%)	(-0.32%)

* In many years

3. AC Inventory Stability:

a. Aggregate Population Stability: Reduced attrition and higher retention have contributed to a measurable improvement in aggregate stability, shown below. Officer stability improved 2.8 percent from FY 1980 to FY 1983. Enlisted stability increased 3.8 percent from FY 1980 to FY 1982, but declined in FY 1983 by 2.4 percent.

TABLE VIII-2
ACTIVE ARMY PROGRAMMED FORCE, PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, AND PROGRAMMED MANNING (END-YEAR)

DEFENSE PROGRAM PLANNING CATEGORY	FY 1983				FY 1984				FY 1985			
	PROG a/		PROG		PROG		PROG		PROG		PROG	
	FORCE (000's)	MAN- NING (000's)	% b/ 200	FORCE	FORCE (000's)	MAN- NING (000's)	% 133	FORCE	FORCE (000's)	MAN- NING (000's)	% 133	FORCE
Strategic	.2	.4	200		.3	.5	133		.3	.5	133	
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-		-	-	-		-	-	-	
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-		-	-	-		-	-	-	
Strategic Control Forces	-	-	-		-	-	-		-	-	-	
Surveillance	.2	.4	200		.3	.5	133		.3	.5	133	
Tactical/Mobility	16	511.0	462.9	91	16	514.7	467.8	91	17	511.6	470.1	92
Land Forces	16	511.0	462.6	91	16	514.7	467.8	91	17	511.6	470.1	92
Division Forces	16	469.8	426.0	91	16	475.3	432.2	91	17	470.8	433.3	92
Theater Force	41.1	36.9	90		39.4	35.6	90		40.8	36.8	90	
Mobility Forces	-	-	-		-	-	-		-	-	-	
Auxiliary Activities	2.4	2.5	104		7.9	6.6	84		6.4	5.6	88	
Intelligence	-	.1	-		1.1	.7	64		1.1	.7	64	
Centrally Managed	2.0	2.0	100		6.4	5.5	83		4.9	4.5	92	
Communications	.4	.4	100		.4	.4	100		.4	.4	100	
Research and Development	-	-	-		-	-	-		-	-	-	
Geophysical Activities	25.3	16.7	66		26.7	16.2	61		27.3	16.6	61	
Support Activities	14.2	7.3	51		14.1	7.1	50		14.1	7.1	50	
Base Operating Support	2.4	1.4	58		2.8	1.6	57		2.8	1.6	57	
Medical Support	1.4	1.4	100		1.4	1.4	100		1.4	1.4	100	
Personnel Support	.2	.2	100		.2	.2	100		.2	.2	100	
Individual Training	-	-	-		-	-	-		-	-	-	
Force Support Training	5.5	4.2	76		5.9	4.4	75		6.0	4.4	73	
Central Logistics	1.2	1.4	117		1.3	1.1	85		1.2	1.1	92	
Centralized Support Activities	1.4	.8	57		1.3	.4	40		1.6	.8	50	
Management Headquarters	222.8	192.6	86		217.5	190.8	88		218.3	185.2	85	
Federal Agency Support	16Div's	674.7	88	16 Div's	766.8	681.4	89	17 Divs	763.6	677.4	89	
Total Force Structure	762.5	674.7	88	16 Div's	766.8	681.4	89	17 Divs	763.6	677.4	89	
Total TDA Units	762.5	674.7	88	16 Div's	766.8	681.4	89	17 Divs	763.6	677.4	89	

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding

a/ Values are approximates due to the fact that requirements for all units cannot be computed by specific program element category.

b/ Percentages are approximates for the same reason, although the total is exact.

Aggregate Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Officer	90.1	91.7	91.8	92.6
Enlisted	78.7	81.7	82.5	80.1

b. Unit Personnel Stability: This measure reflects not only the number of personnel "continuing" in the Army over the course of a year, but the number who remain in the same unit. While unit stability for officers has improved slightly, it has declined somewhat for enlisted personnel, largely due to the October 1981 change in the Army's tour length policy for European assignments. This action reduced the European tour length for three-year enlistees from 24 to 18 months, and from 36 to 24 months for four-year enlistees. This change had the corollary effect of increasing turnover in CONUS-based units, which both receive returnees from and provide replacements for European duty:

Unit Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Officer	40.2	42.4	43.1	42.9
Enlisted	36.5	39.8	36.6	35.9

4. Inventory Imbalances

a. Officer: The data in Table VIII-3, summarized below, indicate that there are no overpopulated commissioned officer occupations, but that shortages have more than doubled. Although these shortages are projected to worsen in FY 1985, they are somewhat speculative, and in fact may not exceed those at end FY 1983.

<u>01-06</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 83 - 85 Change</u>
Total Imbalances	910	2,471	2,646	+1,736 (190%)
Total Desired	60,586	62,735	63,640	
Percent Imbalanced	(1.5%)	(3.9%)	(4.2%)	

b. Enlisted: Long term trends are difficult to assess from only the three fiscal years shown Table VIII-3. A total of all overages and shortages (E1-E9), divided by the E1-E9 desired, yields improvement from FY 1983 - FY 1984, but a worsening imbalance situation in FY 1985. However, in both grade groups shown in Table VIII-3 the number of out-of-

TABLE VIII-3

Active Army Occupational Imbalances

	FY 83	FY 84	FY 85
<u>W1-W4</u>			
Out-of-Kilter Occupations ^{1/}	40/68	41/68	39/68
Total Overage	+772	+983	+711
Total Shortage	-1564	-1440	-1864
Total Desired	14601	14601	15237
<u>01-03</u>			
Out-of-Kilter Occupations ^{1/}	2/38	3/38	3/38
Total Overage	0	0	0
Total Shortage	-171	-417	-385
Total Desired	34925	37607	38235
<u>04-06</u>			
Out-of-Kilter Occupations ^{1/}	3/38	1/38	1/38
Total Overage	0	0	0
Total Shortage	-739	-2054	-2261
Total Desired ^{2/}	25661	25128	25405
<u>E1-E4</u>			
Out-of-Kilter Occupations ^{1/}	226/287	231/287	205/281
Total Overages	+25,106	+14,264	+13,288
Total Shortages	-15,198	- 2,832	-11,864
Total Desired (In 000's)	329.8	327.9	332.8
<u>E5-E9</u>			
Out-of-Kilter Occupations ^{1/}	218/353	168/353	142/353
Total Overages	+ 6,591	+ 4,192	+ 4,056
Total Shortages	- 7,758	- 5,218	- 4,316
Total Desired (In 000's)	265.0	266.8	266.8

^{1/} The number of occupations with inventories greater than 105 percent or less than 95 percent of desired, compared to the total number of occupations.

^{2/} Because DOPMA does not support the Army's field grade requirements, the Army will downgrade about 2,000 billets to the company grade level. Actions in this regard are not reflected in these projects.

kilter occupations declines steadily. This indicates that the absolute excesses and shortages in the remaining imbalanced MOS's increase.

<u>E1-E9</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY83-85 CHANGE</u>
Total Imbalances	54.7	26.5	33.5	-21.2 (39%)
Total Desired	594.8	594.7	599.6	
Percent Imbalanced	(9.1%)	(4.5%)	(5.6%)	

5. Experience & Grade Mix. As shown below the average grade in the enlisted population increases rather markedly. This increase is due principally to improved retention and changes in the structure intended to improve the leader-to-led ratio.

Active Army Experience and Grade Mix
(In 000's)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Enlisted</u>						
E1/E3	294.6	235.7	230.5	226.5	194.0	197.4
Avg YOS	(1.7)	(1.7)	(1.7)	(1.7)	(1.7)	(1.7)
E4/E5	287.6	297.0	292.7	283.8	316.9	138.2
Avg YOS	(4.4)	(4.3)	(4.7)	(5.1)	(5.2)	(5.0)
E6/E7	119.7	125.1	130.3	137.1	138.6	139.3
Avg YOS	(12.9)	(12.7)	(13.2)	(13.7)	(13.1)	(13.2)
E8/E9	16.9	17.1	19.2	19.5	19.8	19.9
Avg YOS	(21.6)	(21.7)	(21.8)	(22.6)	(20.8)	(20.6)
<u>Total E1-E9</u>	673.8	674.9	672.7	665.9	669.3	674.8
(4 YOS)	267.8	285.4	300.6	306.4	309.1	310.7
(Avg YOS)	(6.2)	(6.1)	(6.2)	(6.2)	(6.3)	(6.3)
(Avg Gr)	E-3.7	E-4.0	E-4.2	E-4.4	E-4.4	E-4.4
<u>Warrant Officers</u>						
<u>Total W1-W4</u>	13.3	13.9	14.4	14.9	15.6	15.7
(Avg YOS)	(15.1)	(15.0)	(14.8)	(13.8)	(13.9)	(14.1)
(Avg Gr.)	W2.1	W2.1	W2.2	W2.2	W2.3	W2.3
(4 YOS)	11.6	11.8	12.1	12.6	14.7	14.7

Commissioned

<u>Officers</u>						
01/02	24.6	24.4	24.3	22.9	22.1	21.7
(Avg YOS)	(2.4)	(2.3)	(2.4)	(2.4)	(2.3)	(2.3)
03	20.5	23.4	24.0	24.5	26.0	27.0
(Avg YOS)	(6.2)	(6.2)	(6.6)	(7.2)	(7.0)	(7.0)
04	11.9	12.3	12.1	12.1	12.2	12.4
(Avg YOS)	(13.2)	(13.4)	(13.6)	(13.9)	(13.6)	(13.5)
05	8.5	8.5	8.4	8.2	8.3	8.5
(Avg YOS)	(18.5)	(18.0)	(18.5)	(18.8)	(18.5)	(18.3)
06	3.7	3.7	3.6	3.4	3.5	3.3
(Avg YOS)	(22.5)	(22.9)	(23.5)	(25.3)	(24.8)	(25.3)
07-010	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
(Avg YOS)	(27.6)	(27.9)	(27.9)	(28.1)	(28.1)	(28.1)
Total 01-010	69.6	72.7	72.8	71.5	72.5	73.4
(Avg Grade)	0-3.1	0-3.1	0-3.1	0-3.1	0-3.1	0-3.1
(4 YOS)	54.8	56.0	57.9	60.2	61.8	63.1
(Avg YOS)	(11.0)	(13.1)	(13.8)	(13.4)	(12.9)	(13.1)

6. Readiness Assessment: Worsening skill imbalances and a continuing negative operating strength shortfall all suggest that the active Army's personnel readiness status is not likely to improve.

B. Army National Guard

1. Programmed Force, Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning: As shown on Table VIII-4, an additional mechanized infantry division is activated in FY1984. An additional infantry brigade is added to the theater forces. These changes cause a structure increase of 13,900 from FY 1983 to FY 1985. Programmed manning increases 12,500 in FY 1985, meaning that about 1,300 additional billets above the 27,300 in FY 1984 are not planned for staffing. In other words structure increases 3 percent and "hollowness" increases 4.7 percent.

2. Operating Strength: As shown below, the ARNG has not programmed sufficient total strength to yield a trained strength in units sufficient to support its programmed manning goals. However, the shortfall will be reduced markedly in FY1985. This should minimize the adverse impact on readiness resulting from the increase in programmed "hollowness" discussed in the previous section.

TABLE VIII-4
ARNG PROGRAMMED FORCE, PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, AND PROGRAMMED MANNING (END-YEAR)

DEFENSE PROGRAM PLANNING CATEGORY	FY 1983					FY 1984					FY 1985					
	PROG a/		PROG		PROG FORCE	PROG		PROG		PROG		PROG		PROG FORCE	PROG	
	MPR STRUCTURE (000's)	MAN- NING (000's)	% b/	MPR STRUCTURE (000's)		MAN- NING (000's)	%	MPR STRUCTURE (000's)	MAN- NING (000's)	%	MPR STRUCTURE (000's)	MAN- NING (000's)	%			
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>																
<u>Land Forces</u>																
<u>Division Forces</u>		163.3	150.6	92.2		176.3	162.8	92.3		186.1	169.4	91.0				
Armor Div	2	35.5	33.0	93.0	2	35.5	33.0	93.0	2	37.0	33.0	90.0				
Inf Div	5	87.7	80.0	91.2	5	87.7	80.0	91.2	5	87.7	80.0	91.0				
Mech Inf Div.	1	17.7	16.5	93.2	2	30.7	28.7	93.4		2	37.0	33.3	90.0			
Armor BDE R/O	1	4.1	3.8	92.7	1	4.1	3.8	92.7	1	4.9	4.6	93.9				
Mech BDE R/O	2	6.7	6.4	95.5	2	6.7	6.4	95.5	2	6.7	6.4	95.5				
Tank BN R/O	4	2.3	2.1	91.2	4	2.3	2.1	91.3	4	2.3	2.1	91.3				
Mech Inf BN R/O	3	2.6	2.4	92.3	3	2.6	2.4	92.3	3	3.8	3.6	92.9				
Inf BDE R/O	2	6.7	6.4	95.5	2	6.7	6.4	95.5	2	6.7	6.4	95.5				
<u>Non-Divisional</u>																
<u>Combat Increment</u>		146.3	135.6	92.7		133.3	123.4	92.6		135.2	126.0	93.2				
Armor BDE	3	12.5	11.6	92.8	2	8.3	7.6	92.8	2	9.9	9.2	92.9				
Inf BDE	5	23.0	21.1	91.7	5	23.0	21.1	91.7	5	23.0	21.1	91.7				
Mech Inf BDE	6	26.5	24.7	93.2	4	17.7	16.5	93.2	4	17.5	16.5	93.2				
Armored Cav Regt	4	15.2	14.4	94.7	4	15.2	14.4	94.7	4	15.2	14.4	94.7				
Tank BN	1	.6	.5	83.3	1	.6	.5	83.3	1	.7	.6	85.7				
155mm FA BN	13	20.5	18.4	89.8	13	20.5	18.4	89.8	12	20.9	19.3	92.3				
8" FA BN	20	9.8	9.5	96.9	20	9.8	9.5	96.9	20	9.8	9.5	96.9				
Cbt Eng BN	33	25.1	23.3	92.8	33	25.1	23.3	92.8	33	25.1	23.3	92.8				
Cbt Eng BTN (Hvy)	12	11.0	10.0	90.9	12	11.0	10.0	90.9	13	11.0	10.0	90.9				
Towed Ct Ant. Tank BN	4	2.1	2.1	100.0	4	2.1	2.1	100.0	4	2.1	2.1	100.0				
<u>Theater Forces</u>		18.2	17.2	94.5		18.2	17.2	94.5		18.5	17.3	93.5				
Inf BDE	3	13.2	12.3	90.2	3	13.2	12.3	90.2	3	13.5	12.4	91.9				
Special Forces Gp	2	2.6	2.5	96.2	2	2.6	2.5	96.2	2	2.6	2.5	96.2				
Inf Grp (Scout)	1	2.4	2.4	100.0	1	2.4	2.4	100.0	1	2.4	2.4	100.0				
<u>Tactical Support Increment</u>		91.1	98.0	107.6		103.3	100.1	96.9		97.9	100.4	102.6				
<u>Support Activities</u>		31.7	31.7	100.0		31.7	31.7	100.0		34.6	34.6	100.0				
<u>Total Force Structure</u>		450.6	433.1	96.1		462.8	435.2	94.0		471.3	447.7	95.0				

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding

a/ Values are approximates due to the fact that requirements for all units cannot be computed by specific program element category.

b/ Percentages are approximates for the same reason, although the total is exact.

ARNG Strengths
(In 000's)

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
1. End-year Programmed Manning	433.1	435.2	447.7
2. Average Programmed Manning*	431.1	432.8	441.4
3. Average Operating Strength*	412.5	425.0	440.1
4. Operating Strength Deviation*	-18.6	-7.8	-1.3
5. Percent Deviation	(-4.6%)	(-1.8%)	(-0.3%)

* In many years.

3. Inventory Stability: The ARNG enlisted inventory reflects a positive trend in both measures of stability.

(Percent)

	<u>FY-80</u>	<u>FY-81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY-83</u>
Aggregate Pop. Stability	79.6	82.2	82.6	82.2
Unit Personnel Stability	68.9	72.6	74.5	72.3

4. Inventory Imbalances

a. Officers: ARNG officer imbalances are summarized below. The data indicate that net imbalances are projected to decline. A more detailed breakout is shown in Table VIII-5.

(In 000's)

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 83-85 Change</u>
Total Imbalances	8.4	8.3	7.9	-0.5(6%)
Total Desired	32.7	34.5	36.2	
Percent Imbalanced	(25.7%)	(24.1%)	(21.8%)	

b. Enlisted: The Army National Guard projects a 5.4 percent reduction in net E1-E9 imbalances by the end of FY1985, as shown below. A more detailed breakout of enlisted imbalances is outlined in Table VIII-5.

TABLE VIII-5

Army National Guard Occupational Imbalances
(000's)

		FY 83 (Actual)	FY 84	FY 85
W1-CW4	Out-of-Kilter Occupations <u>1/</u>	3/38	4/36	5/34
	Total overages	+0.6	+0.9	+1.1
	Total shortages	-5.9	-5.5	-4.9
	Total desired	9.7	10.1	10.5
01-03	Out-of-Kilter Occupations <u>1/</u>	12/13	12/11	11/10
	Total overages	+2.5	+2.5	+2.4
	Total shortages	-3.1	-3.1	-3.1
	Total desired	23.1	24.6	26.1
04-06	Out-of-Kilter Occupations <u>1/</u>	27/29	27/29	27/28
	Total overages	+1.1	+1.1	+1.0
	Total shortages	-1.7	-1.6	-1.4
	Total desired	9.6	9.9	10.1
E1-E4	Out-of-Kilter Occupations <u>1/</u>	27/173	30/150	30/150
	Total overages	+9.6	+9.5	+9.4
	Total shortages	-49.9	-49.4	-48.9
	Total desired	233.8	243.0	251.4
E5-E9	Out-of-Kilter Occupations <u>1/</u>	40/125	40/115	40/105
	Total overages	+7.5	+7.1	+6.8
	Total shortages	-22.0	-20.5	-19.1
	Total desired	141.7	147.0	152.1

1/ The number of occupations with inventories greater than 105 percent or less than 95 percent of desired, compared to the total number of occupations.

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY1983-1985</u> <u>CHANGE</u>
Total Imbalances	89.0	86.5	84.2	-4.8 (5.4%)
Total Desired	375.5	390.0	403.5	
Percent Imbalanced	(23.7%)	(22.2%)	(20.9%)	

5. Experience & Grade Mix: As shown below the population's experience level is increasing at a faster rate than total strength.

ARNG Grade and Experience Mix
(000's)

	<u>FY80</u>	<u>FY81</u>	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>
<u>Enlisted</u>						
E1-E3	103.2	112.4	114.5	110.0	114.9	117.5
(Avg YOS)	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4
E4	69.7	74.2	84.4	97.0	100.7	104.9
(Avg YOS)	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.9	4.9	5.0
E5	77.9	80.7	82.9	84.4	87.6	91.3
(Avg YOS)	8.3	8.3	8.6	8.9	9.1	9.1
E6	49.0	52.8	54.5	53.9	56.0	58.3
(Avg YOS)	12.5	12.8	13.3	13.8	14.2	14.2
E7	22.0	22.6	23.0	22.5	22.7	23.1
(Avg YOS)	18.0	18.1	18.3	18.6	18.8	18.8
E8	6.0	6.4	6.5	6.3	6.5	6.8
(Avg YOS)	23.7	23.4	23.5	23.4	23.4	23.4
E9						
(Avg YOS)	28.6	28.9	29.1	29.1	29.1	29.1
<u>Total E1-E9</u>	329.3	350.6	367.2	375.5	390.0	403.5
<u>Avg Grade</u>	E-4.2	E-4.2	E-4.2	E-4.2	E-4.2	E-4.2
<u>Avg YOS</u>	6.9	7.0	7.1	7.3	7.3	7.3
<u>Over 4 YOS</u>	181.7	193.9	205.2	215.0	224.5	233.2
<u>Warrant Officers</u>						
W1-W4	7.7	8.0	8.3	8.8	9.0	9.3
(Avg YOS)	22.2	21.8	21.9	21.8	21.8	21.8

	<u>FY80</u>	<u>FY81</u>	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>
<u>Commissioned</u> <u>Officers</u>						
01-03	21.4	21.8	23.1	23.4	24.1	24.4
(Avg YOS)	9.1	9.1	9.0	8.9	9.1	9.1
04	4.8	5.1	5.3	5.6	5.9	6.0
(Avg YOS)	18.4	18.4	18.2	18.0	17.8	17.8
05	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.6
(Avg YOS)	25.5	25.1	24.7	24.6	24.5	24.5
06	.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3
(Avg YOS)	30.4	30.3	30.4	29.8	29.8	29.8
07	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1
(Avg YOS)	32.6	32.6	32.9	33.3	33.5	33.7
08	*	*	*	*	*	*
(Avg YOS)	35.3	36.1	35.9	36.0	36.0	36.1
<u>Total 01-010</u>	29.6	30.4	32.1	32.9	34.0	34.5
<u>Avg Grade</u>	0-2.8	0-2.8	0-2.8	0-2.8	0-2.8	0-2.8
<u>Avg YOS</u>	14.3	14.4	14.3	14.3	14.3	14.3
<u>Over 4 YOS</u>	33.5	33.9	35.0	36.3	37.4	38.0

*Figures range from 43 to 50.

6. Readiness Assessment: A continued high level of programmed manning, a reduction in the operating strength shortfall, and continued improvement in the stability of the population will all combine to maintain and improve slightly the Army Guard's personnel readiness status. However, it should be emphasized that this improvement will only result if the average operating strength deviation in FY1983 is reduced by about 93 percent.

C. Army Reserve Uniformed Manpower

1. Programmed Force, Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning: The Army reserve increases by five CEWI battalions in FY 1984 and one CEWI battalion in FY 1985. These additional units and other structure changes cause the total programmed manpower structure to increase by 7,000 billets from FY 1983 to FY 1985. Programmed manning increases at a greater rate, 11,400 billets from FY 1983 to FY 1985, reducing the level of "hollowness" by almost two percent. Table VIII-6 outlines available data on the USAR programmed manpower structure.

TABLE VIII-6
USAR PROGRAMMED FORCE, PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, AND PROGRAMMED MANNING (END-YEAR)

DEFENSE PROGRAM PLANNING CATEGORY	FY 1983				FY 1984				FY 1985			
	PROG a/		PROG		PROG		PROG		PROG		PROG	
	PROG FORCE	STRUC- TURE 000's	MAN- NING 000's	% b/ 100's	PROG FORCE	STRUC- TURE 000's	MAN- NING 000's	% 100's	PROG FORCE	STRUC- TURE 000's	MAN- NING 000's	% 100's
Strategic	85	215.1	197.2	91.7	92	216.4	203.3	93.9	93	223.1	207.5	93.0
Tactical/Mobility	61	213.3	195.5	91.7	67	214.6	201.6	93.9	68	221.3	205.8	93.0
Land Forces	57	189.7	174.6	92.0	63	191.3	180.3	94.2	64	198.7	185.1	93.2
Division Forces; BDEs & BNs	4	23.6	20.9	88.6	4	23.3	21.3	91.4	4	22.6	20.6	91.2
Theater Force; BDEs & SF GRP	24	1.8	1.8	100.0	25	1.8	1.8	100.0	25	1.8	1.7	94.4
Mobility Forces; TRANSP GPS												
Auxiliary Activities	58	0.6	0.6	100.0	58	0.6	0.6	100.0	58	0.6	0.6	100.0
Intelligence; DET's	57	0.5	0.5	100.0	57	0.5	0.5	100.0	57	0.5	0.5	100.0
Centrally Managed												
Communications	1	0.1	0.1	100.0	1	0.1	0.1	100.0	1	0.1	0.1	100.0
Research and Development												
Geophysical Activities												
Support Activities	142	83.4	71.5	85.7	134	82.9	72.7	87.7	140	83.0	72.1	86.9
Base Operating Support; Units	40	5.7	5.5	96.5	43	5.9	5.8	98.3	42	5.6	5.5	98.2
Medical Support; FLD HOSP,												
DEMO DETS	41	9.5	9.2	96.8	41	9.1	9.0	98.9	41	9.2	8.9	96.7
Personnel Support												
Individual Training; TNG DIV	15	63.8	51.9	81.3	15	63.7	53.6	84.1	15	63.8	53.4	83.7
Force Support Training												
Central Logistics												
Centralized Support												
Activities; DET's & Units	33	3.9	3.8	97.4	22	3.5	3.5	100.0	29	3.8	3.7	97.4
Management Headquarters	4	0.1	0.1	100.0	4	0.1	0.1	100.0	4	0.1	0.1	100.0
Federal Agency Support;												
Selective Service Units	9	0.5	0.5	100.0	9	0.5	0.5	100.0	0	0.5	0.5	100.0
Total Force Structure	285	299.5	269.4	89.9	284	300.1	276.9	92.3	291	306.5	280.8	91.6

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding

a/ Values are approximates due to the fact that requirements for all units cannot be computed by specific program element category.

b/ Percentages are approximates for the same reason, although the total is exact.

2. USAR Operating Strength: In comparison to the programmed manpower structure data in Table VIII-6, the projected average trained strength in units, shown as operating strength in line 3 below, may indeed be accurate, but the programmed manning data shown, although in many years, bears little relationship to the programmed manning in Table VIII-6. What is apparent is that there is a severe shortage of trained strength in units.

<u>USAR Strengths</u> (IN 000)			
	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY-84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
1. End-Year Programmed Manning	269.4	276.9	280.8
2. Average Programmed Manning*	266.6	273.1	278.8
3. Average Operating Strength*	249.2	254.6	272.5
4. Operating Strength Deviation*	-17.4	-18.5	-6.3
5. Percent Deviation	(-6.5%)	(-6.7%)	(-2.2%)

*In many years

3. Inventory Stability: Both USAR aggregate population stability and unit personnel stability were assessed in the same manner as for the active force, but in this case for the enlisted population only. While aggregate stability has remained roughly constant, unit stability has declined; this results from the increased number of unit activations as the Army places more reliance on the Reserve Component.

	<u>Aggregate Population Stability</u> (Percent)			
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Enlisted	76.8	78.4	78.6	75.4

	<u>Unit Personnel Stability</u> (Percent)			
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Enlisted	66.8	68.0	69.2	57.3

4. Inventory Imbalances

a. Officers

(1) Warrant officers: Table VIII-7 provides more detailed data, indicating that net USAR warrant officer imbalances have been halved since FY 1982, and that the current net imbalance of 11 percent is likely to persist through FY1985, and that all MOS's will be over or undermanned by more than ± 5 percent:

	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>	<u>FY82-85 CHANGE</u>
Total Imbalances	948	446	465	474	-474 (50%)
Total Desired	4,274	4,107	4,275	4,369	
Percent Imbalanced	(22%)	(11%)	(11%)	(11%)	

(2) Commissioned officers: The data shown below depicts a steady reduction in 01-06 net imbalances. More detailed information is contained in Table VIII-7.

	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>	<u>FY82-85 CHANGE</u>
Total Imbalances	11,122	9,639	9,333	9,112	-2,010 (18%)
Total Desired	40,178	41,112	41,926	42,892	
Percent Imbalanced	(28%)	(23%)	(22%)	(21%)	

b. Enlisted: Net E1-E9 imbalances have been reduced substantially from the FY1982 level, and continued reductions are projected, as summarized below. More detailed information is at Table VIII-7.

	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>	<u>FY82-85 CHANGE</u>
Total Imbalances	43,923	39,082	35,264	34,750	-9,173 (21%)
Total Desired	214,098	210,927	234,469	237,396	
Percent Imbalanced	(21%)	(19%)	(15%)	(15%)	

Table VIII-7
USAR Occupational Imbalances

	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85
<u>W1-W4</u>				
Out-of-Kilter Occupations ^{1/}	19/19b/	19/19b/	19/19	19/19
Total Overages	+228	+48	+50	+51
Total Shortages	-720	-398	-415	-423
Total Desired	4,294	4,107	4,278	4,369
<u>01-03</u>				
Out-of-Kilter Occupations ^{1/}	55/47b/	55/44b/	55/43	55/43
Total Overages	+1,225	+1,315	+1,282	+1,250
Total Shortages	-5,304	-4,009	-3,925	-3,808
Total Desired	24,049	24,776	25,294	26,050
<u>04-06</u>				
Out-of-Kilter Occupations ^{1/}	55/43b/	55/50b/	55/49	55/49
Total Overages	+851	+1,575	+1,536	+1,497
Total Shortages	-3,742	-2,740	-2,590	-2,557
Total Desired	16,129	16,336	16,632	16,842
<u>E1-E4</u>				
Out-of-Kilter Occupations ^{1/}	30/25	30/22	30/21	30/21
Total Overages	+11,851	+12,569	+11,676	+11,441
Total Shortages	-12,658	- 6,434	- 5,925	- 4,805
Total Desired	109,750	109,025	117,653	120,240
<u>E5-E9</u>				
Out-of-Kilter Occupations ^{1/}	30/20	30/25	30/23	30/23
Total Overages	+ 3,867	+ 5,378	+ 5,109	+ 4,981
Total Shortages	-15,547	-14,701	-12,554	-12,523
Total Desired	104,348	101,092	116,816	117,156

1/ The number of occupations with inventories greater than 105 percent or less than 95 percent of desired, compared to the total number of occupations.

5. Experience & Grade Mix: The data below indicate that while the NCO population is increasing in total, and in terms of experience, the average grade in the enlisted population is declining. This is due to the large number of junior entrants at the bottom of the rank pyramid. Among all the Services, the USAR enlisted population is the only one to exhibit this phenomenon.

<u>USAR Grade and Experience Mix</u>						
(In 000's)						
	<u>FY80</u>	<u>FY81</u>	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>
<u>Enlisted</u>						
E1-E3	48.7	60.2	71.4	72.7	75.7	79.7
(Avg YOS)	1.23	1.26	1.26	1.26	1.26	1.26
E4-E5	71.8	75.3	83.0	84.9	84.4	88.7
(Avg YOS)	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.5	6.5	6.5
E6-E7	42.5	45.2	47.2	47.6	49.7	52.4
(Avg YOS)	12.7	14.9	13.5	13.8	13.8	13.8
E8-E9	6.2	6.6	7.0	6.9	6.5	6.8
(Avg YOS)	24.6	24.4	24.4	23.5	23.4	23.2
<u>Total E1-E9</u>	169.2	187.2	208.6	216.2	216.3	227.6
(Avg Grade)	E4.7	E3.9	E3.9	E3.8	E3.7	E3.6
(Avg YOS)	7.0	6.8	6.7	6.5	6.4	6.3
(Over 4 YOS)	113.2	118.7	127.0	132.8	140.6	147.9
<u>Warrant Officer</u>						
Total W1-W4	3.6	3.7	4.1	4.1	4.3	4.4
(Avg YOS)	20.4	20.4	20.2	22.5	22.6	22.6
<u>Commissioned Officer</u>						
01/03	19.8	19.9	24.1	24.6	25.2	26.1
(Avg YOS)	6.9	7.0	7.1	7.3	7.3	7.3
04	7.8	8.6	11.8	12.7	10.3	10.4
(Avg YOS)	10.2	15.5	15.9	16.0	16.0	16.0
05	3.8	3.9	5.4	5.7	5.0	5.0
(Avg YOS)	21.7	21.6	21.9	21.8	21.8	21.8
06	1.3	1.5	2.3	2.6	1.3	1.4
(Avg YOS)	27.3	26.8	27.1	26.8	26.8	26.8
07-010	.091	.091	.113	.101	.106	.105
(Avg YOS)	29.4	31.1	31.4	31.3	31.3	31.3
<u>Total 01-010</u>	32.8	34.0	43.7	45.7	41.9	43.0
Avg Grade	0-3.3	0-3.3	0-3.4	0-3.4	0-3.4	0-3.4
Avg YOS	19.1	20.4	20.6	20.6	20.6	20.6
Over 4 YOS	29.4	30.4	39.7	41.1	41.1	41.1

D. Mobilization Manpower

1. Wartime Military Manpower Requirements versus Supply. The following table shows the Army mobilization manpower requirements and the estimated supply of trained military manpower for FY 1985:

<u>Trained Military Manpower</u> <u>(In 000's at M+90 Days)</u>	
	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Demand</u>	
(Structure, overhead, casualties)	1,963.2
<u>Supply</u>	
Force Structure Yield ^{1/}	1,337.2
Pretrained Individual Manpower (PIM)	319.0
Training Base Output	97.4
Individuals Account	167.5
Shortfall	-42.1

^{1/} Includes individuals returning to duty.

In these tables the IRR, ING and Recalled Military Retirees are included in the PIM data, while the IMA are included in the Active/Guard/Reserve unit data of the force structure.

The Army has initiated several programs to offset the shortfalls. For the near term, the Army continues to pursue the goal of achievement and maintenance of an experienced and competent career force through both intensive attrition/separation management; and aggressive, attractive enlistment, reenlistment and extension programs.

Because of resource and manpower constraints, the most flexible source of meeting the Army's PIM needs is the IRR. The Army continues to screen all obligated members who are completing their Active or Reserve Component transfers them to the IRR. Only those who have no potential for service in a full mobilization one discharged before completing their statutory service obligation.

The Army's primary initiative has been to increase the current military service obligation (MSO) from six to eight years. Enabling legislation has been passed by Congress, and the DoD intends to implement the eight year MSO this year. The additional yield from this program (approximately 150 thousand increase in IRR strength) will not begin to occur until the first personnel to enlist under the extended MSO reach the point of additional obligation in FY 1990. In the interim, the Army

plans to use the IRR initiatives included in the 1984 Defense Authorization Act to sustain and increase IRR strength. The Army is considering submitting a reprogramming action, as requested by Congress, to obtain funding to pay an IRR enlistment bonus. The Army will reprogram funds to pay on IRR reenlistment bonus of \$705.

Finally, the Army has amended current reenlistment contracts to require all those who reenlist to serve an additional two years in the IRR after they complete their term of service in the active or reserve components (if separated prior to twenty years of service).

2. Civilian Wartime Manpower Requirements:

US Direct Hire Civilian Requirements Versus Supply (in 000's at M+180 Days)

Demand	412.7
Supply	269.1
Net New Hire Requirements	143.6

The Army bases its plans for military force buildup, deployment, war-fighting, and sustainment--and, thus, its projected military manpower requirements-- on the assumption that an adequate civilian work force will be available when needed to accomplish the support work load. Executing many contingency operations, particularly those involving the mobilization of all or part of the Reserve, will require the "mobilization" of additional civilian employees to bring the civilian work force up to the levels required by the conflict scenario.

The civilian manpower supply available on M-Day is the peacetime work force, represented by the FY 1982 USDH end strength of 269,100. On M-Day, the termination of peacetime activities that are not required in wartime and the assumption of some wartime activities by military manpower reduce the theater of operations requirement for civilian manpower. Concurrently, the worldwide (non-theater of operations) requirement for civilian manpower increases to reflect the support requirements associated with the mobilization activities of the total military force structure. Accordingly, on M-Day, the requirement for civilian manpower begins to increase to reflect the support requirements associated with mobilization buildup and preparation of military forces for employment/deployment. The shortfall, or new hire requirements, between demand and available manpower, will be increased by the loss of 5,000 borrowed and diverted military personnel and approximately 30,000 civilian employees subject to call-up as reservists, retired military, and draftees. (To avoid calling up civilian employees in essential positions, the Army continuously screens individuals who are also members of the Ready Reserve or who are retired military personnel subject to recall.)

Army's plans for offsetting the shortfall in civilian manpower after M-Day include using immediately available new-hires provided by the Office of Personnel Management and by local public employment offices in response to pre-positioned recruitment requests. Additionally, the Army is developing plans for using Federal civilian retirees and DoD employees whose positions become excess upon mobilization to further reduce the civilian manpower mobilization shortfall. It is expected that retirees will provide an excellent source of trained personnel for filling positions requiring scarce or special skills.

Assuming the availability of emergency hiring authority and the presence of favorable labor market conditions, the task of filling 144,000 positions over a period of 180 days would not be insurmountable if the requirement were spread uniformly over this time period. However, there is considerable concern over Army's ability to fill most of these positions in the first 30 days after mobilization (some 4,800 per day).

IV. NAVY MANPOWER READINESS

A. Active Uniformed Manpower: The central issue for the Navy is whether it can sustain its favorable personnel readiness trend as it grows to a 600 ship force.

The following sections will address this issue from the seven aspects previously defined: the Programmed Force, the Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, Operating Strength, Inventory Turnover, Inventory Imbalances, and the Experience and Grade Mix of the inventory.

1. Programmed Force, Programmed Structure, & Programmed Manning: From FY 1983-FY 1985 the Navy grows larger by 32 ships and 12 squadrons. To support this force growth the full manning requirement Navy-wide increases by 49,200 billets from FY 1983 to FY 1985. About 40 percent of this structure growth occurs in the operating forces as a result of the ships and squadrons added to the fleet. The remaining increase is in the shore establishment where the growth is a consequence of three factors -- the implementation of new SHORSTAMPS staffing standards, improvement of ADP systems providing better accountability of structure requirements, and improved data collection efforts. Of these three, the SHORSTAMPS effort is the most significant.

Programmed manning for the units and organizations in the force increases from FY 1983 to FY 1985 in the aggregate by 21,200. What this means is that the structure is growing faster than Navy plans to staff it. The number of programmed manpower structure spaces not planned for staffing increases from 70,500 in FY 1983 to 98,500 in FY 1985, or about 28,000 structure spaces.

Table VIII-8 provides more detailed information regarding the relationship between a growing programmed manpower structure and programming manning, summarizing by major Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC) as of the end of each fiscal year.

Table VIII-8
ACTIVE NAVY PROGRAMMED FORCES, PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, AND PROGRAMMED MANNING (END-YEAR) a/

DEFENSE PROGRAM PLANNING CATEGORY	FY 1983				FY 1984				FY 1985			
	PROG FORCE SHIPS (SQDNS)	PROG MPR TURE (000's)	PROG MAN- NING (000's)	%	PROG FORCE SHIPS (SQDNS)	PROG MPR TURE (000's)	PROG MAN- NING (000's)	%	PROG FORCE SHIPS (SQDNS)	PROG MPR TURE (000's)	PROG MAN- NING (000's)	%
Strategic	41(2)	21.1	94.8	94.8	41(2)	21.9	20.6	94.1	43(2)	22.4	20.8	92.9
Offensive Strategic Forces	41	19.3	18.3	94.8	41	20.0	18.8	94.0	43	20.4	18.9	92.6
Strategic Control	(2)	1.8	1.8	100.0	(2)	1.9	1.9	100.0	(2)	2.0	2.0	100.0
Tactical/Mobility	471(154)	295.7	275.4	93.1	483(161)	308.5	284.5	92.2	501(165)	314.7	291.8	92.7
Land Forces	---	3.6	3.6	100.0	---	4.0	4.0	100.0	---	4.2	4.2	100.0
Tactical Air Forces	13(83)	67.8	65.0	95.9	13(88)	70.3	67.2	95.6	13(90)	71.8	67.7	94.3
Naval Forces	458(71)	224.0	206.5	92.2	470(73)	233.7	213.6	91.1	488(75)	238.2	219.5	92.1
Mobility Forces	---	.3	.3	100.0	---	.5	.3	60.0	---	.5	.3	60.0
Auxiliary Activities	1(1)	33.3	23.0	69.7	1(1)	34.7	23.7	68.3	1(1)	34.8	24.2	69.5
Intelligence	1	10.0	8.3	83.0	1	10.8	8.5	78.7	1	10.9	8.6	78.9
Centrally Managed	---	10.4	7.0	67.3	---	10.8	7.3	67.6	---	10.8	7.6	70.4
Communications	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Research and Development	---	10.4	5.7	54.8	---	10.9	6.0	55.0	---	10.9	6.1	56.0
Geophysical Activities	(1)	2.2	2.0	90.9	(1)	2.2	1.9	86.4	(1)	2.2	1.9	86.4
Support Activities	(49)	192.9	153.8	79.7	(48)	214.3	152.0	70.9	(50)	220.0	156.6	71.2
Base Operating Support	---	95.1	67.7	71.2	---	98.7	64.1	64.9	---	101.5	67.1	66.1
Medical Support	---	14.6	10.6	72.6	---	22.1	11.6	52.5	---	23.7	12.3	51.9
Personnel Support	---	8.6	7.9	96.3	---	8.6	7.8	90.7	---	8.8	7.8	88.6
Individual Training	(20)	29.8	29.6	99.3	(20)	31.2	29.7	95.2	(20)	32.1	29.2	91.0
Force Support Training	(25)	14.6	14.5	99.3	(24)	16.1	15.4	95.7	(26)	16.8	16.4	97.6
Central Logistics	---	11.3	6.7	59.3	---	18.2	6.8	37.4	---	17.4	7.1	40.8
Centralized Support	(3)	8.7	6.7	77.0	(3)	8.8	6.8	77.3	(3)	9.1	6.9	75.8
Activities	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Management Headquarters	---	9.5	9.1	95.8	---	9.5	8.7	91.6	---	9.5	8.7	91.6
Federal Agency Support	(1)	1.1	1.1	100.0	(1)	1.1	1.1	100.0	(1)	1.1	1.1	100.0
Total Force Structure	513(206)	542.7	472.2	87.0	525(212)	579.4	480.9	83.0	545(218)	591.9	493.4	83.4

Notes: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

a/ Includes TARs. Navy utilizes an integrated system to determine Active Forces manpower requirements. Full-time active duty personnel in the SELRES (TAR's) are therefore included in this table.

2. Operating Strength: The actual staffing of programmed manning targets is a function of operating strength which follows a cyclical pattern throughout the year.

a. A comparison of average operating strength throughout the fiscal year against the average programmed manning "demand" is a more relevant measure of the overall fill solution. The data shown below is intended to provide some insight into the degree to which programmed manning targets have been and will actually be staffed. This table converts end-year programmed manning targets into manyear equivalents. For example, an increase of two programmed manning "spaces" halfway through the fiscal year increases the average programmed manning "demand" by one manyear.

b. The average programmed manning target was understaffed by 2.9 percent in FY 1983. By the end of FY 1983 that had improved to 1.7 percent. Although the percentages for FY 1984 and FY 1985 stay in the negative range, operating strength and programmed manning become closer than in previous years.

c. The consistent operating strength shortfall illustrates that the Navy's total authorized (FY 1983 and FY 1984) and requested end-strength in FY 1985 is not sufficient to yield an operating strength equal to programmed manning demand.

d. It is important to stress that all numbers are approximations, and the average operating strength deviation is likely to be reduced with a positive impact on personnel readiness in the fleet.

Active Navy Strengths
(In 000's; Includes TARs)

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
1. End-Year Programmed Manning	472.2	480.9	493.4
2. Average Programmed Manning*	469.4	478.4	487.2
3. Average Operating Strength*	455.9	473.0	480.1
4. Operating Strength Deviation*	-8.7	-7.0	-7.1
5. Percent Deviation	(-2.9%)	(-1.1%)	(-1.5%)

* In manyears.

3. Inventory Stability: Both aggregate population stability and unit personnel stability show positive trends:

a. Aggregate Population Stability: As shown, the Navy has been increasingly successful in keeping its people -- the stability of the enlisted population has increased by 5 percent in the past two years, and by 6.2 percent over the entire period shown.

Aggregate Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Officer	90.5	91.7	92.1	92.6
Enlisted	81.2	81.4	84.1	85.8

b. Unit Personnel Stability: The data below show that greater stability of the enlisted population in general has contributed to greater stability at the unit level -- a 10 percent improvement for enlisted personnel over the period shown.

Unit Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Officer	51.5	50.1	51.0	50.8
Enlisted	45.9	44.6	47.3	50.2

4. Inventory Imbalances:

a. Officer Imbalances: Table VIII-9 provides the imbalances between inventory and officer programmed authorized (OPA) for end FY 1983 through end FY 1985. It contains current projections of the increase in OPA and expected growth in the inventory for FY 1984 and FY 1985. In absolute terms, the net commissioned officer imbalances are holding relatively constant, although they are declining as a percent of desired.

Commissioned Officer Imbalances
(In 000's)

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 83-85</u> <u>Change</u>
Total Imbalances	6.8	6.6	7.0	+0.2(+2.9%)
Total Desired	64.6	64.9	68.6	
Percent Imbalanced	(10.5%)	(10.2%)	(10.2%)	

In addition to the general trend noted, Table VIII-10 outlines imbalances in four officer communities:

(1) Surface Warfare Officers: The demand increase by 4.4 percent between end FY 1983 and FY 1985, while the inventory decreases 1.7 percent.

(2) Submarine Officers: Demand increases by 4.6 percent between FY 1983 and FY 1985. The 04/05/06 inventory actually decreases by 7.7 percent during this period with a 3.4 percent increase in 04/05/06 demand. A 28 percent shortage in the grades of lieutenant commander to captain is the most serious problem. Accessions and retention are improving. Shortfalls in the higher grades will continue into the next decade as a result of not achieving past accession and retention goals. For the near term we need to maximize programs to ensure continuation of these higher grades as well as to maintain the incentives necessary to sustain current accession and retention successes.

(3) Pilots: the demand increases by almost 4.0 percent from FY 1983 - FY 1985 while the inventory grows by about 12 percent.

(4) Naval Flight Officers (NFOs): FY 1983-FY 1985 demand increases by 3.5 percent at the same time the inventory increases by 8.0 percent.

b. Enlisted Imbalances:

(1) Petty officers: As shown below, the E-5 through E-9 petty officer population is projected to grow slightly faster than the increase in demand, as follows:

E5-E9 Petty Officer Shortage
(In 000's)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 1980-FY 1985 CHANGE</u>	
Desired	210.3	216.1	221.5	228.7	235.5	239.9	+29.6	(14.7%)
Inventory	189.5	193.9	214.2	214.2	224.3	233.2	+43.7	(23.1%)
Net Shortage	-20.8	-22.2	-14.5	-14.5	-11.2	-6.7	-14.1	(67.7%)

(2) Overall Enlisted Imbalances: Table VIII-9 outlines Navy projections for all occupations through end FY 1985. It contains an important message: measured at the occupational level, the general thrust of Navy enlisted manpower and training plans will reduce the net inventory imbalance almost 54.3 percent by end FY 1985, from 11.6 percent in FY 1983 to 4.7 percent in FY 1985, as summarized here:

Enlisted Imbalances
(In 000's)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 83-FY 85 CHANGE</u>	
Total Imbalances	53.2	57.6	38.3	42.8	33.7	24.3	-28.9	54.3%
Total Desired	459.3	466.0	487.3	493.3	502.3	512.5		
Percent Imbalanced	(11.6%)	(12.3%)	(7.9%)	(8.6%)	(6.7%)	(4.7%)		

Table VIII-9
Active Navy Occupational Imbalances
(000's)

OFFICERS	FY 83	FY 84	FY 85			
<hr/>						
W1-W4						
Out-of-Kilter						
Occupations 1/	4/4	3/4	3/4			
Total Overage	0	0	0			
Total Shortage	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3			
Total Desired	3.4	3.3	3.4			
<hr/>						
01-03						
Out-of-Kilter						
Occupations 1/	19/27	17/27	16/27			
Total Overage	+3.0	+2.9	+2.9			
Total Shortage	-0.9	-0.9	-0.9			
Total Desired	38.9	38.9	41.7			
<hr/>						
04-06						
Out-of-Kilter						
Occupations 1/	18/26	17/26	20/26			
Total Overage	+0.7	+0.6	+0.6			
Total Shortages	-2.2	-2.2	-2.6			
Total Desired	25.7	26.0	26.9			
<hr/>						
Enlisted	FY 80	FY 81	FY 82	FY 83	FY 84	FY 85
<hr/>						
E1-E4						
Out-of-Kilter						
Occupations 1/	67/85	47/85	85/85	72/85	69/84	64/84
Total Overages	+27.0	+27.5	+18.0	+24.2	+20.4	+13.1
Total Shortages	-6.8	-8.6	-.6	-5.1	-6.4	-6.5
Total Desired	249.6	250.8	260.1	268.8	269.5	272.6
<hr/>						
E5-E9						
Out-of-Kilter						
Occupations 1/	79/99	78/99	64/99	63/99	37/99	24/99
Total Overages	+.4	+.2	+.6	+.3	+.5	+.8
Total Shortages	-19.0	-21.3	-19.1	-13.2	-6.4	-3.9
Total Desired	209.7	215.2	222.7	227.5	232.8	239.9
<hr/>						

1/ The number of occupations in with inventories greater than 105 percent less than or 95 percent of desired compared to the total number of occupations.

TABLE VIII-10
Navy Officer Imbalances In Selected Communities^{a/}
(In 000's)

	FY 83			FY 84			FY 85		
	DES	INV	DELTA	DES	INV	DELTA	DES	INV	DELTA
	<u>b/</u>	<u>c/</u>							
<u>Surface Warfare Officer</u>									
04-06	5.1	4.5	-.6	5.0	4.3	-.7	5.2	4.2	-1.0
01-03	6.2	7.2	+1.0	6.3	7.2	+.9	6.6	7.3	+.7
TOTAL	11.3	11.7	+.4	11.3	11.5	+.2	11.8	11.5	-.3
<u>Submarine</u>									
04-06	1.7	1.3	-.4	1.7	1.2	-.5	1.7	1.2	-.5
01-03	2.0	2.2	+.3	2.0	2.3	+.3	2.1	2.5	+.4
TOTAL	3.7	3.5	-.1 ^{d/}	3.7	3.5	-.2	3.8	3.7	-.1
<u>Pilot</u>									
04-06	4.6	5.0	+.4	4.6	5.0	+.4	4.6	5.3	+.7
01-03	6.5	5.1	-1.4	6.5	5.9	-.6	6.9	6.1	-.8
TOTAL	11.1	10.1	-1.0	11.1	10.9	-.2	11.5 ^{e/}	11.4	-.1
<u>Naval Flight Officers</u>									
04-06	2.2	2.1	-.1	2.2	2.1	-.1	2.3	2.2	-.1
01-03	3.3	3.0	-.3	3.3	3.3	0	3.4	3.4	0
TOTAL	5.5	5.1	-.4	5.5	5.4	-.1	5.7	5.6	-.1

a/ Includes TAR's, but not student designators

b/ Desired

c/ Inventory

d/ Does not add due to rounding

e/ The activation of an additional air wing plus the impending formation of LAMPS MK-III squadrons increases the requirement for pilots. Shortages will exist until the inventory can "grow" to meet requirements. Fleet units will receive necessary pilots with the shortfall being absorbed by the shore establishment until inventory growth is completed. The Navy has requested Aviation Officer Continuation Pay (AOCP) to retain aviators necessary to ensure growth to meet requirements.

These projections reflect corrective Navy management actions in the areas of on-the-job (OJT) and formal school training programs. The low grade excesses shown in Table VIII-9 are for the purpose of achieving two critical objectives. First is the counterbalancing of the senior petty officer shortages. Second, by accessing more personnel into the base of a growing grade/year-of-service pyramid, the Navy will achieve a larger future petty officer population designed to be more self-sustaining by occupation -- that is, an increased "flow" of reenlistees from the first-term into the careerist population, thus reducing the need for careerist occupational conversion and retraining.

5. Experience and Grade Mix: As shown below, experience has increased, as measured by the number of personnel with more than four years service:

Navy Active Experience And Grade Mix
(Strength in 000's)

	FY 80	FY 81	FY 82	FY 83	FY 84	FY 85
<u>Enlisted</u>						
E1/3	172.5	177.9	180.5	176.1	171.5	167.2
(AVG YOS)	(2.0)	(2.0)	(2.1)	(2.2)	(2.2)	(2.2)
E4/5	178.8	182.0	188.1	204.4	209.9	217.2
(AVG YOS)	(5.0)	(5.0)	(5.2)	(5.3)	(5.4)	(5.3)
E6/7	95.6	97.1	98.8	100.8	107.5	112.4
(AVG YOS)	(13.9)	(13.8)	(13.8)	(13.9)	(13.5)	(13.3)
E8/9	11.6	12.0	12.3	12.9	13.6	14.4
(AVG YOS)	(21.4)	(21.5)	(21.7)	(22.0)	(22.1)	(22.0)
TOTAL E1/9	458.5	469.1	479.7	494.2	502.5	511.2
(AVG GRADE)	E-5.35	E-5.35	E-5.4	E-5.4	E-5.4	E-5.4
(AVG YOS)	6.1	6.1	6.2	6.4	6.4	6.4
(4 YOS)	193.1	203.6	218.2	234.4	248.7	257.6
<u>WARRANT OFFICER</u>						
TOTAL W1/4	3.0	3.0	2.9	3.04	3.04	3.04
(AVG YOS)	(19.5)	(19.9)	(20.09)	(20.43)	(20.3)	(20.3)

<u>COMMISSIONED</u>						
<u>OFFICER</u>						
01/03	36.4	38.3	39.6	40.9	40.98	44.3
(AVG YOS)	(6.0)	(6.0)	(5.97)	(5.97)	(5.98)	(5.7)
04	12.3	12.4	13.4	13.4	12.8	12.9
(AVG YOS)	(14.2)	(14.2)	(14.09)	(14.06)	(14.1)	(14.2)
05	7.6	7.8	7.9	8.1	7.8	7.7
(AVG YOS)	(19.3)	(19.2)	(18.9)	(18.9)	(18.9)	(19.1)
06	3.6	3.9	3.8	3.9	3.7	3.9
(AVG YOS)	(25.5)	(25.5)	(25.4)	(25.4)	(25.4)	(25.4)
07/10	.26	.25	.25	.25	.25	.25
(AVG YOS)	(30.6)	(30.3)	(30.3)	(20.7)	(30.6)	(30.4)
TOTAL 01/10	60.2	62.7	64.9	66.9	65.4	69.1
(AVG GRADE)	0-3.18	0-3.17	0-3.16	0-3.14	0-3.16	0-3.11
(AVG YOS)	(10.7)	(10.6)	(10.4)	(10.4)	(10.5)	(10.6)
(4 YOS)	45.5	43.3	47.8	49.8	44.8	49.8

6. Readiness Assessment

The Navy's programmed force growth of 32 ships and 12 squadrons is reflected in a programmed manpower structure increase of 49,200 billets from FY 1983 to FY 1985. The aggregate level of programmed manning decreases from FY 1983 to FY 1985 particularly in the naval and tactical air force categories. Actual staffing of the programmed manning target, in the aggregate, is expected to improve substantially through reduced grade and skill substitution, although operating strengths will continue to average slightly less than programmed manning "demand." Regarding officer imbalances, pilot shortages remain relatively constant; the submarine officer shortage may worsen slightly; surface warfare officer shortages may worsen, particularly in the senior grade population. Enlisted occupational imbalances are expected to be reduced by about 54 percent. The shortage of E5-E9 petty officers will be reduced 67.7 percent from 20,800 to 6,700. Occupational imbalances within the petty officer population may be reduced by as much as 75 percent from FY 1983-FY 1985.

Overall, the figures indicate that the Navy has manpower plans and programs in place to support growth towards the manning of a 600 ship fleet. Moreover, the Navy's program will support an increasing level of personnel readiness in the Fleet. This is attributed to five factors:

- A high level of programmed manning in the operating forces. Although it does not equal the FY 1983 level, its negative affect will be countered by...

- A reduction in operating strength deviation.
- Improved population stability.
- An overall reduction in petty officer shortages.
- An overall reduction of enlisted occupational imbalances.

B. Reserve Manpower

1. Programmed Force, Programmed Structure, and Programmed Manning: The Naval Reserve will add one air squadron, bringing that total to 52 in FY 1985, and two additional ships will be added in FY 1985. The USNR structure increases by 3,700 billets from FY 1983 to FY 1985. During the same period the Navy plans to reduce the number of structure vacancies from 21,100 in FY 1983 to 11,400 in FY 1985.

The Naval Reserve programmed manpower structure and programmed manning shown in Table VIII-11 shows the difference between the Selected Reserve requirement and the desired trained strength in units over the three years FY 1983 to FY 1985.

2. Reserve Operating Strength: Trained strength in units, shown below as end-year operating strength, is sufficient to support programmed manning in the USNR:

Naval Reserve Programmed Manning and Operating Strength (In 000's)

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
1. End-Year Programmed Manning	96.0	105.1	110.0
2. End-Year Operating Strength	96.0	105.1	110.0
3. Operating Strength Deviation	0	0	0

2. Inventory Stability. USNR enlisted population stability has remained stable as shown below. Due to present inability to track personnel historically by social security number and unit identification code, unit stability rates for the USNR are not now available.

(Percent)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY-83</u>
Enlisted	71.6	74.3	76.7	75.4

4. Reserve Inventory Imbalances:

a. Officer Inventory Imbalances: The Navy is not able to document its reserve officer imbalances.

Table VIII-11
USNR PROGRAMMED FORCES, PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, AND PROGRAMMED MANNING (END-YEAR) ^{a/}

DEFENSE PROGRAM PLANNING CATEGORY	FY 1983 ^{b/}				FY 1984				FY 1985			
	PROG FORCE SHIPS (SQDNS)	PROG MPR TURE (000's)	PROG MAN- NING (000's)	%	PROG FORCE SHIPS (SQDNS)	PROG MPR TURE (000's)	PROG MAN- NING (000's)	%	PROG FORCE SHIPS (SQDNS)	PROG MPR TURE (000's)	PROG MAN- NING (000's)	%
Strategic	0	.5	.4	80	0	.5	.4	80	0	.5	.5	100
Offensive Strategic Forces	0	.5	.4	80	0	.5	.4	100	0	.5	.5	100
Defensive Strategic Forces	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Tactical/Mobility	35(51)	75.5	62.2	83	36(51)	74.2	68.6	92	37(51)	73.8	69.7	94
Land Forces	---	2.2	1.5	77	---	2.3	2.0	87	---	2.3	2.1	91
Tactical Air Forces	(18)	5.9	5.0	76	(18)	5.7	5.2	91	37(18)	6.0	6.3	105
Naval Forces	35(32)	65.0	54.6	85	36(33)	64.1	59.2	92	37(33)	63.4	60.3	95
Mobility Forces	---	2.4	1.1	50	---	2.1	2.2	104	---	2.1	2.3	110
Auxiliary Activities	---	7.0	6.3	91	---	7.4	6.2	84	---	7.5	6.5	87
Intelligence	---	4.1	4.1	98	---	4.8	4.3	90	---	4.8	4.4	92
Centrally Managed	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Communications	---	1.4	1.4	114	---	1.5	1.2	80	---	.8	.7	61
Research and Development	---	.8	.5	63	---	.8	.5	63	---	.3	.3	100
Geophysical Activities	---	.3	.3	100	---	.3	.3	100	---	---	---	---
Support Activities	---	34.7	27.7	76	---	38.4	29.8	78	---	39.6	33.3	84
Base Operating Support	---	7.1	8.1	123	---	7.8	6.4	82	---	7.8	6.7	86
Medical Support	---	12.5	5.2	38	---	15.7	11.6	74	---	17.0	13.1	77
Personnel Support	---	.8	.8	100	---	.8	.8	100	---	.8	.8	100
Individual Training	---	.2	1.5	200	---	.2	.2	100	---	.2	.2	100
Force Support Training	---	.7	1.0	143	---	.8	.6	75	---	.8	.7	88
Central Logistics	---	8.0	6.0	69	---	7.6	5.7	75	---	7.6	7.0	92
Centralized Support	---	1.4	1.6	114	---	1.5	1.2	80	---	1.5	1.3	87
Activities	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Management Headquarters	---	3.8	3.5	100	---	3.9	3.2	82	---	3.9	3.4	87
Federal Agency Support	---	.2	.05	25	---	.1	.1	100	---	.1	.1	100
Total Force Structure	53(51)	117.7	96.0	82	36(51)	120.5	105.1	87	37(51)	121.4	110.0	91

a/ Does not include TARs. The Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS) determines, inter alia, the military manpower required for mobilization and specifies which portion requires the frequency of training and availability associated with the Selected Reserve. NAMMOS does not address requirements for Selected Reserve personnel on full-time active duty.

b/ Programmed Manpower Structure reflects NAMMOS mobilization requirements for SELRES.

TABLE VIII-12

Naval Reserve
Enlisted Occupational Imbalances

<u>E1-E4</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>
Out-of-Kilter Occupations <u>1/</u>	82/85	79/84
Total Overages	+650	+1,100
Total Shortages	-11,700	-16,900
Total Desired	51,700	51,700

<u>E5 - E9</u>		
Out-of-Kilter Occupations <u>1/</u>	97/99	89/99
Total Overages	+2,300	+5,700
Total Shortages	-5,000	-3,100
Total Desired	48,300	48,300

1/ The number of occupations with inventories greater than 105 percent or less than 95 percent of desired, compared to the total number of occupations.

b. Enlisted Imbalances: Although the data in Table VIII-12 reflect a broad imbalance, many of the discrepancies are in pay grades only, i.e., the person is qualified to do the job but is not an exact match by pay grade within the two major grade groups shown. With a liberal substitution criteria by pay grade all billets can be staffed at the rating level. As shown, net imbalances have been reduced. A projection for FY 1985 is not presently available:

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY83 - 84 CHANGE</u>
Total Imbalances	19,850	26,800	-3,050 (3%)
Total Desired	100,000	100,000	
Percent Imbalanced	(28.8%)	(26.8%)	

5. Grade & Experience Mix: As shown below, the level of experience in the Naval Reserve is holding relatively constant.

Naval Reserve Grade & Experience Mix

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83 1/</u>	<u>FY 84 2/</u>	<u>FY 85 2/</u>
<u>Enlisted</u>						
E1	1,594	1,857	1,743	Not Available		
(Avg YOS)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.7)			
E2	2,496	2,744	2,821			
(Avg YOS)	(2.3)	(2.4)	(2.5)			
E3	7,083	7,147	7,570			
(Avg YOS)	(4.9)	(5.0)	(5.0)			
E4	14,700	14,970	15,253			
(Avg YOS)	(5.4)	(5.6)	(5.9)			
E5	21,373	21,911	21,255			
(Avg YOS)	(9.3)	(9.4)	(9.0)			
E6	15,248	14,591	15,973			
(Avg YOS)	(14.6)	(15.0)	(15.1)			
E7	5,655	5,569	6,026			
(Avg YOS)	(21.9)	(21.7)	(21.4)			
E8	1,203	1,268	1,349			
(Avg YOS)	(24.8)	(24.7)	(24.8)			
E9	582	589	652			
(Avg YOS)	(28.6)	(28.8)	(29.3)			
<u>Total E1-E9</u>	70,010	70,673	75,674	88,474		
(Avg YOS)	(10.2)	(10.2)	(10.3)	(Not Avail)		
(4 YOS)	(51,653)	(52,497)	(58,545)	(70,260)		
(Avg Grade)	(E4.9)	(E4.8)	(E4.9)	(E4.9)		
<u>Warrant Officers</u>						
W1-W4	691	679	632	(Not Avail)		

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83 1/</u>	<u>FY 84 2/</u>	<u>FY 85 2/</u>
<u>Commissioned</u>						
<u>Officers</u>						
01	101	158	250			Not Available
(Avg YOS)	(8.5)	(10.7)	(8.4)			
02	463	727	571			
(Avg YOS)	(8.1)	(8.2)	(9.5)			
03	4,652	5,095	5,022			
(Avg YOS)	(10.0)	(10.4)	(10.3)			
04	7,254	6,748	7,206			
(Avg YOS)	(14.9)	(15.4)	(15.1)			
05	2,805	2,710	3,243			
(Avg YOS)	(20.5)	(20.9)	(20.1)			
06	644	689	931			
(Avg YOS)	(27.3)	(27.9)	(26.9)			
07	3	10	5			
(Avg YOS)	(31.6)	(33.6)	(33.0)			
08	1	11	12			
(Avg YOS)	(37.0)	(36.0)	(35.4)			
Total 01-08	15,923	16,148	17,240	20,620		
(Avg YOS)	(14.7)	(15.0)	(15.0)	(Not Avail)		
(4 YOS)	(15,743)	(15,911)	(16,899)	(Not Avail)		
(Avg Grade)	(0-3.9)	(0-3.8)	(0-4.0)			

NOTES:

- 1/ Includes TAR's, therefore the data is not exactly comparable with FY 1980-FY 1982. Detailed information by grade not available.
 2/ The Navy is unable to provide projections for FY 1984-FY 1985.

6. Reserve Readiness Assessment: The personnel readiness posture of the USNR is likely to improve through FY 1985 due to an almost 50 percent reduction in "hollowness." The improvement in personnel stability has been countered somewhat by worsening enlisted skill imbalances, but the overall momentum is clearly in the direction of improved readiness.

C. Mobilization Manpower

1. Wartime Military Manpower versus Supply

Upon mobilization, the Navy's peacetime force will require substantial augmentation. The following table reflects the Navy's military mobilization peak shortfall as determined by the Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS) for full mobilization.

<u>Wartime Military Manpower Requirements</u>	
<u>Versus Supply</u>	
(000's at M+30)	
	<u>FY 85</u>
Demand	796.7
Supply	790.5
Net Shortfall	-6.2

Significant shortfalls occur at mobilization. Although shortfalls to some individual skill areas will continue to exist throughout the scenario, the overall shortfall will be resolved by M+40 through the influx of Pretrained Individual Manpower (PIM).

The primary source of PIM is the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The IRR's steady decline in strength since May 1981 is caused by fewer people attriting from the active force. Retention of active duty personnel has increased because of substantial pay incentives and the current state of the economy.

To help recruit and retain IRR personnel, two programs have been developed: (1) IRR bonus and (2) an extended military service obligation from six to eight years. The FY 1984 DoD Authorization Act (P.L. 98-94) approved an IRR bonus of \$900 for a three-year reenlistment and extension of the service obligation to eight years. The reinstatement of the IRR bonus and extension of the service obligation should gradually reverse this trend, and a modest growth rate after FY 1984 to 90,000 by FY 1989 should be realized.

2. Civilian Mobilization Manpower Requirements

The Navy bases its plans for mobilization on the assumption that an adequate civilian work force will be available when needed to accomplish the increased workload.

Wartime Civilian Requirements Versus Supply (USDH In 000's)

Demand	344
Supply	247
Net New Hire Requirements	97

Upon mobilization, non-theater requirements for civilian manpower increase to reflect the support requirements associated with the mobilization activities of the total military force structure. Our supply projections to fill these requirements are understated, for they do not consider the fact that many civilian employees will be subject to call-up as reservists, retired military, and draftees. To alleviate this problem, Navy obtains data from existing Department of Defense computer systems and combines it with the Navy civilian personnel data system to predict workforce losses due to call-up of reservists and retired military. The first test of this program was conducted as part of the PROUD SABER 83 mobilization exercise. The outcome was successful. It defined not only total losses within the sample civilian workforce, but also gave a picture of what occupations and which organizational units were most severely affected. The PROUD SABER 83 test was restricted to one geographic area; the Navy now plans to expand the process to its entire workforce. From the sample data obtained, it appears that the combined effect of the draft, reserve call-up, and retired military recall will have a detrimental impact on the Navy civilian workforce.

Based on all of the above, the Department of the Navy has the capability in peacetime to accurately quantify the workforce changes required to mobilize. The options for addressing these manpower requirements include interaction with the Department of Labor (i.e., preplacing job orders during peacetime), reassignment of staff from non-critical positions to essential jobs, construction of accelerated training programs, direct emergency recruitment by the Navy based upon planning developed prior to mobilization, and recall of recently retired staff. The exact extent to which each option will be used is dependent on further analysis of which Navy civilian occupations will be most affected by mobilization. Further analysis will also be required in the areas of competition with private industry for shortage category occupations (e.g., engineering) and quantification of the impact of a draft.

V. MARINE CORPS MANPOWER READINESS

A. Active Uniformed Manpower

1. Programmed Force, Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning:

a. Programmed, Force Programmed Structure and Programmed Manning: Detailed information concerning force growth in FY 1985 is contained in Chapter V. To support this growth the aggregate full manning requirement increases from 175,600 in FY 1983 to 181,100 in FY 1985 --- an increase of 5,500 structure spaces. From FY 1983 to FY 1985 programmed manning increases by 6,400. Since structure is growing at a slower rate than programmed manning, overall "hollowness" is reduced. The number of billets not planned for staffing is 900 less in FY 1985 than in FY 1983 -- almost a 15 percent reduction in unfilled structure. Table VIII-13 provides an overview of the changing relationship between the programmed force, programmed manpower structure, and programmed manning.

2. Operating Strength. Actual staffing of programmed manning targets, in the aggregate, is contingent upon adequate operating strength. For FY 1984 and FY 1985 the Marine Corps has programmed operating strength "supply" (in many years) equal to programmed manning "demand" (again, in many years). In other words, the Marine Corps has structured a "balanced" manpower plan in the sense that if all elements of the program are executed (recruiting, training, staffing, etc.) the average operating strength population will be sufficient to staff the billets programmed for manning. Actual execution of the plan in FY 1984 and FY 1985 may deviate somewhat from the program, but not more than that experienced in FY 1982 or FY 1983, as shown here:

Table VIII-13
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS PROGRAMMED FORCES, PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, AND PROGRAMMED MANNING (END-YEAR)

DEFENSE PROGRAM PLANNING CATEGORY (MARINE CORPS)	FY 1983				FY 1984				FY 1985			
	PROG FORCE	MPR STRUCTURE (000's)	PROG MAN- NING (000's)	%	PROG FORCE	MPR STRUCTURE (000's)	PROG MAN- NING (000's)	%	PROG FORCE	MPR STRUCTURE (000's)	PROG MAN- NING (000's)	%
Tactical/Mobility		130.2	113.6	88.1		132.2	118.6	89.7		134.3	120.2	89.5
Marine Divisions	3	48.9	46.9	95.9	3	50.0	47.4	94.8	3	51.2	47.3	92.4
Other Combat Support	---	7.5	3.6	57.1	---	6.5	4.7	72.3	---	6.8	5.0	73.4
Marine Aircraft Wings	3	41.8	35.8	85.6	3	42.8	37.1	88.0	3	43.1	38.0	88.2
Force Service Support	3	25.9	21.1	81.5	3	26.8	23.4	87.3	3	27.0	23.7	88.0
GPS	---	---	---	---	---	6.1	6.1	100.0	---	6.2	6.2	100.0
Other	---	6.1	6.2	101.6	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Auxiliary Activities		1.7	1.6	---		1.7	1.7	100.0		1.6	1.6	100.0
Intelligence	---	.8	.7	---	---	.8	.8	---	---	.8	.8	---
Centrally Managed Communications	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Research and Development		.8	.8	---		.9	.9	---		.8	.8	---
Geophysical Activities												
Support Activities		43.7	44.9	102.5		44.7	44.3	99.1		44.8	44.5	99.3
Base Operating Support	20.5	20.5	21.4	104.4	20.6	20.6	20.6	100	20.6	20.6	20.6	100
Personnel Support	4.7	4.7	4.8	102.1	4.7	4.7	4.7	100	4.7	4.7	4.7	100
Individual Training	8.6	8.6	8.7	101.2	8.8	8.8	8.8	100	8.9	8.9	8.9	100
Force Support Training	3.0	3.0	3.1	103.3	3.5	3.5	3.5	100	3.5	3.5	3.5	100
Central Logistics	.8	.8	.7	87.5	.8	.8	.8	100	.8	.8	.8	100
Centralized Support	2.4	2.4	2.3	100.0	2.4	2.4	2.4	100	2.4	2.4	2.4	100
Activities												
Management Headquarters	2.6	2.6	2.4	96.1	2.7	2.7	2.3	85.2	2.7	2.7	2.3	85.2
Federal Agency Support	1.3	1.3	1.2	92.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	100	1.3	1.3	1.3	100
Total Force Structure	3 Div's	175.6	160.0	91.7	3 Div's	178.5	164.6	92.2	3 Div's	181.1	166.4	91.9

a/ Less than 50

Active Marine Corps Operating Strength
(IN 000's)

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
1. End-year Programmed Manning	161.4	164.6	166.4
2. Average Programmed Manning*	161.4	164.3	166.4
3. Average Operating Strength*	162.9	164.6	166.8
4. Operating Strength Deviation*	+1.5	0	0
5. Percent Deviation	(+.9%)	(0%)	(0%)

*In many years

3. Inventory Stability

a. Aggregate Population Stability. As shown below, reduced attrition losses and improved retention (in both the officer and enlisted communities) have contributed to improved stability over the past four years:

Aggregate Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Officer	90.3	91.1	92.3	93.3
Enlisted	78.0	78.5	80.2	79.3

b. Unit Personnel Stability. As shown below, the improvement in aggregate population stability has translated into greater stability at the unit level:

Unit Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Officer	38.0	42.0	43.3	42.4
Enlisted	32.1	36.2	38.0	38.0

4. Inventory Imbalances

a. Officer. The figures in Table VIII-14 summarize existing imbalances in the officer population aggregated into three grade groups. Future reports will use FY 1983 as the baseline for comparison. Projected imbalances for FY 1984 and FY 1985 are not available.

Table VIII-14

Marine Corps Officers Inventory Imbalances

<u>W1-W4</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Out-of-Kilter Occupations <u>1/</u>	54/61
Total overages	+193
Total shortages	-184
Total desired	1,411
<hr/>	
<u>01 - 03</u>	
Out-of-Kilter Occupations <u>1/</u>	76/83
Total overages	+2,007
Total shortages	-2,101
Total desired	14,023
<hr/>	
<u>04 - 06</u>	
Out-of-Kilter Occupations <u>1/</u>	73/79
Total overages	+1,295
Total shortages	-1,392
Total desired	5,258

1/ The number of occupations with inventories greater than 105 percent or less than 95 percent of desired, compared to the total number of occupations.

b. Enlisted

(1) General. In the aggregate, the enlisted population is sufficient to meet the programmed manning demand, although there are and will be both overages and shortages in specific military occupational specialties (MOS's). The overall trend, however, is extremely favorable. Projected further improvement is based on continued quality accessions, pay competitiveness, effectiveness of the enlisted bonus, and the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program (SRBP).

(2) E-1 to E-4. From the end of FY 1980 to the end of FY 1983 the net overages/shortages decreased from 38,192 to 10,752, a 72 percent reduction in overall E1 - E4 imbalances.

(a) High quality nonprior service accessions have helped significantly to reduce MOS imbalances. For example, in FY 1980 77.8 percent of Marine Corps accessions were high school graduates, and in Fiscal Year 1983 91.7 percent were high school graduates. Higher quality accessions experience lower attrition in recruit training than non-high school graduates, and they suffer less attrition overall during their first enlistment.

(b) In addition, the Enlisted Bonus Program (EBP) has increased from a budgeted amount of \$7.7M with 3,400 bonuses in FY 1980 to \$9.7M with 4,270 bonus allocations in FY 1984. The FY 1985 EBP is budgeted for \$9.2M with approximately 4,000 allocations. These increases have helped substantially in reducing occupational imbalances.

In addition to its primary function of accessing quality personnel into short skills in FY 1984, the EBP is also being used to spread the historic high summer accessions more evenly through the year by increasing the bonus amounts during low input months -- February and May -- by allocating more bonuses to those months. A more even flow of accessions will permit a better match of recruits qualified for technical training to the available school seats.

(3) E-5 to E-9. Total overages/shortages decreased from 11,276 in Fiscal Year 1980 to 8,445 in FY 1983. This 25 percent improvement can be attributed to several management actions that include the SRBP and close control of lateral movements into shortage skills.

(4) E1-E-9: Table VIII-15 outlines existing and projected imbalances in the enlisted population. It indicates that in the enlisted population as a whole (E1-E9), total imbalances have been reduced by more than half from FY 1980 to FY 1983 and should be reduced further by the end of FY 1985 (based on current plans). Net inventory imbalances, as a percent of desired, have been reduced dramatically, as summarized here:

Table VIII-15

U.S. Marine Corps
Enlisted Inventory Imbalances

	END FY80	END FY81	END FY82	END FY83	END FY84	END FY85
<u>E1-E4</u>						
Out-of-Kilter Occupations <u>1/</u>	267/299	280/308	278/318	233/313	183/312	152/312
Total Overages	+14,869	+12,678	+10,334	+3,608	+2,360	+2,053
Total Shortages	-23,323	-22,525	-19,319	-7,144	-6,973	-6,017
Total Desired	122,650	122,258	119,003	118,618	121,650	124,987
<u>E5-E9</u>						
Out-of-Kilter Occupations <u>1/</u>	329/377	351/394	334/399	285/387	247/386	205/385
Total Overages	+5,208	+5,968	+6,341	+4,363	+3,460	+3,131
Total Shortages	-6,068	-4,856	-5,242	-4,082	-3,359	-2,467
Total Desired	47,621	49,999	54,402	55,488	54,764	54,247

1/ The number of occupations with inventories greater than 105 percent or less than 95 percent of desired, compared to the total number of occupations.

Enlisted Inventory Imbalances

	<u>FY80</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY85</u>	<u>FY83-85</u> <u>Change</u>
Total Imbalances	49,468	19,197	13,668	-5,529 (29%)
Total Desired	170,271	174,106	179,234	
Percent Imbalanced	(29%)	(11%)	(8%)	

5. Experience and Grade Mix. The data below display the average year of service (YOS) by grade cell for officers and enlisted. The enlisted force is becoming more experienced: 4.5 average YOS years for FY 1980 and 5.37 years for FY 1985. The average grade increases slightly, largely as a consequence of the Marine Corps' success in reducing E5-E9 shortages. Since the average YOS is increasing at a faster rate than the average grade, the Marine Corps will also be promoting a more seasoned population into the leadership cadre -- the Corps will have more experienced NCO's and more of them.

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>ENLISTED</u>						
E1-E3	96.8	95.6	86.5	86.2	84.8	92.2
(AVG YOS)	2.01	2.03	2.06	2.08	2.09	2.12
E4/E5	48.1	51.1	58.6	58.8	56.9	57.1
(AVG YOS)	4.67	4.81	4.73	4.98	5.43	5.84
E6/E7	21.3	21.4	23.8	24.1	24.7	24.8
(AVG YOS)	12.13	12.22	11.89	12.10	12.48	12.87
E8/E9	4.0	4.2	4.5	5.0	5.0	5.0
(AVG YOS)	21.89	21.46	21.85	21.65	22.16	22.58
<u>TOTAL E1-E9</u>	170.3	172.3	173.4	174.1	176.4	179.2
(AVG GRADE)	E3.50	E3.56	E3.72	E3.76	E3.75	E3.74
(AVG YOS)	4.50	4.60	4.83	5.01	5.19	5.37
(4YOS)	47.3	51.8	57.1	61.0	65.1	69.2
<u>WARRANT OFFICER</u>						
<u>TOTAL W1/4</u>	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4
(AVG YOS)	(13.0)	(13.0)	(13.0)	(13.0)	(13.0)	(13.0)

COMMISSIONED OFFICER

01-03	12.0	12.1	12.5	13.3	13.4	13.5
(AVG YOS)	7	7	7	7	7	7
04	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
(AVG YOS)	14	14	14	14	14	14
05	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.6
(AVG YOS)	19	19	19	19	19	19
06	.6	.6	.6	.6	.6	.6
(AVG YOS)	25	25	25	25	25	25
07-010	.07	.07	.07	.07	.07	.07
(AVG YOS)	29	30	30	30	30	30
TOTAL 01-010	17.0	17.1	17.7	18.6	18.7	18.8
(AVG GRADE)	03.4	03.4	03.4	03.4	03.4	03.4
(AVG YOS)	10	10	10	10	10	10

6. Readiness Assessment. Marine Corps FY 1985 end strength increases will support an improved personnel readiness posture. From FY 1983 to FY 1985 programmed manning increases by 6,400 while structure grows by 5,500. Since programmed manning increases faster than structure growth "hollowness" is reduced. Moreover, readiness improvement will also result from the improving trends in occupational imbalances and personnel stability. From FY 1980 to FY 1983 enlisted occupational imbalances were reduced from 49,468 to 19,167 and are projected to decrease further to 13,668 in FY 1985. The continued occupational improvements are based on the previously mentioned assumptions of quality accessions, pay competitiveness, and effectiveness of bonuses. Finally, aggregate and unit population stability have improved since 1980 as a result of improved retention and personnel management actions facilitated by the Precise Personnel Assignment System (Pre-PAS).

B. Marine Corps Reserve Manpower

1. Programmed Force, Programmed Manpower Structure, and Programmed Manning. During FY 1984 programmed manning for the Division and Force Service Support Group (FSSG) decreases slightly as new structure is introduced. These near term shortfalls are then recouped by FY 1985. The reserve wing is manned at a lower level. Table VIII-16 provides an overview of the changing relationship between the programmed force, programmed manpower structure, and programmed manning.

2. Operating Strength. The relationship between average programmed manning and average operating strength is shown below. As shown below, the trained strength in units (operating strength) will be sufficient to staff the USMCR at the average programmed manning goal in this fiscal year and the next:

Table VIII-16
SELECTED MARINE CORPS RESERVE PROGRAMMED FORCES PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, AND PROGRAMMED MANNING (END-YEAR)

DEFENSE PROGRAM PLANNING CATEGORY (MARINE CORPS) a/	FY 1983				FY 1984				FY 1985			
	PROG FORCE	PROG STRUC- TURE (000's)	PROG MAN- NING (000's)	%	PROG FORCE	PROG STRUC- TURE (000's)	PROG MAN- NING (000's)	%	PROG FORCE	PROG STRUC- TURE (000's)	PROG MAN- NING (000's)	%
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>												
Marine Divisions	1	40.2	36.4	90.5		41.9	37.9	90.5		41.9	39.9	95.2
Marine Aircraft Wings	1	22.4	21.9	97.7	1	23.1	22.1	95.6	1	23.2	22.9	98.7
Force Service Support	1	8.6	5.7	66.2	1	8.8	6.6	75.0	1	8.8	7.0	79.5
		9.2	8.8	95.6	1	9.9	9.1	91.9	1	9.9	10.0	100.1
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>												
Intelligence												
Centrally Managed												
Communications												
Research and Development												
Geophysical Activities												
<u>Support Activities</u>												
Base Operating Support		.7	.7	100.0		.8	.8	100.0		1.1	1.1	100.1
Personnel Support												
Individual Training												
Force Support Training												
Central Logistics												
Centralized Support												
Activities		.7	.7	100.0		.8	.8	100.0		1.1	1.1	100.0
Management Headquarters												
Federal Agency Support												
<u>Total Force Structure a/</u>	1 Div	40.9	38.4	93.8	1 Div	42.7	38.7	90.3	1 Div	43.0	41.0	95.3

a/ Does not include "Individuals"

Selected Marine Corps Reserve Strengths
(In 000's)

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
1. End-Year Programmed Manning	38.4	38.7	41.0
2. Average Programmed Manning*	37.1	38.6	41.0
3. Average Operating Strength*	37.9	38.6	41.0
4. Operating Strength Deviation*	+ .8	0	0
5. Percent Deviation	(+2.2%)	(0%)	(0%)

* In many years

3. Inventory Stability. Both aggregate enlisted population stability and unit personnel stability have declined somewhat, as shown below. However, it should be noted that nearly 30 percent of the personnel are non-mandatory participants who can leave the SMCR "at will."

Enlisted Stability
(in 000's)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Aggregate Enlisted Population Stability	75.7	74.6	77.8	73.1
Enlisted Unit Personnel Stability	65.6	66.1	59.0	57.2

4. Inventory Imbalances. Table VIII-17 displays information relating to Marine Corps Reserve enlisted inventory imbalances. As shown, net imbalances have been reduced markedly, and further reductions are expected through FY 1985, as summarized here:

Enlisted Imbalances
(In 000's)

	<u>FY81</u>	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>	<u>FY1983-85 CHANGE</u>
Total Imbalances	17.6	17.8	15.2	12.4	9.3	-5.9(39%)
Total Desired	34.5	37.4	39.6	40.5	43.1	
Percent Imbalanced	(51.0%)	(47.6%)	(38.4%)	(30.6%)	(21.6%)	

5. Experience and Grade Mix. The data below display information relating to the Selected Marine Corps Reserve experience and grade mix. As shown, the experience level, as measured by years of service, is increasing at a faster rate than the average grade.

Selected Marine Corps Reserve
Experience & Grade Mix
(In 000's)

	<u>FY80</u>	<u>FY81</u>	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>
<u>ENLISTED</u>						
E1/3	18.6	19.1	19.5	19.8	20.2	20.6
(Avg. YOS)	(1.3)	(1.3)	(1.4)	(2.2)	(2.4)	(2.7)
E4/5	10.3	11.5	12.8	15.2	16.8	18.4
(Avg YOS)	(4.7)	(4.8)	(4.8)	(4.7)	(4.7)	(4.7)
E6/7	3.4	3.2	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.8
(Avg YOS)	(11.3)	(12.0)	(11.8)	(12.2)	(12.4)	(12.7)
E8/9	.7	.6	.7	.7	.7	.7
(Avg YOS)	(22.8)	(23.1)	(21.5)	(21.6)	(21.0)	(20.5)
<u>Tot E1-9</u>	33.0	34.4	37.1	39.5	41.7	43.9
(Avg Grade)	E3.4	E3.3	E3.3	E3.5	E3.53	E3.56
(Avg YOS)	(3.8)	(3.8)	(4.0)	(4.1)	(4.2)	(4.3)
(# 4 YOS)	(9.2)	(10.2)	(12.1)	(13.0)	(14.3)	(15.6)
<u>WARRANT OFFICER</u>						
(Tot W1/4)	379	422	474	519	566	613
<u>COMMISSIONED OFFICER</u>						
01/3	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
(Avg YOS)	(9.1)	(9.3)	(9.4)	(9.3)	(9.3)	(9.4)
04	.7	.8	.9	1.0	1.1	1.2
(Avg YOS)	(14.9)	(14.9)	(14.8)	(14.7)	(14.6)	(14.5)
05	.2	.3	.4	.4	.4	.5
(Avg YOS)	(21.5)	(21.0)	(21.3)	(20.6)	(20.3)	(20.1)
06	.05	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1
(Avg YOS)	(26.5)	(26.9)	(27.8)	(27.7)	(28.1)	(28.6)
07/10	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
(Avg YOS)	(30.8)	(31.6)	(31.9)	(32.5)	(33.0)	(33.5)
<u>Tot 01-10</u>	2.0	2.1	2.4	2.6	2.8	3.0
(Avg Grade)	03.6	03.7	03.8	03.8	03.8	03.9
(Avg YOS)	(12.9)	(13.7)	(14.2)	(14.2)	(14.6)	(15.0)
(# 4 YOS)	(2.0)	(2.1)	(2.4)	(2.6)	(2.8)	(3.0)

6. USMCR Readiness Assessment: The manpower readiness of the USMCR should improve as a consequence of:

a. Reducing by more than 50 percent the number of programmed manpower structure spaces not staffed with trained personnel -- from 4,100 in FY 1984 to 2,000 in FY 1985.

b. Continued steady reduction in occupational imbalances; projections indicate that the net enlisted imbalances of 12,400 at the end of this fiscal year could be reduced by as much as 25 percent by the end of FY 1985 (12,400 to 9,300)

TABLE VIII-17
Marine Corps Reserve
Enlisted Occupational Imbalances

	<u>FY81</u>	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>
<u>E1-E4</u>					
Out-of-Kilter Occupations <u>1/</u>	267/294	264/304	222/299	187/298	144/298
Total Overages	+1,694	+1,593	+1,401	+1,163	+942
Total Shortages	-10,190	-10,316	-8,769	-7,025	-4,876
Total Desired	24,175	26,191	27,751	28,271	30,163
<u>E5-E9</u>					
Out-of-Kilter Occupations <u>1/</u>	327/383	329/388	330/376	265/375	222/374
Total Overages	+2,917	+2,998	+2,264	+1,768	+1,535
Total Shortages	-2,756	-2,942	-2,772	-2,452	-1,947
Total Desired	10,360	11,224	11,893	12,192	12,927

1/ The number of occupations with inventories greater than 105 percent or less than 95 percent of desired, compared to the total number of occupations.

c. Continued increases in the level of experience in both the officer and enlisted populations.

C. Mobilization Manpower

1. Wartime Military Manpower Requirements versus Supply

Total wartime military manpower requirements (demand) and supply are taken from the FY 1985 Wartime Planning System (WARMAPS) data submission for the Defense Guidance scenario shown below at M+180:

	<u>FY 85</u> (In 000's)
Demand	434.7
Supply	417.2
Net Shortfall/Overage	-17.5

By FY 1989 the Marine Corps has no military manpower shortfalls in total, but they do have shortfalls in particular skills such as combat arms. The preponderance of the FY 1985 WARMAPS manpower shortfalls can be attributed to a paucity of in-theater health care capability. FY 1985 and FY 1989 WARMAPS scenarios consisted of the same combat intensities, similar deployment and employment schedules and similar structures. The major difference was an improved medical care capability in FY 1989. An improved medical evacuation policy would eliminate most of the 1985 manpower shortfall, but not shortfalls by skills.

2. Civilian Wartime Manpower Demand & Supply

Total wartime civilian manpower demand and supply as shown in the most recent Civilian Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS) data are shown below:

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Wartime Requirements	23,192	23,736
Supply	16,422	17,629
Net New Hire Requirements	7,074	6,509

VI. AIR FORCE MANPOWER READINESS

A. Active Uniformed Manpower

1. Programmed Force, Programmed Manpower Structure and Programmed Manning

Table VIII-18 reflects Programmed Manpower Structure and Programmed Manning for all flying and nonflying units and organizations. As shown, the Air Force continues to program a high level of manning. Throughout FY 1983-1985 the number of billets not planned for staffing in the FYDP remains constant at 38,900.

Table VIII-18
ACTIVE AIR FORCE PROGRAMMED FORCES, PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, AND PROGRAMMED MANNING (END-YEAR)
(in 000's)

DEFENSE PROGRAM PLANNING CATEGORY (AIR FORCE)	FY 1983				FY 1984				FY 1985			
	PROG FORCE a/	PROG STRUC- TURE (000's)	PROG MAN- NING (000's)	%	PROG FORCE a/	PROG STRUC- TURE (000's)	PROG MAN- NING (000's)	%	PROG FORCE a/	PROG STRUC- TURE (000's)	PROG MAN- NING (000's)	%
Strategic		75.2	73.9	98.3		74.2	72.9	98.3		73.7	72.5	98.4
Offensive Strategic		56.5	55.2	97.7		55.8	54.5	97.7		54.7	53.4	97.6
Defensive Strategic		7.4	7.4	100.0		6.6	6.6	100.0		6.6	6.6	100.0
Strategic Control & Surveillance		11.4	11.4	100.0		11.8	11.8	100.0		12.5	12.5	100.0
Tactical/Mobility		143.3	139.8	97.6		148.7	145.2	97.6		152.9	149.4	97.7
Land Forces		0.0	0.0			0.0	0.0			0.0	0.0	
Tactical Air Forces		103.0	100.6	97.7		107.8	105.4	97.8		112.7	110.3	97.0
Naval Forces		0.0	0.0			0.0	0.0			0.0	0.0	
Mobility Forces		40.3	39.2	97.3		40.8	39.7	97.3		40.2	39.1	97.3
Auxiliary Activities		50.8	50.8	100.0		52.8	52.8	100.0		53.7	53.7	100.0
Intelligence		15.4	15.4	100.0		15.7	15.7	100.0		16.0	16.0	100.0
Centrally Managed Communications		16.0	16.0	100.0		16.7	16.7	100.0		16.9	16.9	100.0
Research and Development		11.3	11.3	100.0		12.0	12.0	100.0		12.3	12.3	100.0
Geophysical Activities		8.1	8.1	100.0		8.3	8.3	100.0		8.4	8.4	100.0
Support Activities		300.8	267.4	88.9		304.5	271.1	89.0		310.6	277.2	89.2
Base Operating Support		192.7	159.3	82.7		196.4	163.0	83.0		201.2	167.8	83.4
Medical Support		14.6	14.6	100.0		14.8	14.8	100.0		15.5	15.5	100.0
Personnel Support		6.4	6.4	100.0		6.4	6.4	100.0		6.5	6.5	100.0
Individual Support		21.6	21.6	100.0		22.0	22.0	100.0		22.5	22.5	100.0
Force Support Training		26.9	26.9	100.0		26.5	26.5	100.0		26.6	26.6	100.0
Central Logistics		4.6	4.6	100.0		5.0	5.0	100.0		5.1	5.1	100.0
Centralized Support Activities		15.1	15.1	100.0		15.3	15.3	100.0		15.1	15.1	100.0
Management Headquarters		18.6	18.6	100.0		17.8	17.8	100.0		17.8	17.8	100.0
Federal Agency Support		.2	.2	100.0		.3	.3	100.0		.3	.3	100.0
Total Force Structure		570.8	531.9	93.2		580.8	541.9	93.3		593.8	554.9	93.4

a/ Forces supported by the manpower displayed are detailed in the Unit Annex to the DMR.

2. Operating Strength: There is a difference between the number of billets the Air Force has documented in the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) and the number it has approved for staffing. The number in line 2 below is the one identified to unit commanders as the net staffing target. It is a more accurate reflection of the planned staffing level Air Force wide. On the average it is not achievable, because the Air Force will have more programmed manning spaces distributed to its field units than its FYDP will support. In brief, the Air Force is not requesting enough end-strength in FY 1985 to support a higher staffing level apportioned to the field commanders. The end-year operating strength deviation from this target is shown below:

Active Air Force Programmed Manning & Operating Strength (In 000's)			
	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
1. End-Year Programmed Manning in FYDP	531.9	541.9	554.9
2. "Actual" Programmed Manning	532.4	547.3	558.7
3. End-Year Operating Strength	531.9	541.9	554.9
4. Operating Strength Deviation from "Actual" Programmed Manning	-.5	-5.4	-3.8
5. As Percent	(-0.1%)	(-1.0%)	(-0.7%)
6. Operating Strength Deviation From FYDP Programmed Manning (Line 1 minus Line 3)	0	0	0

Since Air Force personnel readiness will be measured against the larger value in line 2 above, reported levels of readiness will be affected.

Historically, Air Force policy has been to staff at 100 percent of FYDP programmed manning. However, as a result of Congressional reductions in the FY 1984 Authorization Act that denied all but 2,000 of a requested 20,100 end strength increase, the Air Force has elected to temporarily understaff its programmed manning goals (line 2 above) in FY 1984 and FY 1985. This will have an adverse impact on Air Force personnel readiness.

3. Inventory Stability.

a. Aggregate Population Stability: continues to improve in both the officer and enlisted populations, as shown.

(Percent)				
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Officer	91.7	93.5	94.0	93.9
Enlisted	84.1	85.8	87.2	88.7

b. Unit Personnel Stability: reflects a similarly favorable trend over the four years shown, although it has declined recently for the officer population:

(Percent)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Officer	52.9	57.2	56.8	55.0
Enlisted	51.8	53.1	53.6	55.6

4. Inventory Imbalances:

a. Officer Imbalances. At the end of FY 1983, the following shortages existed: (In 000's)

<u>Occupational Area</u>	<u>Desired^{a/}</u>	<u>Inventory^{b/}</u>	<u>Shortage</u>
Pilots	23.8	23.5	.3
Navigators	10.3	10.3	.1
Engineers	8.4	7.9	.5
Physician	.8	.6	.2
Specialties ^{c/}			

^{a/} Number of programmed manning spaces (01-05)

^{b/} Inventory actually filling programmed manning spaces (01-05)

^{c/} Specialties: general surgery and subspecialties, E.N.T., orthopedic surgery, OB-GYN, anesthesiology, psychiatry

The Air Force anticipates that pilot, navigator and engineer shortages will be eliminated by the end of FY 1984. However, a shortage of electrical engineers will continue for the foreseeable future and the pilot deficit could also reappear in future years.

b. Enlisted: As shown in Table VIII-19, inventory excesses and shortages exceeded ± 5 percent of desired in 50 percent of all occupations at end of FY 1983 (147 of 294 skills, E1-E9). In grades E5-E7, which are a convenient gauge of mid-grade NCO manning, inventory imbalances exceeded ± 5 percent of desired in 143 (63 percent) of 230 occupations.

Total E1-E9 imbalances for FY 1983 sum to about 4.5 percent of desired, an increase from a 3.7 percent net imbalance at end FY 1982. Given the uncertainties that surround skill management at the individual occupation level, these deviations are not regarded by the Air Force as inordinate.

5. Grade and Experience Mix: As shown below experience levels as measured by average years of service, both overall and within each grade, have shown relatively little change over the past several years. This results from the combined effect of improved retention of experienced personnel, and increased accessions to support end strength growth. The average experience level in FY 1984-1985 is expected to approximate the FY 1983 level.

TABLE VIII-19

Air Force Enlisted Occupational Imbalances
(In 000's)

<u>E1-E9</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Out-of-Kilter Occupations <u>1/</u>	95/229	147/294
Total Overages	+8.0	+10.4
Total Shortages	-8.4	-9.9
Total Desired	438.0	447.1

E5-E7

Out-of-Kilter Occupations <u>1/</u>	167/229	143/230
Total Overages	+4.2	+2.6
Total Shortages	-16.1	-12.3
Total Desired	192.4	187.1

1/ The number of occupations with inventories greater than 105 percent or less than 95 percent of desired, compared to the total number of occupations.

Active Air Force Grade & Experience Mix
(Strength in 000's)

ENLISTED	FY80	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85
E1/3	154.5	160.0	170.0	168.6	168.3	173.1
(AVG YOS)	(1.1)	(1.0)	(1.1)	(1.3)	(1.3)	(1.2)
E4/5	202.6	207.2	204.5	210.2	208.1	214.5
(AVG YOS)	(5.9)	(5.9)	(6.0)	(6.1)	(6.1)	(6.0)
E6/7	85.1	85.6	87.7	89.8	92.6	94.9
(AVG YOS)	(16.1)	(16.0)	(15.8)	(15.7)	(15.6)	(15.6)
E8/9	13.7	13.9	14.2	14.5	14.5	14.9
(AVG YOS)	(22.6)	(22.6)	(22.6)	(22.6)	(22.6)	(22.6)
<u>TOTAL E1/9</u>	455.9	466.5	476.5	483.0	483.5	497.4
(AVG GRADE)	E3.8	E4.2	E4.3	E4.3	E4.3	E4.3
(AVG YOS)	(6.8)	(6.5)	(6.6)	(6.7)	(6.7)	(6.7)
(4 YOS)	(219.1)	(226.5)	(225.5)	(220.5)	(220.3)	(225.3)
<u>COMMISSIONED OFFICER</u>						
01/3	61.3	63.1	65.3	67.1	68.5	70.1
(AVG YOS)	(4.7)	(4.8)	(4.8)	(4.8)	(4.7)	(4.8)
04	18.2	18.1	18.6	19.2	19.6	20.1
(AVG YOS)	(13.8)	(14.2)	(14.3)	(14.1)	(14.1)	(14.0)
05	12.6	12.5	12.4	12.5	12.6	12.6
(AVG YOS)	(18.2)	(18.3)	(18.4)	(18.5)	(18.6)	(18.7)
06	5.1	5.2	5.3	5.4	5.5	5.6
(AVG YOS)	(22.6)	(22.7)	(22.8)	(22.9)	(22.7)	(22.7)
07/10	.4	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3
(AVG YOS)	(27.6)	(27.8)	(28.0)	(28.0)	(27.9)	(27.8)
<u>TOTAL 01/10</u>	97.6	99.4	101.9	104.6	106.5	108.8
(AVG GRADE)	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3
(AVG YOS)	(9.2)	(9.2)	(9.2)	(9.1)	(9.1)	(9.1)
(4 YOS)	(66.5)	(65.6)	(68.5)	(72.1)	(74.4)	(76.0)

6. Readiness Assessment: The operating strength shortfall in FY1984-1985 will be compensated by improved stability and further reduction of existing grade and skill imbalances, particularly in the enlisted population. However, because the Air Force measures readiness against programmed manning, and because it will allocate more programmed manning spaces to the field commands than its FYDP will support, the likely effect will be a slight downturn in reported readiness levels.

B. Air National Guard

1. Programmed Force, Programmed Manpower Structure and Programmed Manning. Table VIII-20 reflects programmed manpower structure and programming manning for all flying and nonflying units and organizations in the Air National Guard. From FY1983 to 1985 the structure grows a modest 4 percent, and programmed manning increases 5 percent, reducing the planned "hollowness" of the force from 4,100 billets to 3,200 billets.

Table VIII-20
ANG PROGRAMMED FORCES, PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, AND PROGRAMMED MANNING (END-YEAR)

DEFENSE PROGRAM PLANNING CATEGORY (ANG)	FY 1983				FY 1984				FY 1985			
	PROG FORCE a/	PROG STRUC- TURE (000's)	PROG MAN- NING (000's)	% a/	PROG STRUC- TURE (000's)	PROG MAN- NING (000's)	% a/	PROG FORCE a/	PROG STRUC- TURE (000's)	PROG MAN- NING (000's)	% a/	PROG FORCE a/
Strategic		21.2	20.9	98.6	21.2	20.8	98.1		23.2	22.2	95.7	
Offensive Strategic		10.7	10.7	100.0	10.7	10.5	98.1		10.7	10.6	99.0	
Defensive Strategic		9.7	9.5	97.9	9.7	9.6	99.0		11.7	10.8	92.3	
Strategic Control & Surveillance		0.8	0.7	87.5	0.8	0.7	87.5		0.7	0.7	100.0	
Tactical/Mobility		62.8	60.3	96.0	62.8	60.3	96.1		64.3	62.5	97.2	
Tactical Air		44.4	43.0	96.8	44.5	43.0	96.9		44.9	44.1	98.2	
Mobility Forces		18.4	17.4	94.6	18.3	17.3	94.5		19.5	18.4	94.4	
Auxiliary Activities		12.5	11.5	92.0	12.7	12.6	99.2		12.7	12.6	99.8	
Centrally Managed Communications		11.9	11.0	92.4	12.1	12.1	100.0		12.1	12.1	100.0	
Geophysical Activities		0.6	0.5	83.3	0.6	0.5	83.3		0.6	0.5	83.3	
Support Activities		7.9	7.5	94.9	8.5	7.9	92.9		8.5	8.1	95.3	
Base Operating Support		2.7	2.7	100.0	2.9	2.9	100.0		2.9	2.9	100.0	
Personnel Support		0.5	0.5	100.0	0.5	0.5	100.0		0.5	0.5	100.0	
Force Support Training		2.2	2.2	100.0	2.5	2.3	92.0		2.5	2.5	100.0	
Centralized Support		2.4	2.0	83.3	2.5	2.1	84.0		2.5	2.1	84.0	
Management Headquarters		0.1	0.1	100.0	0.1	0.1	100.0		0.1	0.1	100.0	
Total Force Structure		104.4	100.3	96.1	105.3	101.7	96.6		108.7	105.5	97.1	

a/ Forces supported by the manpower displayed are detailed in the Unit Annex to the DMRR.

2. Operating Strength. The following data compare programmed manning to trained strength in ANG units for FY 1983 through FY 1985.

<u>Air National Guard Strengths</u>			
(In 000's)			
	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>
1. End-Year Programmed Manning	101.3	101.7	105.5
2. End-Year Operating Strength	99.7	101.4	104.5
3. Operating Strength Deviation	-0.6	-0.3	-0.9
4. Percent Deviation	(-0.5%)	(-0.3%)	(-0.8%)

The data shown reflect end-year "snapshots," and do not reflect the average trained strength in units, projections for which cannot be provided. However, the very small end-year shortfall suggests strongly that average trained strength in units should support the programmed manning "demand."

3. Inventory Stability

a. Aggregate Population Stability: The Air National Guard continues to maintain a stable force as reflected below.

(Percent)				
	<u>FY80</u>	<u>FY81</u>	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>
Officer	*	92.1	92.9	93.2
Enlisted	85.7	87.3	88.7	84.5

*Data not available

Though the general rise in continuation is not dramatic, it does indicate that more Air National Guard members are continuing their service; there are no indications of trend reversal through FY 1985.

b. Unit Personnel Stability: The Air National Guard is experiencing a steadily increasing trend in unit personnel stability -- a 25 percent improvement over the past four years:

(Percent)				
	<u>FY80</u>	<u>FY81</u>	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>
Enlisted	71.0	81.1	80.6	90.5

4. Inventory Imbalances

a. Officer Inventory Imbalances: Officer occupational imbalances are depicted in Table VIII-21. Since Air National Guard assignment policies only permit new accessions only against valid manning document vacancies, significant overages essentially do not exist. 01-06 shortages and overages sum to about 17 percent of desired (2,287 overages and shortages against 13,420 desired), and there is no indication that the problem will be abated in FY 1984-1985.

b. Enlisted Inventory Imbalances: Enlisted imbalances by Air Force Specialty are depicted in Table VIII-21 also. Because the FY 1982 and FY 1983 information is not comparable, no assessment of imbalance trends can be made. FY 1983 E1-E9 imbalances sum to 25 percent of desired (23,380 overages and shortages against 92,210 desired); projected imbalances are not available. It should be noted that many imbalances are caused by changes to unit manning documents (UMD's) and the need to realign personnel in appropriate positions.

5. Experience and Grade Mix: FY 1980 - 1983 ANG trends are shown below. Note that the experience content is increasing in the enlisted force while the average grade remains relatively constant.

(In 000's)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>ENLISTED</u>						
E1/3	13.4	13.3	12.3	11.3	NOT	
(AVG YOS)	(1.7)	(1.6)	(1.6)	(1.4)	AVAILABLE	
E4/5	37.6	36.0	37.7	40.3		
(AVG YOS)	(7.2)	(7.2)	(7.1)	(7.3)		
E6/7	30.1	33.2	34.6	34.3		
(AVG YOS)	(16.7)	(17.0)	(16.9)	(17.4)		
E8/9	3.3	3.4	3.6	3.6		
(AVG YOS)	(27.6)	(27.9)	(28.2)	(28.4)		
Total E1/9	84.4	85.9	88.1	89.5		
(AVG GRADE)	E5.5	E5.5	E5.5	E5.4		
(AVG YOS)	(10.4)	(10.7)	(10.9)	(11.2)		
(4 YOS)	(64.0)	(66.0)	(67.8)	(68.6)		
<u>WARRANT OFFICER</u>						
Total W4	.046	.030	.017	.013	NOT	
(AVG YOS)	(34.3)	(34.7)	(34.5)	(35.2)	AVAILABLE	

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>COMMISSIONED OFFICER</u>						
01/3	6.0	6.2	6.1	6.0	NOT	
(AVG YOS)	(11.0)	(10.6)	(10.5)	(10.5)	AVAILABLE	
04	3.3	3.7	3.9	4.1		
(AVG YOS)	(17.1)	(17.1)	(17.0)	(17.3)		
05	2.0	1.9	1.9	2.0		
(AVG YOS)	(24.4)	(24.4)	(24.1)	(23.8)		
06	.411	.422	.499	.446		
(AVG YOS)	(29.0)	(29.0)	(28.8)	(28.9)		
07/8	.113	.111	.117	.119		
(AVG YOS)	(32.0)	(32.7)	(33.2)	(32.3)		
Total 01/08	11.9	12.4	12.5	12.7		
(AVG GRADE)	(03.7)	(03.7)	(03.6)	(03.7)		
(AVG YOS)	(15.6)	(15.5)	(15.5)	(15.6)		
(4 YOS)	(11.4)	(11.7)	(11.7)	(11.7)		

NOTES:

- a. Projected data is not available for FY 1984-1985.
- b. Warrant Officer program is being phased out.

6. Readiness Assessment. A continued high level of programmed manning, greater stability (particularly at the unit level), and an increasing level of experience will maintain and improve further the Air Guard's overall readiness posture.

C. Air Force Reserve

1. Programmed Force, Programmed Manpower Structure and Programmed Manning. Table VIII-22 reflects programmed manpower structure and programmed manning for the Air Force Reserve. Note that structure increases by 6,900 spaces (FY 1983-1985) and that programmed manning increases 7,500 spaces, indicating that a greater percentage of total requirements are planned for staffing.

2. Operating Strength: As shown below, operating strength is not quite sufficient to support the average programmed manning "demand." However, the shortfall is small, and the combined affect of a higher level of programmed manning and a minimal operating strength deviation will reduce the level of "hollowness" in the force.

Table VIII-21
Air National Guard Occupational Imbalances^{1/}

	FY 82	FY 83
<u>01-03</u>		
Out-of-Kilter Occupations <u>2/</u>	34/37	34/37
Total Overages	+240	+790
Total Shortages <u>3/</u>	-300	-480
Total Desired	6,030	5,580
<u>04-06</u>		
Out-of-Kilter Occupations <u>2/</u>	29/37	29/37
Total Overages	+6	+45
Total Shortages <u>3/</u>	-580	-972
Total Desired	6,740	7,840
<u>E1-E4</u>		
Out-of-Kilter Occupations <u>2/</u>	40/88	59/88
Total Overages <u>4/</u>	+320	+1,340
Total Shortages <u>3/</u>	-210	-11,450
Total Desired	32,330	32,700
<u>E5-E9</u>		
Out-of-Kilter Occupations <u>2/</u>	45/97	77/97
Total Overages <u>4/</u>	+1,700	+6,840
Total Shortages <u>3/</u>	-700	-3,750
Total Desired	56,680	59,510

^{1/}Data for past years or projections for future years are not available.

^{2/}The number of occupations with inventories greater than 105 percent or less than 95 percent of desired compared to the total number of occupations.

^{3/}Increase in shortages from FY 1982 to FY 1983 reflects a change in method of accounting for untrained personnel in the student pipeline.

^{4/}The data for FY 1982 and FY 1982 are not comparable.

^{4/}The increased overages are caused by the phasing of weapons system conversions and new, expanded missions.

Table VIII-22
AIR FORCE RESERVE PROGRAMMED FORCES, PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, AND PROGRAMMED MANNING (END-YEAR)
(In 000's)

DEFENSE PROGRAM PLANNING CATEGORY (ANG)	FY 1983				FY 1984				FY 1985			
	PROG FORCE a/	PROG STRUC- TURE (000's)	PROG MAN- NING (000's)	%	PROG FORCE a/	PROG STRUC- TURE (000's)	PROG MAN- NING (000's)	%	PROG FORCE a/	PROG STRUC- TURE (000's)	PROG MAN- NING (000's)	%
Strategic		2.1	2.0	95.2		2.1	2.0	95.2		2.0	2.0	100.0
Offensive Strategic		2.1	2.0	95.2		2.1	2.0	95.2		2.0	2.0	100.0
Tactical/Mobility		42.4	42.6	100.4		44.3	43.7	98.6		46.6	46.5	99.7
Tactical Air		10.0	9.1	91.0		10.4	10.3	99.0		10.4	10.4	100.0
Mobility Forces		32.4	33.5	103.4		33.9	33.4	98.5		36.2	36.1	99.7
Auxiliary Activities		0.6	0.6	100.0		0.6	0.6	100.0		0.6	0.6	100.0
Centrally Managed Communications		0.1	b/	28.4		0.1	0.1	100.0		0.1	0.1	100.0
Geophysical Activities		0.5	0.5	100.0		0.5	0.5	100.0		0.5	0.5	100.0
Support Activities		9.6	9.3	96.9		10.6	10.5	99.1		12.0	11.8	98.3
Base Operating Support		6.2	6.1	98.4		6.5	6.4	98.5		7.3	7.2	98.6
Medical Support		2.6	2.4	92.3		3.3	3.2	97.0		3.9	3.8	97.4
Personnel Support		0.3	0.3	100.0		0.3	0.3	100.0		0.3	0.3	100.0
Individual Training		0.0	b/	+		0.1	0.1	100.0		0.1	0.1	100.0
Centralized Support		0.5	0.4	80.0		0.5	0.4	80.0		0.5	0.4	80.0
AGR c/		0.3	0.2	66.7		0.3	0.2	66.7		0.3	0.3	100.0
Individual Mobilization Augmentees		20.3 d/	11.1	54.7		20.3 d/	11.2	55.2		20.3 d/	12.0	59.1
Strategic		e/	0.1			e/	0.1			e/	0.1	
Tactical/Mobility		e/	0.2			e/	0.3			e/	0.3	
Auxiliary Activities		e/	2.9			e/	2.9			e/	2.9	
Support Activities		e/	8.0			e/	8.0			e/	8.7	
Total Force Structure		75.0	65.7	87.6		77.9	68.3	87.7		81.9	73.2	89.4

a/ Forces supported by the manpower displayed are detailed in the Unit Annex to the DMRR.

b/ Less than 50

c/ Recruiters are displayed in Personnel Support

d/ Approved FY 1983 Authorizations are used in FY 1984 and FY 1985 for comparison purposes

e/ Authorizations are not maintained by DPPC

AFR Operating Strength

	(In 000's) <u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
1. End-Year Programmed Manning	65.7	68.3	73.2
2. End-Year Operating Strength*	63.6	67.1	71.4
3. Operating Strength Deviation	-2.1	-1.1	-1.7
4. Percent Deviation	(3.3%)	(2.1%)	(2.4%)

*Total strength less training pipeline.

3. Inventory Stability

a. Aggregate Population Stability: The Air Force Reserve maintains a relatively stable population as reflected below:

	<u>FY80</u>	<u>FY81</u>	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>
Officer	*	83.0	83.4	85.0
Enlisted	83.1	83.7	83.8	83.3

* Data not available

b. Unit Personnel Stability: has remained relatively constant for enlisted personnel:

	<u>FY80</u>	<u>FY81</u>	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>
Enlisted	73.9	72.0	73.2	74.9

4. Inventory Imbalances

a. Officer. The data in Table VIII-22, summarized below, show that imbalances have worsened since FY 1982 in both absolute and relative terms:

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 82-83 Change</u>
Total Imbalances	597	654	+57 (9.5%)
Total Desired	6,909	7,283	
Percent Imbalanced	(8.6%)	(8.9%)	

b. Enlisted: The data shown in Table VIII-23 indicate that while half the occupations are out of balance, the absolute number of net overages and shortages is relatively small (5 percent of desired). Additional data to show trends are not available.

5. Experience & Grade Mix: The trends shown below, indicate that the average enlisted grade was relatively constant at the same time the level of experience increased.

<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
E1/3 (Avg YOS)	5,616 (1.1)	6,211 (0.9)	5,564 (0.7)	5,110 (0.6)
E4/5 (Avg YOS)	20,652 (5.8)	19,950 (5.9)	20,128 (5.8)	23,145 (5.8)
E6/7 (Avg YOS)	17,816 (15.9)	20,317 (15.8)	22,594 (15.8)	22,177 (16.1)
E8/0 (Avg YOS)	1,898 (25.1)	2,030 (25.4)	2,267 (25.6)	2,378 (25.6)
Total E1-E9	45,981	48,508	50,553	52,810
Avg Grade	E5.1	E5.2	E5.3	E5.3
(Avg YOS)	(9.5)	(9.6)	(9.9)	(10.0)
(4 YOS)	(34,381)	(36,709)	(39,078)	(40,934)

Warrant Officer

Total W1/4	4	3	3	2
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Officers

01/3 (Avg YOS)	6,359 (10.3)	5,851 (10.2)	5,821 (10.2)	5,928 (10.0)
04 (Avg YOS)	3,722 (16.7)	4,466 (16.5)	5,111 (16.6)	5,611 (16.8)
05 (Avg YOS)	1,933 (23.9)	1,768 (23.7)	1,960 (23.2)	1,914 (22.9)
06 (Avg YOS)	872 (27.8)	891 27.4	918 27.5	885 27.5
07/08 (Avg YOS)	77 (32.3)	78 32.3	77 31.7	77 32.0
01-08				
Total Officer	12,963	12,054	13,887	14,415
Avg Grade	0-3.7	0-3.7	0-3.8	0-3.7
(Avg YOS)	(15.5)	(15.5)	(15.7)	(15.5)
(4 YOS)	(12,577)	(12,583)	(13,285)	(13,529)

Table VIII-23
Air Force Reserve Occupational Imbalances

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>E1-E9</u>		
Out-of-Kilter Occupations <u>1/</u>	Not Available	20/41
Total Overages		+1,371
Total Shortages		-961
Total Desired		46,009
<hr/>		
<u>01-06</u>		
Out-of-Kilter Occupations <u>1/</u>	24/34	28/36
Total Overages	+107	+85
Total Shortages	-490	-569
Total Desired	6,909	7,283

1/ The number of occupations with inventories greater than 105 percent or less than 95 percent of desired, compared to the total number of occupations

6. Readiness Assessment

The readiness of the Air Force Reserve is a function of unit staffing, stability, occupational imbalances, and the level of experience. Improvement can be documented in three of these four areas. If the existing skill imbalances do not worsen substantially, the current personnel readiness posture should remain basically unchanged through FY1985, and may improve slightly.

D. Mobilization Manpower:

The wartime military and civilian supply and demand data are time phased over the Defense Guidance scenario and result in the following shortfall.

Military Manpower

(In 000's at M+40)

FY 85

Demand	916.6
Supply	<u>790.2</u>
Net Shortfall	-126.4

Civilian Manpower

(In 000's at M+180)

FY 85

Demand	265
Supply	<u>183</u>
Required New Hires	82

In the event of a full mobilization there would be (a) losses to the civilian work force of employees with a military recall status and for other mobilization-related reasons; and (b) adjustments in civilian manpower authorizations--reductions at some locations and increases at others. There may also be evacuations of noncombatants from foreign areas. To ensure the continuity of essential civilian support and to meet the wartime demands for additional civilian manpower, civilian force planning and actions are necessary prior to a mobilization of the Armed Forces. Air Force civilian personnel offices plan to take the following actions (in sequence) and hold them in readiness to implement on M-Day:

a. Match peactime on-board employees (less mobilization losses) against wartime-required manpower authorizations.

b. Identify emergency-essential positions and employees.

c. identify vacant wartime-required positions considered critical and take actions to ensure duties will be performed with minimum delay. These actions include (1) pre-selection of current employees; and (2) standby recruitment with assistance by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the parent major command, and local labor unions.

d. Plan to utilize evacuees and surplus employees to the maximum extent.

e. When, after the foregoing steps, there are other vacant wartime-required positions, preposition job orders with the local public employment office to be activated on M-Day.

f. Plan to commit civilian personnel office resources to ensure expeditious hiring and placement of employees.

CHAPTER IX

ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE IN THE ARMED FORCES

I. Introduction

A. Background

A worldwide survey of drug and alcohol use among military personnel is conducted biennially among service members by Congressional mandate and is used as the primary means for monitoring the extent and impact of drug and alcohol abuse. The survey serves as an important basis for developing policy to prevent drug and alcohol abuse and to treat personnel who suffer from the problem. This chapter will summarize major findings of the 1982 survey, comment on differences between these findings and those of the previous survey, address likely modifications to be made in following surveys, and discuss some of the policy implications of findings from the 1982 survey.

B. Survey Methodology

The survey instrument consisted of 109 multiple choice items. Many questions allowed for more than one response. This questionnaire was similar to that employed in the 1980 survey. The sampling design consisted of two phases. In the first, military units were stratified by Service and by location according to four geographic regions, with the exception that Marines in Europe were sampled in conjunction with the Navy in Europe. Units were then proportionately selected from these fifteen cells according to manpower strength. The second phase of sampling involved random selection of personnel within five rank strata (E1-E5, E6-E9, W01-W04, 01-03, and 04-06), according to line items on the personnel rosters. No weighting was done in the sample selection.

For the most part, surveys were conducted in groups of approximately 50 service members. Individuals who were unable to attend the survey session were presented the written questionnaire by the installation military liaison officer. While the group session survey was conducted during August and September of 1982, the "make-up" phase continued into the early part of 1983.

The number of respondents was 21,936 (i.e. 85 percent of those personnel identified and who were not ineligible to participate due to separation, death, or AWOL). Because of the sensitivity of its content, special efforts were made to assure subjects of anonymity. The survey instrument and methodology were also pretested to assure intelligibility of the questions.

II. ALCOHOL ABUSE

A. Alcohol Consumption

As indicated by Table IX-1, most military personnel had consumed alcohol in the preceding 30 day period. DoD-wide the percentage of personnel who drink has changed very little since 1980. Across Services,

however, some differences are seen, with the Army and Air Force percent of personnel who drink increasing and the Navy and Marine rate decreasing. Within the Army and Air Force, this increase has occurred in all rank groups with the exception of senior officers, among whom the percentage of personnel who consume alcohol remains almost constant.

Table IX-1 suggests that for enlisted personnel there is a general tendency for the percentage of personnel who drink to decline as rank increases. For officers, however, the percentage tends to rise as a function of rank. Table IX-6, which follows later, also shows that most males between 18 and 25 in our society drink at least once a month. The data do, however, suggest that the gap has widened between the civilian and military populations. While the 1980 data is based on both males and females and the 1982 data on males only, the difference between comparable military (i.e. matched on sex, age, education and marital status) and civilian populations has gone from 2 percent to 10 percent with personnel in the military being more likely to drink. Most military people drink moderately, however, with the modal level of daily consumption across all Services and all paygrades two to three drinks.

TABLE IX-1

Personne Who Have Consumed
Alcohol In The Preceding 30 Days
(percent)

<u>Rank Groups</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Total DoD</u>
E1-E5	87 (81)	80 (88)	83 (86)	85 (82)	84 (83)
E6-E9	83 (75)	81 (78)	82 (83)	85 (78)	83 (77)
W01-W04	82 (76)	79 (80)	* (*)	* (*)	83 (76)
O1-O3	90 (80)	89 (88)	84 (91)	91 (82)	90 (83)
O4-O6	92 (92)	94 (94)	100 (84)	90 (90)	91 (91)
Total	86 (80)	81 (86)	83 (86)	86 (82)	84 (83)

*Fewer than 20 respondents in cell or does not apply.

Note: 1980 data in parentheses

Table IX-2 displays rates of heavy daily consumption by rank and by service. Heavy daily consumption is defined as 3.5 or more ounces of pure ethanol per day. (A standard drink of an alcoholic beverage consists of approximately one-half an ounce of pure ethanol.) Across the Services there seems to be a decrease in heavy daily consumption since 1980. In particular, a smaller percentage of junior Marine enlisted personnel are now found in the heavy drinking category. A counter-trend is seen among senior Army officers where 7 percent report heavy daily alcohol consumption. This figure is not only higher than for officers of comparable rank in the other services but also represents a dramatic increase from the 1 percent 1980 figure.

TABLE IX-2

Personnel Consuming An Average Of
3.5 Or More Ounces Of Alcohol Per Day
 (percent)

<u>Rank Groups</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Total DoD</u>
E1-E5	18 (21)	19 (22)	14 (22)	9 (11)	15 (19)
E6-E9	7 (8)	5 (6)	5 (7)	5 (4)	6 (6)
W01-W04	1 (1)	1 (1)	* (*)	* (*)	2 (1)
01-03	3 (3)	3 (3)	* (1)	1 (1)	2 (2)
04-06	7 (1)	0 (0)	2 (2)	3 (0)	3 (2)
Total	14 (16)	15 (15)	12 (19)	7 (8)	12 (14)

*Fewer than 20 respondents in cell or does not apply

Note: 1980 data in parentheses

The 1982 survey analysis included a regression equation to determine the demographic and psychological/behavioral variables associated with average daily alcohol consumption levels for enlisted personnel. In this analysis a large number of variables were statistically regressed against consumption level with the regression coefficient of each predictor simultaneously adjusted for its correlation with all other predictors. Hence the coefficients represent the unique contributions of each predictor. Table IX-3 presents a list of those predictors found to have a correlation with daily consumption at p less than or equal to .05. It should be noted, however, that the regression weights are not standardized and hence do not account for variations in standard deviations. Thus the relative weights of each can not be directly interpreted.

TABLE IX-3

Correlates Of Average Daily Consumption
Of Alcohol During The Past Twelve Months
Among Enlisted Personnel

<u>Regression Predictors</u>	<u>Beta Weights</u>
Demographic Variables	
Hispanic versus White	.26*
Male versus female	.48**
Spouse not present versus spouse present	.39**
Stationed in Europe versus in the Americas	.46**
Psychological/Behavioral Variables	
Problem behavior index	.42**
Use marijuana versus uses no drugs	.42**
Use drugs other than marijuana versus use marijuana only	.74**
Alcohol social support index	.14**
Reasons for not drinking index	-.31**
Drinking motivation index	.45**
Church attendance	-.10**
Smoking level	.27**
Need a drink at work question	.30**

*p less than or equal to .01

**p less than or equal to .001

In order to understand the predictors, some definitions are required:

The problem behavior index score consists of seven items dealing with UCMJ offenses, traffic violations, aggressive episodes, and incarceration.

The alcohol social support index involves the extent to which the respondent believes his social and military life styles encourage drinking.

The reason for not drinking index consists of questions dealing with social, economic, and personal motives to not drink.

The drinking motivation index is comprised of responses for personal psychological reasons for not drinking.

The regression analysis is based on these and a similar number of items with smaller relationships to the criterion accounts for 24 percent of the variance in daily alcohol consumption. Within this, the psychological/behavioral item series was found to account for slightly over three times as much variance as the demographic variable combination. This is encouraging since the Services likely have more potential to modify the former variables than to change the demographic ones.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT FY
1985 VOLUME III FORCE READINESS REPORT(U) ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ADMINISTRATION) WASHINGTON DC
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
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NL

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FILM & TV

PMAC



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

B. Effects of Alcohol Consumption

Table IX-4 indicates the percentage of service members who report that their drinking caused serious adverse consequences to them in the past year. Contrasting 1982 and 1980 figures suggests that alcohol usage is now resulting in a greater percentage of personnel reporting work impairment. This effect is seen in all Services. The diminished work performance index consists of four questions dealing with self-reported problems associated with alcohol usage (i.e. lower performance, leaving work early or arriving late, not coming at all to work or being intoxicated on the job). Within these questions among all ranks and all Services generalized lower performance was most commonly reported. Unfortunately, this response alternative was global in nature and does not allow the precise type of job performance decrement to be clearly identified. The next survey questionnaire will attempt to define lowered work performance with greater precision. Beyond overall declines in productivity, large percents, particularly among junior enlisted personnel, also report that alcohol usage is related to their coming late to work, leaving early, or being intoxicated on the job. While Table IX-2 indicates there has been a slight decrease of heavy daily consumption, Table IX-4 suggests alcohol use is now associated with more serious effects on work performance. The reasons for this are not clear but may indicate that isolated instances of inebriation may lead to negative effects in work or that consumption of even fewer than seven drinks per day may degrade performance. Another possibility is that respondents may have become more sensitized to the effects of alcohol on their daily work performance since 1980.

TABLE IX-4

Adverse Consequences Of Alcohol Usage In the
Past Twelve Months
(percent)

<u>Consequences</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Total DoD</u>
Diminished work performance	33(24)	42 (35)	38 (34)	28 (20)	34 (27)
Physical damage	12	13	10	6	10
Social disruption	12	13	14	6	11
Other consequences	19	21	23	11	18

Note: 1980 data in parentheses

III. DRUG ABUSE

A. Drug Usage

More favorably, survey results suggest that the military is making considerable progress in curbing drug abuse.

Table IX-5 shows that among junior enlisted service members abuse of drugs in general, cannabis, and most specific drugs has declined substantially. While DoD-wide one quarter of E1's to E5's report using drugs illicitly during the past 30 days, this figure is 34 percent lower than the 1980 rate. The reduction is even more impressive in the Navy and the Marine Corps where rates have declined by approximately 50 percent. Drug abuse remains least prevalent in the Air Force. While illicit use of drugs has diminished to a smaller extent within the Army, recent data from "unit sweep" urinalyses in Europe suggest that the Army is now experiencing a similar decline. This is particularly important since, unlike among the other Services, the drug abuse problem in Europe seems more severe among Army personnel than in other geographic areas. An as yet unpublished 1983 Marine Corps survey indicates further reduction in that Service's rates of drug abuse with 19 percent reporting use of any illicit drug in the past 30 days and 17 percent admitting to use of cannabis. Marine urinalyses results support this further decline in drug abuse since the 1982 Worldwide Survey.

TABLE IX-5

Personnel E1 To E5 Abusing Psychoactive
Drugs In The Past 30 Days
(percent)

<u>Drug Type</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Total DoD</u>
Cannabis	31 (40)	17 (47)	21 (47)	15 (20)	22 (37)
Amphetamines/Stimulants	7 (8)	7 (15)	7 (10)	3 (4)	6 (9)
Cocaine	5 (6)	4 (11)	4 (10)	2 (2)	4 (7)
Hallucinogens (Other than PCP)	4 (3)	2 (7)	5 (10)	1 (2)	3 (5)
Tranquilizers	2 (3)	2 (4)	2 (3)	1 (1)	2 (3)
Barbiturates	2 (4)	2 (5)	1 (4)	1 (1)	2 (3)
Opiates (other than heroin)	1 (2)	1 (2)	1 (2)	0 (1)	1 (2)
PCP	1 (2)	1 (2)	1 (4)	0 (0)	1 (1)
Heroin	1 (2)	1 (2)	1 (0)	0 (0)	1 (1)
Total abusing at least one drug	34 (41)	21 (48)	25 (48)	18 (21)	25(38)

Note: 1980 data in parentheses

As shown by Table IX-6, drug abuse among military personnel now compares favorably with that occurring among civilian personnel matched on age, sex, education, and marital status. While military personnel

remain more likely to abuse stimulants than their civilian counterparts, this disparity has also narrowed considerably.

TABLE IX-6

Comparison Of Military And Civilian Rates
Of Nonmedical Drug And Alcohol Use
During The Preceding 30 Days

<u>Drug</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilians</u>
Alcohol	86 (84)	76 (82)
Marijuana	25 (40)	35 (42)
LSD/Hallucinogens	4 (5)	2 (5)
Cocaine	5 (7)	9 (10)
Stimulants	7 (10)	5 (4)
Tranquilizers	2 (3)	2 (3)
Heroin	1 (1)	0 (1)

Note 1: 1980 data in parentheses.

Note 2: 1980 date includes males and females. 1982 data consists of males only.

The survey does not elucidate possible reasons for the larger decline in drug abuse among military personnel than among their civilian counterparts. Putative reasons include:

More stringent enlistment standards between 1980 and 1982 due to the Services' greater success in satisfying end-strength requirements;

More intensive employment of mandatory urinalysis including larger numbers of tests, sensitivity of the test to detect cannabis, and widespread use of field-testing equipment;
and

Greater efforts in preventive education on drug abuse as well as heightened command emphasis on suppressing the problem.

The reduction in abuse is likely a reflection of all these and of other undefined factors.

Table IX-7 is based on the same statistical model as Table IX-3 but considers only enlisted personnel, since this is the predominant high risk group for drug abuse. The criterion was a dichotomous measure of use versus do not use drugs. Most of the predictors are either self-explanatory or have been defined in conjunction with Table IX-3. A few, however, are unique:

The drugs impair health/work index involves a brief series of questions dealing with the respondent's belief that drugs may cause work problems or damage to psychological or physical health.

The drug social support index includes questions on the degree to which the individual believes that drug abuse is acceptable social behavior within the military context.

The drug treatment climate index deals with the extent to which the service member feels that his or her installation personnel will support treatment efforts by drug abusers.

TABLE IX-7

Correlates Of Illicit Use Of Psychoactive Drugs
During The Past 30 Days Among Enlisted Personnel

<u>Regression Predictors</u>	<u>Beta Weights</u>
Demographic Variables	
Army versus Air Force	.05**
Air Force versus Navy	.03*
High school completion versus less	-.04**
Spouse present versus no spouse present	.03**
Stationed in Europe versus North Pacific	-.07**
E1-E5 versus E6-E9	.04*
Age in years	.01**
Psychological/Behavioral Variables	
Problem behavior index	.03**
Drugs impair health/work index	.10**
Drug social support index	.04**
Drug treatment climate index	-.03**
Need an upper at work question	.02**
Alcohol social support index	.01*
Alcohol treatment climate index	-.02**
Drinking motivation index	.02**
Church attendance	-.01**
Daily ethanol consumption level	.02**

*p. less than or equal to .01

**p. less than or equal to .001

Perhaps the most important finding in Table IX-3 and IX-7 is that drug and alcohol abuse are quite predictive of each other.

B. Effects of Drug Use

Not only has drug abuse declined substantially in the Services during the two year interval between surveys, the percent of personnel reporting that drug abuse has harmed their work performance has similarly decreased. The diminution across the Department is 33 percent which closely parallels the 34 percent decrease in personnel E1 to E5 reporting abuse of drugs in the past 30 days. Contrasting Tables IX-4 and IX-8 also appears to indicate that drug usage is not as clearly associated as alcohol usage is with perceived physical damage consequences. Nevertheless, drug abuse appears more detrimental to social relationships (e.g. marital disharmony and legal problems) as well as to "other" consequences such as failure to be promoted, entry into rehabilitation, and family violence.

TABLE IX-8
Adverse Consequences Of Drug Usage In The Past
Twelve Months Among E1-E5 Personnel
(percent)

<u>Consequences</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Total DoD</u>
Diminished work performance	18 (22)	15 (28)	11 (28)	7 (9)	14 (21)
Physical damage	3	2	2	0	2
Social disruption	11	11	10	4	9
Other consequences	12	12	11	4	10

Note: 1980 data in parentheses

IV. MAJOR FINDINGS

A. Summary

Results of the statistical analyses may be highlighted briefly. While a slightly larger percentage of military personnel consumed alcohol on at least a monthly basis in 1982 than in 1980 and more drink than do their civilian peers, the percent of those who engage in extremely heavy daily consumption (3.5 + oz of ethanol) has, for the most part, declined. Use of alcohol, nonetheless, appears to be adversely affecting the work performance of a substantial percentage of military personnel and the problem appears to be growing worse since the 1980 survey. Of particular concern is the increase in consumption among Army senior officers.

Drug abuse among military personnel has declined dramatically since the last survey and now appears generally less common in the military than in a comparable civilian sample. Likewise, drug abuse appears to be having less effect on military job performance. That 25 percent of the service members E-1 to E-5 use illicit drugs at least once a month still presents cause for serious concern.

B. Anticipated Changes in Future Surveys

While future worldwide surveys will repeat items dealing with the extent and the effects of alcohol and drug usage among service members, several changes in survey content and methodology will likely be made. The size of the sample will be reduced. Although this will result in some loss of precision, the confidence interval is more than sufficiently narrow on abuse items. At the same time, units in which the military is particularly concerned from a readiness perspective will likely be oversampled in the future.

Phase II of the 1982 survey involved seeking out all personnel selected for participation who missed the first session. Finding these individuals and arranging for the survey was burdensome for the survey liaison officer at the local installation. In subsequent surveys, only a random sample of the Phase I non-participants will be sought out for Phase II.

As noted earlier, the survey items dealing with work impairment will be refined to permit more precise understanding of the specific aspects of job performance which are related to drug or alcohol abuse. Rates of self-reported drug abuse will be compared with rates of positive urinalyses in the next survey.

Most importantly, the survey content will be expanded to include information of habits and behaviors related to physical and psychological health in addition to drug and alcohol abuse. We are also interested in learning more about the inter-relationships of alcohol and drug abuse, stress, smoking, nutrition, etc.

C. Policy Implications

Results of the 1980 survey not only indicated the nature and extent of the alcohol and drug abuse problem among military personnel, it also caused us to reevaluate basic program and policy issues. Until publication of the 1980 survey, drug abuse was considered equivalent to drug addiction. DoD policies and, therefore, DoD programs emphasized treatment, often in the form of intensive individual counseling. Nearly 50 percent of the DoD drug and alcohol abuse budget was spent on treatment. The 1980 survey proved earlier assumptions to be incorrect, at least regarding the current DoD drug abuse problem. With respect to illicit drug abuse, there was little evidence of dependence and, although alcohol dependence was substantially higher, the military drug and alcohol abuse problem was found to be characterized as indiscipline rather than as addiction. As a result of these findings, DoD put greater emphasis on prevention. While treatment was still available to those who needed it, policies and programs became more punitive. Deterrence through urine testing and the use of urinalysis results in disciplinary proceedings became the primary elements of prevention.

Because the 1980 survey indicated that marijuana and alcohol were the most abused drugs, DoD policy began to focus on these two substances. The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology developed a procedure for confirming urine samples screened positive for cannabis in 1981 and urine testing for cannabis became the main thrust of the DoD drug abuse identification program. To combat the abuse of alcohol, the Secretary of Defense issued a stringent new policy aimed at reducing the incidence of drunk driving. This policy took the form of a memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments in 1982, followed by a Department-wide directive in 1983.

The findings of the 1982 survey again illustrated that alcohol and marijuana were the drugs most abused by military personnel. The use of marijuana, however, had declined sharply. For policymakers, this fact was seen as a vindication of the change in emphasis from treatment to prevention. Even so, reported marijuana use was substantial and alcohol usage was accounting for greater losses in work performance. The emphasis on prevention, especially the widespread use of urinalysis as a deterrent, had apparently been effective, though not completely. Clearly, more must be done to bring alcohol and drug abuse by military personnel under control. The 1982 survey results raised two important questions. What can be done to reduce the effects of alcohol abuse on work performance and what additional measures are needed to further curb the abuse of illicit drugs?

In addition to its strict anti-drunk driving policy, DoD is considering two new measures to reduce alcohol abuse. First is the wider use of alcohol breathalyzer tests in connection with accidents or other incidents. Second is the establishment of a specific blood alcohol level indicating impairment for driving. Once the level is established, any service member with a blood alcohol concentration at or above the cutoff while on duty will be considered impaired, and would be evaluated for determination as to appropriate rehabilitative, disciplinary, and administrative procedures. Just as with the use of urinalysis for illicit drugs, treatment and rehabilitation will be made available for service members with serious problems and who are motivated.

While deterrence has proven to be a successful prevention strategy, the 1982 survey results indicate that its success is limited. To further reduce demand, means must be employed to change the attitude of service members regarding the use of alcohol and other drugs. To accomplish this goal, the Department of Defense is developing strategies to encourage healthy living. Through the gradual implementation of voluntary changes, DoD policymakers hope to make healthy living patterns directly related to readiness the norm, to the point where abuse of alcohol and other drugs (as well as other health risk behaviors) will be regarded by the peer group as incompatible with military service. The degree of success of this approach will not be known for at least a decade, but the 1982 survey seems to indicate that deterrent measures alone will meet with only limited success.

CHAPTER X

COST OF MANPOWER

I. Introduction

DoD outlays for manpower are estimated to be \$113.5 billion in the President's FY 1985 Budget request. This chapter discusses the makeup of those costs, provides an overview of manpower cost trends, identifies and discusses detailed FY 1985 manpower costs, and provides selected military and civilian pay rates.

II. Description of Defense Manpower Costs

A. Cost Categories

The manpower cost categories discussed in this chapter are described below:

1. Military Personnel Appropriations, one for each Service, fund active military pay, cash allowances, matching Social Security contributions (FICA), enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, permanent change of station travel expenses, the cost of feeding military people (subsistence-in-kind), and the cost of individual clothing. Beginning in FY 1985, the Military Personnel appropriations will also fund the retired pay accrual provision contained in 10 USC 74.

2. Defense Family Housing Costs are incurred to lease, construct, and maintain family housing for military personnel. This category also includes funds to pay civilians who operate and maintain family housing. Since pay for all DoD civilians is counted under another category, "Civilian Costs," in this chapter, the Defense Family Housing cost category here excludes civilian compensation and compensation-related costs and does not reflect the total Defense Family Housing appropriation.

3. Military Retired Pay. Prior to FY 1985, military retired pay was funded by the Military Retired Pay appropriation. This appropriation, managed by DoD, provided funds for the compensation of military personnel retired from previous service. Commencing in FY 1985, DoD will implement a new accrual accounting system for military retired pay. Under the new concept, accrual costs will be budgeted in the Military Personnel accounts and subsequently transferred to a new Military Retirement Trust Fund. Retired pay will be paid from the trust fund. Unfunded liability for retired pay will be liquidated over a period of time to be determined by the DoD Board of Actuaries. The Board of Actuaries will also determine an amortization schedule for the transfer of funds from the general fund of the Treasury to the new DoD Military Retirement Trust Fund.

4. Reserve and Guard Personnel Appropriations, one for each of the six Reserve Components, fund inactive duty drills, active duty for training, ROTC, full-time reservists for administration and training, the Health Professions Scholarship Program, and management and training for the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

5. Civilian Costs. Unlike military personnel costs, which are funded by specific appropriations, civilian costs are spread among several appropriations according to function performed. Civilian costs include compensation for both direct and indirect hire employees. Also included are DoD contributions to retirement and to health and life insurance for civilian employees. Nearly 90 percent of DoD civilian costs are paid from the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) appropriations or from industrially - funded activities largely financed by O&M funds. Much smaller percentages of civilian costs are paid from the RDT&E, Military Construction, and Family Housing appropriations.

6. Personnel Support Costs are incurred in carrying out the following functions:

- Individual Training
- Medical Support (including CHAMPUS)
- Recruiting and Examining
- Overseas Dependents Education
- Base Operating Support (50 percent of total BOS)
- Other Personnel Support

Direct personnel costs are not included in personnel support costs, since they are included in previously defined cost categories.

B. Cost Trends

Table X-1 shows trends in manpower costs and the associated strengths for the President's FY 1985 budget and selected historical years.

C. Pay Raise Assumption

Pay raises granted in recent years and the pay raise assumptions contained in the FY 1985 budget are shown in Table X-2. The figures for General Schedule and Wage Board employees are for base salary only. The military figures are the overall average percentage increase in basic pay, basic allowance for quarters, and basic allowance for subsistence. The figures are expressed as percentage increases over the previous year's pay scale.

TABLE X-1

DEFENSE MANPOWER COST 1/
(Outlays, \$billion)

	Actual							FY 1985 President's Budget Request	
	FY 64	FY 68	FY 74	FY 78	FY 80	FY 82	FY 83	FY 84	FY 85
Total Defense	49.5	77.3	77.6	103.0	132.8	182.9	205.0	231.0	264.4
Manpower Costs									
Direct Manpower Costs									
Military Personnel									
Appropriations	12.3	19.0	22.1	25.1	33.3	38.5	41.0	42.9	61.9
(Retired Pay Accrual)									(15.4)
Def Family Housing Costs 2/	.5	.4	.7	1.1	1.6	2.0	2.1	2.5	2.8
Military Retired Pay									
Appropriation 3/	1.2	2.1	5.1	9.2	13.7	14.9	15.9	16.5	-
Reserve and Guard									
Personnel Appropriations	.7	.9	1.6	2.0	3.0	3.8	4.5	5.2	8.1
(Retired Pay Accrual)									(2.0)
Civilian Costs 4/	7.5	10.6	14.1	18.6	22.3	26.1	27.0	27.3	28.4
Subtotal Direct Manpower Costs	22.2	33.0	43.7	56.0	73.9	85.3	90.5	94.4	101.2
Personnel Support Costs 5/	1.7	2.8	2.9	4.2	5.2	8.3	8.9	10.2	12.3
Total Manpower Costs	23.9	35.8	46.6	60.2	79.1	93.6	99.4	104.6	113.5

End Strengths (000s)

Active Military	2,687	3,547	2,161	2,061	2,050	2,109	2,123	2,136	2,166
Selected Reserve 6/	953	922	925	788	851	964	1,005	1,051	1,104
Civilian 4/									
Direct Hire	997	1,233	1,013	935	916	945	980	994	999
Indirect Hire	140	119	94	81	75	83	84	84	85
Total	1,137	1,352	1,107	1,016	991	1,028	1,064	1,078	1,084
Retired Military	435	651	1,012	1,243	1,328	1,391	1,419	1,448	1,477

NOTE: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/ Data exclude civil functions, NSA, and special programs for disadvantaged youths.

2/ Excludes civilian pay portion of this appropriation which is included under civilian costs.

3/ For those already retired. Future retirement costs for current members are not reflected in the budget prior to 1985.

4/ The cost of civilians is budgeted under the functional appropriations -- e.g., operations and maintenance, family housing, RDT&E. Often indirect hire civilians are excluded from manpower costs and strength data.

5/ Excludes the pay of military and civilian personnel, since they are accounted for separately. Includes costs of individual training, medical support, recruiting and examining, overseas dependent education, half of base operating support, and a miscellaneous category.

6/ Includes National Guard and Reserve technicians who are also counted as civilian employees. Includes all people attending paid drills or receiving initial training. From 1980 on, the reserve data also include officers on statutory tours and other reservists on full-time duty for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve forces.

TABLE X-2

PERCENTAGE PAY RAISES

<u>FY</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>General Schedule</u>	<u>Wage Board</u>
74	4.8	4.8	10.2 <u>1/</u>
75	5.5	5.5	8.9
76	5.0	5.0	9.0
77	4.8	4.8	8.3
78	7.1	7.1	7.9
79	5.5	5.5	5.3
80	7.0	7.0	6.4 <u>2/</u>
81	11.7	9.1	9.1
82	14.3 <u>3/</u>	4.8	4.8
83	4.0	4.0	4.0
84 <u>4/</u>	4.0	3.5	3.5
85 <u>4/5/</u>	5.5	3.5	3.5

1/ Includes approximately 4 percent catch-up increase upon the release from economic controls effective the first pay period after April 1, 1974.

2/ Wage board raises were limited by legislative action each year after 1979.

3/ Enlisted basic pay raises for FY 1982 ranged from 10 percent for pay grade E-1 to 17 percent for E-7 through E-9. All warrant officers and commissioned officers received a 14.3 percent increase.

4/ Raise effective January 1.

5/ Proposed.

III. Detailed FY 1985 Manpower Costs

The costs in this section are derived from budget support detail submitted to Congress and, therefore, are stated as total obligational authority (TOA). Since these estimates are expressed as TOA, they will not agree with the cost data (outlays) provided elsewhere in this chapter.

Table X-3 provides a detailed breakout of FY 1985 manpower costs by DoD Component. Key elements, indexed in the margins of Table X-3, are discussed in more detail following the table.

1. Active Component Basic Pay (\$29,097 million TOA) is the only element of compensation received in cash by every active duty military member. It ranges in FY 1984 from \$7,065.60 a year for a new recruit to \$66,000 a year (effective January 1, 1984) for grades 0-9 and above. The amount of basic pay a member receives is a function of pay grade and length of military service. For this reason, the total cost of basic pay is determined by the number of manyears distributed across grade and length of service (see table X-8).

2. Active Component Retired Pay Accrual (\$14,840 million TOA) provides the funds (accrual costs) necessary to implement the retired pay accrual provision contained in 10 USC 74, the FY 1984 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 98-94). Under the accrual concept, each Service is required to budget for retired pay in the Military Personnel account and transfer funds on a monthly basis to the new Military Retirement Trust fund from which payments will be made to retirees. Accrual estimates are determined by applying a fixed normal cost percentage rate (51.0%) to basic pay amounts in the Military Personnel appropriations.

3. Active Component Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ). (\$3,769 million TOA) BAQ is paid to military members who do not occupy government housing or when the government housing occupied is declared inadequate. There are two BAQ rates for each military grade: one for members without dependents and another for members with dependents. Members without dependents who are provided government quarters or who are assigned to field or sea duty receive a partial BAQ payment. BAQ costs are a function of overall strength, the grade and dependency status distribution of the force, and the numbers and condition of units of government housing. The range of BAQ in FY 1984 is from \$1,510.80 a year for an E-1 with less than four months active duty and no dependents to \$7,941.60 a year for a flag/general officer with dependents (see table X-8). The costs of in-kind housing are not shown in this category, but are included in the family housing and base operating support categories.

4. Active Component Variable Housing Allowance (VHA). (\$1,073 million TOA) VHA is paid to military members receiving BAQ who reside in high housing cost areas of the continental United States or who are assigned overseas but whose dependents reside in high housing cost areas of the continental United States. It is a function of the number of military families residing off post in high housing cost areas of the continental US and the cost of housing relative to BAQ rates.

5. Active Component Subsistence (\$3,320 million TOA) represents both the cost of food for military personnel eating in military messes and cash payments to military members in lieu of food (called Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS)). All officers receive BAS at the same rate, which in FY 1984 is \$1,225.20 a year. Enlisted members receive either "subsistence-in-kind" in military messes or BAS. There are three BAS rates for enlisted personnel. Except for those with less than four months active duty, enlisted members

TABLE X-3

FY 1985 MANPOWER COSTS BY COMPONENT
(from FY 1985 Presidents Budget in TOA-SM)

Index	COST CATEGORIES	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Defense Agencies	DoD Wide	Total DoD	Index
1	Military Personnel Appropriations								
2	Basic Pay	10,462	7,492	2,364	8,779			29,097	1
3	Retired Pay Accrual	5,336	3,821	1,206	4,477			14,840	2
4	Basic Allowances - Quarters(BAQ)	1,301	1,038	268	1,162			3,769	3
5	Variable Housing Allowance (VHA)	277	384	93	319			1,073	4
6	Subsistence (In-Kind and Cash Allowance)	1,208	857	286	968			3,320	5
7	Bonuses	265	302	98	96			760	6
8	Other Pay	221	553	36	261			1,072	7
9	Other Allowances	458	343	109	348			1,258	8
10	FICA	730	525	166	610			2,032	9
11	PCS Travel	932	617	208	862			2,618	10
12	Cadets	32	34		34			100	11
	Miscellaneous	102	54	29	58			243	12
	Subtotal	21,324	16,021	4,863	17,975			60,183	
	- Reimbursables								
	(Pay and Allowances)	-151	-124	-17	-174			-467	
	Direct Obligations	21,173	15,898	4,846	17,800			59,716	
	TOTAL MILITARY PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS	21,173	15,898	4,846	17,800			59,716	
<hr/>									
	Reserve and Guard Personnel Appropriations								
13	Pay	2,700	559	128	759			4,146	13
14	Retired Pay Accrual	1,388	283	65	385			2,121	14
15	Allowances	639	162	36	179			1,016	15
16	Clothing	142	25	9	22			198	16
17	Travel	270	84	26	83			463	17
18	Other	121	18	5	27			171	18
	Direct Obligations	5,259	1,132	270	1,455			8,115	
	TOTAL RES/GRD PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS	5,259	1,132	270	1,455			8,115	

TABLE X-3 (Continued)

Index	COST CATEGORIES	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Defense Agencies	DoD Wide	Total DoD	Index
19	Defense Family Housing Appropriation (Non-pay)						3,110	3,110	19
	<u>Civilian Costs 1/2/</u>								
20	Salaries	9,687	9,130		6,509	3,060	2	28,388	20
21	Health and Life Insurance	287	270		193	91		841	21
22	Retired Pay (DoD Contribution)	679	640		456	425		2,200	22
	<u>Direct Obligations</u>	<u>10,653</u>	<u>10,040</u>		<u>7,158</u>	<u>3,576</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>31,429</u>	
	TOTAL CIVILIAN COSTS 1/ 2/	10,653	10,040		7,158	3,576	2	31,429	
	<u>Personnel Support Costs 1/</u>								
23	Individual Training	1,102	1,328	72	1,111	32		3,645	23
24	Medical Support	667	200	-	615	1,540		3,022	24
25	Recruiting and Examining	234	71	53	47	-		406	25
26	Overseas Dependents Education	-	-	-	-	387		387	26
27	Base Operating Support (50%)	2,038	1,556	327	2,495	74		6,490	27
28	Other Personnel Support	44	164	8	71	-		288	28
	<u>Total Personnel Support Costs 1/</u>	<u>4,085</u>	<u>3,320</u>	<u>460</u>	<u>4,310</u>	<u>2,033</u>		<u>14,238</u>	
	TOTAL MANPOWER COSTS 1/	41,170	30,390	5,576	30,753	5,609	3,112	116,608	

NOTE: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/ Navy civilian costs and support costs are Department of Navy totals including Marine Corps.
 2/ Defense-wide totals include the costs of civilians employed under the Defense Family Housing, Military Court of Appeals, Civil Defense, and Military Assistance Accounts.

receive \$4.87 per day (\$1,777.55 annually) when on leave or authorized to mess separately (which is the most common form of BAS), \$5.50 per day when a mess is not available, or \$7.28 per day when assigned duty under emergency conditions where no U.S. messing facilities are available. Those with less than four months active duty (E-1) receive \$4.68 per day, \$5.29 per day, and \$7.10 per day, respectively. The emergency ration rate is rarely used. Subsistence costs vary with the total number and grade distribution of manyears, the number of people receiving cash in lieu of in-kind allowances, and the cost of food to DoD.

6. Active Component Enlisted Bonuses (\$760 million TOA) include both Enlistment and Reenlistment Bonuses. Enlistment Bonuses (\$148 million TOA) are paid as an incentive for people to enlist in shortage skills. High-quality Service personnel enlisting in selected combat and some combat support skills receive this incentive in return for additional service obligation. The maximum enlistment bonus allowed by law is \$8,000, but the actual level is a function of supply and demand in the national youth labor market and of Service requirements. Reenlistment Bonuses (\$612 million TOA) include Selective Reenlistment Bonuses and Regular Reenlistment Bonuses (saved-pay). All personnel who were on active duty on the effective date of PL 93-277 (June 1, 1974) receive the regular bonus up to a cumulative total of \$2000 over a 20-year period. PL 93-277 limited the payment of reenlistment bonuses to critical skills with chronic and sustained shortages. This law replaced the Regular and Variable Reenlistment Bonuses with the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB). The SRB is given only to qualified people reenlisting in a critical and shortage skill during the first 14 years of active military service. The current maximum SRB level is \$20,000 for nuclear skills and \$16,000 for other critical skills. The SRB concept is intended to apply the principles of supply and demand to the career manpower requirements of the Services on a skill-by-skill basis. The current SRB, effective January 15, 1982, provides for a lump-sum payment up to 50 percent of the bonus with the rest paid in equal installments over the reenlistment period.

7. Active Component Other Pays (\$1,072 million TOA) include Incentive, Special, and Proficiency Pay. Incentive Pay (\$465 million TOA) includes payments made to personnel engaged in hazardous duty and career incentive pay for submarine and aviation duty. Total incentive pay costs are dependent on the number and grade distribution of qualifying personnel. Special Pays (\$555 million TOA) include a number of pays designed to encourage continuation on active duty, such as bonuses for medical and nuclear-qualified officers, and pays to provide recompense to people performing certain types of duty, such as sea duty and diving duty. Proficiency Pay (\$51 million TOA) is authorized for enlisted personnel in critical undermanned skill areas and for those meeting special requirements. These payments are, in effect, additional incentives to attract and retain people. In accordance with the intent of Congress, Proficiency Pay has been sharply curtailed in favor of the use of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus.

8. Active Component Other Allowances (\$1,258 million TOA) include uniform allowances, overseas station allowances, family separation allowances, and separation payments. Uniform Allowances (\$379 million TOA) include the cost of providing uniforms to enlisted members entering active duty and to most officers upon commissioning. Included in these allowances are the costs of uniform maintenance for enlisted personnel with more than six months of active service. Overseas Station Allowances (\$482 million TOA) are paid to certain military personnel serving in designated areas outside the continental United States to reimburse them for increased costs of living, housing, and temporary lodging. The rates vary by geographical location and by the availability of commissary and post exchange facilities. Family Separation Allowances (FSA) (\$57 million TOA) are paid to military members who are serving at duty stations apart from their dependents. FSA Type I, equivalent to the "without dependents" BAQ rate, is paid to members assigned on permanent duty outside the U.S. or in Alaska when government housing is not available. FSA I is designed to offset the added expense of maintaining two houses. It is not paid a member assigned in Hawaii or on permissive orders. FSA Type II is a set monthly amount of \$30.00 for the added expenses of enforced family separation due to permanent duty in an area where dependents are not authorized but where quarters are provided the member, or duty aboard ship or temporary duty away from home for a continuous period of more than 30 days. Separation Payments (\$339 million TOA) are paid to four groups of people who are leaving the Services: (a) members with unused leave for which they receive lump sum terminal leave payments; (b) members separated for physical disability reasons; (c) officers separated for reasons of unfitness or failure of promotion; and (d) reserve members involuntarily released from active duty after completing at least five years continuous active duty. The largest component in terms of cost among these four groups is lump sum terminal leave. The value of this component is influenced by the rate of basic pay and the number of days of unused leave. Public Law 94-212 limits to 60 days the total terminal leave in a career for which an individual can be paid. The FY 1977 Authorization Bill (PL 94-361) prohibited quarters or subsistence payments for any leave accrued after 31 August 1976.

9. Active Component FICA Contributions (\$2,032 million TOA) are those payments made for Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (Social Security) by the Defense Department as the employer of military personnel. Payments are influenced by the levels of basic pay and the Social Security tax rates established by law (7.05% of basic pay up to \$39,300 in calendar year 1985).

10. Active Component PCS Travel (\$2,618 million TOA) is the cost of moving people and their households when they enter the Service, move, training, leave the Service, are reassigned to a new duty station, or are part of a unit movement to a new duty location. Tables show detailed PCS costs by type and Service for FY 1984.

TABLE X-4

FY 1984 PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION (PCS) COSTS
(\$MILLIONS-TOA)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>DoD</u>
Accession travel	151	102	40	70	362
Training travel	47	46	10	36	140
Operational travel	64	127	36	121	348
Rotational travel	523	215	80	523	1,341
Separation travel	109	95	38	81	323
Travel of Organized Units	10	23	1	*	34
<u>Non-Temporary Storage</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>70</u>
Total Obligations	932	617	208	862	2,618
<u>Less Reimbursements</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>12</u>
Total Direct Obligations	927	613	206	860	2,606

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

*Number less than 1

11. Cadet Pay and Allowances (\$100 million TOA) includes the pay and allowances of those attending the Military Academy, the Naval Academy, and the Air Force Academy.

12. Miscellaneous Costs (\$243 million TOA) include death gratuities and apprehension of deserters. Death gratuities (\$7 million TOA) are paid to beneficiaries of military personnel who die on active duty. Funds for apprehension of deserters (\$6 million TOA) cover the costs of finding and returning military deserters to military control. Unemployment compensation (\$182 million TOA) is for payment to eligible ex-service personnel. Fiscal Year 1984 was the first year of budgeting this entitlement. Survivor benefits (\$49 million TOA) provides funds for payment of benefits provided by the Veteran's Administration to spouses and children of deceased service members. This fund was previously budgeted in the Defense Retired Pay Appropriation.

13. Reserve Component Pay (\$4,146 million TOA) includes drill pay and pay for periods of active duty for training of reserve component people.

14. Reserve Component Retired Pay Accrual (\$2,121 million TOA) provides the funds (accrual costs) necessary to implement the retired pay accrual provision contained in 10 U.S.C. 74, the FY 1984 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 98-94). Under the accrual concept, each Service is required to budget for retired pay in the Reserve Personnel account and transfer funds on a monthly basis to the new Military Retirement Trust Fund from which payments will be made to retirees. Accrual estimates are determined by applying a fixed normal cost percentage rate (51.0%) to basic pay amounts in the Reserve Personnel appropriations.

15. Reserve Component Allowances (\$1,016 million TOA) include BAQ, subsistence, the other allowances including special and incentive pays and FICA payments for reserve component people.

16. Reserve Component Clothing (\$198 million TOA) includes both cash allowances and in-kind clothing issued to recruits.

17. Reserve Component Travel (\$463 million TOA) includes the cost of travel and transportation of reserve component people.

18. Other Reserve Component Military Personnel Costs (\$171 million TOA) include monthly student stipends (ROTC, Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarships, and Platoon Leader Class), educational assistance, disability and hospitalization benefits, death gratuities, administrative duty pay, and management and training costs for the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

19. Defense Family Housing Appropriation (Non-Pay) (\$3,110 million TOA) funds leasing, construction, and maintenance of family housing for military personnel. The total appropriation includes funds for paying civilians, which are counted in this report under civilian costs. To avoid double counting, this civilian pay has been excluded from the Defense Family Housing cost category.

20. Civilian Salaries (\$28,388 million TOA) are the direct monetary compensation paid to civilian employees including basic pay, overtime, holiday, incentive, and special pays.

21. Civilian Health and Life Insurance (\$841 million TOA) includes the government share of the DoD Civilian Health and Life Insurance programs.

22. Civilian Retired Pay (DoD Contribution) (\$2,200 million TOA) is the DoD contribution, as employer, to the Civil Service retirement fund. This is currently 7% of total civilian base salaries.

23. Individual Training (\$3,645 million TOA) includes all the non-pay costs of individual training, including recruit training, flight training, professional training, Service Academies, and other training of individuals.

24. Medical Support (\$3,022 million TOA) includes the non-pay costs of medical support, including CHAMPUS (Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services), military hospitals, and some research and development activities.

25. Recruiting and Examining (\$406 million TOA) is the non-pay costs of recruiting (including advertising) and examining military personnel.

26. Overseas Dependents Education (\$387 million TOA) includes the non-pay costs of this program.

27. Base Operating Support (50%) (\$6,490 million TOA) includes half of the non-pay part of Base Operating Support (BOS) costs. The 50 percent factor is an estimate of the portion of non-pay BOS costs related to the support of people.

28. Other Personnel Support Costs (\$288 million TOA) is a miscellaneous category covering the non-pay costs of personnel administration, civilian education and development programs, and other personnel activities.

IV. Current Civilian and Military Pay Rates

The current civilian pay rates are shown in Tables X-5, X-6, and X-7. The General Schedule pay rates are in Table X-5. Wage Board pay rates are in Tables X-6 and X-7, for Appropriated Fund and Nonappropriated Fund employees, respectively. Note that the Wage Board pay table entries are representative averages for wage areas. Each wage area has its own distinct pay table. These tables are included as samples only.

Current military pay rates are shown in Tables X-8 and X-9. Table X-8 contains the active military basic pay rates, as well as Basic Allowance for Quarters and Basic Allowance for Subsistence rates. Table X-9 lists the pay per training weekend for military reserve personnel. A training weekend is defined as four four-hour training periods. The annual pay for reserves is a function of the number of drills, which varies by individual according to his level of authorized participation.

Table X-10 shows Regular Military Compensation (RMC) for active military personnel. RMC is the total of basic pay, quarters (BAQ) and subsistence (BAS) allowances, variable housing allowance (VHA), and the estimated value of the tax advantage which results because BAS, BAQ and VHA allowances are not taxed. Figures shown in Table X-10 are the average cash and in-kind RMC for each pay grade and longevity step, assuming that the total housing allowance received by members living off post is the sum of BAQ plus VHA and the value of in-kind quarters is equivalent to the BAQ rate.

All of these tables are as of 1 January 1984.

TABLE X-5

ANNUAL GENERAL SCHEDULE PAY RATES*

STEP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS-1	\$8,980	\$9,279	\$9,578	\$9,876	\$10,175	\$10,350	\$10,646	\$10,942	\$10,955	\$11,232
2	10,097	10,337	10,617	10,955	11,078	11,404	11,730	12,056	12,382	12,708
3	11,017	11,384	11,751	12,118	12,485	12,852	13,219	13,586	13,953	14,320
4	12,367	12,779	13,191	13,603	14,015	14,427	14,839	15,251	15,663	16,075
5	13,837	14,298	14,759	15,220	15,681	16,142	16,603	17,064	17,525	17,986
6	15,423	15,937	16,451	16,965	17,479	17,993	18,507	19,021	19,535	20,049
7	17,138	17,709	18,280	18,851	19,422	19,993	20,564	21,135	21,706	22,277
8	18,981	19,614	20,247	20,880	21,513	22,146	22,779	23,412	24,045	24,678
9	20,965	21,664	22,363	23,062	23,761	24,460	25,159	25,858	26,557	27,256
10	23,088	23,858	24,628	25,398	26,168	26,938	27,708	28,478	29,248	30,018
11	25,366	26,212	27,058	27,904	28,750	29,596	30,442	31,288	32,134	32,980
12	30,402	31,415	32,428	33,441	34,454	35,467	36,480	37,493	38,506	39,519
13	36,152	37,357	38,562	39,767	40,972	42,177	43,382	44,587	45,792	46,997
14	42,722	44,146	45,570	46,994	48,418	49,842	51,266	52,690	54,114	55,538
15	50,252	51,927	53,602	55,277	56,952	58,627	60,302	61,977	63,652	65,327
16	58,938	60,903	62,868	64,833	66,798	68,763	70,728	72,693	74,658	
17	69,042	71,343	73,644	75,945	78,246					
18	80,920									

* Basic Pay is limited to \$66,000 annually.

TABLE X-6

FEDERAL WAGE SYSTEM NATIONAL HOURLY AVERAGE SCHEDULE (APPROPRIATED FUND)
AS OF 1 APRIL 1984

GRADE	WG-RATES					WL-RATES					WS-WD-MN RATES					WS-WD PAY LEVEL
	STEP 1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	
1	\$ 6.38	\$ 6.65	\$ 6.92	\$ 7.18	\$ 7.45	\$ 7.03	\$ 7.32	\$ 7.61	\$ 7.91	\$ 8.20	\$ 9.38	\$ 9.77	\$10.16	\$10.55	\$10.94	
2	6.31	7.09	7.37	7.66	7.94	7.49	7.80	8.11	8.42	8.74	9.80	10.21	10.62	11.03	11.44	
3	7.21	7.51	7.81	8.11	8.41	7.93	8.26	8.59	8.92	9.25	10.20	10.63	11.06	11.48	11.91	1
4	7.61	7.93	8.25	8.56	8.88	8.37	8.72	9.07	9.42	9.77	10.61	11.05	11.49	11.93	12.38	2
5	8.00	8.33	8.66	9.00	9.33	8.79	9.16	9.53	9.89	10.26	10.99	11.45	11.91	12.37	12.82	3
6	8.40	8.75	9.10	9.45	9.80	9.24	9.63	10.02	10.40	10.79	11.40	11.87	12.34	12.82	13.29	4
7	8.80	9.17	9.54	9.90	10.27	9.69	10.09	10.49	10.90	11.30	11.80	12.29	12.78	13.27	13.76	5
8	9.19	9.57	9.95	10.34	10.72	10.11	10.53	10.95	11.37	11.79	12.18	12.69	13.20	13.71	14.21	6
9	9.60	10.00	10.40	10.80	11.20	10.56	11.00	11.44	11.88	12.32	12.60	13.12	13.64	14.17	14.69	7
10	9.98	10.40	10.82	11.23	11.65	10.98	11.44	11.90	12.36	12.81	12.98	13.52	14.06	14.60	15.14	8
11	10.38	10.81	11.24	11.67	12.11	11.41	11.89	12.37	12.84	13.32	13.34	13.90	14.46	15.01	15.57	9
12	10.77	11.22	11.67	12.12	12.57	11.85	12.34	12.83	13.33	13.82	13.82	14.40	14.98	15.55	16.13	10
13	11.15	11.61	12.07	12.54	13.00	12.26	12.77	13.28	13.79	14.30	14.42	15.02	15.62	16.22	16.82	11
14	11.54	12.02	12.50	12.98	13.46	12.69	13.22	13.75	14.28	14.81	15.12	15.75	16.38	17.01	17.64	12
15	11.94	12.44	12.94	13.44	13.93	13.13	13.68	14.23	14.77	15.32	15.93	16.59	17.25	17.92	18.58	13
16											16.86	17.56	18.26	18.96	19.67	14
17											17.89	18.64	19.39	20.13	20.88	15
18											19.05	19.84	20.63	21.43	22.22	16
19											20.30	21.15	22.00	22.84	23.69	17

TABLE X-7

FEDERAL WAGE SYSTEM NATIONAL HOURLY AVERAGE SCHEDULE (NON-APPROPRIATED FUND)
AS OF 1 APRIL 1984

GRADE	NA-RATES					NL-RATES					NS-RATES				
	STEP 1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
1	\$ 3.61	\$ 3.76	\$ 3.92	\$ 4.06	\$ 4.22	\$ 3.97	\$ 4.14	\$ 4.30	\$ 4.47	\$ 4.63	\$ 4.80	\$ 4.99	\$ 5.19	\$ 5.40	\$ 5.59
2	3.93	4.09	4.26	4.42	4.59	4.33	4.51	4.68	4.87	5.05	5.11	5.33	5.54	5.75	5.97
3	4.28	4.46	4.63	4.81	4.99	4.70	4.90	5.10	5.29	5.49	5.46	5.69	5.92	6.14	6.37
4	4.61	4.80	4.99	5.19	5.38	5.07	5.28	5.50	5.71	5.93	5.79	6.03	6.27	6.52	6.75
5	4.93	5.13	5.33	5.53	5.75	5.35	5.57	5.80	6.03	6.26	6.05	6.30	6.55	6.82	7.06
6	5.24	5.46	5.68	5.89	6.11	5.73	5.97	6.21	6.43	6.68	6.36	6.63	6.90	7.16	7.43
7	5.53	5.77	6.01	6.24	6.47	6.08	6.35	6.61	6.86	7.12	6.70	6.99	7.28	7.56	7.79
8	5.87	6.12	6.37	6.62	6.86	6.47	6.74	7.01	7.29	7.56	7.05	7.34	7.63	7.92	8.22
9	6.23	6.48	6.74	7.00	7.26	6.86	7.14	7.42	7.71	8.00	7.46	7.78	8.10	8.40	8.72
10	6.56	6.84	7.11	7.38	7.65	7.21	7.53	7.83	8.12	8.42	7.87	8.19	8.52	8.84	9.19
11	6.89	7.18	7.47	7.76	8.05	7.59	7.90	8.22	8.53	8.84	8.28	8.63	8.98	9.31	9.66
12	7.22	7.54	7.84	8.14	8.43	7.95	8.29	8.62	8.96	9.28	8.68	9.04	9.41	9.77	10.13
13	7.57	7.88	8.19	8.51	8.82	8.32	8.67	9.01	9.35	9.71	9.07	9.47	9.84	10.22	10.60
14	7.89	8.22	8.55	8.89	9.22	8.69	9.05	9.42	9.78	10.14	9.48	9.87	10.27	10.66	10.97
15	8.21	8.55	8.91	9.25	9.59	9.04	9.42	9.80	10.17	10.55	9.86	10.27	10.68	11.09	11.50
16											10.27	10.70	11.13	11.57	11.98
17											10.69	11.13	11.58	12.02	12.47
18											11.10	11.57	12.02	12.49	12.95
19											11.49	11.98	12.47	12.94	13.42

TABLE X-8

MILITARY BASIC PAY (MONTHLY)*
EFFECTIVE 1 JANUARY 1984

YEARS OF SERVICE

PAY UNDER 2	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	26
GRADE													

COMMISSIONED OFFICERS

O-10	4874.40	5046.00	5046.00	5046.00	5046.00	5239.50	5239.50	5640.60	5640.60	6044.10	6044.10	6448.50	6850.80
O-9	4320.30	4433.40	4527.60	4527.60	4527.60	4642.80	4642.80	4836.00	4836.00	5239.50	5239.50	5640.60	6044.10
O-8	3912.90	4030.20	4125.90	4125.90	4125.90	4239.50	4239.50	4433.40	4433.40	4836.00	4836.00	5239.50	5640.60
O-7	3251.40	3472.50	3472.50	3472.50	3472.50	3627.90	3627.90	3838.50	3838.50	4030.20	4030.20	4239.50	4433.40
O-6	2409.90	2647.80	2821.20	2821.20	2821.20	2821.20	2821.20	2916.90	2916.90	3185.70	3185.70	3351.10	3551.10
O-5	1927.50	2263.50	2419.50	2419.50	2419.50	2493.30	2493.30	2627.10	2627.10	2802.90	2802.90	2982.00	3196.60
O-4	1624.50	1978.20	2110.50	2110.50	2110.50	2149.20	2149.20	2244.60	2244.60	2397.30	2397.30	2532.30	2647.80
O-3	1509.90	1687.80	1804.20	1804.20	1804.20	1804.20	1804.20	1804.20	1804.20	1804.20	1804.20	1804.20	1804.20
O-2	1316.40	1437.60	1572.10	1572.10	1572.10	1622.80	1622.80	1622.80	1622.80	1622.80	1622.80	1622.80	1622.80
O-1	1143.00	1189.80	1237.60	1237.60	1237.60	1237.60	1237.60	1237.60	1237.60	1237.60	1237.60	1237.60	1237.60

COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH OVER 4 YEARS ACTIVE DUTY AS AN ENLISTED MEMBER OR WARRANT OFFICER

O-3E	1996.50	2091.90	2167.50	2284.20	2397.30	2493.30	2493.30	2493.30	2493.30	2493.30	2493.30	2493.30	2493.30
O-2E	1785.30	1822.80	1880.40	1978.20	2053.80	2110.50	2110.50	2110.50	2110.50	2110.50	2110.50	2110.50	2110.50
O-1E	1437.60	1535.70	1592.40	1650.00	1707.30	1785.30	1785.30	1785.30	1785.30	1785.30	1785.30	1785.30	1785.30

WARRANT OFFICERS

W-4	1538.10	1650.00	1650.00	1687.80	1764.60	1842.30	1919.70	2053.80	2149.20	2224.80	2284.20	2358.30	2437.20
W-3	1398.00	1516.50	1516.50	1535.70	1554.00	1667.70	1764.60	1822.80	1880.40	1936.80	1996.50	2073.90	2149.20
W-2	1224.60	1324.50	1324.50	1363.20	1437.60	1516.50	1573.80	1631.40	1687.80	1746.90	1804.20	1861.50	1936.80
W-1	1020.30	1169.70	1169.70	1267.20	1324.50	1381.50	1437.60	1497.30	1554.00	1611.30	1667.70	1727.10	1727.10

ENLISTED MEMBERS

E-9	1788.90	1829.70	1871.10	1914.00	1956.60	1994.70	2059.70	2303.70					
E-8	1500.60	1543.20	1583.70	1625.10	1668.00	1706.40	1748.40	1851.00	2057.70				
E-7	1047.60	1130.70	1173.00	1213.80	1255.50	1295.10	1336.80	1378.20	1440.60	1481.40	1523.10	1542.90	1646.40
E-6	901.20	982.50	1023.60	1067.10	1106.40	1146.90	1188.90	1250.10	1289.40	1331.10	1351.20	1351.20	1351.20
E-5	791.10	861.00	902.70	942.00	1003.80	1044.60	1086.30	1126.20	1146.90	1146.90	1146.90	1146.90	1146.90
E-4	738.00	779.10	824.70	888.90	924.00	924.00	924.00	924.00	924.00	924.00	924.00	924.00	924.00
E-3	695.10	732.90	762.60	792.90	792.90	792.90	792.90	792.90	792.90	792.90	792.90	792.90	792.90
E-2	668.70	668.70	668.70	668.70	668.70	668.70	668.70	668.70	668.70	668.70	668.70	668.70	668.70
E-1>4	596.40	596.40	596.40	596.40	596.40	596.40	596.40	596.40	596.40	596.40	596.40	596.40	596.40
E-1<4	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60

C/S 7558.80 M/S 2800.20

* Basic Pay is limited to \$5499.90 by level V of the Executive Schedule.

TABLE X-8 (Continued)

MONTHLY
BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR QUARTERS RATES
EFFECTIVE 1 JANUARY 1984

PAY GRADE	WITHOUT DEPENDENTS FULL RATE1/	PARTIAL RATE2/	WITH DEPENDENTS	BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR SUBSISTENCE RATES
O-10	528.90	50.70	661.80	Officers: \$102.10 per month
O-9	528.90	50.70	661.80	
O-8	528.90	50.70	661.80	Enlisted Members:
O-7	528.90	50.70	661.80	
O-6	474.90	39.60	579.00	When on leave or authorized to mess separately: E-1<4 months All others
O-5	437.70	33.00	527.10	\$4.68 per day \$4.87 per day
O-4	389.70	26.70	470.10	When rations in-kind are not available: \$5.29 per day \$5.50 per day
O-3	342.60	22.20	422.70	
O-2	297.60	17.70	376.20	
O-1	232.50	13.20	302.40	When assigned to duty under emergency conditions where no messing facilities of the United States are available: \$7.00 per day \$7.28 per day
W-4	375.30	25.20	453.30	
W-3	334.80	20.70	412.80	
W-2	291.00	15.90	370.80	
W-1	262.80	13.80	340.50	
E-9	283.20	18.60	398.70	
E-8	261.00	15.30	368.10	
E-7	222.00	12.00	342.60	
E-6	201.99	9.90	315.30	
E-5	194.10	8.70	289.80	
E-4	171.00	8.10	254.70	
E-3	153.00	7.80	222.00	
E-2	135.00	7.20	222.00	
E-1>4	127.50	6.90	222.00	
E-1<4	122.70	6.90	213.60	

1/ Payment of the full rate of basic allowance for quarters at these rates for members of the uniformed services to personnel without dependents is authorized by 37 United States Code 403 part IV of Executive Order 11157, as amended.

2/ Payment of the partial rate of basic allowance for quarters at these rates to members of the uniformed services without dependents who, under 37 United States Code 403(b) or 403(c), are not entitled to the full rate of basic allowance for quarters, is authorized by 37 United States Code 1009(d) and Part IV of Executive Order 11157, as amended.

TABLE X-9

RESERVE PERSONNEL PAY PER TRAINING WEEKEND*

GRADE	YEARS OF SERVICE														
	PAY	UNDER 2	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	26
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS															
O-8	521.72	537.36	550.12	550.12	550.12	550.12	591.12	591.12	619.04	619.04	644.80	672.80	698.60	726.60	726.60
O-7	433.52	463.00	463.00	463.00	463.00	483.72	483.72	511.80	511.80	537.36	591.12	631.72	631.72	631.72	631.72
O-6	321.32	353.04	376.16	376.16	376.16	376.16	376.16	376.16	388.92	450.44	450.44	473.48	483.72	511.80	555.08
O-5	257.00	301.80	322.60	322.60	322.60	322.60	322.60	332.44	350.28	373.72	401.68	424.76	437.60	452.88	452.88
O-4	216.60	263.76	281.40	281.40	286.56	286.56	299.28	319.64	337.64	353.04	368.52	378.72	378.72	378.72	378.72
O-3	201.32	225.04	240.56	240.56	266.20	278.92	289.00	304.56	319.64	327.52	327.52	327.52	327.52	327.52	327.52
O-2	175.52	191.68	230.28	238.04	238.04	243.04	243.04	243.04	243.04	243.04	243.04	243.04	243.04	243.04	243.04
O-1	152.40	158.64	191.68	191.68	191.68	191.68	191.68	191.68	191.68	191.68	191.68	191.68	191.68	191.68	191.68
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH OVER FOUR YEARS ACTIVE SERVICE AS A WARRANT OFFICER OR ENLISTED MEMBER															
O-3E			266.20	278.92	289.00	304.56	319.64	332.44	332.44	332.44	332.44	332.44	332.44	332.44	332.44
O-2E			238.04	243.04	250.72	263.76	273.84	281.40	281.40	281.40	281.40	281.40	281.40	281.40	281.40
O-1E			191.68	204.76	212.32	220.00	227.64	238.04	238.04	238.04	238.04	239.64	239.64	239.64	239.64
WARRENT OFFICER															
W-4	205.08	220.00	220.00	225.04	235.28	245.64	255.96	273.84	286.56	296.64	304.56	314.44	324.96	350.28	350.28
W-3	186.40	202.20	202.20	204.76	207.20	222.36	235.28	243.04	250.72	258.24	266.20	276.52	286.56	296.64	296.64
W-2	163.28	176.60	176.60	181.76	191.68	202.20	209.84	217.52	225.04	232.92	240.56	248.20	258.24	258.24	258.24
W-1	136.04	155.96	155.96	168.96	176.60	184.20	191.68	199.64	207.20	214.84	222.36	230.28	230.28	230.28	230.28
ENLISTED MEMBERS															
E-9							238.52	243.96	249.48	255.20	260.88	265.96	279.96	307.16	307.16
E-8							205.76	211.16	216.68	222.40	227.52	233.12	246.80	274.36	274.36
E-7							172.68	183.76	192.08	197.52	203.08	205.72	219.52	246.80	246.80
E-6	139.68	150.76	156.40	161.84	167.40	172.68	178.24	183.76	192.08	197.52	203.08	205.72	219.52	246.80	246.80
E-5	120.16	131.00	136.48	142.28	147.52	152.92	158.52	166.68	171.92	177.48	180.16	180.16	180.16	180.16	180.16
E-4	105.48	114.80	120.36	125.60	133.84	139.28	144.84	150.16	152.92	152.92	152.92	152.92	152.92	152.92	152.92
E-3	98.40	103.88	109.96	118.52	123.20	123.20	123.20	123.20	123.20	123.20	123.20	123.20	123.20	123.20	123.20
E-2	92.68	97.72	101.68	105.72	105.72	105.72	105.72	105.72	105.72	105.72	105.72	105.72	105.72	105.72	105.72
E-1	89.16	89.16	89.16	89.16	89.16	89.16	89.16	89.16	89.16	89.16	89.16	89.16	89.16	89.16	89.16
E-1	79.52	79.52	79.52	79.52	79.52	79.52	79.52	79.52	79.52	79.52	79.52	79.52	79.52	79.52	79.52

* Training weekend normally consists of four, four-hour training assemblies.

TABLE X-10

REGULAR MILITARY COMPENSATION (RMC) - ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL
Cash and In-Kind Pay Grade Average (RMC)

YEARS OF SERVICE

PAY GRADE	UNDER 2	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	26
C/S														81803.63
O-10														81803.62
O-9														82365.13
O-8														82036.59
O-7														73097.31
O-6	41987.39		47136.01		41640.16	41130.24	41009.90	42050.06	43851.92	46203.27	48955.75	51274.62	52572.97	54080.41
O-5	34594.87	39046.73		35928.57	36460.78	37714.51	39743.86	41545.32	43091.33	44642.87	45656.92			
O-4	29510.40	34161.12	36269.13		32920.38	34158.18	35132.99	36653.70	38138.80	38917.66				
O-3	26568.32	28880.19	30397.64		28947.86	29431.42								
O-2	22926.79	24462.81	28198.80											
O-1	19687.39	20283.43	23422.53											

COMMISSIONED OFFICERS

COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH OVER FOUR YEARS ACTIVE SERVICE AS WARRANT OFFICERS OR ENLISTED MEMBERS

O-3E	34001.23	34748.35	35676.74	37220.38	38714.69	39993.10
O-2E	29635.28	30069.28	30828.22	32113.54	33103.81	33830.47
O-1E	24051.43	25323.72	26057.30	26798.04	27525.68	28525.96

ALLO3	26568.32	28880.19	30397.64	32920.59	34158.64	35137.08	36677.96	38244.96	39633.48
ALLO2	22926.79	24462.81	28198.80	28948.65	29473.40	30828.22	32113.54	33103.81	33830.47
ALLO1	19687.39	20283.43	23422.53	24051.43	25323.72	26057.30	26798.04	27525.68	28525.96

ALLCO	20191.06	23386.62	26992.66	31901.34	32957.66	34595.74	36703.05	39412.24	40638.16	46645.91	48908.53	53768.39	57199.08	65181.61
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TABLE X-10 (Continued)

REGULAR MILITARY COMPENSATION (RMC) - ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL
Cash and In-Kind Pay Grade Average (RMC)

YEARS OF SERVICE

PAY GRADE	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	26
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WARRENT OFFICERS

W-4 26744.68 34461.11 35451.32 36433.16 37211.36 38169.24 39201.10 41718.49
W-3 25202.62 25942.46 26090.58 26492.27 28286.85 29559.68 30319.60 31073.79 31811.51 32589.32 33585.32 34553.48 35529.12
W-2 22031.66 22738.73 23279.34 23745.09 24689.77 25699.60 26437.98 27178.55 27904.94 28668.27 29411.90 30154.81 31141.59
W-1 18629.52 20517.06 20513.09 21750.35 22470.51 23189.83 23896.58 24650.70 25372.01 26110.73 26811.11 27605.49

ALLMO 20390.80 20542.82 20796.01 22789.27 23416.10 24267.42 25581.83 27516.33 29119.22 30186.72 31609.50 33106.53 35382.88 39726.32
ALLOPF20191.76 23337.86 26885.76 31675.39 32662.59 34124.03 35887.23 38213.86 39708.22 44446.13 47297.83 50506.35 54738.47 61528.57

ENLISTED MEMBERS

M/S
E-9
E-8
E-7
E-6
E-5
E-4
E-3
E-2
E-1

42998.08
30956.76 32593.61 33168.75 33672.45 35044.12 37700.13
25657.43 27094.65 27672.18 28222.61 28783.91 29283.31 29831.57 31174.56 33874.59
22820.53 22928.36 23419.69 23949.41 24475.32 25272.01 25796.16 26333.23 26588.57 27928.18 30589.40
17838.59 18882.18 19433.01 19953.15 20447.48 20957.90 21486.09 22258.79 22754.67 23283.86 23536.33
15791.50 16630.76 17153.71 17649.42 18427.86 18940.40 19464.62 19969.18 20231.42
14239.61 14739.14 15294.43 16094.52 16534.94
13151.63 13616.67 13983.09 14356.88
12396.20
10990.72

ALLNL12319.53 14207.98 15420.93 16653.61 17999.95 19751.03 20851.12 22276.70 23231.42 25052.40 25739.73 28248.23 30715.41 35104.98
ALLDOD12725.65 14869.59 16531.46 18314.12 19965.04 22356.25 23849.62 26564.84 28656.28 30025.97 32147.50 34020.59 40299.60 44907.76

CHAPTER XI

MANPOWER AND FORCES BY LOCATION

I. U.S. Strategic Forces

END FY 1985 STRATEGIC FORCES

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
<u>OFFENSIVE</u>		
<u>AIR FORCE</u>		
<u>Active</u>		
1023 ICBM	CONUS	
20 Bomber Squadrons (B-52/FB-111)	1 Guam 19 CONUS	
32 Tanker Squadrons (KC-135)	1 Japan 31 CONUS	Deter nuclear and conventional attack against the US and our allies, our military forces, and bases. If deterrence should fail, support measures aimed at early war termination at the lowest possible level of conflict on terms acceptable to the US and our allies.
<u>ANGUS</u>		
13 Tanker Squadrons (KC-135)	CONUS	
<u>USAFR</u>		
3 Tanker Squadrons (KC-135)	CONUS	
<u>NAVY</u>		
<u>Active</u>		
37 SSBNs		
4 Submarine Tenders (for SSBNs)		
<u>DEFENSIVE</u>		
<u>AIR FORCE</u>		
<u>Active</u>		
5 Interceptor Squadrons (F-15, F-106)	CONUS	Airspace control (tactical warning/attack assessment) and wartime damage control
<u>ANGUS</u>		
11 Interceptor Squadrons (F-4, F-106)	CONUS	Airspace control (tactical warning/attack assessment) wartime damage control

II. U.S. Tactical/Mobility Forces

Forward deployments of US tactical/mobility forces are shown in the first display below. In addition to location, this display provides the missions of deployed units. The second display shows the locations of units in or near the United States.

FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS

END FY 1985 TACTICAL/MOBILITY FORCES

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
<u>Army Divisions</u>		
1st Armored Division	W. Germany	Force presence. In concert with allied and other US forces, deter Warsaw Pact aggression. Failing that, stop any Warsaw Pact ground attack with a minimum of loss of NATO territory and ensure the prompt restoration of prewar boundaries.
3d Armored Division		
3d Infantry Division (M)		
8th Infantry Division (M)		
Bde, 1st Infantry Division (M)		
Bde, 2d Armored Division		
2d Infantry Division	S. Korea	Force presence. Deter North Korean aggression and, if deterrence fails, assist the ROK in ejecting North Korean forces.
<u>Special Mission Brigades</u>		
Berlin Brigade	W. Germany	Force presence.
172d Infantry Brigade	Alaska	Defense of Alaska.
193d Infantry Brigade	Panama	Defense of the Panama Canal and force presence in Central America.
<u>Armored Cavalry Regiments</u>		
2d Armored Cavalry Regiment	W. Germany	Force presence. Provides reconnaissance and security forces.
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment		
<u>Navy Ships and Aircraft 1/</u>		
<u>Sixth Fleet 2/ 3/</u>	Mediterranean	Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Mediterranean. Provide naval force in Mediterranean in the event of a NATO conflict. Provide crises management or contingency force in Mediterranean.
2 Multipurpose Carriers		
18 Surface Combatants and Attack Submarines		
11 Auxiliaries		
1 Amphibious Ready Group 4/		
2 ASW Patrol Squadrons		

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
<u>Middle East Force 2/ 3/</u> 1 Flagship (AGF) 4 Surface Combatants	Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea	Provide peacetime naval presence in Persian Gulf and North Arabian Sea. Provide limited contingency force in the area.
<u>Seventh Fleet & Western Pacific 2/ 3/</u> 2 Multipurpose Carriers 28 Surface Combatants and Attack Submarines 6 Auxiliaries 2 Amphibious Ready Groups 4/ 4 ASW Patrol Squadrons	Western Pacific and Indian Ocean	Maintain Western Pacific sea lanes in NATO or Asian conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces in support of Asian conflict. Provide crisis management of contingency force in Western Pacific. Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Western Pacific and Indian Ocean.

- 1/ These numbers and locations are representative and continually subject to change due to vessel acquisitions, deployment changes, decommissionings, and new conflict crises.
- 2/ Figures shown are approximate averages. Most ships are rotated to distant assignments from US homeports. Mediterranean and Western Pacific forces, however, contain a few units selectively homeported overseas, including one CV homeported in Japan.
- 3/ SIXTH and SEVENTH Fleets are providing units from the assigned forward deployed forces to the Indian Ocean in response to JCS tasking for presence in that area.
- 4/ An Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) consists of 3 to 5 amphibious ships with a Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT) or a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) embarked.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
<u>Marine Corps Forces</u>		
Marine Amphibious Unit (afloat)	Mediterranean	Provide forward afloat force presence in the Eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean and intermittently in the Indian Ocean.
Battalion Landing Team (afloat)	Atlantic Deployed afloat intermittently	Provide forward afloat force presence in the Western Atlantic and Caribbean.
III Marine Amphibious Force 3d Marine Division (-)	Japan (Okinawa)	Provide forward deployed ground/air combat forces and logistical forces with amphibious forcible entry capability.
1st Marine Aircraft Wing (-) 3d Force Service Support Group (-)		
Marine Amphibious Unit (afloat) Battalion Landing Team (afloat)	Western Pacific	Provide forward afloat force presence in the Western Pacific and intermittently in the Indian Ocean.

Air Force Tactical Aircraft Forces 1/

Europe

16 Squadrons	United Kingdom	Provide force presence in forward areas. Provide close air support, gain air
13 Squadrons	West Germany	
1 Squadron	Netherlands	
superio-		
3 Squadrons	Spain	rity, and provide
interdiction		
2 Squadrons	Iceland	and reconnaissance for a NATO
5 Squadrons (Dual-based)	W. Germany,	conflict.
40	Italy, England. (US Based)	

Pacific

2 Squadrons	Philippines	Provide force presence.
5 Squadrons	Japan	Provide close air support,
6 Squadrons	Korea	gain air superiority, and
13		provide interdiction and
		reconnaissance for
		an Asian conflict.

1/ Includes fighter, attack, reconnaissance, TEWS, TACCS and airborne TACS squadrons.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
<u>Air Force Mobility Forces 1/</u>		
<u>Europe</u>		
2 Squadrons 1/ 1 Squadron 2/	W. Germany United Kingdom	Provides transportation air logistic support, and aeromedical evacu- ation capability for theater forces.

Pacific

1 Squadron 2 Squadrons 1/	Japan Philippines	Provides transportation air logistic support, and aeromedical evacu- ation capability for theater forces.
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1/ Includes tactical airlift and aeromedical evacuation aircraft.

2/ Includes rotational squadron.

UNITS IN OR NEAR THE UNITED STATES

END FY 1985 TACTICAL/MOBILITY FORCES

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>Active Army</u>	
<u>Army Divisions</u>	
1st Infantry Division (M) 1/	Fort Riley, Kansas
2d Armored Division 1/	Fort Hood, Texas
4th Infantry Division (M)	Fort Carson, Colorado
1st Cavalry Division 2/	Fort Hood, Texas
9th Infantry Division	Fort Lewis, Washington
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)	Fort Campbell, Kentucky
82d Airborne Division	Fort Bragg, North Carolina
7th Infantry Division (Light) 4/	Fort Ord, California
24th Infantry Division (M) 2/	Fort Stewart, Georgia
5th Infantry Division (M) 2/	Fort Polk, Louisiana
25th Infantry Division 2/	Hawaii
6th Infantry Division (Light) 3/	To be determined

1/ These divisions each have one brigade in Europe.

2/ Composed of two active components and one reserve component brigades.

3/ To be activated in FY 1985 as a light infantry division.

4/ Composed of three active components and one reserve component brigades.

UnitLocationArmy Separate Brigades

194th Armored Brigade	Fort Knox, Kentucky
197th Infantry Brigade (M)	Fort Benning, Georgia
6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat)	Fort Hood, Texas

Armored Cavalry Regiment

3d Armored Cavalry Regiment	Fort Bliss, Texas
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Reserve ComponentsArmy Divisions

49th Armored Division	Texas
50th Armored Division	New Jersey, Vermont
40th Infantry Division (M)	California
38th Infantry Division	Indiana, Michigan
28th Infantry Division	Pennsylvania
26th Infantry Division	Massachusetts, Connecticut
42d Infantry Division	New York
47th Infantry Division	Minnesota, Illinois, Iowa
35th Infantry Division (M) <u>1/</u>	Kansas

1/ This division was activated in FY 1984. It will be fully structured in FY 1989. It is being formed by combining in FY 1986 three existing separate brigades (the 67th Infantry (M), the 69th Infantry (M) and the 149th Armored Brigade) that are no longer shown as separate brigades in this report.

Army Separate Brigades 1/ 3/ 5/

30th Armored Brigade	Tennessee
31st Armored Brigade	Alabama
155th Armored Brigade <u>2/</u>	Mississippi
48th Infantry Brigade (M) <u>2/</u>	Georgia
157th Infantry Brigade (M)	Pennsylvania (USAR)
218th Infantry Brigade (M)	South Carolina
256th Infantry Brigade (M) <u>2/</u>	Louisiana
32d Infantry Brigade (M)	Wisconsin
30th Infantry Brigade (M)	North Carolina
29th Infantry Brigade <u>2/</u>	Hawaii
81st Infantry Brigade (M)	Washington
45th Infantry Brigade	Oklahoma
187th Infantry Brigade <u>4/</u>	Massachusetts (USAR)
39th Infantry Brigade	Arkansas
205th Infantry Brigade <u>4/</u>	Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa (USAR)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
41st Infantry Brigade 2/	Oregon
53d Infantry Brigade 4/	Florida
73d Infantry Brigade 4/	Ohio
92d Infantry Brigade 4/	Puerto Rico
58th Infantry Brigade 3/	Maryland
116th Infantry Brigade 3/	Virginia

- 1/ The 33d Infantry Brigade (Illinois National Guard) is provided for school support and is not included.
 2/ Round-out brigade for active Army division.
 3/ Notionally designated to form the tenth National Guard Division in FY 1986.
 4/ Designated for theater defense roles.

Army Armored Cavalry Regiments

107th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Ohio, West Virginia
116th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Idaho, Oregon, Mississippi
163d Armored Cavalry Regiment	Montana, Texas
278th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Tennessee

Navy Ships and Aircraft

Active

<u>Tycom/Second Fleet/Western Atlantic</u>	U.S. East Coast and Western Atlantic
6 Multipurpose Carriers	
1 Battleship	
136 Surface Combatants and Attack Submarines	
61 Patrol Combatants, Mine Warfare Ships, Amphibious Ships, and Auxiliaries	
10 ASW Patrol Squadrons	

<u>Tycom/Third Fleet/Eastern Pacific</u>	U.S. West Coast and Eastern Pacific
4 Multipurpose Carriers	
1 Battleship	
124 Surface Combatants and Attack Submarines	
37 Patrol Combatants, Amphibious Ships, and Auxiliaries	
8 ASW Patrol Squadrons	

Reserve Surface Components

<u>Second Fleet and Western Atlantic</u>	U.S. East Coast and Western Atlantic
5 Surface Combatants	
10 Mine Warfare Ships/Amphibious Ships	
3 Auxiliaries	

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>Third Fleet and Eastern Pacific</u>	U.S. West Coast and Eastern Pacific
2 Surface Combatants	
10 Mine Warfare Ships/Amphibious Ships	
3 Auxiliaries	
6 ASW Patrol Squadrons	
<u>Reserve Air Components</u>	
<u>Commissioned Aircraft Squadrons</u>	Various locations throughout
13 ASW Patrol	CONUS
4 Fighter (VF)	
6 Attack (VA)	
2 Photo Reconnaissance (VFP)	
2 Electronic Warfare (VAQ)	
2 Airborne Early Warning (VAW)	
2 Tanker (VAK)	
4 Helicopter ASW (HS)	
2 Helicopter Light Attack (HAL)	
1 Combat Search and Rescue (HC)	
2 Composite (VC)	
11 Transport (VR)	
<u>Marine Corps Forces</u>	
<u>Active</u>	
<u>I Marine Amphibious Force</u>	
(1st Marine Division/3d Marine Air Wing, 1st Force Service Support Group, plus supporting elements).	Camp Pendleton, Calif.; Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), El Toro, Calif.; and Marine Corps Base, Twenty-Nine Palms, Calif.
<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>II Marine Amphibious Force</u>	
(2d Marine Division/2d Marine Air Wing, 2d Force Service Support Group plus supporting elements).	Camp Lejeune, N.C.; MCAS, Cherry Point, N.C.; MCAS, New River, N.C.; and MCAS, Beaufort, S.C.
<u>1st Marine Brigade</u>	
3rd Marine Regimental (Rein), Aircraft Group 24, plus supporting Brigade Service Support Group).	MCAS, Kaneohe Bay; and Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>7th Marine Amphibious Brigade (Command Element)</u>	
(HQ 27th Marine Regiment/Marine Air Group 70 (Nucleus)/Brigade Service Support Group 7 (Nucleus)	Marine Corps Base, Twenty-Nine Palms, Calif. (Operational Units will be assigned from Marine Amphibious Forces as directed to support Near-Term Prepositioned Forces)

Reserve Components

Division Wing Team

(4th Marine Division/4th Marine Air Wing/4th Force Service Support Group).	Headquarters at New Orleans, Louisiana
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Air Force Tactical Aircraft Forces 1/

Active

60 Squadrons <u>2/</u>	CONUS, Alaska and Hawaii
56 CONUS	
3 Alaska	
1 Hawaii	

Reserve Components

60 Squadrons	CONUS, Puerto Rico and Hawaii
58 CONUS	
1 Puerto Rico	
1 Hawaii	

1/ Includes fighter, attack, reconnaissance, special operations, electronic combat, tanker/cargo (KC-10), TACCS, and airborne TACS squadrons.

2/ Excludes dual-based squadrons.

Air Force Mobility Forces 1/

Active

28 Squadrons <u>2/</u>	CONUS and Alaska
27 CONUS	
1 Alaska	

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>Reserve Components</u>	
54 Squadrons 3/ 53 CONUS 1 Alaska	CONUS and Alaska
1/ Includes strategic and tactical airlift and aeromedical evacuation aircraft. Does not include rescue or tanker/cargo aircraft.	
2/ Excludes rotational squadrons.	
3/ Includes C-130 reserve squadrons; C-5, C-141, and C-9 USAFR Associate Squadrons; one ANG C-19 Squadron; and one unit equipped USAFR C-5 Squadron.	

III. Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country

The tables shown on the following pages reflect active duty military personnel strengths by regional area and country for FY 1983 through FY 1985. The FY 1983 actual data count people where they are actually located on 30 September 1983 to include people on temporary duty for over 30 days. The FY 1984 and FY 1985 data show people where they are projected to be permanently assigned and show all patients, prisoners, holdees, students, trainees and cadets in CONUS rather than where they may actually be located at the end of the Fiscal Year.

TABLE P309A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1983

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
U. S. TERRITORY AND SPECIAL LOCATIONS					
CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES (CONUS)	1,301,283	467,568	429,843	257,244	146,628
ALASKA	20,180	7,670	10,681	1,630	189
HAWAII	44,651	17,466	6,588	12,671	7,926
AMERICAN SAMOA	1	1	0	0	0
GUAM	9,196	36	4,018	4,752	390
JOHNSTON ATOLL	131	126	5	0	0
MIDWAY ISLANDS	1	0	0	1	0
PUERTO RICO	3,813	488	45	3,125	155
TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS	77	34	13	30	0
VIRGIN ISLANDS OF THE U.S.	10	8	1	1	0
WAKE ISLAND	8	0	8	0	0
TRANSIENTS	59,350	21,826	17,147	15,190	5,187
AFLOAT	165,131	0	0	165,131	0
TOTAL-U.S. TERR. AND SPECIAL LOCATIONS	1,603,832	515,223	468,349	459,775	160,485
FOREIGN COUNTRIES					
(1) WESTERN & SOUTHERN EUROPE					
AUSTRIA	30	5	2	0	23
BELGIUM*	2,132	1,327	656	115	34
CYPRUS	14	3	2	0	9
DENMARK*	60	4	29	16	11
FINLAND	17	5	2	2	8
FRANCE*	71	14	15	9	33
GERMANY (FED. REPUBLIC & WEST BERLIN)*	254,477	214,825	39,244	321	87
GIBRALTAR	1	0	0	1	0
GREECE*	3,579	530	2,574	460	15
GREENLAND*	316	0	316	0	0
ICELAND*	3,074	2	1,074	1,891	107
IRELAND	10	3	0	0	7
ITALY*	13,515	4,108	4,645	4,493	269
LUXEMBOURG*	7	1	0	0	7
MALTA	1	0	0	0	0
NETHERLANDS*	2,652	734	1,893	17	8
NORWAY*	204	34	122	33	15
PORTUGAL*	1,648	68	1,159	408	13
SPAIN*	9,402	20	5,265	3,941	176
SWEDEN	19	1	6	2	10
SWITZERLAND	30	6	2	0	22

TABLE P309A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1983

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
TURKEY*	5,316	1,220	3,981	97	18
UNITED KINGDOM*	27,985	214	25,211	2,230	330
AFLOAT	17,740	0	0	17,236	504
TOTAL-WESTERN & SOUTHERN EUROPE	342,300	223,124	86,198	31,272	1,706
(*EUROPEAN NATO)	(324,438)	(223,100)	(86,184)	(14,031)	(1,123)
(*EUROPEAN NATO PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED)	(312,158)	(211,938)	(85,102)	(13,995)	(1,123)
(2) EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC					
AUSTRALIA	728	9	268	444	7
BURMA	9	3	2	0	4
CHINA	21	5	4	2	10
FIJI	1	0	0	1	0
HONG KONG	40	10	5	15	10
INDONESIA	48	12	11	13	12
JAPAN (INCLUDING OKINAWA)	48,711	2,489	14,409	7,288	24,525
MALAYSIA	17	4	3	0	10
NEW ZEALAND	69	2	10	51	6
PHILIPPINES	14,850	41	9,102	5,078	629
REPUBLIC OF KOREA	38,705	27,304	10,707	638	56
SINGAPORE	28	5	4	12	7
THAILAND	122	65	35	10	12
AFLOAT	33,666	0	0	31,133	2,533
TOTAL-EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	137,015	29,949	34,560	44,685	27,821
(3) AFRICA, NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA					
AFGHANISTAN	6	0	0	0	6
ALGERIA	6	1	0	0	5
BAHRAIN	98	2	1	95	0
BANGLADESH	7	2	0	0	5
BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY (INCLUDES DIEGO GARCIA)	1,631	0	12	1,619	0
CAMEROON	8	2	0	0	6
CONGO	7	1	0	0	5
EGYPT	1,324	1,180	86	32	26
ETHIOPIA	14	0	0	0	14
GABON	5	0	0	0	5
GHANA	11	3	0	0	8
INDIA	30	3	5	5	17
ISRAEL	80	25	19	10	26
IVORY COAST	10	3	0	0	7
JORDAN	25	10	7	0	8

TABLE P309A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1983

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
KENYA	34	12	11	2	9
KUWAIT	28	19	1	1	7
LEBANON	173	155	0	1	17
LIBERIA	24	10	2	4	8
MADAGASCAR	7	0	0	2	5
MALAWI	2	2	0	0	0
MALI	6	0	0	0	6
MAURITIUS	6	0	0	0	6
MOROCCO	52	22	11	3	16
NEPAL	9	2	0	0	7
NIGER	5	0	0	0	5
NIGERIA	18	3	3	0	12
OMAN	18	5	4	1	8
PAKISTAN	34	7	7	2	18
ST. HELENA (INCLUDES ASCENSION ISLAND)	12	0	12	0	0
SAUDI ARABIA	635	243	317	62	13
SENEGAL	11	0	0	2	9
SEYCHELLES	20	16	4	0	0
SOMALIA	33	26	1	2	4
SOUTH AFRICA	20	2	4	2	12
SRI LANKA	9	0	0	3	6
SUDAN	22	9	4	0	9
SYRIA	11	3	0	0	8
TANZANIA, UNITED REPUBLIC OF	7	0	0	0	7
TUNISIA	25	11	3	1	10
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	2	0	2	0	0
UPPER VOLTA	6	0	0	0	6
YEMEN (SANAA)	14	6	4	0	4
ZAIRE	22	8	5	0	9
ZAMBIA	6	0	0	0	6
ZIMBABWE	7	2	0	0	5
AFLOAT	8,942	0	0	7,030	1,912
TOTAL-AFRICA, NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA	13,482	1,795	525	8,880	2,282
(4) WESTERN HEMISPHERE					
ANTIGUA	111	0	1	110	0
ARGENTINA	21	4	7	2	8
BAHAMAS, THE	31	0	1	24	6
BARBADOS	10	3	0	1	6
BELIZE	4	3	0	1	0

TABLE P309A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1983

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
BERMUDA	1,890	0	0	1,804	86
BOLIVIA	12	3	3	0	6
BRAZIL	52	13	7	6	28
CANADA	702	17	249	425	11
CHILE	16	3	2	1	10
COLOMBIA	28	9	3	4	12
COSTA RICA	24	15	0	0	9
CUBA (GUANTANAMO)	2,365	0	0	1,901	464
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	18	4	2	3	9
ECUADOR	16	3	6	2	5
EL SALVADOR	108	86	5	0	17
GUATEMALA	21	6	1	0	14
GUYANA	5	0	0	0	5
HAITI	13	3	1	0	9
HONDURAS	2,623	2,592	17	2	12
JAMAICA	13	1	0	2	10
MEXICO	32	11	7	2	12
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES	0	0	0	0	0
NICARAGUA	12	2	0	0	10
PANAMA	9,208	6,628	2,043	394	143
PARAGUAY	10	3	1	1	5
PERU	27	4	7	8	8
SURINAME	3	3	0	0	0
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS	1	0	1	0	0
URUGUAY	14	4	2	2	6
VENEZUELA	38	11	13	5	9
AFLOAT	8,711	0	0	7,926	785
TOTAL-WESTERN HEMISPHERE	26,139	9,431	2,379	12,626	1,703
(5) ANTARCTICA	66	0	0	66	0
(6) EASTERN EUROPE					
BULGARIA	9	2	2	0	5
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	10	1	3	0	6
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	51	45	0	0	6
HUNGARY	11	3	1	0	7
POLAND	16	3	1	0	12
ROMANIA	13	3	0	0	10
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	54	8	7	5	34
YUGOSLAVIA	20	3	4	1	12
TOTAL-EASTERN EUROPE	184	68	18	6	92

TABLE P309A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

		SEPTEMBER 30, 1983			
REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
(7) UNDISTRIBUTED	131	53	15	63	0
TOTAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES	519,517	264,420	123,695	97,798	33,604
ASHORE	450,258	264,420	123,695	34,273	27,870
AFLOAT	69,259	0	0	63,525	5,734
TOTAL WORLDWIDE	2,123,349	779,643	592,044	557,573	194,089
ASHORE	1,888,959	779,643	592,044	328,917	188,355
AFLOAT	234,390	0	0	228,656	5,734

NOTE: ASHORE INCLUDES TEMPORARILY SHORE-BASED.

TABLE P309A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	SEPTEMBER 30, 1984				
	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
U. S. TERRITORY AND SPECIAL LOCATIONS					
CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES (CONUS)	1,311,999	472,476	429,741	266,286	143,496
ALASKA	20,366	7,705	10,598	1,866	197
HAWAII	46,797	19,203	6,754	12,299	8,541
AMERICAN SAMOA	1	1	0	0	0
GUAM	8,862	35	3,934	4,504	389
JOHNSTON ATOLL					
MIDWAY ISLANDS	135	126	9	0	0
PUERTO RICO	49	0	0	49	0
TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS	3,510	487	65	2,804	154
VIRGIN ISLANDS OF THE U.S.	64	22	7	35	0
	10	8	1	1	0
WAKE ISLAND					
TRANSIENTS	7	0	7	0	0
Afloat	69,723	23,294	16,055	23,049	7,325
TOTAL-U.S. TERR. AND SPECIAL LOCATIONS	1,625,551	523,357	467,171	474,921	160,102

FOREIGN COUNTRIES
(1) WESTERN & SOUTHERN EUROPE

AUSTRIA	22	5	3	0	14
BELGIUM*	2,514	1,331	1,008	144	31
CYPRUS	14	3	1	0	10
DENMARK*	62	5	23	22	12
FINLAND	19	5	2	2	10
FRANCE*	81	13	14	9	45
GERMANY (FED. REPUBLIC & WEST BERLIN)*	249,164	208,539	40,164	376	85
GIBRALTAR	1	0	0	1	0
GREECE*	3,650	483	2,616	535	16
GREENLAND*	316	0	316	0	0
ICELAND*	3,145	2	1,147	1,888	108
IRELAND	8	2	0	0	6
ITALY*	14,522	3,909	5,143	5,215	255
LUXEMBOURG*	10	4	0	0	6
MALTA	1	1	0	0	0
NETHERLANDS*	2,830	880	1,924	17	9
NORWAY*	246	54	121	42	29
PORTUGAL*	1,732	62	1,142	515	13
SPAIN*	9,309	26	5,391	3,694	198
SWEDEN	19	1	6	4	8
SWITZERLAND	34	7	3	0	24

TABLE P309A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	SEPTEMBER 30, 1984				
	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
TURKEY*	5,091	1,222	3,750	101	18
UNITED KINGDOM*	29,706	156	26,983	2,223	344
AFLOAT	26,667	0	0	26,635	32
TOTAL-WESTERN & SOUTHERN EUROPE	349,163	216,710	89,757	41,423	1,273
(*EUROPEAN NATO)	(322,378)	(216,686)	(89,742)	(14,781)	(1,169)
(*EUROPEAN NATO PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED)	(322,378)	(216,686)	(89,742)	(14,781)	(1,169)
(2) EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC					
AUSTRALIA	777	9	271	444	53
BURMA	12	3	2	0	7
CHINA	23	7	4	3	9
FILIP	1	0	0	1	0
HONG KONG	41	10	5	15	11
INDONESIA	48	10	12	14	12
JAPAN (INCLUDING OKINAWA)	49,606	2,106	15,141	7,240	25,119
MALAYSIA	17	4	2	1	10
NEW ZEALAND	66	1	9	50	6
PHILIPPINES	15,112	41	9,121	5,260	690
REPUBLIC OF KOREA	40,058	29,243	10,375	390	50
SINGAPORE	24	4	1	13	6
THAILAND	104	51	27	13	13
AFLOAT	33,031	0	0	27,256	5,775
TOTAL-EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	138,920	31,489	34,970	40,700	31,761
(3) AFRICA, NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA					
AFGHANISTAN	6	0	0	0	6
ALGERIA	7	1	0	0	6
BAHRAIN	84	2	2	80	0
BANGLADESH	8	2	0	0	6
BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY (INCLUDES DIEGO GARCIA)	1,625	0	0	1,625	0
CAMEROON	8	2	0	0	6
CONGO	6	0	0	0	6
EGYPT	1,467	1,282	127	31	27
ETHIOPIA	7	0	0	0	6
GABON	6	0	0	0	6
GHANA	11	3	0	0	8
INDIA	33	3	4	7	19
ISRAEL	78	24	18	8	28
IVORY COAST	14	3	0	4	7
JORDAN	21	10	5	0	6

TABLE P309A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1984

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
KENYA	70	12	13	34	11
KUWAIT	31	19	2	4	6
LEBANON	29	11	2	1	15
LIBERIA	20	9	0	4	7
MADAGASCAR	8	0	0	2	6
MALAWI	2	2	0	0	0
MALI	6	0	0	0	6
MAURITIUS	6	0	0	0	6
MOROCCO	47	10	14	4	19
NEPAL	8	2	0	0	6
NIGER	6	0	0	0	6
NIGERIA	18	3	3	0	12
OMAN	52	5	2	37	8
PAKISTAN	37	7	8	3	19
ST. HELENA (INCLUDES ASCENSION ISLAND)	1	0	1	0	0
SAUDI ARABIA	543	246	192	84	21
SENEGAL	11	0	0	2	9
SEYCHELLES	4	0	4	0	0
SOMALIA	25	7	1	11	6
SOUTH AFRICA	21	2	3	4	12
SRI LANKA	10	0	0	3	7
SUDAN	21	9	3	0	9
SYRIA	13	3	0	0	10
TANZANIA, UNITED REPUBLIC OF	8	0	0	0	8
TUNISIA	28	11	5	2	10
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	9	0	2	1	6
UPPER VOLTA	6	0	0	0	6
YEMEN (SANAA)	24	6	11	1	6
ZAIRE	24	8	7	0	9
ZAMBIA	6	0	0	0	6
ZIMBABWE	5	0	0	0	5
AFLOAT	3,001	0	0	1,111	1,890
TOTAL-AFRICA, NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA	7,481	1,704	429	3,063	2,285
(4) WESTERN HEMISPHERE					
ANTIGUA	14	0	1	13	0
ARGENTINA	23	4	5	5	9
BAHAMAS, THE	70	0	1	63	6
BARBADOS	8	1	0	1	6
BELIZE	2	1	0	1	0

TABLE P309A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	SEPTEMBER 30, 1984			
	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY MARINE CORPS
BERMUDA	1,569	0	0	1,483
BOLIVIA	14	3	3	1
BRAZIL	51	11	7	9
CANADA	557	9	104	434
CHILE	22	3	3	3
COLOMBIA	27	6	3	4
COSTA RICA	12	3	0	0
CUBA (GUANTANAMO)	2,502	0	0	435
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	18	4	2	9
ECUADOR	21	3	6	9
EL SALVADOR	44	19	4	1
GUATEMALA	21	6	1	0
GUYANA	6	0	0	0
HAITI	12	3	1	0
HONDURAS	28	8	7	4
JAMAICA	13	0	0	3
MEXICO	31	10	5	13
NICARAGUA	12	2	0	3
PANAMA	9,173	6,559	1,971	491
PARAGUAY	13	3	2	1
PERU	27	3	6	10
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS	1	0	1	0
URUGUAY	16	4	2	3
VENEZUELA	39	6	18	6
AFLOAT	168	0	0	0
TOTAL-WESTERN HEMISPHERE	14,514	6,671	2,153	4,612
(5) ANTARCTICA	69	0	0	69
(6) EASTERN EUROPE				
BULGARIA	10	2	2	0
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	11	1	3	0
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	53	45	0	0
HUNGARY	12	3	1	1
POLAND	18	3	1	2
ROMANIA	14	3	1	0
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	62	8	8	7
YUGOSLAVIA	22	4	4	2
TOTAL-EASTERN EUROPE	202	69	20	12
TOTAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES	510,349	256,643	127,329	89,879
				36,498

TABLE P309A
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1984					
REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
ASHORE	447,482	256,643	127,329	34,877	28,633
AFLOAT	62,867	0	0	55,002	7,865
TOTAL WORLDWIDE	2,135,900	780,000	594,500	584,800	196,600
ASHORE	1,909,005	780,000	594,500	345,770	188,735
AFLOAT	226,895	0	0	219,030	7,865

NOTE: ASHORE INCLUDES TEMPORARILY SHORE-BASED.

TABLE P309A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1985

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
U. S. TERRITORY AND SPECIAL LOCATIONS					
CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES (CONUS)	1,328,594	472,760	439,283	271,376	145,175
ALASKA	20,672	7,860	10,719	1,896	197
HAWAII	46,968	19,129	6,737	12,714	8,388
AMERICAN SAMOA	1	1	0	0	0
GUAM	9,054	35	3,998	4,632	389
JOHNSTON ATOLL	135	126	9	0	0
MIDWAY ISLANDS	49	0	0	49	0
PUERTO RICO	3,574	487	65	2,868	154
TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS	64	22	7	35	0
VIRGIN ISLANDS OF THE U.S.	10	8	1	1	0
WAKE ISLAND	7	0	7	0	0
TRANSIENTS	71,225	22,923	16,848	24,015	7,439
AFLOAT	166,509	0	0	166,509	0
TOTAL-U.S. TERR. AND SPECIAL LOCATIONS	1,646,862	523,351	477,674	484,095	161,742
FOREIGN COUNTRIES					
(1) WESTERN & SOUTHERN EUROPE					
AUSTRIA	22	5	3	0	14
BELGIUM*	2,877	1,312	1,394	140	31
CYPRUS	14	3	1	0	10
DENMARK*	62	5	23	22	12
FINLAND	19	5	2	2	10
FRANCE*	81	13	14	9	45
GERMANY (FED. REPUBLIC & WEST BERLIN)*	250,353	208,904	40,978	386	85
GIBRALTAR	1	0	0	1	0
GREECE*	3,682	483	2,646	537	16
GREENLAND*	316	0	316	0	0
ICELAND*	3,181	2	1,160	1,911	108
IRELAND	8	2	0	0	6
ITALY*	15,304	3,932	5,878	5,239	255
LUXEMBOURG*	10	4	0	0	6
MALTA	1	1	0	0	0
NETHERLANDS*	2,965	891	2,048	17	9
NORWAY*	1,246	54	1,21	42	29
PORTUGAL*	1,737	62	1,138	524	13
SPAIN*	9,708	26	5,705	3,779	198
SWEDEN	19	1	6	4	8
SWITZERLAND	34	7	3	0	24

TABLE P309A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	SEPTEMBER 30, 1985			
	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY MARINE CORPS
TURKEY*	5,282	1,222	3,940	102
UNITED KINGDOM*	30,610	158	27,783	2,325
AFLOAT	27,243	0	0	27,211
TOTAL-WESTERN & SOUTHERN EUROPE	353,775	217,092	93,159	42,251
(*EUROPEAN NATO)	(326,414)	(217,088)	(93,144)	(15,033)
(*EUROPEAN NATO PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED)	(326,414)	(217,088)	(93,144)	(15,033)
(2) EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC				
AUSTRALIA	805	9	271	472
BURMA	12	3	2	7
CHINA	23	7	4	9
FIJI	1	0	0	1
HONG KONG	41	10	5	15
INDONESIA	48	10	12	14
JAPAN (INCLUDING OKINAWA)	51,358	2,113	16,323	7,353
MALAYSIA	17	4	2	1
NEW ZEALAND	66	1	9	50
PHILIPPINES	15,179	41	9,045	5,403
REPUBLIC OF KOREA	41,140	29,660	11,041	389
SINGAPORE	24	4	1	13
THAILAND	105	51	28	13
AFLOAT	33,607	0	0	27,832
TOTAL-EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	142,426	31,913	36,743	41,559
(3) AFRICA, NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA				
AFGHANISTAN	6	0	0	0
ALGERIA	7	1	0	0
BAHRAIN	88	2	2	84
BANGLADESH	8	2	0	0
BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY (INCLUDES DIEGO GARCIA)	1,314	0	0	1,314
CAMEROON	8	2	0	0
CONGO	6	0	0	0
EGYPT	1,441	1,282	101	31
ETHIOPIA	7	0	0	0
GABON	6	0	0	0
GHANA	11	3	0	0
INDIA	33	3	4	7
ISRAEL	78	24	18	19
IVORY COAST	14	3	0	8
JORDAN	21	10	5	28
				6

TABLE P309A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1985

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
KENYA	58	12	3	32	11
KUWAIT	30	19	2	3	6
LEBANON	29	11	2	1	15
LIBERIA	20	9	0	4	7
MADAGASCAR	8	0	0	2	6
MALAWI	2	2	0	0	0
MALI	6	0	0	0	6
MAURITIUS	6	0	0	0	6
MOROCCO	43	10	10	4	19
NEPAL	8	2	0	0	6
NIGER	6	0	0	0	6
NIGERIA	18	3	3	0	12
OMAN	18	5	2	3	8
PAKISTAN	37	7	8	3	19
ST. HELENA (INCLUDES ASCENSION ISLAND)	1	0	1	0	0
SAUDI ARABIA	552	246	208	77	21
SENEGAL	11	0	0	2	9
SEYCHELLES	4	0	4	0	0
SOMALIA	22	7	1	8	6
SOUTH AFRICA	21	2	3	4	12
SRI LANKA	10	0	0	3	7
SUDAN	21	9	3	0	9
SYRIA	13	3	0	0	10
TANZANIA, UNITED REPUBLIC OF	8	0	0	0	8
TUNISIA	28	11	5	2	10
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	9	0	2	1	6
UPPER VOLTA	6	0	0	0	6
YEMEN (SANAA)	15	6	2	1	6
ZAMBIA	29	8	12	0	9
ZIMBABWE	6	0	0	0	6
AFLOAT	5	0	0	0	5
TOTAL-AFRICA, NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA	2,995	1,704	401	1,105	1,890
	7,093			2,703	2,285
(4) WESTERN HEMISPHERE					
ANTIGUA	11	0	1	10	0
ARGENTINA	23	4	5	5	9
BAHAMAS	67	0	1	60	6
THE BARBADOS	8	1	0	1	6
BELIZE	2	1	0	1	0

TABLE P309A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1985

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
BERMUDA	1,526	0	0	1,440	86
BOLIVIA	14	3	3	1	7
BRAZIL	51	11	7	9	24
CANADA	608	9	104	485	10
CHILE	22	3	3	3	13
COLOMBIA	27	6	3	4	14
COSTA RICA	12	3	0	0	9
CUBA (GUANTANAMO)	2,532	0	0	2,097	435
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	18	4	2	3	9
ECUADOR	27	3	12	3	9
EL SALVADOR	44	19	4	1	20
GUATEMALA	21	6	1	0	14
GUYANA	6	0	0	0	6
HAITI	12	3	1	0	8
HONDURAS	27	8	7	3	9
JAMAICA	13	0	0	3	10
MEXICO	31	10	5	3	13
NICARAGUA	12	2	0	0	10
PANAMA	9,190	6,559	2,017	462	152
PARAGUAY	13	3	2	1	7
PERU	27	3	6	10	8
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS	1	0	1	0	0
URUGUAY	16	4	2	3	7
VENEZUELA	37	6	16	6	9
AFLOAT	978	0	0	0	978
TOTAL-WESTERN HEMISPHERE	15,376	6,671	2,203	4,614	1,888
(5) ANTARCTICA	66	0	0	66	0
(6) EASTERN EUROPE					
BULGARIA	10	2	2	0	6
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	11	1	3	0	7
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	53	45	0	0	8
HUNGARY	12	3	1	1	7
POLAND	18	3	1	2	12
ROMANIA	14	3	1	0	10
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	62	8	8	7	39
YUGOSLAVIA	22	4	4	2	12
TOTAL-EASTERN EUROPE	202	69	20	12	101
TOTAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES	518,938	257,449	132,526	91,205	37,758

TABLE P309A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	SEPTEMBER 30, 1985			
	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY MARINE CORPS
ASHORE	454,115	257,449	132,526	35,057
AFLOAT	64,823	0	0	56,148
TOTAL WORLDWIDE	2,165,800	780,800	610,200	575,300
ASHORE	1,934,468	780,800	610,200	352,643
AFLOAT	231,332	0	0	222,657

NOTE: ASHORE INCLUDES TEMPORARILY SHORE-BASED.

IV. European Troop Strengths. The Department has intensified the management of its European troop strength to ensure that manpower strengths are held to the minimum level consistent with security requirements. The FY 1983 DoD Appropriation Act limited the number of U.S. military personnel permanently stationed ashore in European NATO countries at the end of FY 1983 to the number we planned to have ashore at the end of FY 1982 -- 315,600. The Act, however, also allowed the President to waive this limitation by a declaration to Congress of overriding national security requirements. He exercised this option and submitted a waiver for 1,380 spaces to deploy the Ground Launched Cruise Missile. To comply with the Congressional troop ceiling, the Department reduced its originally planned manning levels in Europe for the end of FY 1983 by 4,600 people. The following table shows the U.S. military strengths permanently stationed ashore in European NATO countries at the end of FY 1983.

FY 1983 Military End-Strengths Permanently Stationed
Ashore in European NATO Countries

	<u>Total</u> <u>DoD</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>USMC</u>
Troop Ceiling	316,900 ^{1/}	214,300	14,200	87,200 ^{1/}	1,200
Actual	312,158	211,938	13,995	85,102	1,123

^{1/} Includes 1,380 military spaces to support the deployment of the Ground Launched Cruise Missile to Europe.

The FY 1983 actual end strength in Europe was lower than the ceiling not because we did not need the additional manpower forward deployed, but because of essentially two factors. First, the Services manage by major subordinate commands, not by geographical area. Each Service has a major subordinate command oriented on Europe that contains the bulk of its European manpower. However, each Service also has worldwide support commands that assign people to Europe. These commands are not subordinate to the Services' European commands. Thus, it is difficult for the Services to manipulate their automated data systems and forecasting models to adapt to a geographical management mode. Second, as any good manager would, the Services tend to go under an absolute limit (as the Congressional ceiling is), rather than exceed it. Therefore, they unintentionally undermanned the force in Europe by constricting the flow of people to assure compliance with the ceiling. The undermanning resulting from the troop ceiling (and the unintentional over compensation) caused some degraded readiness in combat units.

The FY 1984 DoD Authorization Act set a ceiling on the number of U.S. military personnel who can be permanently stationed ashore in European NATO countries at the end of FY 1984 at the same level as the FY 1983 ceiling -- 315,600. It, however, also provides for a higher ceiling of 320,000 if various conditions are met. Both ceilings permit an additional 2,600 people for the Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) program. The Department has reduced European force structure from the originally projected FY 1984 European end strength of 326,300 by about 3,700 spaces,

and will make every effort to achieve the higher conditional end strength of 322,600. Although the force capability has been reduced because of the structure adjustments to comply with the ceiling, the Services intend to avoid any undermanning and degraded combat readiness.

The Department recently completed an extensive review of its FY 1985 requirements in European NATO countries. It was concluded that DoD needs 326,414 (includes 4,650 for GLCM) U.S. military personnel permanently stationed ashore in European NATO countries at the end of FY 1985. This strength is 8,600 below the level at which we began the review. The major changes in military strength in European NATO countries from the FY 1984 data shown in last years Defense Manpower Requirements Report to FY 1985 are shown in the following table:

Army

Multiple Launched Rocket System	+1143	
Division 86 Redesign	-3379	
Division Air Defense System	+ 297	
Improved Nuclear Chemical Biological Defense	+ 246	
Corps Intelligence Improvements	+ 149	
Bradley Fighting Vehicle	+ 118	
Improved TOW Vechicle System Support	+ 109	
NORTHAG Support	+ 91	
Quick Fix System	+ 125	
Unit Realignments (to standard doctrinal designs)	+1020	
Improved Theater Communications	+ 430	
Net all Other Changes	+ 63	
Total Army		+ 412

Air Force

EF-111	+ 244	
TR-1	+ 201	
GLCM	+2050	
Other Force Structure Changes	+ 319	
European Distribution System	+ 59	
COB Vehicles	+ 82	
Chemical/Biological Defense	+ 44	
Air Base Ground Defense	+ 113	
Medical	+ 297	
Net all other changes	-43	
Total Air Force		+3366

<u>Navy</u>		
ASW/Fleet Air Defense	+ 48	
Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance	+ 26	
Intelligence	+ 8	
Communications	+ 126	
Construction Administration	+ 14	
Medical	+ 28	
Net all other changes	- 64	
Total Navy		+ 186
Total DoD		+3964

The Department has established regional management responsibility for controlling European troop strength and strongly urges the Congress not to set a European strength ceiling for FY 1985. In addition to intensively and aggressively managing this issue during the development of the FY 1985 budget, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recent appointment of the US Commander-in-Chief, Europe as the single person with authority to prioritize all US military strength levels in Europe will serve as a check to maintain only essential force levels. We will continue to work to keep the number of military people in Europe to a minimum consistent with our need to have a strong deterrent partnership with our allies.

APPENDIX A

MANPOWER DATA STRUCTURE

I. Introduction

This appendix provides audit trails of changes to the DPPC structure that have been implemented since publication of the Defense Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1984.

II. Structure Changes

Activity transfers and other management actions result in a number of changes within the DPPC structure. These changes do not affect total manpower but do represent corrections, refinements, and management actions that alter the manner of accounting for this manpower. The changes since the FY 1984 DMRR by component are included in the following table.

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY		CIVILIAN			
			FY 1983	FY 1984	FY 1985	FY 1984	FY 1985	
ARMY								
Project "Sheepwalk"	Centralized Support Activities	Intelligence	0.2	*	*	*	*	*
Theater Communications Units	Division Forces	Centrally Managed Communications	4.2	4.2	4.2	-	-	-
NAVY								
Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Departments	BOS-Combat Installations	Naval Support Forces	6.1	6.7	7.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Missile Repair Facilities	Maintenance Operations	Offensive Strategic Forces	-	0.3	0.3	0.9	0.9	0.9
AIR FORCE								
Federal Emergency Management Agency (AFR)	Defensive Strategic	Federal Agency Support	.6	.6	.6	-	-	-
Communication Flights (ANG)	Offensive Strategic	BOS-Combat Installations	.4	.4	.4	-	-	-
Communication Flights (ANG)	Defensive Strategic	BOS-Combat Installations	*	*	*	-	-	-
Replacement Training Units (ANG)	Defensive Strategic	Force Support Training	.1	.2	.3	-	-	-
Communication Flights (ANG)	Tactical Air Forces	BOS-Combat Installations	1.3	1.4	1.4	-	-	-
Replacement Training Units (ANG)	Tactical Air Forces	Force Support Training	2.2	2.1	2.2	-	-	-
Communication Flights (ANG)	Mobility Forces	BOS-Combat Installations	.5	.6	.6	-	-	-

* Fewer than 50.

APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

AC: Active Component

Auxiliary & Support Activities: Include the following

Auxiliary: Intelligence
Centrally Managed Communications
Research and Development (R&D)
Geophysical Activities

Support: Base Operating Support (BOS)
Medical Support
Personnel Support
Individual Training (less students)
Central Logistics
Centralized Support Activities
Management Headquarters
Federal Agency Support

Billet: A programmed manpower structure space that defines by grade and occupation a job to be performed which is associated with a specific unit or organization (see position).

Balanced Occupation: An occupation in which the inventory is lesst than or equal to 105% and greater than or equal to 95% of the desired population for the fiscal year.

Careerist: A servicemember with more than four years of completed Total Active Federal Military Service (TAFMS).

Critical Occupation: An occupation in which the inventory is equal to or less than 85% of the desired population for the fiscal year.

End-Strength: The sum of operating strength and the "Individuals" account on the last day of the fiscal year.

First-Termer: An enlisted servicemember who has completed four years or less Total Active Federal Military Service (TAFMS).

Funded peacetime authorizations: An Air Force term synonymous with programmed manning

Grade: The pay grade requirement of a billet or the pay grade possessed by a service member.

Individuals: Transients, trainees, patients, prisoners, holdees, cadets and students -- personnel not filling programmed manning level spaces.

Lateral Movement: A reclassification action resulting in a change of a servicemember's primary occupation.

Manning Level: Synonymous with programmed manning

Occupation: The specialty skill requirement of a billet, and the skill qualifications of personnel. Occupations are defined according to the following coding systems.

Army: SSI (officer), MOS (Enlisted)
 Navy: NOBC (officer), Rating/NEC (enlisted)
 USAF: AFSC (officer & enlisted)
 USMC: MOS (officer & enlisted)

Occupational Field: An aggregation of discrete occupations

Operating Strength: An Army term identifying that portion of the total population filling programmed manning targets. The term is synonymous with the following for the other Services:

Navy: distributable strength
 USAF: assigned strength
 USMC: chargeable strength

For the Selected Reserve, "trained strength in units" is equivalent to operating strength.

Operating Strength Cycle: The annual variation in operating strength resulting from seasonal fluctuations in the number of personnel categorized as "Individuals."

Operating Strength Deviation: The absolute difference between total operating strength and programmed manning at a point in time or the average deviation (expressed in man-years) for the fiscal year.

Overage Occupation: An occupation in which the inventory is greater than 105% of the desired population for the same fiscal year.

Position: Same as Billet above,

Programmed Force: The set of units and organizations that exists in the current year, and which is planned to exist in each future year of the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP).

Programmed Manpower Structure: The aggregation of billets describing the full manning requirement for all units and organizations in the programmed force, defined as the Table of Organization (or its equivalent) structure for operational units, and for auxiliary and support activities the structure associated with peacetime workload requirements.

Programmed Manning: Those spaces in the programmed manpower structure planned to be filled. The term "programmed manning" recognizes that 100% fill of the programmed manpower structure may not always be desirable or achievable within fiscal and manpower constraints. The term "programmed manning" is synonymous with:

- Army: Force Structure Allowance
- Navy: Distributable billets
- USAF: Force Structure Authorizations
- USMC: Authorized Strength Report

RC: Reserve Component (includes Selected Reserve and National Guard)

Round out: An Army term wherein RC units are assigned to AC divisions to make up the difference between the number of AC units required in a standard division configuration and the number of AC units they actually have. These RC units are scheduled to deploy with the AC division, or as soon thereafter as possible.

Shortage Occupation: An occupation in which the inventory is less than 95% of the desired population for the fiscal year.

Skill: Same as occupation

Staffing: The process of distributing personnel to fill programmed manning targets in accordance with assignment policies, tour length constraints, and projections of the trained operating strength population.

Wartime Manpower Structure Requirement: The aggregation of billets describing the full manning requirement for all units and organizations in the programmed force, defined as the Table of Organization (or its equivalent) structure for operational units and for auxiliary and support activities the structure associated with wartime workload requirements.

APPENDIX C

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORY DEFINITIONS

1. Strategic

The DPPCs in the Strategic category consist of those nuclear offensive, defensive, and control and surveillance forces that have as their fundamental objective deterrence of and defense against nuclear attack upon the United States, our military forces and bases overseas, and our allies.

Offensive Strategic Forces

This category contains program elements for land-based ICBMs; sea-based SLBMs, ballistic missile submarines and supporting ships; long-range bombers and refueling tanker aircraft; strategic cruise missiles; and operational headquarters for these forces.

Defensive Strategic Forces

This category contains program elements for interceptor aircraft and anti-ballistic missile systems, including directly supporting communications, command, control, and surveillance and warning systems.

Strategic Control and Surveillance

This category contains program elements for the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), airborne satellite and ballistic missile early warning and control systems, satellite and orbiting objects surveillance systems, and supporting radar and optical sensor systems.

2. TACTICAL/MOBILITY

The DPPCs in the Tactical/Mobility category consist of land forces (Army and Marine Corps), tactical air forces (Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps), naval forces (Navy and Marine Corps), and mobility forces (Army, Air Force, and Navy).

Land Forces

This group consists of DPPCs for Army and Marine Corps comprising division forces and theater forces.

Division Forces

This category contains program elements for Army and Marine divisions, nondivisional combat brigades/regiments, other nondivisional combat forces, and tactical support forces (including helicopter support units of the Marine Air Wings). Program elements for the procurement and stockpiling of Army and Marine war reserve materiel and for the Army and Marines Component of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force are also included in this category.

Theater Forces

This category contains Army program elements for theater-wide and specialized units, including separate infantry brigades stationed in Alaska, Berlin, Panama, and the Caribbean; units in Europe that provide for supply, maintenance, and security control of nuclear ammunition support of NATO; theater surface-to-surface missile units; tactical surface-to-air missile units; theater heavy engineering battalions for support of other services; theater psychological operations, civil affairs, and unconventional warfare units; and their supporting supply, maintenance, and command and control units. Also included are similar reinforcing units in Forces Command.

Tactical Air Forces

This category contains program elements for Air Force, Navy, and Marine fighter, attack, reconnaissance, and special operations squadrons; direct support aircraft, armament and electronics maintenance units, and weapon system security units; multipurpose aircraft carriers; air-launched tactical missile systems and ground launched cruise missiles; tactical air control systems; Fleet Marine Force direct support aircraft; and operational headquarters for these forces. Also included are program elements for Air Force resources for the Joint Tactical Communications Program (TRITAC) war reserve materiel and the Air Force Component of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

Naval Forces

The DPPCs in the Naval Forces group include the Navy's anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and fleet air defense forces, amphibious forces, and supporting forces.

Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) and Fleet Air Defense (FAD) Forces

This category contains program elements for surface combatant ships (cruisers, destroyers, and frigates), fixed wing and helicopter ASW squadrons, attack submarines, mines and mine countermeasures, and directly supporting forces. Also included are program elements for air-, sea-, and submarine-launched ordnance and missiles.

Amphibious Forces

This category contains program elements for amphibious assault ships, supporting ships and tactical support units, coastal/river forces, Navy special warfare forces, the Navy components of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, explosive ordnance disposal forces, and inshore undersea warfare forces.

Naval Support Forces

This category contains program elements for carrier-on-board delivery squadrons, fleet support ships, underway replenishment ships, construction forces, deep submergence systems, and fleet telecommunications. Also included are program elements for tactical intelligence, war reserve materiel, and the TRITAC program.

Mobility Forces

This category contains program elements for strategic, tactical, and administrative airlift; sealift, and land movement of passengers and cargo by both military and commercial carriers, including military cargo, tanker, and support ships; and the Defense Freight Railway Interchange Fleet. This category also contains program elements for tactical medical airlift squadrons, air and sea port terminal operations, traffic management, integral command and control systems, aerospace rescue and recovery, Air Force special mission forces, and the non-management headquarters activities within the Joint Deployment Agency.

3. AUXILIARY ACTIVITIES

The DPPCs in the auxiliary activities category consist of those major Defense-wide activities conducted under centralized OSD control. Included are DPPCs in intelligence, centrally managed communications, research and development, and geophysical activities.

Intelligence

This category contains program elements for the centralized intelligence gathering and analytic agencies and activities of the Department of Defense, consisting of the Consolidated Cryptologic Program and the General Defense Intelligence Program, including intelligence communications.

Centrally Managed Communications

This category contains program elements for the long-haul Defense Communications System, the military Service's communications systems, satellite communications systems, communications security, communications engineering and installation activities, and the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center. Excluded are program elements for base and command communications, intelligence communications, and communications systems dedicated to strategic, tactical, or WWMCCS missions, and management headquarters.

Research and Development Activities

This category contains all research and development (Program 6) program elements, except those for weapons systems for which procurement is programmed during the FYDP projection and for program elements identifiable to a Support Activities DPPC such as Medical or Personnel Support. Also excluded are operational systems development and other program elements not in Program 6 but containing research and development resources.

Geophysical Activities

This category contains program elements for meteorological, topographic, oceanographic, and navigational activities, including the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, the Air Force and Navy weather services, navigational satellites, oceanography, and mapping, charting and geodesy activities.

4. SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

The DPPCs in the Support Activities category consist of the base operating support functions for both combat and support installations; centralized activities, services and organizations providing medical and personnel support; individual and force support training; central logistics; management headquarters; federal agency support; and other centralized support activities.

Base Operating Support - Combat Installations

This category contains program elements for the operation and maintenance of installations of the strategic, tactical, airlift and sealift commands (Program 1, 2, and 4), including supporting real property maintenance, base communications, installation audiovisual support, and air traffic control. Also included are resources for installation headquarters administration and installation operational, housekeeping, and service functions.

Base Operating Support - Support Installations

This category contains program elements for the operation and maintenance of installations of the auxiliary forces, research and development, logistics, training, medical, and administrative commands (Program 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9), including supporting real property maintenance, base communications, and installation audiovisual support. Also included in this category are all family housing activities and health care in station hospitals and medical clinics. These program elements include resources for installation headquarters administration; installation operational, housekeeping, and service functions; and commissaries.

Medical Support

This category contains program elements for medical care in DoD required medical facilities, including medical centers, and laboratories and for medical care to qualified individuals in non-DoD facilities. This category also includes research and development program elements in support of medical research and medical equipment and systems.

Personnel Support

This category contains program elements for provision of varied services in support of personnel, including recruiting and examining, the overseas dependents education program, Section 6 schools, reception centers, disciplinary barracks, centrally-funded welfare and morale programs, the Armed Forces Information Program, civilian career training and intern programs and the VEAP program. This category also includes research and development program elements for human factors and personnel development research.

Individual Training

This category contains the staff and faculty program elements for formal military and technical training and professional education of military personnel conducted under centralized control of service training commands. Program elements include those for recruit training, officer acquisition training (including ROTC), general skill training, flight training, professional development education, health care individual training, and training support activities. This category also includes research and development program elements in support of new or improved training equipment, techniques, and technology.

Force Support Training

This category contains program elements for Air Force and Naval advanced flight training conducted by combat commands; Navy training conducted at sea and ashore in direct support of submarine, surface combatant, surveillance, and mine warfare forces; fleet level training at fleet training centers, submarine schools and anti-submarine warfare schools; and certain Army and Marine Corps force-related training activities. Included are resources for fleet readiness squadrons, and Air Force combat crew training squadrons.

Central Logistics

This group includes DPPCs for centrally managed supply, procurement, maintenance, and logistics support activities.

Supply Operations

This category contains program elements for the operation of supply depots and centers, inventory control points, and centralized procurement offices and for military personnel support to DLA. It also includes resources for POL pipeline and storage operations and other resources specifically identified and measurable to centralized supply operations.

Maintenance Operations

This category contains program elements for the centralized repair, modification, and overhaul of end items of equipment and their components conducted at depots, arsenals, reprocessing facilities, and logistic centers.

Logistics Support Operations

This category contains program elements for centralized logistics activities, other than supply and maintenance. Specifically included are program elements for industrial preparedness, second destination transportation, property disposal, production engineering and testing, construction planning and design, operation of printing plants, storage and disposal of inactive equipment, logistics administrative support, and other centrally managed logistic support services.

Centralized Support Activities

This category contains miscellaneous service program elements that provide centralized support to multiple missions and functions that do not fit other DPPCs. Specifically included are non-management headquarters program elements for unified commands, international military organizations, foreign military sales support, combat developments, counter-intelligence, reserve readiness support, public affairs, Defense Technical Information Center, personnel administration, audiovisual activities, criminal investigations, claims, service-wide support, DCAA activities, and other miscellaneous support.

Management Headquarters

The DPPCs in this category consist of five DPPCs for Management Headquarters as defined in DoDD 5100.73: Defense Agencies, International Military Organizations, Unified Commands, Service Support - Combat Commands, and Service Support - Service Commands.

Management Headquarters - Defense Agencies

This category contains the management headquarters program elements for OSD, OJCS, and the defense agencies. The defense agencies are discussed in detail in Chapter VII.

Management Headquarters - International Military Organizations

This category contains the program elements for the military Services' support of the headquarters of international military organizations. Examples are: NATO, United Nations Command (Korea), etc.

Management Headquarters - Unified Commands

This category contains the program elements for the military Services' support of the headquarters of the unified commands. Examples are: US European Command, US Pacific Command, etc.

Management Headquarters - Service Support - Combat Commands

This category contains the program elements for the headquarters of the combat commands, i.e., those in FYDP Programs 1, 2, and 4. Examples are: US Army, Europe; US Navy, Pacific Fleet; Strategic Air Command; etc.

Management Headquarters - Service Support - Support Commands

This category contains the program elements for the headquarters of support commands, i.e., those in FYDP Programs 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9.

Federal Agency Support

This category contains program elements for military and civilian DoD manpower assigned on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis to support other federal agencies.

5. INDIVIDUALS

The DPPCs in this group account for military personnel who are not force structure manpower. They are transients, patients, prisoners, holdees, students, trainees, and cadets.

Transients

This category contains only the Transient program element, which consists of active duty military personnel in travel, leave enroute, or temporary duty status (except for training) while on Permanent Change of Station orders.

Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees

This category contains only the Personnel Holding Account program element that consists of active duty military personnel who are dropped from the assigned strength of an operational or training unit for reasons of medical, disciplinary, or pre-separation nonavailability.

Trainees, Students, and Cadets

This category contains active service officer students, active enlisted students, active enlisted trainees, Service Academy Cadets/Midshipmen, and active officer accession students.

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